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ABSTRACT 
Using a socio-legal framework, this thesis addresses the present dearth of research on gender 
and judging in Africa, by examining the judicial appointment processes in Zambia and South 
Africa. This study is grounded in the argument that judges, and those who appoint them, are 
operating in environments where multiple factors can and do have an impact on whether a 
country is able to successfully create a gender-diverse judiciary. Using a feminist lens, this 
thesis describes women in terms of gender and explores various facets of the appointment 
system, in order to respond to the research question. How do aspects of the judicial appointment 
process inform equal representation of women and men on the bench? Drawing from existing 
literature on gender and judging, this thesis interrogates particular formal and informal aspects 
of the appointment process. It highlights the various subtleties that exist within or around these 
aspects and how they affect women candidates, while appreciating the difficult balance that is 
involved in selecting judges. In doing so, this thesis affirms the importance of context when 
studying judicial appointments and seeking solutions for judicial diversity. This thesis 
additionally reveals various elements of the process affected by bias, discrimination, exclusion, 
and a traditional definition of merit, that invariably devalues women’s contributions and 
attributes. This study makes the case for gender diversity not just in the courts but on the 
judicial appointment bodies that appoint judges. While arguing that one benefit of this diversity 
would be the presence of more representative perspectives, it acknowledges that a feminist 
perspective can and should also be held by male judicial appointers. This study makes 
suggestions for improving the appointment systems in both jurisdictions and emphasises the 
need for a multi-sector response. 
*************** 
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Deze thesis komt tegemoet aan het huidige gebrek aan onderzoek rond gender en rechtvoering 
in Afrika, door onderzoek te voeren naar de juridische aanstellingsprocedure in Zambia en 
Zuid-Afrika vanuit een sociaal-juridisch framework. Deze studie is gebaseerd op het argument 
dat rechters, en diegenen die hen aanstellen, werken in een omgeving waar meerdere factoren 
een impact (kunnen) hebben op het vermogen van een land om een gender-diverse  
rechterlijke macht te creëren. Deze thesis beschrijft vrouwen in de context van gender als 
sociale constructie en verkent verschillende facetten van het aanstellingssysteem vanuit een 
feministisch perspectief, om te antwoorden op de onderzoeksvraag: Hoe dragen aspecten van 
de aanstellingsprocedure bij tot een gelijke vertegenwoordiging van vrouwen en mannen in de 
rechterlijke macht? Voortbouwend op bestaande literatuur rond gender en justitie, onderzoekt 
deze thesis in het bijzonder formele en informele aspecten van de aanstellingsprocedure. Het 
geeft de verschillende subtiliteiten in en rond deze aspecten aan en beschrijft hoe ze 
vrouwelijke kandidaten beïnvloeden, terwijl de moeilijke balans die gepaard gaat met de 
selectie van rechters wordt gerespecteerd. Daarbij bevestigt deze thesis het belang van context 
in onderzoek naar juridische aanstellingen en het zoeken naar oplossingen voor juridische 
diversiteit. Bijkomend onthult deze thesis verschillende elementen van het proces getroffen 
door vooroordelen, discriminatie, uitsluiting en een traditionele definitie van verdienste, die 
onvermijdelijk de vrouwelijk bijdragen en eigenschappen devalueert. Deze studie pleit voor 
genderdiversiteit, zowel in de rechtbanken als in de juridische aanstellingsorganen die rechters 
aanstellen. Het argument dat diversiteit leidt tot een grotere vertegenwoordiging van 
verschillende perspectieven, bevestigt dat het feministische perspectief kan en zou moeten 
gebruikt worden door mannen bij rechterlijke aanstellingen. Deze studie maakt suggesties om 
de aanstellingsprocedure in beide rechtsgebieden te verbeteren en benadrukt de noodzaak van 
een sectoroverschrijdende aanpak.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
I was lamenting the paucity of young men in my hometown, studying law. And I 
thought, “It would be wonderful if we had more people like you," I said to him. “Young 
men who go to university to study law, so that we can have people like you, to practise 
law in the city and to defend people in the way, you know, you did with me." And he 
just looked at me and said, "Why men?" At that point in time, you hardly had women 
as lawyers, as practising lawyers, particularly within black communities. And he 
actually encouraged and motivated me to study law. So, I went to university. I actually 
raised it [money] for a legal degree, and the rest is history.1 
 
These are the words of world renowned former South African Constitutional Court Justice 
Yvonne Mokgoro, as she recounted her decision to study law. In the quote, she highlighted two 
poignant aspects of her history. That she lived in a time where law was considered to be a male 
domain and that the paucity of women lawyers was even more pronounced in black 
communities. As a black woman living in South Africa, the practice of law seemed to be an 
impossibility and while this has changed dramatically in the last two decades, elements of 
exclusion still remain in the judiciary and in the legal profession. This thesis is an attempt to 
re-focus discussions of gender diversity, on the pivotal aspects of the judicial appointment 
process that can and do affect women’s judicial aspirations. It re-examines assumptions that 
underpin debates on the need for gender diversity in the judiciary and those that hinder the 
possibility of more targeted initiatives. 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
In the last decade, there has been growing recognition across the globe of the importance of 
having diverse judiciaries. In particular, the significance of increasing the number of racial 
 
1 Rutherfurd Living History Program, ‘Yvonne Mokgoro’ (North Carolina: Duke University, 2009), pp. 1–48 
<http://livinghistory.sanford.duke.edu/interviews/yvonne-mokgoro/>. 
 
 
2 
 
minorities and women in judiciaries has been debated worldwide.2 The study of women and 
judiciaries is commonly referred to as the field of gender and judging.3 This field evolved from 
initially focusing on arguments that justify the presence of women on judiciaries, to studies 
that identified barriers to women’s appointments. Now the attention has turned to examining 
ways to make courts more gender equitable. There is ample research on gender and judging in 
the global North but despite the increasing visibility of African women on domestic and 
international courts, the research on and in the African region is limited.4 As such, in order to 
add to the limited research on the African region, this research is driven by one question. How 
do aspects of the judicial appointment process inform equal representation of women and men 
on the bench?  
 This research is especially relevant because despite the great strides made by legal 
feminists in inspiring a growing jurisprudence in Africa, particularly on the violation of 
women’s rights,5 there is insufficient attention paid to who is creating this jurisprudence in the 
courts. One of the reasons is that historically in Africa, judiciaries were marginalised due to 
single party rule or military regimes.6 VonDoepp argues that the ‘onset of democratic rule in 
many African countries brought new significance to judicial institutions, in both theoretical 
and practical terms’.7 The practical result was that ‘some processes of political transition 
brought court institutions directly into the political arena, as judges were forced to adjudicate 
disputes between democratic movements and the incumbents they sought to replace’.8 Judge 
 
2 There have been various global initiatives that seek to improve racial and gender diversity on courts from 
academia, Civil Society Organisations and even international organisations such as the International 
Commission of Jurists . 
3 Initially used by political scientists, this term is now widely used by socio-legal scholars too. 
4 See Josephine J Dawuni, ‘African Women Judges on International Courts: Symbolic or Substantive Gains?’, 
University of Baltimore Law Review, 47.1 (2018), 199–245. 
5 Sylvia Tamale and Jane Bennett, ‘Editorial: Legal Voice: Challenges and Prospects in the Documentation of 
African Legal Feminism’, Feminist Africa Legal Voice: Special Issue, 2011, 1–16. 
6 Mable Agyemang, ‘Foreword’, in Gender and the Judiciary in Africa: From Obscurity to Parity, ed. by 
Josephine J Dawuni and Gretchen Bauer (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. xiii–xv. 
7 Peter VonDoepp, Judicial Politics in New Democracies: Cases from Southern Africa (Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers Inc, 2009) p.3. 
8 Ibid. 
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Agyemang agrees with VonDoepp and identifies the last few decades of political transition as 
the period when the prominence of the rule of law became a benchmark of proper governance 
in fledging democracies.9 
The last six decades brought the establishment of more authoritative courts worldwide. 
This global expansion of judicial power was a catalyst for a growing interest in the appointment 
process of judges. This is what Malleson, one of the leading scholars in judicial appointments 
refers to as ‘judicialisation’.10 This was either in the form of judicial activism of magistrates in 
France, Spain and Italy; or increasing judicial authority by way of the establishment of 
constitutional courts in countries that had experienced rapid political change.11 Eventually, the 
growing interest in appointments facilitated questions about the composition of judiciaries and 
the lack of women judges.12  
This growing interest in courts has raised various arguments to advance the case for 
women judges. Sally Kenney has argued that women have the right to form part of the judiciary 
because they are part of society.13 Others have argued that democratic legitimacy and public 
confidence are strengthened when judiciaries are gender equitable.14 Further, a better quality 
 
9 Agyemang, p.xiv. 
10 Kate Malleson, ‘Introduction’, in Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power ;Critical Perspectives from 
around the World, ed. by Kate Malleson and Peter.H Russell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), pp. 
3–12. 
11 Ibid, p.3 
12 Beverly B. Cook, ‘Women Judges: A Preface to Their History’, Golden Gate University Law Review, 14.3 
(1984), 1–38; Susan Tolchin, ‘The Exclusion of Women from the Judicial Process’, Source: Signs, 2.4 (1977), 
877–87 <http://www.jstor.org>; Ruth B Cowan, ‘Women’s Representation On The Courts In The Republic Of 
South Africa’, University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class, 9 (2006), 291–318 
<http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc>;Leny E. De Groot-Van Leeuwen, ‘Merit Selection and 
Diversity in the Dutch Judiciary’, Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from 
Around the World, 2006, pp. 145–58. 
13 Sally J. Kenney, Gender &; Justice:Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter (New York: Routldege, 
2013). 
14 See Iyiola Solanke, ‘Diversity and Independence in the European Court Of Justice’, Columbia Journal of 
European Law, 15 (2008), 89–121 <https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?>.Judith Resnik, ‘On the 
Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges’, Southern California Law Review, 61 
(1988), 1877–1944 <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers>. 
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of deliberation and an enhancement of judicial decisions, are additional reasons given for a 
more gender diverse bench.15  
Amidst the making of this case for gender representation, a number of obstacles have 
been identified that have inhibited diversity on the bench. These include the continued presence 
of an ‘old boys’ network’ and a male dominated legal profession,16 the presence of gatekeepers, 
the fallacy of the argument that women will ‘trickle up,’17 and stereotypical perceptions of 
masculinity and femininity.18 However it remains uncertain whether the selection methods 
employed in recruiting judges are obstacles in and of themselves.  
This uncertainty is evident in the different results emenating from global studies. In the 
United States of America (USA), there have been contradictory results from studies trying to 
determine whether a particular selection method influences women’s chances of becoming a 
judge.19 Studies in the United Kingdom have also found no evidence that judicial appointment 
commissions provide better results for women, as opposed to executive-only selections.20 
Scholarly material from an African perspective that can add to this particular issue of judicial 
 
15 See Yvonne Mokgoro, ‘Judicial Appointments’, Advocate, 23.3 (2010), 43–48; Catherine Albertyn, ‘Judicial 
Diversity’, in The Judiciary in South Africa, ed. by Cora Hoexter and Morné Olivier (Cape Town: JUTA, 2014), 
pp. 245–87. 
16 Hugh Corder, ‘The Appointment of Judges: Some Comparative Ideas’, Stellenbosch Law Review, 2 (1992), 
207–30. 
17 Cook, 'Women Judges: A Preface to Their History', p, 2; see also Kate Malleson, ‘Diversity in the Judiciary: 
The Case for Positive Action’, Journal of Law and Society, 36.3 (2009), 376–402. 
18 Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw, ‘Introduction:Gender and Judging:Overview and Synthesis’, in Gender and 
Judging, ed. by Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw (Portland: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), pp. 3–44. 
19 Nicholas O Alozie and others, ‘Distribution of Women and Minority Judges: The Effects of Judicial Selection 
Methods’, Sociel Science Quaterly, 71.2 (1990), 315–25.  
20 Sundeep Iyer, ‘The Fleeting Benefits of Appointments Commissions for Judicial Gender Equity’, 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 51.1 (2013), 97–121 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2013.749673>.  
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selection is limited to one study.21 In general, the role of women in African judiciaries remains 
largely under-investigated, with a few notable exceptions.22 
1.2 THE QUESTION OF WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN AFRICAN 
ADJUDICATION  
Article 9(2) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on The Rights 
of Women in Africa, requires states parties to ensure increased and effective representation and 
participation of women at all levels of decision-making.23 Buoyed by this, the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Gender and Development went further in an 
attempt to increase the participation of women in decision-making mechanisms. Initially, 
Article 12(1) of the SADC Protocol required states to endeavour to have women in at least fifty 
percent of decision-making positions, in the public and private sectors by 2015.24 In 2016, the 
SADC protocol was amended with the fifty percent threshold removed,25 in order to align it 
with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5.26  
 
21 J Jarpa Dawuni and Tabeth Masengu, ‘Judicial Service Commissions and the Appointment of Women to High 
Courts in Nigeria and Zambia’, in Research Handbook on Law and Courts, ed. by Susan.M Sterett and Lee 
Demetrius Walker (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp. 213–30. 
22 See Gender and the Judiciary in Africa:From Obscuirty to Parity?, ed. by Josephine J Dawuni and Gretchen 
Bauer (New York: Routledge, 2015); Ruth B Cowan, ‘Women’s Representation on the Courts in the Republic 
of South Africa’, Univeristy of Maryland Law Journal Race Religion Gender & Class, 9 (2006), 291–318; See 
note 15 Albertyn 'Judicial Diversity'; Elsje Bonthuys, ‘Gender and Race in South African Judicial 
Appointments’, Feminist Legal Studies, 23.2 (2015), 127–48 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10691-015-9285-5>; 
Tabeth Masengu, ‘A Perspective on Women and Leadership in the South African Judiciary’, South African 
Journal on Human Rights, 31.3 (2015), 655–65 
<http://ipproducts.jutalaw.co.za/nxt/print.asp?NXTScript=nxt/gateway.dll&NXTHost=ipproducts.jutalaw.co.za
&d=&multi=0&pb=0&isrc=yes&f=print&>. 
23 African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on The Rights of Women in 
Africa, 2003, pp. 1–33 <http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/women-
protocol/achpr_instr_proto_women_eng.pdf> [accessed 7 August 2018]. 
24 Southern African Development Community, ‘SADC Protocol on Gender and Development’ (Johannesburg: 
SADC, 2008) <https://www.sadc.int/files/8713/5292/8364/Protocol_on_Gender_and_Development_2008.pdf> 
[accessed 6 April 2018]. 
25 Southern African Development Community, ‘Agreement Amending the SADC Protocol on Gender and 
Development’ (Gabarone: SADC, 2016), pp. 1–14 <https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/sadc/1187-
agreement-amending-the-sadc-protocol-on-gender-and-development-31-august-2016/file.html>. 
26 Nyarai Kampilipili, ‘Revised SADC Gender Protocol Enters into Force’, TRALAC Newsletter, 2019 
<https://www.tralac.org/news/article/13380-revised-sadc-gender-protocol-enters-into-
force.html#targetText=The SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (1002 KB) *,age of 18 shall 
marry.”&targetText=The SADC Protocol on Gender and Development entered into fo> [accessed 14 October 
2019]. 
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The focus of SDG 5 is the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of all 
women and girls and it sets nine targets to be met by the global community by 2030.27 Of 
relevance to this discussion, is the target that seeks to ensure ‘women’s full and effective 
participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, 
economic and public life’.28 In this research, judicial office is considered a decision-making 
mechanism where officials hold power. Therefore the appointment of women judges falls 
squarely within the remit of the SADC Protocol and SDG 5. Yet even before the amendment 
to the SADC Protocol, no country in the region had achieved the 50% threshold in its judiciary.  
In 2015, the composition of the bench in Tanzania was 44% women, Lesotho and 
Zimbabwe had a complement of 40% and South Africa was at 36%. Namibia had 21% women 
and Botswana had a paltry 5.6%.29 However in spite of this lag, some countries in and outside 
of the SADC region had made some gains. For example, Benin, Nigeria, Malawi and Rwanda 
enjoyed female leadership on their Constitutional Courts.30 Today, the current Chief Justices 
in Zambia, Sudan and Seychelles are women,31 and in 2017, Zambia became the first nation in 
the region to reach a representation of 50% women in its judiciary.32 
While the ideal of gender equity in judiciaries is widely shared, the judicial appointment 
process itself has received inadequate attention in the region. In Shultz and Shaw’s edited 
volume, there is some literature on the appointment process in Kenya and Uganda.33 However 
as Mingst noted three decades ago, ‘there is a relative neglect of cross-national studies of the 
 
27 United Nations, ‘Achieve Gender Equality and Empower All Women and Girls’, UN Chronicle, 2015, 13–14 
<https://doi.org/10.18356/a014136d-en>. 
28 Ibid. 
29 These statistics were collated from requests to individual judiciaries. Efforts to collate statistics for 2017 
proved futile as most judiciaries are weary about giving desegregated data to outsiders. 
30Dawuni and Kang, p.27. 
31 A fourth, Nthomeng Majara who was the first woman Chief Justice of Lesotho, has been on suspension since 
September 2018. 
32 By 2019, the number had gone up to 52%. Statistics collated from the judiciary website, see 
https://www.judiciaryzambia.com/. 
33 Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw, Gender and Judging, ed. by Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw (London: Hart 
Publishing, 2013) <https://doi.org/10.5771/1866-377x-2013-3-133>. 
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African judiciary’.34 Consequently, there is a dearth of research on women and judicial 
appointment methods on the continent and a lack of comparable data on women in the highest 
courts in all African countries.35 To date, there has also only been one attempt to collate the 
experiences of African women judges adjudicating in international bodies.36  
An additional study on women Chief Justices in Africa by Dawuni and Kang is 
enlightening. Their research on the rise of female Chief Justices in Africa highlighted regional 
diffusion as a basis for the increase of women in leadership.37 They argue that a woman’s 
promotion to the top of the judiciary in one country may have an influence on gatekeepers who 
hold judicial power in a neighbouring or peer country. Furthermore, they contend that women 
activists spurred on by seeing the possibility of a woman at the top of the judiciary, may 
mobilize and encourage women judges in their own countries to seek leadership.38 The regional 
diffusion that Dawuni and Kang found present in West African countries, appears to be absent 
in the SADC region. For instance at the end of 2017, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe all had 
over 40% women on their courts, while Botswana lagged behind with 5.6%.39  
The difference in regional demographics is not only present in Africa, but in other 
judiciaries globally.40 Hence an international commission of jurists recommended that ‘laws, 
procedures and administrative practices governing judicial selection and appointment must be 
 
34 Karen A Mingst, ‘Judicial Systems of Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis of Neglect’, African Studies Review, 
31.1 (1988), 135–47 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/524587>. 
35 G Bauer ‘Conclusion’ in J Dawuni & G Bauer (eds.) Gender and the Judiciary in Africa: From Obscurity to 
Parity (2015) 154-169 (p.168). 
36 Interntional Courts and the African Woman Judge: Unveiled Narratives, ed. by Josephine Jarpa Dawuni and 
Akua Kuenyehia (New York: Routledge, 2017) <https://doi.org/10.1159/000144207>. 
37 Josephine Dawuni and Alice Kang, ‘The Rise of the Female Chief Justice Africa’, Africa Today, 62.2 (2015), 
44–69. 
38 Ibid, p.62. 
39 Statistics obtained from the judiciaries, on file with the author. 
40 See Maria C Escobar-lemmon and others, ‘Appointing Women to High Courts’, in Research Handbook on 
Law and Courts, ed. by Susan Sterett and Lee .D Walker (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp. 
200–212. 
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designed to ensure judicial diversity and equality of opportunity’.41 It has also been suggested 
that any measures for reform need to be context-specific, because of the varying methods of 
appointment across jurisdictions.42 Indeed there is no uniform process of appointing judges in 
the SADC region. African countries have different colonial histories, and different types of 
legal systems and their legal professions are structured differently.  
However the variation in methods of appointment stimulates questions about whether 
and which particular aspects of the appointment process affect the relative success of women 
with judicial ambitions. Escobar-Lemmon et al have argued that ‘while the exact concerns that 
enter in, will vary across countries and over time, selectors make choices given the domestic 
political context’.43 There is no study on any African country in this regard. The study on the 
rise of female Chief Justices in Africa found that the ascension of women in leadership is not 
necessarily attributable to the appointment method alone.44 Yet, the authors did not suggest 
that this theory applies to judicial appointments for ordinary judicial positions and there has 
been no research undertaken on this area since.45 
1.3 EXPLORING JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS IN THE TWO CASE STUDIES 
To initiate such research, two distinct countries in the SADC region – Zambia and South Africa, 
were selected as case studies. The countries were studied separately as sites of exploration and 
not as sites of comparison because of their disparate characters.46 The focus was the judicial 
appointment period of 2013-2017 in both jurisdictions. Both countries have appointing bodies 
for judges known as the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), though they operate differently. 
 
41 International Commission of Jurists, Women and the Judiciary, Geneva Forum Series (Genevva, 2013) 
<https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Universal-Women-and-Judiciary-Gva-For-1-Publications-
Conference-Report-2014-ENG.pdf>. 
42 Ibid, p.27. 
43 Maria Escobar-lemmon and others, ‘Breaking the Judicial Glass Ceiling : The Appointment of Women to 
High Courts Worldwide’, Unpublished, 2019. 
44 Dawuni and Kang. 
45Ordinary judicial positions here refers to positions in the High Court , Courts of Appeal and Constitutional 
Courts that have no leadership designations. 
46 This will be explained further in part 2 of Chapter 3, under Methodology. 
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South Africa inherited a mixed legal system of common law and Roman Dutch law and at the 
end of 2017 had a 36% representation of women on its Superior Courts (which include High 
Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) and the Constitutional Court). It has a widely 
admired jurisprudence on equality47 and legislation specifically promoting equality.48 
Moreover, the judicial appointment process is guided by section 174 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996, which includes a clause that states that the racial and gender 
composition of society must be considered when appointing judges.49 There is also some 
academic literature on the judicial appointment process and the JSC since 1994.50 
 Additionally, the JSC conducts interviews before appointment to judgeships in what 
could largely be considered as a transparent and accountable manner, with judicial vacancies 
publicly advertised. Anybody can nominate candidates and the interviews of the shortlisted 
candidates are also held in public. This has enabled lay persons and legal commentators to 
observe the interviews in person.51 On the face of it, such a process is ideal because it implies 
a willingness to move away from an opaque biased system, in order to encourage greater citizen 
involvement which minimises the chances of visible nepotism.52 However due to a number of 
 
47 This included ground-breaking cases declaring the customary law practice of male primogeniture as 
unconstitutional and allowing Muslim women involved in polygynous marriages to inherit a share of their 
deceased husband’s estate. 
48 Promotion of Equality and prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
49 Section 174 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
50 For example see Hugh Corder, ‘Struggling to Adapt:Regulating Judges in South Africa’, in Regulating 
Judges: Beyond Independence and Accountability, ed. by Richard Devlin and Adam Dodek (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2016), pp. 372–89; Chris Oxtoby and Tabeth Masengu, ‘Who Nominates Judges ? Some Issues 
Underlying Judicial Appointments In South Africa’, Stellenbosch Law Review, 3 (2017), 541–63; Francois Du 
Bois, ‘Judicial Selection In Post-Apartheid South Africa’, in Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power - 
Critical Perspectives from Around the World, ed. by Kate Malleson and P H Russell (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press Incorp, 2006), pp. 280–312; Ruth B Cowan, ‘Women’s Representaion on the Courts in the 
Republic of South Africa’, Univeristy of Maryland Law Journal Race Religion Gender & Class, 9 (2006), 291–
318. 
51 For example, the public can watch and comment on interviews through a live feed on YouTube, see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0fScWayAEgk 
52 MTK Moerane SC, ‘The Meaning of Transformation of the Judiciary in the New South African Context’, 
South African Law Journal, 120 (2014), 708–18 (p.712) <https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2007.54.1.23.>. 
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factors, the process has attracted criticism as regards to whether there is a real concerted effort 
to appoint more women.53 
In contrast, Zambia is purely a common law legal system and at the end of 2017, it had 
the highest number of women judges in the SADC region (50%). Despite this achievement, 
there is an absence of detailed literature on the appointment process. Worse yet, there is no 
literature on how Zambia has achieved gender parity on its courts. The appointment process is 
mostly private, with no public announcement of vacancies or requests for nominations.54 When 
vacancies arise, the Judge President in charge informs designated members of the legal 
profession. This method was adopted from Zambia’s former colonial power, England and is 
also referred to as ‘secret soundings’.55 In Zambia, all prospective judges are interviewed in 
private by the JSC.56 Governed by section 140 of the Constitution of Zambia Amendment Act 
No. 2 of 2016, the JSC makes recommendations for judicial appointment to the President. The 
President has the power to appoint judges, subject to ratification by Parliament.57 This allows 
for legislative influence or interference in the appointment process. This is unlike the South 
African process, where the president must appoint the judges that the JSC recommends for 
positions in the High Court and SCA.58  
It is also worth noting that a clause to ensure gender equality in appointments to public 
office was only included after the new amendment to the Zambian Constitution.59 The creation 
of a Gender Commission is also a recent development and there is no specific legislation 
 
53 See Masengu 'A Perspective on Women and Leadership' and Bonthuys 'Gender and Race in the South African 
Judicial Appointment System'. 
54 This process will be explained in detail in Chapter 4 entitled’ The Judicial Service Commission in Zambia: 
Gatekeeper or Ally?’. 
55 Dermot Feenan, ‘Judicial Appointments in Ireland in Comparative Perspective’, Judicial Studies Institute 
Journal, 1 (2008), 37–66 (p.56). 
56 Pamela Towela Sambo, ‘The Legal Profession and Judicial Appointments in Zambia’, in SADC Lawyers 
Association Conferencce and General Meeting (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 2015), pp. 1–10. 
57 Section 140 of the Constitution of Zambia Amendment Act No. 2 of 2016. 
58 This however, excludes the leadership of the SCA and the justices and leadership of the Constitutional Court 
who have a different process of appointment. 
59 Part 10 under the General Provisions Section, in section 259. 
 
 
11 
 
regarding gender equality or discrimination.60 Thus, a study of the two jurisdictions from these 
sets of facts provides an interesting learning prospect. Zambia has a relatively closed 
appointment method and is only just strengthening its constitutional protection of women and 
yet it has more women on the bench than South Africa. The latter, which has a relatively 
transparent appointment method and is famed worldwide for its equality jurisprudence, appears 
to be lagging behind in regard to gender equity in the judiciary. Academics continue to wonder 
why some judicial appointment systems seem to be making much faster progress in 
diversifying the composition of the bench than others.61 There is insufficient writing on gender 
and the judiciary in Africa to provide answers to this question.62  
Various studies have explored gender and judicial appointments from different 
avenues.63 A research report written by Cheryl Thomas on the United Kingdom specifically 
addresses the question of ‘what factors might directly or indirectly lead to a lack of diversity 
in the judiciary’?64 This report was useful in framing the question for this research because it 
recognised that there are many variables that affect whether gender diversity is increased in 
various jurisdictions.65 Using Thomas’s approach of exploring which factors may be 
determinant, this research identifies specific formal and informal aspects of the appointment 
process for examination. The formal aspects identified are I suggest, constitutive of a first layer 
of scrutiny before a potential judicial candidate can proceed to the next level. These formal 
aspects are the recruitment process, recommended qualifications and experience for candidates 
 
60 Section 231 of the Constitution makes provision for the Commission for Gender Equality. 
61 Rachel L. Ellet, Pathways to Judicial Power in Transitional States.Perspectives from African Courts. 
(Chicago: Routledge, 2013),p.2. 
62 The first in-depth analysis of various African countries was only published in 2015. See Dawuni and Bauer 
'Gender and the Judiciary in Africa'.  
63 For example, others have looked at the selection method, others have focused on the legal profession and 
some have looked at the definition of merit. 
64 Cheryl Thomas Judicial Diversity in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions: A review of research , 
policies and practices (November 2005) available at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-
institute/files/Judicial_Diversity_in_the_UK_and_other_jurisdictions.pdf, accessed on 16 May 2016. 
65 The report also includes a section on the study of diversity in other jurisdictions, excluding Africa and Asia. 
See pp.25-27. 
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and the operations of the appointment body. In addition, interview data from this research 
revealed an additional aspect that is worthy of examination. That is the role of the judge and 
the expectations that the judiciary, lawyers and citizens have of a judge. This aspect goes 
beyond professional qualifications and experience and it includes conduct, character traits and 
specific preferences that each judiciary has. 
 There are also informal aspects that have a bearing on judicial appointments. They 
include the extent to which political actors, the organised legal profession and Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) are involved in the process. Moreover this study also considers the 
legislative environment for women’s rights in each jurisdiction, as it interrogates whether the 
legislation advancing women’s rights is relevant in the goal to diversify judiciaries. It is 
noteworthy that scholars have asserted that the judicial appointment system is not gender 
neutral and that seemingly neutral institutional processes and practices are in fact gendered.66 
Acknowledging these views and using a feminist lens,67 this study examines the structure and 
process of the identified judicial appointment methods. It does this by asking the central 
research question of how aspects of the judicial appointment process inform equal 
representation of women and men on the bench.  
In order to answer this question, the following sub-questions are also explored: 
1) How do various stakeholders such as judges, lawyers, JSC members, CSO’s and 
journalists ( who have been identified as relevant in exploring the informal aspects), 
perceive the judicial appointment process in respect to gender diversity goals? 
 
66 See Kate Malleson, ‘Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench: Why Difference Won’t Do’, Feminist Legal 
Studies, 11 (2003), 1–24;Sally J Kenney, ‘Thinking about Gender and Judging’, International Journal of the 
Legal Profession, 15.2 (2008), 87–110 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09695950802461837>. 
67 This lens recognises patriarchal elements of society and in turn explores the consequences that flow from 
seemingly neutral gender policies, in order to identify discrimination in the judicial appointment process. 
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2) What is the general experience of women judges and legal professionals in respect of 
the appointment process and how does this affect women’s judicial aspirations?  
3) Does the gender composition of the JSC matter and will more women JSC members 
lead to more women judges being appointed? 
4) Does a more public and transparent appointment process lead to an increased presence 
of women on the bench? 
5) What is the role of various political actors such as Presidents and Members of 
Parliaments and is there a notable effect on how their power is used in respect of women 
and judicial appointments?  
6) With regard to judicial appointments, what can be deduced from various achievements 
and shortcomings present in both jurisdictions? 
1.4 POSITIONING THE WOMAN JUDGE 
‘Once we accept that who the judge is matters, then it matters who our judges are’.68 This quote 
by eminent academic Erika Rackley encapsulates the essence of the research approach in this 
study. If who a judge is matters, then it is necessary to reject the idea of judges as objective 
beings, devoid of any personal baggage or subjective attitudes. The judge is a culmination of 
various life experiences that are informed by, amongst others, their gender, social status, race, 
sexual orientation, religion and even political ideology. The judge and those who appoint 
judges operate within a context that is filled with multiple factors. These can and do affect who 
gets appointed as a judge and what type of environment they operate in. Accordingly, this 
research uses a feminist lens and deliberately describes women in terms of gender (as a social 
process), rather than sex (as a biological category). This is because of the societal ramifications 
 
68 Erika Rackley, Women, Judging and the Judiciary: From Difference to Diversity, Women, Judging and the 
Judiciary: From Difference to Diversity,(p.164) (Cavendish: Routldege, 2012). 
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that flow from the construction of gender and how they affect women.69 In the context of gender 
and judging, these ramifications become evident as the analysis in this thesis progresses.  
Second, this research focuses on an interrogation of various factors that may have a 
bearing on women’s judicial aspirations. The focus on women in this research is ‘not meant to 
privilege gender’ or ‘to deny the importance of other identity characteristics’.70 Using women 
as a focal point is also not an indication that women as a category are not differentiated by 
various societal factors. This research recognises how the intersectionality of identities affects 
women and thus it does not take an essentialist view of women.71 In Chapter 2, two additional 
justifications for gender diversity are offered and with relevant alteration, these arguments can 
also apply to other under-represented groups in judiciaries.  
Third, various authors use the terms gender diversity and gender representativity 
interchangeably. Thus some references to women in this thesis will use the term 
representativity and/or representativeness, based on the work that is being referred to. 
However, this research adopts Cathi Albertyn’s preference for the use of the term diversity 
over representativity. Albertyn has argued that diversity is a ‘more complex idea of multiple 
judicial differences that go beyond the facial, group-based difference to difference in norms, 
values, judicial attitudes and philosophies’.72 Representativity she suggests, is just the 
requirement that the judiciary should consist of different social groups.73  
Thus, as noted by Andrews quoting Carmel Rickard in her observations on the South 
African judiciary: 
 
69 A detailed discussion on this will follow in Chapter 2 under the section entitled ‘Gender as a Social Process 
and Democratic arguments for diversity’. 
70 Rackley, 'Women, Judging and the Judiciary 'p.2. 
71 For more on the effect of intersectional identities, see Chapter 7, under the section ’Dynamics in the Legal 
Profession’. 
72 Albertyn 'Judicial Diversity', p.242. 
73 Ibid. 
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Diversity is not just about women, black people and other groups that one might want 
to see on the Bench. It's also about whether the candidate being considered has a fresh 
outlook; whether in addition to traditional legal competence he or she can really 
understand the great shift in thinking that has come with the new Constitution. Whether 
they have the kind of openness that will ensure the values of the Constitution do shape 
the way they approach legal problems.74  
The above description of diversity is specific to South Africa, yet the essence of the message 
can be applied to other jurisdictions. It is desirable to have judges who understand the new 
values in their respective constitutions, while having a philosophy that ensures that these values 
are properly infused into their decision-making. 
Fourth, the focus of this research is on appointment to Superior Courts (High Courts, 
Courts of Appeal and Constitutional Courts) and does not include appointments to lower courts 
often known as Magistrates Courts.75 This does not negate the importance of gender diversity 
in the lower courts, neither does it suggest that the judicial functions of the lower courts are 
unworthy of attention. Rather it is because the Superior Courts are often where ground-
breaking or definitive decisions are made. Additionally, the number of women in lower courts 
is often higher than that in Superior Courts and as in South Africa, the glass ceiling starts to 
appear as women ascend up the judicial ladder.76  
Finally, this research does not consider the question of whether the appointment of 
women has made judiciaries more efficient, neither does it examine courts’ jurisprudence as a 
means to determining women’s contributions. Those issues are outside the remit of this 
research. However, I do posit that one’s judicial contribution and/ or merit for judicial 
appointment are not determined by their gender; even though gender does affect what is often 
perceived as merit or who is considered meritorious. 
 
74 Penelope Andrews, ‘The Judiciary in South Africa: Independence or Illusion?’, in Judicial Independence in 
Context (Toronto: Irwin law Inc, 2010), pp. 466–98 (p.480). 
75 The magistracy is examined as a pool from which judges are drawn in Chapter 7. 
76 This will be discussed further in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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1.5 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
Most discussions about ‘judicial diversity typically coalesce around two issues: first, what are 
the reasons we don’t have diverse judiciaries and how can we have them’?77 Second, ‘why 
should we want greater diversity among judges’?78 The first part of Chapter 2 focuses on the 
first issue by introducing the body of literature on gender and judging. The literature corpus 
consists primarily but not exclusively of American, English and Canadian resources, with some 
contributions from South Africa, Australia and other parts of the world. The latter part of the 
Chapter responds to the question of why increased diversity amongst judges is needed. It does 
so by introducing new justifications for gender diversity. These justifications are concerned 
with judicial independence and impartiality.  
Chapter 3 sets the scene for the discussions that follow in the rest of the thesis. Firstly, 
it introduces the reader to the research methodology employed in this study, including the 
choice of research design and the selected case studies. It discusses the research methods 
employed in this study and their limitations, and it also provides the reader with a breakdown 
of interview participants across both jurisdictions. The second part of Chapter 3 recognises that 
context matters and in doing so, it offers a historical account of each country’s judiciary, 
explaining the process of judicial appointments. 
 Subsequently, Chapters 4-8 are devoted to an examination of the various aspects of the 
appointment process identified as useful sites of study. Chapter 4 considers the JSC in Zambia 
analysing its composition, procedures, lack of transparency and its appointments in the period 
of 2013-2017. It then takes a normative approach by detailing views from the interview 
participants on their respective appointment process. It suggests that the negative perception of 
women judges found in some responses, could be attributed to illegitimacy perceptions of 
 
77 Rackley, 'Women, Judging and the Judiciary ' p.4. 
78 Ibid. 
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women in leadership positions. The final part of Chapter 4 moves discussions away from the 
need for a gender diverse judiciary, to why we need a gender diverse appointment body. In 
examining the gender composition of the JSC, it provides theoretical arguments for gender 
diversity on judicial appointment bodies. 
 Taking a similar approach, Chapter 5 is focused on the South African JSC and 
examines similar aspects of the process. The visibility of the appointment process is critical 
here, as data compiled from participant observation and media reporting unveils three central 
issues. The first is that there are limitations on how transparent the JSC is, resulting in two 
instances where parties have approached the courts for relief.79 The second issue is that the 
JSC’s mandate to transform the judiciary has resulted in questions about its independence and 
its inability to appoint ‘meritorious’ candidates. Third, gender bias has been present in some 
JSC interviews revealing that some JSC members are not immune from the patriarchal and 
masculinist cultural attitudes, present in South African society.  
Chapter 6 takes a step back from the operational aspect of the appointment process. It 
instead examines what international guidelines, judiciaries and lawyers expect of judges in 
order to determine whether there are impediments that prevent women from ascending to the 
bench. Using responses from interview participants and an assessment of jurisdictional and 
international requirements, it finds that women are not found wanting in regard to qualifications 
or technical expertise. Rather the challenges that women face include amongst others, the 
difficulties of balancing career and family life, and the lack of acting appointments. The chapter 
 
79See The Judicial Service Commission & Another v Cape Bar Council & Another, 2012, DCCCXVIII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2012/115.pdf> [accessed 16 January 2018]; Helen Suzman Foundation 
v Judicial Service Commission & Others, 2018, ZACC 08, 1–33 
<https://collections.concourt.org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/3903/Full judgment Official version 24 
April 2018.pdf?sequence=30&isAllowed=y> [accessed 24 April 2018]. 
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closes with a categorisation of the main expectations of judges into three thematic groups, 
before concluding with some insight into whether expectations of judges are gendered. 
Chapter 7 builds on the previous chapter by interrogating women’s challenges, this 
time, in the legal profession. It commences with a review of women in the legal profession 
globally, before localising the discussion to South Africa and Zambia. It investigates the 
dynamics of the legal pools in both jurisdictions and explores the various legal pools from 
which judges are drawn. Subsequently, it considers the structural and cultural barriers 
preventing women from progressing to upper levels of the legal profession in private practice. 
It comes to various conclusions on each jurisdiction, while recognising that the presence or 
absence of women in the judiciary is a direct result of what occurs in the legal profession. 
 Chapter 8 examines other relevant aspects of the judicial appointment process such as 
the role of political actors, the legislative landscape for women’s rights and the role of CSOs 
and legal professional organisations. These aspects of the process have different effects in each 
jurisdiction and hence the chapter continues to emphasise the importance of context in the 
larger debates around gender diversity. It is argued that political will has been one of the most 
critical elements of Zambia’s success in appointing more women. However, in South Africa 
the landscape for women’s rights and the involvement of CSO’s have been more influential 
than political will. This chapter therefore is a reminder that the presence or absence of women 
on the bench is informed by many factors and that any solutions to address the lack of diversity, 
require a holistic approach.  
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by reiterating the importance of judicial diversity, not 
just for women but for the judicial system and those whom it serves. It makes further 
contributions to issues highlighted in previous chapters, while also addressing concerns present 
in each jurisdiction. It concludes by providing potential solutions to achieving more diverse 
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judiciaries. It does this by making six recommendations for research and policy initiatives. 
These recommendations are not limited to the case studies and can be applied to other 
jurisdictions in the region. They are the outcome of a narrative on gender diversity and judicial 
appointments in two jurisdictions. This narrative commences with a theoretical overview of 
the gender and judging field. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A DIFFERENT CASE FOR GENDER DIVERSITY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter introduces the various existing arguments for gender diversity in the judiciary. It 
then offers a different additional model to the current, largely accepted justifications for diverse 
judiciaries.80 This model is two-pronged, and it posits that gender diversity can strengthen 
substantive independence and judicial impartiality. It is recognised that the term gender 
diversity is replete with various possible definitions. How gender is expressed ranges across a 
broad spectrum—‘one can, for instance, be a masculine woman or be a person who used to be 
a woman and is now a man; the sex assigned to one's body can be distinct from the gender one 
expresses; and gender is distinct from sexuality’.81 This broad spectrum includes members of 
the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and Others (LGBTIQ+) communities.  
However for the purposes of this research, I refer to gender in respect of the social 
constructions of women and men. In sum, I argue that women face various challenges because 
of the social constructions of womanhood and the expectations that flow from this. They are 
not merely a result of biological differences, but rather of what is fashioned from our social 
fabric. To this end any reference to women and men in this research, includes those who present 
themselves as either of the two genders, irrespective of sexual orientation, biological 
classification and any other manner of lived experience.82 A discussion on the debates that arise 
from using the term ‘gender’ and an analysis of the consequences of doing so in a binary 
manner, are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
80 Amongst others, there are justifications that gender diverse judiciaries will more equitable, more 
democratically legitimate, and will have better decision-making processes. 
81 Gabeba Baderoon, '"Gender within Gender": Zanele Muholi’s Images of Trans Being and Becoming’, 
Feminist Studies, 37.2 (2011), 390–416 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23069910> [accessed 7 February 2017]. 
82 Ashley Currier, ‘Representing Gender and Sexual Dissidence in Southern Africa’, Qualitative Sociology, 34 
(2011), 463–81 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11133-011-9198-9>. 
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This thesis commences from an understanding that there are some elements about the 
adjudicative role that are indisputable. The role of the judge in common law and civil law 
countries differs. In the former, judges craft legal decisions that have far-reaching 
consequences both politically and socially. In the latter, there are some debatable theories that 
suggest that judges function as ‘automatons’, because of limitations on how creative they can 
be.83 Yet irrespective of the jurisdiction, one such indisputable element that stands is the point 
that adjudication is an interpretative exercise.84 In the absence of clear established norms or in 
the presence of what may be deemed unjust laws, the adjudicator makes a decision based on 
the interests of justice. The definition of what is in the interest of justice differs depending on 
who is interpreting the law and penning the judgment. Thus though a judicial appointment 
process is a means to an end, it is a necessary means to study, because of the power that lies in 
the hands of judges. 
Globally discussions have moved away from why we need women judges, to how to 
get more women judges. Yet Rackley and Webb suggest that arguments for judicial diversity 
are still important because they take us in several directions, leading to different ideas of 
judicial diversity and differently constituted judiciaries.85 In this chapter, differently constituted 
judiciaries are viewed as a means of achieving two goals: first, strengthening judicial 
independence by improving a judge’s substantive independence and secondly, improving 
judicial impartiality. 
 
83 Adelaide Remiche, ‘When-Judging-Is-Power’, Journal of Law and Courts, 3.1 (2015), 95–114. 
84 For discussions on the role of the judge in regard to adjudication, see Richard Devlin, A. Wayne MacKay, and 
Natasha Kim, ‘Reducing the Democratic Deficit: Representation, Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or 
towards a Triple P Judiciary’, Alberta Law Review, 38 (2000), 734–865 
<http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/alblr38&id=746&div=34&collection=journals> 
[accessed 19 October 2016]; Leslie Green, Law and the Role of a Judge, Legal Research Paper Series (Oxford, 
2014) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495953> [accessed 19 October 2017]. 
85 Erika Rackley and Charlie Webb, ‘Three Models of Diversity’, in Debating Judicial Appointments in an Age 
of Diversity, ed. by Gee Graham and Erika Rackley (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp. 283–98 (p.238). 
 
 
23 
 
 I have previously argued that gender transformation in South Africa,86 can enhance 
perceptions of impartiality and in this chapter, I expand on this theory.87 It is submitted that 
actual impartiality, which is a hallmark of a strong judiciary, can be strengthened by having 
more women on the bench. Further, once one appreciates that judicial independence and 
impartiality are valid reasons to diversify the judiciary, the examination of the formal and 
informal aspects of judicial appointments becomes more important. This chapter commences 
with an outline of the more prominent theoretical views on gender and judging in the judiciary 
in order to provide an overview of the field. I draw mostly from international sources because 
of the dearth of material on this subject matter in Africa. When reference is made to African 
sources they are mostly from South Africa.88  
 The section does not include a deconstruction of most feminist theories or an 
examination of wider feminist debates. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that some of the 
reasons advanced for appointing women to the bench have been informed by justifications for 
more women in other sectors of society, such as politics.89 These reasons have also been 
critiqued by general feminist theories.90 For example, it has been argued by radical feminists 
that the gender of legal personnel is largely irrelevant, because the law's maleness is inherent 
in the very form of legal reasoning.91 Therefore, while more women judges would clearly 
 
86 Gender transformation refers to the demographic restructuring of the courts, to ensure that more women are 
appointed as judges. 
87Tabeth Masengu, ‘Gender Transformation as a Means of Enhancing Impartiality on the Bench’, South African 
Law Journal, 133.3 (2016), 475–490. 
88 The first compilation of essays from different African jurisdictions was only published in 2016. See Gender 
and the Judiciary in Africa: From Obscurity to Parity?, ed. by Josephine Dawuni and Gretchen Bauer (New 
York: Routldege, 2016). 
89 See Patricia Yancey Martin, John R. Reynolds, and Shelley Keith, ‘Gender Bias and Feminist Conciousness 
amongst Judges and Attorneys’, Signs, 27.3 (2002), 665–701. Martin and others promote the feminist 
Standpoint theory and argue that women’s greater experiences of life sensitizes them to gender inequality and 
makes them worthwhile judges. 
90 Catherine Mackinnon directly questions the office of the judge and challenges the very hierarchical 
institutions that allow for the existence of judges. For a detailed discussion of her views see Resnik, ‘On the 
Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges’. 
91 Emily Jackson, ‘Catharine MacKinnon and Feminist Jurisprudence: A Critical Appraisal’, Journal of Law and 
Society, 19.2 (1992), 195–212 <https://doi.org/10.2307/1410220>. 
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impact upon prevailing attitudes, it would not be incompatible with the retention of a male 
legal order in the judiciary.92 In this study the presence of a male order is not disputed, it is a 
consequence of the social construction of gender. Rather, the additional justifications for 
gender diversity advanced in this chapter seek to ameliorate the effects of this male order. 
The second section of this chapter briefly refers to the work of Carol Gilligan, a feminist 
psychologist and ethicist, who is widely known for promoting the ethic of care versus the ethic 
of responsibility.93 Reference is made to Gilligan’s research because it has been used to 
promote what is referred to as the ‘difference’ argument by proponents of gender diversity on 
the bench.94 The difference argument postulates that women should be appointed as judges 
because they speak in a ‘different voice’ from men. However this argument has limitations 
which will be discussed later in this chapter and, therefore it is useful to look beyond difference 
when making the case for more women judges.  
 To do this, it is necessary to deconstruct the difference argument from an unfamiliar 
perspective; that of an African woman. I encourage an appreciation of the multiple layers of 
perspectives that women can bring, that make them different, in order to improve the quality 
of justice delivered by the entire judiciary. Subsequently, I proceed to outline the first strand 
of my theory which relates to the independence of the judiciary. This section will focus on 
building an understanding of gender diversity as a central element of judicial independence. 
Judicial independence is an indispensable element of the rule of law with two strands: 
institutional independence and substantive independence.95 I propose an extended definition of 
 
92 Ibid p.208. 
93 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982). 
94 For a good summary of this literature, see Dermot Feenan, ‘Editorial Introduction: Women and Judging’, 
Feminist Legal Studies, 17.1 (2009), 1–9. 
95 Akinola Aguda, ‘The Judiciary in Africa’, The Fletcher Forum, 9 (1985), 13–35. 
 
 
25 
 
substantive independence that includes the ability to be independent from one’s inarticulate 
premise.96  
It is suggested that this extended definition of substantive independence can be 
strengthened by gender diversity. In advocating for greater diversity on the European Court of 
Justice, Iyiola Solanke rightly argued that judicial legitimacy has two important inputs − 
judicial independence and diversity.97 In this study, in addition to being an input of legitimacy, 
I consider diversity as an integral input of judicial independence. The latter part of the third 
section in the chapter focuses on impartiality, which is closely related to substantive 
independence. In my argument, I discuss the difference between the two, before concluding 
the chapter by linking substantive independence and impartiality to the judicial appointment 
process. 
2.2 THEORETICAL VIEWS ON GENDER AND JUDGING IN THE JUDICIARY 
2.2.1 Gender as a Social Process and Democratic arguments for diversity 
Empirical, biographical and other narrative studies have revealed important information on 
women's continuing difficulties and some successes in appointment to, and retention of, 
judicial office.98 In the 1980’s, political scientists such as Beverly Blair Cook99 and Elaine 
Martin positioned the absence of women in the judiciary as a political matter.100 Cook 
chronicled the failure of the trickle-up process which was meant to see more women hold 
higher positions in judicial office, as more women graduated from law school.101 The trickle-
up process appeared to be incompatible with what Cook was discovering and this prompted a 
 
96 John Dugard, Human Rights & The South African Legal Order (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1978), p.284. 
97 Solanke, ‘Diversity and Independence in the European Court Of Justice’, p.114 . 
98 Feenan ‘Editorial Introduction: Women and Judging’, p. 1.  
99 See Beverly B. Cook, ‘Women Judges: A Preface to their History’, Golden Gate University Law Review, 14.3 
(1984), 1–38. 
100 Sally J Kenney, ‘Thinking about Gender and Judging’. 
101 Cook ‘Women Judges: A preface to their history’, p.574.  
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further investigation into the nature of the legal profession and the judiciary. Inspired by Cook, 
Kenney argued that by exploring gender as a social process and establishing the implications 
of such, Cook exposed unfairness in the treatment of men and women.102 This had radical 
implications for thinking about merit and the best way of choosing judges.103  
Building on Cook’s work, Kenney emphasised that discussions on gender and judging 
needed to avoid using sex as a variable and rather view gender diversity through the lens of 
gender as a social process.104 In her view, the meaning attached to sex differences creates a 
false dichotomy where sex masks other variables. By stripping down people's identities and 
ignoring other aspects just to look at sex difference, one approaches sex as a biological category 
instead of gender as a social process.105 For Kenney, approaching gender as a social process 
meant recognising that gender is intersectional, not just something that happens to women who 
are ‘otherwise privileged’.106 For example, one cannot limit the description of a woman to a 
single aspect of privilege such as being middle class and yet ignore the fact that being middle 
class and black, is very different from being middle class and white. Therefore, failing to 
recognise gender as a social process results in a simplification of both the challenges women 
face in their quest to ascend to the bench and the solutions to address any existing problems.  
Accordingly, viewing gender as a social process also enables one to understand how 
the structure of society and the courts impedes women’s progression on to the bench. Kenney 
suggests that if one delves deeper into why women must be present at the centre of power as 
issues are framed and agendas constructed, one finds a simple answer.107 It is that the demand 
 
102 Kenney, ‘Thinking about Gender and Judging’, p.88. 
103 Cook ‘Women Judges: A preface to their history’, p.589.  
104 Sally.J Kenney, Gender & Justice:Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter (New York: Routldege, 2013). 
105 Kenney, ‘Thinking about Gender and Judging’, p. 89. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Sally J. Kenney, ‘Breaking the Silence: Gender Mainstreaming and the Composition of the European Court 
of Justice’, Feminist Legal Studies, 10.3 (2002), 257–270 (p.258). 
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for women judges is intrinsically linked to putting all public policies under a gender lens.108 
Essentially, if the judiciary is part of government which is a political body, then the 
appointment of judges is part of public policy. It cannot be excluded from the scrutiny that the 
legislature and executive have been placed under. 
 Devlin et al refer to this as a democratic argument for diversity because ‘a democratic 
institution must be open to the input of those upon whom it has an effect and there must be an 
equal capacity for self-determination’.109 The decisions of the judiciary have far-reaching 
effects and because judges enforce the law (and in some jurisdictions makes law) the judiciary 
should not be composed of a section of society that is privileged. In this case privileged, 
because they are men. Rackley and Webb add that to advance the argument for democratic 
legitimacy, ‘we need to identify which communities the judiciary should reflect’.110 The answer 
to what appointments will improve the legitimacy of the courts, ‘will depend not just on the 
present make-up of the judiciary, but also more importantly, on the social and political 
backdrop against which these appointments fall to be made’.111 Thus, it is necessary to view 
courts as representative institutions even if their administrative functions differ from 
legislatures.112 Efforts to increase women’s roles in legislatures have advocated that women 
should have more political space in society to organize, assert themselves as political actors, 
and voice gender equity concerns because women make up a large aspect of societies.113  
Kenney reasons that if women are viewed as representatives who are ‘standing for a 
particular section of society’, their presence in the judiciary is as important as in the 
 
108 Ibid. 
109 Richard Devlin, A.Wayne MacKay and Natasha Kim,‘Reducing the Democratic Deficit: Representation, 
Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary or towards a Triple P Judiciary’, Alberta Law Review, 38 (2000), 734–865. 
110 Rackley and Webb, 'Three models of Diversity', p.290. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid, p.130. 
113 Mi Yung Yoon, ‘Democratization and Women’s Legislative Representation in Sub-Saharan Africa’, 
Democratization, 8.2 (2001), 169–190 (p.1730). 
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legislature.114 Not in the same manner as parliamentarians who have been voted in by a 
constituency, but in a manner that recognises the ‘other half’ of the population.115 This 
recognition of the other half of the population is not only about having women’s faces in court, 
but is also revealed when women are present in the decision-making process. When they 
participate in the process of adjudication by either writing judgments or agreeing with those 
written by their peers, it is a sign that the judiciary, like other political institutions, is including 
those who were previously outsiders. In doing so, the judiciary normalises women’s power and 
authority.116 
2.2.2 Women as Outsiders 
Erika Rackley’s work has illustrated that the exclusion of women from the judiciary is the 
exclusion of a particular voice and being. Like Kenney, she encourages seeing gender as a 
social process and has submitted that ‘the experience of being a woman’ has an impact on 
judicial decision-making.117 Thus by harnessing the power of storytelling, Rackley’s work has 
provided indicative and illustrative tales of women judges who by their presence, ‘disrupt the 
apprehensible world in order to open spaces for dreaming alternatives’.118 It is a disruption 
because the role of the judge at present is still not imagined as one which women and members 
of other currently under-represented groups can comfortably and constructively occupy.119 
Informal networks of male power through various manifestations of the ‘old boys’ network’ 
operate alongside more structural forms of institutional discrimination, within the legal 
profession preventing women from reaching the top.120 Rackley found that women not only 
 
114 Kenney, ‘Gender and Judging’, p. 129. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Nancy B. Arrington, ‘Gender and Judicial Replacement’, Journal of Law and Courts, 6.1 (2018), 127–54 
(p.129). 
117 Erika Rackley, ‘Judicial Diversity,the Woman Judge and Fairy Tale Endings’, Legal Studies, 27.1 (2007), 
74–94 (p.76). 
118 Ibid. 
119 Rackley, ‘Judicial Diversity,the Woman Judge and Fairy Tale Endings’, p. 624. 
120 Erika Rackley, ‘Representations of the (Woman) Judge: Hercules, the Little Mermaid, and the Vain and 
Naked Emperor’, Legal Studies, 22.4 (2002), 602–624 (p. 606). 
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have a harder time getting on to the bench, but once they get there, at best they are considered 
as an oddity or token. At worst, they are considered a threat to the judicial norm, simultaneously 
confirming and disrupting its established masculinity.121  
2.2.3 Equality, Legitimacy and Improved Quality of deliberations 
In recognising the masculine context in the judiciary, Malleson proposes that a starting point 
to promoting gender diversity is equity arguments that explain how inherently unfair it is that 
men enjoy a near monopoly of judicial power.122 There are no inherent attributes that make 
men better suited to be judges than women123 and I have echoed this in previous work focusing 
on women and leadership in the South African judiciary.124 This therefore means that the 
disproportionate levels of participation of men in law generally and in the judiciary specifically, 
are the result of unfair arrangements both past and present which disadvantage women.125 As 
Lord Neuberger MR argued: 
if ... women are not less good judges than men, why are 80% or 90% of judges male? 
It suggests, purely on a statistical basis, that we do not have the best people because 
there must be some women out there who are better than the less good men who are 
judges. 
That is why equity arguments emphasise that there should be equal opportunities for making it 
into the pool of possible appointees. This is not just about fairness to the individuals but also 
to ensure that the judiciary finds those best suited for the job− assuming that attributes relevant 
to judicial excellence are distributed more or less evenly.126  
 
121 Erika Rackley, Submission to the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity (Durham, 2009) 
<http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/eji/docs/51452.pdf> [acccessed 15 May 2017]. 
122 Kate Malleson ‘Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench: Why Difference Won't Do’, Feminist Legal 
Studies,11(2003), 1-24 (p.15). 
123 Ibid. 
124 Tabeth Masengu, ‘A Perspective on Women and Leadership in the South African Judiciary’, South African 
Journal on Human Rights, 31,15 (2015), 655–666. 
125 Kenney ‘Thinking about Gender and Judging, p. 15. 
126 Rackley and Webb, 'Three models of Diversity', p.287. 
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However, Malleson warns that, if the demands for equal participation of women judges 
are to last, they must be both empirically and theoretically sound.127 From a South African 
perspective, Albertyn provides sound theoretical and empirical demands for women judges by 
echoing the view that a diverse and representative judiciary will provide greater institutional 
legitimacy. This legitimacy is critical for public confidence and accountability.128 By doing 
this, Albertyn encourages us to view the necessity of having more women on the bench, not 
only as a means to create equality between genders, but also as a manner in which citizens can 
feel that they ‘belong’ when they look at the bench.129  
Albertyn adds better quality of deliberation and judicial process and improved legal 
outcomes as further justifications for a diverse bench.130 Dawuni has also proposed the 
improvement in the quality of deliberation and legal outcomes as reasons for gender diversity. 
She has used the International Criminal Court and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, as proxies for opening up the discussion on substantive and tangible contributions 
women judges bring to international courts.131 Another example of African women judges’ 
contribution to jurisprudence, is a novel collection of essays narrating the experiences of 
African women judges on international courts.132 The judges’ personal and legal experience as 
women, contributed to their efforts to improve the decision making process.133 
2.2.4 Symbolism  
Symbolic arguments for diversity have been identified by British academic Rosemary Hunter. 
In addition to judicial legitimacy and equality arguments, the presence of women judges 
 
127 Malleson, ‘Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench: Why Difference Won’t Do’, p.1. 
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encourages lawyers and students and provides mentoring opportunities for those with judicial 
aspirations.134 Having women on the bench symbolises a new era where the doors of judicial 
office are not entirely closed to women because of their gender. It also makes courts less 
intimidating and instils confidence in women practitioners who appear in those courts.135  
Hunter then refers to three reasons for diversity which she describes as practical 
arguments. The first is that women judges are more likely to be empathetic with women 
litigants and provide a better court room experience.136 Secondly she submits that women will 
educate male colleagues by denouncing sexist comments, gender bias and stereotyping.137 
Finally, Hunter argues that women will bring a gendered sensibility to the process of decision-
making sometimes altering the outcome.138 This gendered sensibility to judging is what other 
academics have referred to as a different approach to adjudication139 that leads to improvements 
in the lives of other women especially litigants.140 However, the notion of a different approach 
to adjudication has also fuelled the argument that women judges will speak in a different voice ̶ 
a theory that I examine in a later section. 
2.2.5 The use of merit as an exclusionary method 
An important aspect of the research on gender and judging has also been the appreciation that 
the paucity of women in the judiciary is manifestly unfair. For Malleson, this unfair 
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arrangement is buttressed by continuing requirements and criteria for appointment that 
invariably keep out women, such as preference for private-schooled advocates and the 
definition of a ‘meritorious’ candidate.141 In Australia, this improper arrangement resulted in 
competent candidates who possessed requisite qualities for judicial office, being overlooked 
because they were women.142 In 1985, Thornton posited that the direct or indirect exclusion of 
women from the Australian judiciary from amongst those who were deemed to be the most 
able, had little to do with the innate ability of group members.143 She suggested that it was the 
traditional exclusion of people on the basis of ‘merit’ or lack thereof, which has served the 
myth of intellectual inferiority and given rise to the view that the appointment of women or 
‘non-whites’ was synonymous with a decline in efficiency.144  
This perception of women still exists today, where calls for gender diversity are 
denounced as being antithetical to merit. Kenney describes this perception as an idiosyncratic 
phenomenon.145 Global research has found that the notion of merit is not an objective standard 
neutrally applied; rather it is socially constructed to the advantage of a narrow group of white 
male lawyers.146 This is applicable in jurisdictions such as South Africa, Canada, the USA and 
England where the population is racially diverse.147 This means that instead of being a fairer 
and more transparent process that achieves gender diversity, the merit-based system also 
becomes a process that excludes women on the basis that they lack ‘merit’. As Hamilton 
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submits, ‘merit can lie in the eye of the beholder and it has not served women and “other” 
contenders for judicial office in the past’.148  
While merit or the lack thereof is often cited regarding the appointment of women 
judges, Mcloughlin notes that when eminent men are appointed judges, it is taken for granted 
that they are appointed on the basis of merit. Yet merit is determined in the context of power.149 
The concept of merit is determined by where the power deciding it lies and, for a long time, 
this power has lain with white men. Thus, the real issue is not that the appointment of women 
is antithetical to the competence and capabilities required to be a judge. It is rather that the 
definition of what is regarded as competent and capable is drawn from a small elite group of 
men. Consequently, when applied to those unlike them, the ‘others’ will always fall short of 
the prescribed measure of merit.  
2.3 JUDGING IN A ‘DIFFERENT’ VOICE: MYTHS AND REALITY 
Before proceeding to the next section, it is necessary to respond to one question borne from 
another theory on gender and judging: is the presence of women on the bench necessary 
because they are different or because they adjudicate in a different voice from their male 
counterparts? 
2.3.1 Women and the Ethic of Care 
Gilligan’s book emanating from developmental psychology was ground-breaking in the 
feminist arena because it detailed how men and women make decisions about morality.150 
Using a psychological framework, Gilligan argued that gender differences in moral reasoning 
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result in the feminine voice acknowledging and being concerned to preserve social 
relationships. The masculine voice on the other hand, tends to see individuals as atomistic and 
makes judgments according to a hierarchy of rights.151 Therefore the male approach to morality 
sees individuals as having certain basic rights, and that as an individual, you must respect the 
rights of others. Morality imposes restrictions on what you can do. The female approach to 
morality, views people as having responsibilities towards others and thus morality instead of 
being a restriction, is an imperative to care for others.152  
The latter imperative is what has been described as the distinctly feminine ‘ethic of 
care’, which proponents of the difference theory have drawn directly or indirectly from 
Gilligan’s work. Commentators on women in the legal profession have argued that the greater 
presence of women on the bench ‘will bring about a reorientation of the legal system away 
from formalism, objectivity, universalism and adversarial methods of conflict solving’.153 The 
result will be a move towards the subjective needs of individuals and a greater use of alternative 
dispute resolution such as mediation. Menkel-Meadow also theorised that applying Gilligan’s 
female form of ‘moral reasoning’ to the legal process would result in different substantive 
solutions and an increased emphasis on a ‘just’ result.154  
To further buttress this argument, Sherry noted that women’s participation as judges 
operates on one level – within either the masculine or the feminine paradigm – to constrain the 
gender-directed harms of the system.155 Thus because women are more naturally connected to 
others, they are more likely to be governed by true empathy, and a strand of ‘paternalism’ 
grounded on self and other and not on power.156 Accordingly, Sherry believed that women 
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brought a unique contribution to law and judging that made a difference and impacted on 
judging as a whole. In an interesting counter to this school of thought, former justice of the 
Supreme Court of Canada Bertha Wilson responded to a question about difference, as follows: 
If the existing law can be viewed as the product of judicial neutrality or impartiality, 
even although the judiciary has been very substantially male, then you may conclude 
that the advent of increased numbers of women judges should make no difference, 
assuming, that is, that these women judges will bring to bear the same neutrality and 
impartiality. However, if you conclude that the existing law, in some areas at least, 
cannot be viewed as the product of judicial neutrality, then your answer may be very 
different.157 
 
Justice Wilson argues that the legal field and law itself has been dominated by men and 
male perspectives. As such Wilson continues, the advent of women on the bench could 
invariably bring an element that was lacking. Arguably, Wilson’s comments could be 
interpreted as confirmation that women bring ‘a gendered sensibility to the process of decision 
-making’.158 On the face of it this reasoning appears valid because if women reason based on 
morality and are more inclined to desire a just outcome for the greater good, then women will 
surely speak in a different voice. The function of law and how it is dispensed will and can 
change because those who have been allowed into in the system, are using a different reasoning 
from those who have dominated it.159 However, a deeper examination of the difference theory 
requires that we interrogate the meaning of ‘speaking in a different voice’. What is this voice 
and what evidence is available to show that women across nations, cultures, class and other 
forms of status speak with it?  
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2.3.2 Whose Voice is being heard? The problem with the ‘different’ voice from an 
African perspective 
In the last two decades, there have been more convincing and less divisive justifications for 
gender diversity on the bench. There is an absence of conclusive evidence to the effect that 
women bring a singular voice to judging, and numerous studies conducted in the global North 
have been inconclusive.160 In the 1990s, former US Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor reflected on feminist commentators’ views on the difference theory. 
The gender differences currently cited are surprisingly similar to stereotypes from years 
past. Women attorneys are more likely to seek to mediate disputes than litigate them. 
Women attorneys are more likely to focus on resolving a client's problem than on 
vindicating a position. Women attorneys are more likely to sacrifice career 
advancement for family obligations. Women attorneys are more concerned with public 
service or fostering community than with individual achievement. Women judges are 
more likely to emphasize context and deemphasize general principles. Women judges 
are more compassionate. And so forth.161 
O’Connor described the difference approach as interesting but troubling, because it echoed the 
Victorian myth of the ‘true woman’,162 The very description that kept women away from law 
for such a long time.163 It painted a picture of one type of woman who would don the judicial 
robe dispensing justice in a specific manner.  
Menkel-Meadow conceded that the difference argument is a dangerous and problematic 
argument because of the possibility that arguments or claims about differences, can be distorted 
into claims about inabilities or stereotypical devaluing of what is labelled female.164 The 
inabilities she refers to would occur if a woman judge didn’t meet the expected standard of 
womanhood. I suggest that the existence of such a standard only reinforces sexist views about 
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how women should behave. Hunter further proffers that it was ‘at best naïve and at worst 
essentialist’, 165 to assume that women would make a difference merely by being present. An 
essentialist concept of gender is defined as the notion that a unitary, ‘essential’ women's 
experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and 
other realities of experience.166  
In rejecting essentialism, Canada’s first female judge of East Asian ancestry Maryka 
Omatsu, differentiated between two arguments. She stated that the special or uniform insight 
of women, or of any other demographic group, is not the same thing as the claim that the 
presence on the bench of heretofore under-represented people can help to balance an existing 
tilt.167 It is argued that promoting a view of a special or uniform insight of women, places all 
women in one category leaving no space for varying perspectives. Consequently, if the existing 
tilt is favoured towards a homogenous male narrative, arguing for a unique woman’s voice will 
only tilt the balance towards an equally homogenous female narrative with no in-between 
stance. A homogenous female narrative does not exist. Not only is it essentialist because it 
proffers the idea of one type of woman, but it also silences the polytonality of voices.168  
Harris has found that ‘it is not only that some voices are silenced in order to privilege 
others, but that the voices that are silenced turn out to be the same voices silenced by the 
mainstream legal voice’, among them voices of black women.169 Critical race theorist Kimberle 
Crenshaw argues that black women are sometimes excluded from feminist theory and antiracist 
policy discourse because both are predicated on a discrete set of experiences, that often does 
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not accurately reflect the interaction of race and gender.170 If the difference argument is applied 
to the judiciary, it effectively prevents the presence of adjudication in ‘different’ voices and 
establishes a myopic view of jurisprudence that does not consider the multiple layers of the 
judge who is dispensing justice. It also prohibits women from offering intellectual excellence 
and diverse experience that can fully enrich the court proceedings.  
To elaborate, African societies are very different from those in the global North or even 
other continents in the global South such as Asia. In the region, there exists a plethora of 
different ethnic groups, different languages and customs each with their own histories and the 
same applies in individual African countries too. Since the literature on women and judging is 
predominantly from the global North, the result is that the difference argument either 
assimilates African women judges into an existing type of ‘woman’ or it alienates them because 
they are not ‘that’ type of woman. Secondly African women themselves are not a homogenous 
group. Despite the common heritage derived from colonialism, economic exploitation, and 
racism, there are wide variations in the ways that these have impacted on individual women in 
different regions and communities.171 For example, colonial rule created chasms or hierarchies 
of ethnic groups, thus people experienced the effects differently depending on where they were 
positioned.172 
 Consider the two countries chosen for this study: Zambia alone has 72 languages, it 
gained independence from Britain in 1964, and has not experienced any civil wars like its 
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regional neighbours.173 South Africa on the other hand was a former British and Dutch colony 
and instituted apartheid laws for decades with democratic rule only achieved in 1994.174 While 
both colonialism and apartheid were established for the subjugation of one people by another, 
the ripple effects of both are different. In Zambia, colonial rule resulted in amongst others, the 
governance of customary law in matters of personal law and succession which to date still has 
an adverse effect on women.175 Yet even in the Zambian populace, despite a history of 
patriarchy, a fair number of women who are middle class and live in the urban areas, are literate 
and educated.176 Those that come from matriarchal tribes are able to inherit and thus women’s 
exposure to education, wealth and discrimination differs.  
In South Africa although apartheid consistently favoured white people over other 
people who were regarded as ‘broadly black’ or ‘not-white,’ it also deliberately differentiated 
between groups of black people classifying them as African, Indian, and ‘Coloured’.177 
Bonthuys writes that black people were all disadvantaged to different extents and in different 
ways by the various manifestations of apartheid.178 Most severely affected were people of 
African descent, while Coloured and Indian people were treated differently and in certain 
respects better than black African people.179 In this research, any reference to Africans when 
discussing the South African context is specific to indigenous black South Africans and does 
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not include those identified as Indian, Coloured or white.180 Due to this racial differentiation, 
African women in South Africa experienced discrimination that was both similar to and 
different from other women of colour, white women and even African men. 
Moyer reveals that ‘studies show that women who are also members of racial and ethnic 
minorities, have experiences with discrimination that both include and transcend sex 
discrimination or race discrimination alone’. 181 If one considers these studies and the different 
circumstances and experiences encountered by women of different classes and varied social 
identities, is it even possible that they can have the same voice? To say that women from these 
localities speak with one voice is to ignore the interactions of race, gender, class and even 
ethnic politics involved in both Zambia and South Africa. Eva Brems notes that African 
feminists have called for a broader conception of feminism that recognizes the historical 
African experience of imperialism combined with patriarchy, and on the other hand the 
contemporary divergent cultural context in which feminism must be situated.182 This is because 
there is a need to account for multiple grounds of identity when considering how the social 
world works.183 
 Initiatives such as the African Feminist Judgment Project consider how the social 
world works by writing alternative feminist judgments in leading cases.184 One question the 
project asks amongst others, is how alternative feminist judgments could contribute to African 
jurisprudence, legal practice and judicial decision-making. This desire to contribute to African 
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jurisprudence recognises the importance of infusing context specific experiences into 
adjudication, as opposed to merely adapting from other jurisdictions. This does not mean that 
feminist judgments can only be written by women. Women do not have a monopoly on caring 
and compassion, nor do men have a monopoly on cold detachment and mistaken reliance on 
conclusions dictated by abstract reason.185 Seminal judgments advancing women’s rights and 
denouncing discrimination in both Zambia and South Africa, such as Longwe v Intercontinental 
Hotel186 and Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others,187 have been written by 
men.  
In the former case Sara Longwe successfully challenged a rule at the Intercontinental 
Hotel that prevented women who were not accompanied by men from entering the hotel bar. 
This was declared discriminatory and unconstitutional. A similar declaration was made in the 
Bhe case where the applicants challenged the customary law rule of male primogeniture that 
the stated first-born son inherited a deceased estate and prevented daughters from inheriting. 
These decisions demonstrate that men can also be gender conscious and identify gender-
specific harm. However, later in this chapter, I argue that the different perspectives women 
judges bring to the bench, not as one voice but as a polytonality of several voices, can greatly 
improve substantive independence and impartiality.  
A third problem with essentialising women and giving them one unique voice is the 
danger of easily getting lost in the detail of ascertaining what this voice is. As mentioned earlier, 
the inference of the voice is that of a woman judge from the global North. Trying to discern 
whether a Zambian or South African judge is speaking with this voice places too much 
emphasis on the detail of the judgment alone, without due attention to the process of reaching 
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the said judgement. For instance, if a woman judge is assumed to be more empathetic, averse 
to conflict and more compassionate, this creates expectations about how a woman judge will 
adjudicate in cases where there is a gendered dimension to the case. A case in point is former 
Judge Thokozile Masipa who presided over the widely publicised S v Pistorius trial, where the 
former Paralympic gold medallist was charged with the murder of his girlfriend.188  
Masipa was heavily criticised for acquitting Pistorius on the charge of murder, with 
many of the frequent comments expressing shock at her decision, ‘especially because she was 
a woman.’ 189 The dismay with Judge Masipa’s decision was in part because she was expected 
to ‘care’ more, because another woman had been killed.190 Here the adverse comments and 
public opinion focused on the factual findings of the judgement, ignoring the process of 
reasoning that informed her decision. Regardless of one’s view on the severity of the sentence 
handed down, Judge Masipa used legal reasoning to apply the law to the facts of the case, as 
judges do in a system that strives to solve legal problems.191 To expect her to adjudicate in a 
particular manner because she is a woman, invariably shackles her and other women judges to 
an unfair standard that seeks to treat them as automatons operating in a singular dimension. 
Ironically, the very argument used to lobby for more gender representation, also diminishes a 
woman’s contribution if it does not conform to a specific ‘type’ of woman. 
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Fourth, a claim that women speak with one voice is problematic because it restricts 
appointing bodies and anybody else involved in the appointment of judges. If a Judicial Service 
Commission (JSC) is made to believe that women speak with one singular voice, it effectively 
provides an excuse not to probe potential appointees on their intellectual and judicial views on 
pertinent subjects of law. If the belief is that women in their compassionate, conflict-averse 
and kind ways will adjudicate in a particular way, there is no need therefore for the appointers 
to expand the pool from which judges are selected.192 After all why should they be encouraged 
to seek women and minorities from the attorneys’ profession, magistracy and academia if those 
who are advocates can adjudicate in the same voice that non-advocates would? Furthermore, 
the stereotypes of women’s behaviour could also be an impediment to women’s aspirations for 
the bench. An example is the JSC interview of now Judge Benita Witcher, who was interviewed 
for a position on the Labour Court of South Africa. Witcher came under severe scrutiny due to 
comments provided to the JSC, which said she was aggressive as an acting judge.193  
Commissioner Julius Malema however, pointed out to the commissioners that 
everybody wants an assertive lawyer and he questioned why this trait was appreciated in men 
and yet considered as aggressive and thus unworthy in women.194 His comments were a firm 
reminder that ideas about how a ‘true woman’ behaves are deeply ingrained in people’s 
consciousness, resulting in the application of a double standard when considering judicial 
candidates. Thus, a focus on what different women can bring to the bench would avoid 
situations like the above mentioned one. It would also encourage bodies to extend the judicial 
pool further into communities or groups which are absent from or under-represented on the 
bench. Ultimately, this thesis is not disputing that the presence of women will make a difference 
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profession, which is mainly white, male and privileged. 
193 JSC interviews held at the President Hotel Bantry Bay on 8 October 2014 where the author was present. 
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on the bench. Gender is but one of many variables which might influence patterns in judgment 
writing, these patterns are nonetheless an important part of situating and understanding a 
judge’s contribution to a given court.195  
What is disputed is that women will make a difference because of the singular voice 
they bring in their adjudication. Malleson summarises various studies that have been 
undertaken in the USA and Israel, which show no clear or consistent differences between men 
and women on the bench.196 She further adds that differences only emerged in cases directly 
related to sex discrimination and even there the findings were mixed.197 Moreover where there 
are differences, these do not necessarily fit with expected gender patterns according to theories 
such as Gilligan’s ethic of care/rights dichotomy.198 Conversely, some research in affirmative 
action cases in the USA has shown that diversity is more likely to move decisions in the 
direction that the law requires.199  
So, does the absence of a distinct voice or the inconsistencies around it deny any 
traceable impact of gender on judging? I submit that it does not; rather the justification for 
including women in the judiciary is precisely the fact that women are not monolithic and not 
speaking in a singular voice. Including women in the ranks of judges will more closely 
approximate varying societal experiences. This is exemplified in Belleau and Johnson’s 
research of dissenting opinions from women judges on the Supreme Court of Canada.200 They 
found that even though the first three women on the bench201 had the highest number of 
 
195 KcaseyMcloughlin,‘“A Particular Disappointment?” Judging Women and the High Court of Australia’, 
Feminist Legal Studies, 23.3 (2015), 273–294 (p. 287). 
196 ‘Kate Malleson 'Justifying Gender Equality On The Bench’, (pp.5-7). 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Baroness Brenda Hale, ‘The Appointment and Removal of Judges: Independence and Diversity’ 8th Biennial 
Conference of the Intenational Association of Women Judges, (Sydney, Australia, 2006), p. 2.  
200 Marie-Claire Belleau and Rebecca Johnson, ‘Judging Gender: Difference and Dissent at the Supreme Court 
of Canada’, International Journal of the Legal Profession, 15.1–2 (2008), 58–70. 
201 Justice Claire Heaureux-Dube, Justice Bertha Wilson and Justice Beverly Mclachlin. 
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dissenting judgements, it did not necessarily mean that they had a shared perspective stemming 
from their feminine essence.202 Rather as the first women, ‘they were positioned distinctively 
in relation to the majority’,203 because of their gender. Yet this shared positioning did not result 
in shared reasoning, simply because they were women. 
Similarly, the findings of an experiment conducted by Erika Rackley to ascertain 
whether her students could guess the correct gender of a judge from anonymised judgments, 
showed no definite difference.204 The students were able to identify the correct gender in only 
46% of the cases. Rackley argues that it is implausible to think that gender does not affect 
judicial decision-making however, ‘there is no reason for thinking that it does so in a particular 
and identifiable way’.205 
 Furthermore, having chronicled the performance of Australia’s first women high court 
judges, Mcloughlin noted the disappointment of commentators with the fact that women were 
not different in the ways that had originally been hypothesised.206 She writes that difference is 
defined as being invidious, because exhibiting any kind of difference is inimical to the judicial 
role. Hence, she believes that there is a need to reconceptualise difference. This would involve 
recasting not only how we understand difference itself, but also expectations around who might 
make that difference and how the difference should be made.207 It is this reconceptualization 
that I turn to in my discussion on substantive independence. 
 
202 Marie-Claire Belleau and Rebecca Johnson ‘Judging Gender: Difference and Dissent at the Supreme Court of 
Canada’, International Journal of the Legal Profession, 15.1 (2008), 58–70 (p. 62). 
203 Ibid p. 63. 
204 Erika Rackley ‘Judgment Day for Gender Is Diversity Crucial in Court’, The Conversation, 8 June 2013, 
available at <http://theconversation.com/judgment-day-for-gender-is-diversity-crucial-in-court-15273>, 
[accessed on 1 October 2016]. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Kcasey Mcloughin, ‘“A Particular Disappointment?” Judging Women and the High Court of Australia’, 
(p.274). 
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2.4 SEEING A DIVERSE JUDICIARY AS A PUBLIC GOOD: AN INDEPENDENT 
JUDICIARY IS A STRONG JUDICIARY 
2.4.1 Redefining Substantive Independence  
Sonia Lawrence posits that judicial independence like any concept worth its salt, is not 
particularly well defined and thus attempts at definition are cabined by jurisdiction or limited 
to the world of theory.208 Article 2 of the Siracusa Draft Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary states that judicial independence means: 
(a) That every judge is free to decide matters before him in accordance with his 
assessment of the facts and his understanding of the law without any improper 
influences, inducements, or pressures, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any 
reason, and 
(b) That the Judiciary is independent of the Executive and Legislature, and has 
jurisdiction, directly or by way of review…209 
The Bangalore Principles disseminated two decades later charge judges to uphold and 
exemplify independence in both its institutional and individual aspects.210 The application of 
such independence it is stated, requires a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any 
extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from 
any quarter or for any reason.211 Thus, judicial independence is often equated with the court’s 
ability to act sincerely according to its own preferences and judgements.212 
 The court’s ability to do so is of course premised on the conduct of its judges. Any 
undue interference whether external or internal has the ability not only to damage the quality 
of justice, but also to place individual judges in a precarious position. Despite numerous 
 
208 Sonia Lawrence, ‘Reflections: On Judicial Diversity and Judicial Independence’, in Judicial Independence in 
Context, ed. by Adam Dodek & Lorne Sossin (Toronto: Irwin law Inc, 2010), pp. 193–219. 
209 Committee of Experts, Draft Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary: Siracusa Principles (Sicily, 
1981). 
210 ‘Judicial Group Strengthening Judicial Integrity', in The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (The 
Hague, 2002) <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf> [accessed 
on 15 February 2017. 
211 Article 1.1 of the Principles. 
212 Shipan Charles Ferejohn John and Rosenbluth Frances, Comparative Judicial Politics, The Oxford Handbook 
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guidelines on judicial independence,213 contention continues to exist because the role of the 
courts has evolved over time and judges find themselves adjudicating matters that are 
seemingly political, as opposed to just commercial and criminal law matters.214 This in turn 
gives rise to a myriad of sources and forms of interference. The more insidious the interference, 
the less likely it is that a judge will quickly become aware of it and resist its effects. Issues such 
as security of tenure are often a common agenda item in discussions on independence, because 
it is believed that if judges know their job is secure, they are less likely to fall prey to such 
undue interference.215  
Former South African Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson described tenure as an essential 
component of independence, but not a sufficient guarantee of such.216 In trying to provide 
solutions to prevent undue interference, efforts are often aimed at defending against executive 
interference, public opinion and even interference from one’s Chief Justice; these are 
commonly recognised as sources of judicial interference.217 The focus is more on substantive 
independence than formal independence (also known as institutional independence). Formal 
independence involves the question of whether the judicial appointment procedures at the 
various courts require judges to be independent.218 Swart differentiates this from substantive 
independence, which occurs when a judge acts independently and impartially in a concrete case 
before her/him.219  
 
213 Amongst others, Article 26 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981. 
214 Tabeth Masengu, ‘The Vulnerability of African Judges in Contemporary Africa: Alarming Trends’, Africa 
Today, 63.4 (2017), 3-19. 
215 Brian Opeskin, ‘Models of Judicial Tenure: Reconsidering Life Limits, Age Limits and Term Limits for 
Judges’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 35.4 (2015), 627-33. 
216 Susannah Cowen, in Judicial Selection in South Africa, First (Cape town: Democratic Governance and 
Rights Unit, 2013). 
217 Incidences have occurred in Swaziland, Botswana and the Gambia in the last thirteen years where the Chief 
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218 Mia Swart, ‘Judicial Independence at the Regional and Sub-Regional African Courts’, South African Public 
Law, 29.1 (2014), 388–406. 
219 Also referred to as normative or internal independence by others such as John Ferejohn, ‘Independent Judges, 
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Shetreet’s definition of substantive independence specifically states that in the 
discharge of a judge’s official functions, he/she must be subject to no one and to nothing but 
the law and his conscience.220 In Shetreet’s definition, it is presumed that a judge’s conscience 
is not a source of undue influence or concern, that one’s conscience is without bias or untainted 
and thus it can offer no interference. I advance a contradictory perspective and argue that this 
is an incorrect presumption, because judges are products of personal experiences and different 
backgrounds that can and do influence how they see life and adjudicate matters.221 It is 
suggested that the definition of substantive independence should include the ability to 
recognise and be free from one’s personal proclivities or as Dugard referred to it, one’s 
‘inarticulate premise’.222 
 Dugard defines one’s inarticulate premise as the presence of concealed factors or 
hidden agendas, that play a major role in the judicial function.223 The presence of the 
inarticulate premise means that as long as the judicial function is entrusted to human beings, 
not automatons, subconscious prejudices and preferences will never be completely removed 
from the judicial process.224 Thus, it is suggested that a rarely discussed aspect of substantive 
independence is the extent to which a judge has knowledge of which prejudices and preferences 
inform their inarticulate premise. The lack of attention to this, creates a lacuna because one can 
not search for creative ways to counter what has not been identified. Lawrence proposes that 
this gap exists because the links between diversity, legitimacy and impartiality do not explicitly 
mention judicial independence despite a connection.225 Hence, eminent academic Iyiola 
Solanke has suggested that the definition of judicial independence needs to be modernised so 
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that diversity is considered integral to judicial independence and not complementary.226 
Therefore trying to establish the link between judicial independence and diversity on the bench, 
brings in new questions and opens new areas for research and policy-making.227 Efforts at 
establishing the link between judicial independence and diversity start with noting the 
centrality of an extended definition of substantive independence.  
As Ifill explains, judges are situated actors who, like members of the community, see 
the world through their own knowledge and experience and ascending to the bench does not 
strip them of pre-existing values and embedded cultural experiences.228 It is well known that 
the judicial oath requires that a judge administer her/his role without fear, favour or prejudice. 
This is a worthy duty to demand from those tasked with the heavy responsibility of dispensing 
justice. Nevertheless, taking the judicial oath does not miraculously strip a judge of his or her 
previous experiences. Different jurisprudential schools of thought may be an acceptable basis 
for differentiation of judicial opinion,229 but biases arising from differences in such factors as 
political view, race, gender, ethnic background or religion are not.230 If one concedes that a 
judge’s inarticulate premise means that a judge can be subject to subconscious prejudices, can 
those subconscious prejudices be exposed if there is diversity amongst judges? If so, what is 
the clear connection between diversity and substantive independence and how is this useful? 
To answer these questions, former South African Constitutional Court Justice Kate O’Regan 
offers insight into the role of judges. 
 
226 Iyiola Solanke, Courts, Social Change, Judicial Independence, Courts, Social Change and Judicial 
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230 Joanne Fedler and Olckers Ilze, Ideological Virgins and Other Myths: Six Principles for Legal Revisioning 
(Pretoria: Justice College, 2001). 
 
 
50 
 
2.4.2 Finding strength in differences: independence from one’s inarticulate premise 
O’Regan states that the task of judging in a democracy ‘demands more of judges than that they 
merely give effect to a world-view inherited from their particular backgrounds’.231 It demands 
a self-conscious appreciation of the impact of their judge’s background on their way of 
thinking’.232 Judges apply legal doctrine, but they do so by employing their own interpretation 
of the law. Moreover, when permitted, they at times use judicial discretion to make decisions, 
in a manner that is not easily challenged. The self-conscious appreciation O’Regan refers to 
entails that a judge not only admit to the possibility of being affected by their world view 
(regardless of their oath), but that they critically consider how they can avoid internal undue 
interference.  
An appreciation of the possibility of undue influence from one’s inarticulate premise 
does not mean that society expects a ‘perfect’ judge, who has no baggage. Such a judge does 
not exist and in any case the definition of what is a perfect judge would be open to contestation. 
It does mean though, that a judge should be open to interrogating their own perspectives and 
receptive to having their perspectives challenged; or as Martha Minow describes it, ‘being 
willing to be surprised, rather than always confirmed’.233 To reach a stage where one is willing 
to be surprised, one has to be exposed to views or perspectives that are unlike what they have 
known before. The more alike the judges are, the more likely that they will mistake prejudices 
for simple truths; the more different they are, the more likely that they will interrogate the 
correctness of their assumptions.234  
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This is why O’Regan opines that a collegial court with different members enables 
judges to interrogate their own prejudices or blind-spots.235 This reasoning is applicable to 
many institutions and not just the courts, as a homogenous group breeds comfort which 
eventually makes it harder to accept anything different. Homogenous sections function on 
shared interests, values, lifestyles and even habits with no regard for anything outside this 
group because anything outside their mould is unnecessary for their existence. For example, 
male dominated spaces such as the legal system and the judiciary have viewed women as alien 
to the system or as the ‘other’. As a result, women have been met with dismissal, deliberate 
ignorance or simple aversion.236  
Yet, there is ample proof that a diversity of judges in courts worldwide has only 
strengthened deliberations and added richness to jurisprudence. Former justice of the US 
Supreme Court Thurgood Marshall is often touted as one of the greatest jurisprudential minds 
of that court, not only because of his jurisprudential acumen, but because his presence 
challenged his colleagues in their previously steeped understanding of law and society.237 In 
the words of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: 
at oral arguments and conference meetings, in opinions and dissents, Justice Marshall 
imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life experiences, constantly pushing 
and prodding us to respond not only to the persuasiveness of legal argument but also 
to the power of moral truth’.238  
The moral truth evoked by Justice Marshall was very much influenced by his experiences as 
an African American man growing up and living in a system that discriminated against African 
American people for so long. His objective was not only to challenge his colleagues to re-
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examine their preconceived notions of justice, but also to alert them to the lived experiences of 
people like ‘him’.239  
Likewise former Canadian Supreme Court justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubé’s enduring 
legal legacy will be her emphasis on equality rights in Canadian society.240 As the first female 
justice on the Supreme Court from the province of Quebec241 and only the second woman 
justice on the court, she was known to dissent from her colleagues many a time. She saw her 
dissents as a sign of judicial independence, but also as an opportunity to have a dialogue with 
colleagues and point out weaknesses in the majority judgement.242 She also famously stated 
that ‘law is not for lawyers, nor for academics; it is for people’243 and was known to be very 
candid with colleagues when she believed that they were straying from making law about the 
people.244  
Sir Sydney Kentridge, who once acted as a justice of the South African Constitutional 
Court, commented on his experience there: 
[W]hat I found overwhelming was the depth and variety of [the judges’] experiences of 
law and of life. This diversity illuminated our conferences especially when competing 
interests, individual, governmental and social, had to be weighed. I have no doubt that 
this diversity gave the court as a whole a maturity of judgment it would not otherwise 
have had. Yet no-one, black, white, male or female was representing any 
constituency.245 
The result of the diversity that Kentridge experienced underpins the deliberative argument in 
favour of diversity. Advocates of this argument posit that a proportionally diverse judiciary 
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provides an opportunity for the development of channels of communication, openness, 
mediation, and mutual understanding.246 While the essence of this argument applies mostly to 
a collegial court where a bench has more than one judge sitting in a matter, it is submitted that 
it can go further than that. Even when judges sit alone, the presence of other judges in their 
divisions, tea rooms or hallway that are unlike them, can have the purpose of exposing them to 
otherwise unconsidered views. 
 High Court judges who preside single-handedly have found that tearoom exchanges 
with other judges assist them, when they are adjudicating complex matters. It has been said 
that discussions with fellow judges have enlightened a judge’s perspectives on their case and 
provided a vantage point they had not previously considered.247 A dialogue I witnessed 
amongst a group of four women judges from different High Courts of South Africa, of different 
races and backgrounds, illustrates this point best. The judges shared notes on common issues 
that widows faced in their courts, regarding inheritance. There was an agreement on the 
gendered implications of the dissolution of intestate estate on women. However they differed 
on their views of how a judge should approach the intestate consequences of customary law 
marriages. 248  
Customary law marriages are defined as marriages negotiated, celebrated or concluded 
according to any of the systems of indigenous African customary law that exist in South 
Africa.249 It was previously enough that customary law marriages were concluded with the 
permission of the given community. Unlike civil law marriages, they did not need to be 
 
246 Devlin, MacKay, and Kim, 'Reducing the Democractic Deficit', p. 795. 
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registered. However, the Recognition of Customary Law Marriages Act250 was enacted to 
ensure that these marriages were registered with the Department of Home Affairs to protect the 
position of women in customary law marriages.251 There was common agreement amongst the 
judges, that many women did not know that customary law marriages should be registered, and 
this often came to light when their husband was deceased. To compound matters further, this 
realisation often arose in instances where the deceased had died intestate and the spouse’s 
inheritance was being threatened by the appearance of ‘another’ wife.  
The judges reported that this other ‘wife’ would be supported by the relations of the 
deceased, who would deny any knowledge of the first wife. The white woman judge in the 
group questioned why there was often such a great emphasis on the familial denial in these 
cases, because it was common practice for witnesses to deny parties and/or change statements 
in court. The African women judges explained that a customary law marriage relied on 
representatives of both families being involved in discussions and bride price negotiations.252 
There were no written documents or signed certificate as in a civil marriage and the marriage 
stood by an oral agreement, sometimes followed by a celebration. A denial by the deceased’s 
family of the wife’s marriage to the alleged husband, meant that the widow would lose more 
than just an inheritance from the deceased estate because she could not prove the marriage. 
This denial was not just considered an insult to those family members who had negotiated her 
marriage, but it also meant that the widow’s status as the ‘daughter’ of the deceased’s family 
would be lost.  
Consequently, her standing in the community would suffer because marriage made one 
a part of the man’s family and made the husband’s family responsible for the bride. The 
 
250 Department of Home Affairs, Recognition of Customary Law Marriages Act (South Africa: South African 
Parliament, 1998). 
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importance of what the wife would be losing therefore went further than just the property 
benefits that would be derived from a deceased estate. It was the loss of identity that was at 
stake and the dignity of her family too.253 This explanation though not a legal consideration in 
inheritance matters, was enlightening for the white judge who had never had that aspect 
explained to her in court. She was able to understand the significance of taking a bit more time 
and going beyond the approach typical of a civil marriage enquiry, in cases regarding 
customary law marriages and intestate estates. 
This example epitomises the need for strengthening substantive independence, by 
recognising the need to be independent from one’s inarticulate premise. This is not just about 
reaching an outcome with an untainted view, free from one’s own personal views and baggage. 
It is also about the process of reaching that outcome. The judge in question who learnt from 
her colleagues may still arrive at the same conclusion in similar cases involving customary law, 
but the process of arriving at it will now be enriched by an understanding that was previously 
missing. This process I suggest, is one which takes into consideration the majority and minority 
narratives, especially in societies that have been fractured by previous systems of racial, ethnic 
or other types of segregation.254 A judge’s thought process should also involve a recognition 
that one’s perspective on truth as a judge is not always the only truth available in instances 
where societal factors are involved. 
 It is conceded however, that this expanded notion of substantive independence is built 
on the presumption that ‘legal decision-making is a rational and deliberative process; that is, 
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after lawyers on either side present their arguments, judges then retire to ponder and discuss 
the arguments with their colleagues’.255 ‘A pivotal assumption of this argument is that judges 
actually approach a problem with a relatively open mind and are willing to be persuaded by the 
process of discursive engagement.' 256 If not persuaded, then at least that judge will consider 
what has been offered, as advice or reasoning by other judges. Considering advice from 
colleagues is not a matter of replacing one’s inarticulate premise with that of your colleagues, 
because that would be undue influence of another type. It is rather to allow room for one’s 
premise to be exhibited, analysed and explained if need be.  
Experience informs understanding and the more that judges engage with the 
experiences of others by mingling and communicating with a diverse group, the more informed 
their understanding of life will be. Former Justice of the Zambian Supreme Court Florence 
Mumba257 once said:  
the cause of justice has moulded social values regarding doctrines and different 
interpretations of law, which all lead to justice as understood by different communities 
in the world. I have come to learn that justice does accommodate a diversity of social 
values for different peoples on earth.258 
This is more reason why different people should be on the courts, so that these different social 
values can be shared, heard and debated amongst one another. The process of getting to a 
decision can be enriched by having different kinds of women on the bench. Women from 
different cultures, ethnicities, race, social status, professional background and differently abled 
can all contribute to a reshaping of reality for those that are different from them. 
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 This is illustrated by Justices Kate O’Regan and Yvonne Mokgoro who were the first 
and only women on the South African Constitutional Court for twelve years of their tenure.259 
While they had commonalities in gender and being outsiders on the bench, they had different 
experiences that informed the way they saw matters before them. In the case of President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo260, a male prisoner had challenged the 
constitutionality of Presidential Act No. 17 (the Presidential Act) signed by President Nelson 
Mandela pardoning approximately 440 imprisoned mothers but not fathers of children under 
the age of 12.261 While both justices arrived at the conclusion that the Presidential Act was not 
unconstitutional, they did so for different reasons.  
Justice Mokgoro argued that the Presidential Act amounted to unfair discrimination262 
because the reasons for the Presidential Act were stemmed in gender stereotyping.263 However 
she found that the discrimination was justified and therefore not unconstitutional. She reasoned 
that referring to mothers as special caregivers of children and primary caregivers deprived 
women of fair opportunities and saw fathers as less capable. Mokgoro submitted that women 
had been prevented ‘from gaining economic self-sufficiency, or forging identities for 
themselves independent of their roles as wives and mothers’.264 However, she concluded that 
the aim of easing the plight of South African children was extremely important and that every 
possible opportunity should be taken to further that aim. Thus the temporary denial of 
parenthood to fathers (the unfair discrimination), was justifiable when related to the interests 
of the children whose mothers were released.265  
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O’Regan on the other hand found the discrimination to be fair because she found it 
generally true that mothers do play a special role and they bear a great burden.266 She further 
added that the social fact of the role played by mothers in child-rearing and more particularly 
the inequality which results from it, was troubling. She opined that child-rearing is not shared 
between mothers and fathers and would not be shared in the near future. In O’Regan’s view, 
the discrimination in this case caused no significant harm to mothers and no severe harm to the 
interests of fathers267.  
The different rationale for arriving at the same conclusion regarding the 
constitutionality of the Presidential Act, is an apt example of how different perspectives can 
inform two judges, even if they are both women. Baines advises that ‘scholars should read their 
judgments together as a dialogue about the existence of two distinctive approaches to analysing 
substantive equality’.268 These distinct approaches could be as a result of ideological 
differences, or even the different backgrounds of the two Justices −despite their gender being 
a common factor. This is further proof that women judges do not speak with one voice, but in 
multiple voices that seek to ‘reveal and recall the importance of multiple perspectives in the 
adjudication process’.269 If a judge’s individual decision-making process is strengthened by 
diversity, then the next step is to connect this to impartiality. Impartiality I argue, is the external 
manifestation of whether a judge is substantively independent or not. 
2.5 IMPARTIALITY EXPLORED 
2.5.1 Impartiality and bias 
The previous section extended the definition of substantive independence to include an 
awareness of and freedom from one’s inarticulate premise. Thus, substantive independence as 
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defined here is more concerned with the internal process of judicial behaviour, as opposed to 
the outward demonstration of judicial independence. I argue that this is different from 
impartiality, but the two go hand in hand. The tainting of the internal process leads to a lack of 
impartiality. Judicial independence at its root, is also concerned with impartiality in appearance 
and in fact.270 Independence is not a perk of judicial office. It is a guarantee of the institutional 
conditions of impartiality.271 The ability to be impartial is elevated as a central quality, indeed 
an imperative of judging, irrespective of jurisdiction.272 Yet the definition of impartiality 
encompasses many issues and can be as broad as one allows it to be.  
The judicial oath requires that judges put aside any preference for or partiality towards 
any parties or arguments. This necessitates that a judge does not predetermine a matter, neither 
does she/he decide on a matter before them based on a particular affiliation. Above all else 
judges are expected to be, impartial arbiters so that legal disputes are decided according to the 
law free from the influence of bias or prejudice.273 Bias is deeply abhorred in law because it 
favours one litigant or disfavours one litigant to the benefit of the other. A perception of bias 
can be formed if there is an improper relationship between the adjudicator and a litigant, if 
there is a past personal or business relationship, or even a proclivity based on a common ground 
such as gender or race. Numerous works have chronicled the rampant bias in the American, 
South African and Canadian judicial system amongst others based on racial partisanship.274  
In the Zambian case of Priscilla Mwenya Kamanga v the Attorney-General and Hon. 
Ng’andu Peter Magande, the appellants argued that a decision by the High Court trial judge to 
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call five witnesses in an election petition matter after the respondents had closed their case, 
amounted to bias in favour of the respondents.275 Counsel for the petitioner argued that bias 
has two limbs - namely actual and perceived bias and that ‘when an allegation of perceived 
bias is alleged and proved, then the decision by the adjudicator should be rendered a nullity’.276 
The court however, stressed that the question should be whether a fair-minded informed person 
could conclude that the judge was biased in favour of a party and in this case, they could not 
because judges were permitted to call additional witnesses.277 The proper approach to 
allegations of bias is for judges to first search for personal bias and an assessment of 
impropriety and then assess whether the circumstances create an appearance of bias, through 
the eyes of the public.278  
Though an allegation of bias may lead to a recusal application, a request for recusal on 
the basis of bias should not be taken lightly. This was the caution given in President of the 
Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union,279 the leading South African 
case on bias and impartiality. In this matter, the issue was the constitutionality of two notices 
issued by the late president Nelson Mandela. There were allegations of bias against the High 
Court judge and five Constitutional Court justices, by the appellants and fourth respondent 
respectively. The Constitutional Court highlighted that a presumption in favour of a judge’s 
impartiality must be taken into account in deciding whether such a reasonable litigant, would 
have a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer was or might be biased.280 The dangers 
 
275Priscilla Mwenya Kamanga v the Attorney General and Hon. Ng’andu Peter Magande, 2007, p. SCZ Appeal 
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of bias are so damaging, that there are those who promote a judicial function that stresses 
disengagement and calls for judges who are disinterested, detached, and dispassionate.281  
However, this view of a dispassionate and detached judge is idealistic because 
impartiality cannot mean absolute objectivity. Justice Yacoob further adds that if absolute 
objectivity were possible, it would be bad because ‘after all we are judging human beings.’282 
Graycar quotes Cardozo who succinctly opined that ‘true impartiality does not require that the 
judge have no sympathies or opinions; it requires that the judge nevertheless be free to entertain 
and act upon different points of view with an open mind.’283 The idea of an open mind is also 
echoed by Erika Rackley in stating that ‘judicial impartiality might be understood as an open 
mind rather than a blank slate, as situated rather than non-situated.’284 It means acknowledging 
that one can never be truly dispassionate or detached, but one should still strive to find the 
correct balance between subjectivity and objectivity.  
Once a judge is substantively independent as discussed in the earlier section, the pursuit 
of impartiality is encouraged. This is because a judge can now internally prepare themselves to 
see the world differently with a view to listening to what litigants have to say regardless of 
what they look like. Such a judge is more likely to make a conscientious effort at impartiality 
and dispassion, than one who believes that his/her elevation to the bench makes him/her at once 
the dehumanised instrument of infallible logical truth.285 The conscientious effort taking place 
will be externally demonstrated in the way a judge treats parties before them. How the evidence 
is appraised, how legal representatives and witnesses are spoken to, the type of obiter dicta 
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expressed by the judge and others, are an indication of whether a judge is applying partial 
justice or not. 
 A greater understanding of how diversity enhances impartiality requires that we 
recognise the societal context in which every judiciary operates. This is important because race, 
class, ability and other forms of societal attributes can influence one’s vantage point, for better 
or for worse. Dugard opined that during apartheid, judges were drawn only from the white 
minority and they all had one commonality – loyalty to the status quo.286 However a judge’s 
inarticulate premise was exhibited in various ways, depending on the background and outlook 
of that judge. Some were more antagonised by ‘social intercourse between races’ and others 
by ‘radical political change’.287 While the judiciary no longer operates as it did before the 
democratic era, the essence of Dugard’s point remains.  
 Judiciaries globally are operating in a new era, one where technology has given room 
to financial cyber-crime, international child pornography syndicates and revenge pornography. 
On a scrutiny of the jurisdictions in this study, Zambia a deeply conservative country must now 
grapple with the question of whether the morality of the country as a Christian nation, is more 
important than an individual’s sexual orientation. South Africa is faced with unprecedented 
matters before the equality courts regarding hate speech and the increased judicialisation of 
politics before the courts. There is a greater need now for a diversity of judges who can 
adjudicate these matters, while informed by different backgrounds and outlooks. In the absence 
of this, there is a danger of undermining the judicial oath of impartiality both in and outside the 
court. 
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To illustrate this point, it is necessary to refer to the matter of former South African 
Judge Mabel Jansen.288 On 8 May 2016, various messages between Judge Jansen and media 
social activist Gillian Schutte were shared on twitter, sparking an outcry because of the 
substance of the communication from the judge.289 In Facebook posts and messages from 2015, 
Judge Jansen made a number of allegations about black men. She said that rape was part of 
black culture and that ‘99 percent of criminal cases I hear are of black fathers/uncles/brothers 
raping children as young as 5 years old’.290 She also stated that she was yet to meet a young 
black girl who hadn’t been raped by 12. She went on further to say: 
…murder is also no biggy. And gang rapes of baby, daughter and mother, a pleasurable 
pastime. That in reality is the flipside of the coin. They are simply now in a position to 
branch out and include white women.’291 
Judge Jansen was placed on special leave, but strongly defended her statements saying that that 
was her experience in the criminal court.  
Charges of crimen injuria were laid against Jansen and a formal complaint was made 
to the JSC by Vuyani Ngalwana SC.292 In his complaint, he noted that Jansen explained on 
twitter that her comments had been made confidentially and were taken ‘out of context’.293 
Ngalwana SC submitted that amongst others, Jansen’s conduct was prejudicial to judicial 
independence and impartiality and a breach of her oath to uphold the Constitution and treat 
people alike without fear, favour or prejudice.294 Additionally he submitted that she could not 
remain manifestly impartial in cases involving black men and that Jansen had shown herself to 
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be manifestly prejudiced.295The Black Lawyers Association (BLA)296 also expressed their 
‘disgust and disbelief’ at the repulsive racist utterances’297 made by Jansen and requested a 
review of all criminal cases involving rape or murder where the accused or victims were black 
persons.298 
 The expressions of disbelief and disgust expressed by BLA were shared by a number 
of South Africans and Schutte later explained why she had exposed Jansen.299 Schutte wrote 
that what was outrageous was that ‘[a] person who is supposed to epitomise neutrality and 
integrity in all her cases was revealing her innermost thoughts about blackness.’300 Jansen, in 
her position as a judge expressed prejudice and made pronouncements on the character and 
lifestyles of black men and women. Despite her objections, her impartiality had been 
compromised in two ways. Firstly, having decided that rape is part of black culture, any male 
accused of rape, sexual assault and even murder could not reasonably believe that they could 
get a fair trial in her court.  
Secondly, any black female victim of rape or sexual assault would already be assumed 
to have been ‘exposed’ to such behaviour from a young age or as Jansen said, ‘raped by the 
time they were 12’, and thus in her eyes would be less of a victim than a white woman in the 
same situation. Jansen strongly denied any impropriety, but there can be no doubt that as a 
judge, she has tainted her role as an impartial adjudicator who would apply the law without 
fear, favour or prejudice. This example was specifically selected to emphasise important 
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aspects. Firstly, I referred to a matter involving a woman judge particularly because one’s 
gender does not make one a less partial judge. Women bring different perspectives to the bench; 
these perspectives can be good or bad. Jansen who previously had succinctly narrated the 
challenges of sexism and discrimination that women face in the advocates’ profession, was 
blind to her own racial discrimination and bias.301 
 Multiple perspectives in a judiciary do not only arise from women, but from men too. 
The essence of my argument is that until the judiciary has a large number of women, a full 
spectrum of perspectives will be absent in courts. Secondly, while gender places women in a 
unique position, the intersections of discrimination and the effect of such cannot be ignored. 
Jansen was a white woman whose comments were borne from the view of a woman rightly 
horrified by rape. However, by stating that black rapists were now able to extend their reach to 
white women, Jansen inferred that raping white women was a graver crime than raping black 
women. Thus, knowingly or unknowingly, she extended the racial discrimination to black 
women. Finally, the Jansen example is ample evidence that a judge is not stripped of their 
predilections and baggage once they take the judicial oath and ascend to the bench.302 It is only 
when the existence of life experience is acknowledged, that we can propose a way of action 
that can strengthen the judiciary. 
2.5.2 To have or not to have: Should judges bring life experience and baggage to the 
bench? 
The acknowledgment of a judge’s inarticulate premise brings into question issues of 
impartiality. In striving for impartiality, a common area of confusion is whether a judge’s life 
experiences can render them less or more impartial.303 Martha Minow’s article that addresses 
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this confusion was inspired by the American Supreme Court confirmation hearing of Justice 
Clarence Thomas in 1991. 304 In the hearing, he famously stated, ‘as a judge [y]ou want to be 
stripped down like a runner,’ and ‘shed the baggage of ideology’.305 This statement Minnow 
argues, created confusion about the links between impartiality, knowledge and experience. She 
further adds ‘that the confusion is particularly pronounced because the ultimate goal of fairness 
in our society includes notions of representation as well as ideas of neutrality’.306 Stripping 
down like a runner and ridding oneself of ideologies sounds correct in theory, but it actually 
amounts to more of an aspiration than a description - because it may suppress the inevitability 
of the existence of a perspective.307  
A perspective can be borne from various life experiences and acquired knowledge, and 
it can enrich adjudication, if properly understood. When misunderstood, a perspective can lead 
to questions about a judge’s impartiality. For instance, women have faced accusations of bias 
because of their membership in a minority group or involvement in prior civil rights 
struggles.308 Globally women judges have faced a backlash for being feminist judges, making 
decisions that go against family values or being too sympathetic to accused persons of a 
previously disadvantaged race.309 They have also been attacked when they point out the 
presence of sexism and gender discrimination in written judgments from superior courts or 
those written by their male colleagues.310 In addition, women judges have also been accused 
of being biased if they do not conform to a ‘standard’. Ironically this standard is itself partial 
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because it is based on the notion of an objective judge who is white and male, of particular 
privileged background and who supposedly has no prejudices himself.311  
 Graycar expertly points out that ‘whiteness or maleness are not viewed as impediments 
to impartiality precisely because they are not recognised as positions as all’.312 However judges 
who are non-white, and therefore racialised as ‘other’ or those who respond to decisions that 
make explicit reference to gender, race or unequal race relations are viewed differently.313 
Unlike their white, male counterparts, they are seen as being positioned (as opposed to neutral 
and impartial) if they go against what is considered to be objective. This is the case even though 
there is some subjectivity in the definition of neutrality. How is the standard decided, and what 
is the benchmark? What classifies one form of adjudication as neutral and objective because it 
ignores societal factors, while the other is biased because it considers societal factors that affect 
a litigant’s everyday life? Malleson suggests that in interpreting impartiality itself we should 
consider that legal decision-making has systematically favoured men and disadvantaged 
women.314 If this is acknowledged, then what is contested is the application of what is 
considered to be impartial, rather than the principle of impartiality itself.  
If instances arise where women judges give more weight to women’s perspectives, 
values and interests, it does not mean they are acting with favour or being biased. Rather it 
could be argued that they are correcting the existing partiality of judicial decision-making.315 
Simply put, if litigants were treated partially because the judicial decision-making system did 
not appreciate their voices, allowing those litigants a voice and giving credence to it in 
judgments, is arguably a means of ‘putting things right.’ Former justice of the International 
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Criminal Court Sanji Monageng appears to agree with this view. When asked whether some 
women judges were biased towards women’s rights, she responded: ‘if those women do not, 
then who will? Some women who are not feminists will not, so I have never apologized for 
that'.316 
This perceived bias I argue, is because the presence of women judges, who themselves 
had been outsiders on the bench, creates room for the consideration of previously unheard 
voices and perspectives. This does not mean that the purpose of the presence of women judges 
is to judge from the standpoint of their ‘femaleness’. Rather, Mcrobie advances that problems 
are created when one gender-group dominates the system and determines what is considered 
to be ‘just’.317 A gender-equal judiciary she argues, ‘would neutralise the problems – for justice, 
for fairness and for a society’.318 The more women there are for male judges to interact with 
and to challenge long held previously considered patterns, the more those male colleagues will 
also be inclined to hear women litigants better. This may not necessarily result in decisions that 
will always favour women or previously disadvantaged litigants, but it will at least mean more 
judges who have an open mind rather than a blank slate.  
It will mean that judiciaries have judges who are not just able to use what they know 
but are able to suspend their conclusions (based on that knowledge), long enough to be 
surprised.319 The same should be true of women judges who can also benefit from having their 
perspectives challenged by male judges. Critically, the point is that all judges must suspend 
their inarticulate premises long enough to consider an alternative perspective to what they have 
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known, or what they believe they already know. Consider Rackley who refers to such judges 
as having ‘good bias’:  
that is, preferences and affections that facilitate the gathering of knowledge… and lead 
us to the truth... a judge with the special ability to listen with connection before 
engaging in the separation that accompanies judgment and who is willing to walk in the 
shoes of others.320 
She acknowledges that difference can act as a catalyst for disruption. Therefore in the 
circumstance of reworking traditional notions of the judge and judging, she emphasises the 
importance of 'listening with connection' and contextualisation.321 The crucial aspect of 
diversity strengthening impartiality, is that judges will still apply law, and legal doctrine is not 
suspended. However, it is informed by jurists who can assess the evidence before them with an 
open mind. 
In such instances, women are not making a difference because they speak in one 
singular voice; but rather they are using their multiple voices (and at times not using them), in 
order to listen and connect with litigants. With the variety of experiences and perspectives that 
women bring, they can challenge male colleagues to consider that there is truth in views that 
had been previously dismissed. Further, that there may be an alternative way of viewing the 
very same evidence that they have viewed before. Sian Elias, the former Chief Justice of New 
Zealand remarked: 
[t]o fulfil their roles, judges need insight into societies so that they can convince others 
of what is demonstrably justified, reasonable and fair. Women and minorities are well 
suited to participate in justified judging because their experiences do not prompt 
complacency, or certainty-they know how to listen and watch.322 
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Impartiality is not about a different type of justice for different people but rather a different 
way of perceiving the lives of those whose matters are in the hands of judges, in a way that 
acknowledges their self-worth and does not ignore the reality of their lives.  
Impartiality is not ‘some stance above the fray, but the characteristic of judgments that 
takes into account the perspectives of others in the judging.’323 Taking into account previously 
excluded groups such as women, both as judges and as litigants, does not only assist in 
dismantling hierarchies and the gendered notion of impartiality, it also creates room for a new 
type of jurisprudence. One that sees the participants in the judicial system including 
traditionally marginalised groups, not just as subjects of inquiry but as producers of 
knowledge.324 
2.5.3 Substantive independence, impartiality and the judicial appointment process 
The judicial appointment process carries great risk and reward, irrespective of what type of 
jurisdiction is concerned. Whether judges are elected, appointed solely by the executive, as in 
some American states, or by appointment commissions as in some jurisdictions,325 the risks of 
appointing the ‘wrong’ judges are grave.326 The wrong judges could be lacking in 
independence, impartiality, honesty and competence and that is why van Zyl Smit emphasises 
the importance of a reliable appointment process.327 The danger is particularly acute because 
in most jurisdictions it is difficult to remove judges once in office. While security of tenure is 
an important element of an independent judiciary, it also needs to be informed by an 
appointment process that is legitimate in the eyes of the public and is free from discrimination. 
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Wynn and Mazur make numerous illuminating submissions that support the connection of 
substantive independence and impartiality to the process of judicial appointments. 
 Firstly, they highlight that judicial selection issues always involve a balancing of 
judicial independence and accountability.328 The former entails immunity from extra-legal 
pressure while the latter seeks to be responsive democratically to the public.329 Secondly, they 
argue that a judge has a judicial predisposition and that any discussion touting a particular 
judicial selection method, is irrelevant if substantive ideological and narrative judicial diversity 
is absent.330 Substantive ideological diversity is informed by a greater range of perspectives 
from different professional and life experiences. It cannot be present where judges are drawn 
from a single preferred experience, for example privately educated, and privileged, like many 
advocates/barristers. Narrative diversity occurs when there is a pool of different ethnic, racial, 
cultural, and gender applicants from which to select judicial officers. 
Wynn and Mazur further contend that ‘the absence of diversity creates (in fact) a 
judicial partiality to the values and stories of the groups over-represented − white men − in its 
midst’.331 In this research, men are the over-represented group in the countries studied. South 
Africa has made great strides in having a more racially diverse bench332 and Zambia is devoid 
of the racial history that South Africa possesses. Wynn and Mazur advise that accordingly, in 
the pursuit to attain an independent and impartial judiciary, we cannot escape the reality and 
consequences that each judge brings to the bench a sum of life experience.333 These life 
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experiences can be used for ill or for good, but there is no denying that they inform substantive 
independence and impartiality which are aspects of judicial independence in its totality.  
Third, they suggest also that judicial impartiality is actually not the absence of 
experience, but rather the presence of human experience coupled with an open mind.334 They 
further elaborate that judicial independence and judicial accountability, when defined 
phraselogically, represent the social value of promoting impartiality in the administration of 
justice by seeking representation in the decision making process.335 I propose that if applied 
practically, this phraseological definition of independence and accountability requires an 
assessment of the process that appoints judges to understand whether the process itself is 
impartial. Does the process encourage diverse representation and promote impartiality in the 
administration of justice? Finally, it requires an examination of the bodies that appoint judges, 
to interrogate whether they too are independent and accountable. 
The examination of the judicial appointment system is also about ensuring equality both 
before and under the law. To Devlin et al, this type of equality also means equal opportunity to 
‘make and enforce the law, and not merely equal application of the law’.336 Enabling more 
women to make and enforce the laws recognises the totality of women’s contributions to the 
judiciary as a whole. Women bring something more than just ‘a feminine touch’ to the bench, 
and they contribute to judicial diversity through their experience, perspectives, opinions, skills 
and leadership.337 Gender considerations in judicial appointments are not illegitimate and 
reforms to judicial appointment processes, whether they involve quotas or amending the criteria 
for appointment, need to be understood in this context.338 The plausibility and effectiveness of 
 
334 Ibid. 
335 Wynn and Mazur, p.790. 
336 Devlin, MacKay and Kim , p.790. 
337 Dawuni 'African Women Judges on international Courts' p.226. 
338 McLoughlin ' The Politics of Gender diversity', p.166. 
 
 
73 
 
any such reforms rest on reasserting that diversity has a meaningful (and legitimate) role in the 
selection of judges.339  
If more women on the bench means strengthening substantive independence and 
strengthening impartiality, then one starts to appreciate the importance of the judicial 
appointment process. Doing so permits the examination of two very different judicial 
appointments processes in Zambia and South Africa, in order to inform our understanding of 
the formal and informal aspects of the judicial appointments process. Both jurisdictions use a 
merit-based type of appointment system. Appointment systems described as merit-based often 
involve a commission that decides on the suitability of a candidate based on their qualifications, 
experience and other factors such as diversity provisions, if and where they are applicable.340  
This contrasts with the system of executive type of appointments, which are now less 
prevalent in Commonwealth countries. In these types of appointments, the head of the judiciary 
and the executive sound out potential candidates and conduct the recruitment with no 
engagement from other parties.341 In this regard proponents of the merit-based system have 
stated that judicial commissions are more transparent, because secret soundings invariably lead 
to actual or perceived cronyism, political or reward appointments, gender bias and even self-
selection.342 Hence, they believe, the merit-based system will be more equitable as it appoints 
the most qualified person with characteristics and abilities to best perform the judicial 
function.343  
 
339 Ibid. 
340 For example, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States are grappling with 
transforming their judiciaries by race and gender, in more homogenous societies; race is less of an issue. 
341 Van zyl Smit 'The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Judges', p.13. 
342 Alan Patterson, ‘“The Scottish Judicial Appointments Board: New Wine in Old Bottles”’, in Appointing 
Judges in an Age of Judicial Power ;Critical Perspectives from around the World, ed. by Kate Malleson and 
Peter Rusell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorp, 2006), pp. 13–38. 
343 Kate Malleson,‘Diversity in the Judiciary: The Case for Positive Action’ Journal of Law and Society 36,3 
(2009), 376-402 (p.381). 
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The merit-based appointment system in Zambia and South Africa will be explored in 
detail in subsequent chapters. This will include an examination of the process from the time 
judicial vacancies arise to when successful candidates are appointed. This necessitates an 
introduction to the context of the study. Coupled with the methodological framework used for 
this study, the subsequent chapter provides an adequate point of departure for the rest of this 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE BEGINNING: 
METHODOLOGY AND CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into two distinct parts – a methodological section and a contextual 
section. The first part is the methodological section and it introduces the reader to the 
qualitative methods used in this study. Qualitative research and the process of analysis in 
particular, ‘involve continuous reflexivity and self-scrutiny’.344 It also requires paying 
particular notice to whether the research pays attention to issues of validity, reliability and 
triangulation.345 In order to address these important aspects of qualitative research, the 
methodological section will be divided into four segments. The first segment is a brief 
justification of the use of qualitative research and a two-country case study. The next two 
segments explain the multiple methods of qualitative research used in this study. Multiple 
methods of data analysis are necessary because they provide more grist for the research mill, 
as each method exhibits different aspects of empirical reality.346 
The methods used in this study include an extensive literature review, in-person semi-
structured interviews and participant observation of JSC interviews, amongst others. I provide 
information on the literature used and the manner in which participant observation took place. 
Details of the fieldwork interviews are also furnished, which includes a breakdown of the 
interview participants who took part in this research. The penultimate segment of the section 
describes the data analysis phase, before an explanation of the limitations that were faced in 
this study and how they were overcome. The second part of this chapter introduces the reader 
to a summary of the judicial appointments background of both Zambia and South Africa. This 
 
344 Priscilla M Pyett, ‘Validation of Qualitative Research in the “Real World”’, Qualitative Health Research, 
13.8 (2003), 1170–79 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732303255686>. 
345 Michael Quinn Patton, ‘Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis.’, Health Services 
Research, 34.5 (1999), 1189–1128. 
346 Ibid, p. 1192. 
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background is not the basis of a comparative analysis. Zambia and South Africa are disparate 
in regard to colonial histories, demographics, legal foundations and legal professional 
structure.347 Rather, the contextual framework leans towards an examination of distinct 
countries as case studies. The selected countries are suitable because as Gerring et al posit, they 
‘can provide a useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest’.348 This is 
advantageous for this research because it is novel and seeks to make an original contribution 
to literature by providing data from varied points of analysis.  
The contextual section commences with a brief history of both judicial systems. It is 
not extensive but is sufficient to provide an understanding of the backdrop from which this 
study takes place. Reference to the judiciary in this research is particularly in respect of judges 
presiding in Superior Courts, which are different from Subordinate Courts where magistrates 
are presiding. The second segment of the contextual section is an explication of the past judicial 
appointment methods in both countries, which in large part originated from the Westminster 
system. There, the Lord Chancellor was responsible for selecting candidates for formal 
appointment by the Queen.349 In South Africa and Zambia, this translated into the Minister of 
Justice or the President deciding who should ascend to the bench with no recourse for 
objections.  
This executive-driven appointment system proved both challenging and antiquated as 
the two countries moved towards a democratic era. Eventually many changes were put in place 
leading to the current appointment procedures.350 These changes are explored in the final 
segment of the section, which briefly describes the foundation of the appointment process in 
 
347 Zambia only has one bar with Advocates, while South Africa has a split bar of Advocates and Attorneys. 
348 John Gerring and Rose Mcdermott, ‘An Experimental Template for Case Study Research’, American Journal 
of Political Science, 51.3 (2007), 688–701. 
349 Jan van Zyl Smit, The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Judges under Commonwealth Principles A 
Compendium and Analysis of Best Practice (London: The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
2015) p.13. 
350 The changes referred to in this research are those made from 1994 onwards. 
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both countries. The court structures in both past and present systems are mentioned because it 
is necessary to understand the hierarchy of the courts, in order to appreciate the analytical 
chapters that will follow. In addition, the criteria used for determining the appointment of 
judges will be introduced and further expanded on, in succeeding chapters. 
3.2 METHODOLOGY 
3.2.1 Qualitative Research or Quantitative Research? 
The nature of the research question often determines the applicable methodology.351 This 
study’s research question asks how aspects of the judicial appointment process inform equal 
representation of men and women on the bench. This research seeks to describe this phenomena 
and carefully analyse and interpret pertitnent data for the purpose of theory building.352 As 
opposed to traditional legal methods of study, this is an interpretivist approach that is socio-
legal in nature. This approach focuses on the social factors that have informed the preceding 
theoretical chapter and that are identified in the substantive chapters to follow. Socio-legal 
research can be conducted using qualitative and/or quantitative methodology.  
Quantitative research is used to derive a quantitative answer, study numerical changes, 
explain a phenomenona or test a hypothesis, with the aim of explaining an occurrence.353 
Qualitative methodologies seek to explain the particular, allow the researcher to study issues in 
depth and provide a theoretical explanation of a certain phenomena and also test hypotheses.354 
Qualitative research is therefore more suitable for this study because it aims ‘to give privilege 
to the perspectives of research participants and to illuminate the subjective meaning, actions 
 
351 Claire Bless, Craig Higson-Smith, and Sello Levy Sithole, Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: An 
African Perspective, 5th edn (Cape Town: Juta & Co.Ltd, 2013). 
352 Patricia Bazeley, Qualitative Data Analysis: Practical Strategies (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2013) p.4. 
353 Daniel Muijs, Introduction to Quantitative Research in Education with SPSS (California: SAGE publishing, 
2010) <http://www.modares.ac.ir/uploads/Agr.Oth.Lib.23.pdf>. 
354 Kenneth F. Hyde, ‘Recognising Deductive Processes in Qualitative Research’, Qualitative Market Research, 
3.2 (2000), 82–90 <https://doi.org/10.1108/13522750010322089>. 
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and context of those being researched’.355 In order to answer the research question in this study, 
it was important for the participants to be heard and their roles in the process understood. 
Multiple methods of qualitative methodology form part of this research and will be used to 
answer the identified research question. These methods include case studies, participant 
observation and semi-structured interviews.356 
3.2.2 Case Studies 
Case studies are used to undertake a systematic inquiry into an event or a set of related events 
which aim to describe and explain the phenomenon of interest.357 They are particularly well 
suited to new research areas or research areas for which existing theory seems inadequate.358 
Yin cautions however, that selected cases should reflect characteristics and problems identified 
in the underlying theoretical propositions.359 Zambia and South Africa — the identified sites 
of study are on different spectrums of the judicial appointments paradigm. Prior to 2016, 
Zambia had limited legisltation regarding the protection of women’s rights. Moreover the field 
of gender and judging as a research field has not previously been explored. However despite 
this, and despite its private opaque appointment process, Zambia has achieved gender equity 
on its Superior Courts.  
South Africa is a jurisdiction with a strong women’s rights protection framework and a 
more public and accountable appointment process than Zambia. However women’s 
representation on the Superior Courts is still below 40%. In terms of research, the existing 
theory on gender and judging in South Africa is inadequate because of the absence of any 
 
355 Ellie Fossey and others, ‘Understanding and Evaluating Qualitative Research’, Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Psychiatry, 36 (2015), 717–32 <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1440-1614.2002.01100.x.Understanding>. 
356 These statistics will include statistics of the composition of both judiciaries between 2013- 2017.  
357Donna M. Zucker, ‘How to Do Case Study Research’, in Teaching Research Methods in the Social Sciences, 
ed. by M Garner, C Wagner, and B Kawulich (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), pp. 171–92. 
358 Jennifer Rowley, ‘Using Case Studies in Research’, Management Research News, 25.1 (2002), 16–27 (p.16) 
<https://doi.org/10.1108/01409170210782990> [accessed 28 June 2017]. 
359 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods, 2nd edn (California: Sage, 1994). 
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detailed studies that interrogate how women experience the judicial appointment process. This 
information makes the two jurisdictions useful for examining the stated research problem 
because the examination of identified aspects in both jurisdictions, has the potential to extract 
a variety of results. If the sub-questions probed in this research are to be answered adequately, 
it is imperative that different normative and empirical claims about the judicial appointment 
process are heard and analysed. Therefore issues such as the experience of women judges, the 
perceptions of relevant stakeholders of their respective appointment process and the importance 
of a gender diverse JSC or a transparent appointment process, are best investigated with the aid 
of the two case studies.  
Nonetheless, this is not presented as a comparative analysis. Jan van Zyl Smit has 
warned that any comparative analysis of diversity and judicial appointments must proceed with 
caution and remain sensitive to local dynamics which may cast doubt on otherwise workable 
diversity strategies.360 To this end, the case studies are used only as a ‘potent method of 
probing’361 particular aspects of the judicial appointments process. They are the tools with 
which this research examines how particular aspects of the appointment process inform equal 
representation of women and men on the bench. They reflect contrasting, but not exhaustive 
methods of judicial appointments present in the region. 
3.2.3 Literature 
An extensive array of literature was used in this research. This includes a compilation of journal 
articles, book chapters and books, relevant legislation, policy documents, reports, a few cases 
and media statements. The first step was a global literature review of material on judicial 
appointments and gender in order to evaluate the extent of material already written on these 
 
360 Jan van Zyl Smit, ‘“ Opening up ” Commonwealth Judicial Appointments to Diversity? The Growing Role of 
Commissions in Judicial Selection’, in Debating Judicial Appointments in an Age of Diversity, ed. by Graham 
Gee and Rackley Erika (Oxford: Routldege, 2017), pp. 60–82. 
361 Anne-Marie Ambert and others, ‘Understanding and Evaluating Qualitative Research’, Journal of Marriage 
and Family, 57.4 (1995), 879–93 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/353409> [accessed 16 May 2017]. 
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topics. This was also useful in identifying an existing gap in literature in respect of research 
from an African perspective. The result of the literature review was two-fold; the construction 
of a basis for the theoretical framework proposed in chapter two and the identification of the 
relevant research question. The research question asks, ‘how do aspects of the judicial 
appointment process inform equal representation of women and men on the bench’?  
Second, once the research question was identified and the case study sites selected as 
above, literature was examined for a contextual background of each country and its 
appointment system. Third, the work of Cheryl Thomas was instrumental in identifying the 
particular themes that will be examined in order to answer the research question.362 These 
include the recruitment process, composition of the appointment body, the legal profession, the 
role of political leadership and transparency or lack thereof of the process. While this research 
is not a comparative study of the two countries, the work of academics comparing different 
jurisdictions was nonetheless illuminating in respect of how to theorise findings when writing 
about more than one country. These academics include amongst others, Feenan,363 Valdini et 
al,364 Baines365 and Gill.366  
As different strands of themes emerged out of the data analysis, the existing literature 
was utilised in order to evaluate findings. In this regard it was useful to ascertain whether the 
findings could be confirmed by other studies or whether they provided a basis for new evidence 
of what was occurring in the selected jurisdictions. Finally, the array of literature was 
 
362 Cheryl Thomas, Commission for Judicial Appointments Judicial Diversity in the United Kingdom and Other 
Jurisdictions (London, 2005) <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-
institute/files/Judicial_Diversity_in_the_UK_and_other_jurisdictions.pdf>. 
363 Dermot Feenan, ‘Judicial Appointments in Ireland in Comparative Perspective’, Judicial Studies Institute 
Journal, 1 (2008), 37–66. 
364 Melody Ellis Valdini and Christopher Shortell, ‘Women’s Representation in the Highest Court: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Appointment of Female Justices’, Political Research Quaterly, 69.4 (2016), 865–
76, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2492365> [accessed on 4 January 2020]. 
365 Baines, ' Women Judges and Constitutional Courts: Why Not Nine Women?'. 
366 Rebecca Gill, ‘A Framework for Comparative Judicial Selection Research With an Application to Gender 
Diversity on High Courts’ (New Orleans, 2012), pp. 1–30 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1982705> [accessed 18 
October 2017]. 
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instrumental in providing guidelines for analytical approaches and data analysis techniques, 
essential to the write-up of the findings.  
3.2.4 Interviews  
Smith and Osborne proffer that one of the best ways to obtain data for some studies is the use 
of semi-structured interviews. They argue that ‘this form of interviewing allows the researcher 
and participant to engage in a dialogue whereby initial questions are modified in the light of 
the participants’ responses’.367 The investigator can then probe interesting and important areas 
which arise. With this insight, it was necessary to identify suitable participants or units of 
investigation that were pertinent for this study. Four of them were identified. The first was 
women judges because the research is essentially about gender and judicial appointments. The 
research question seeks to examine how aspects of the appointment process inform the 
ascension of women to the bench. Hence women judges who are on the bench were the first 
necessary group of participants.  
The second group was members of the appointment body (the JSC) because they have 
the mandate to select judicial candidates and are constitutionally entrusted to do so in both 
countries. The third group was legal professionals which includes advocates, attorneys, 
magistrates, academics and lawyers in state institutions.368 This group is the pool from which 
judges are selected. Their understanding of the process from the outside would provide a 
different perspective than that of those currently on the bench. The final group was members 
of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and journalists who are involved in the appointment 
 
367 Jonathan A. Smith and Mike Osborn, ‘Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis’, in Qualitative Psychology: 
A Practical Guide to Research Methods, ed. by Jonathan A. Smith (California: SAGE publishing, 2015), pp. 
53–80 <http://www.corwin.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/17418_04_Smith_2e_Ch_04.pdf> [accessed 25 
June 2017] p. 56. 
368 Zambia does not have a split-bar like South Africa, so no attorneys were interviewed there. In addition, in 
South Africa, judges do not get appointed from state institutions, so that only applies to Zambian participants. 
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process either by making submissions to the JSC or reporting on the process that unfolds at the 
JSC.369 
The sampling of the interview participants was done using the purposive or judgmental 
method of sampling. This type of sampling rests on the assumption that ‘the researcher knows 
what type of participants will provide the most complex and rich information that will be 
valuable to the research’.370 It is aimed at a more closely defined group for whom the research 
question will be significant, as opposed to a random or representative sample.371 Random 
sampling or representative sampling was inappropriate for this research because ordinary 
citizens would not possess the information sought.372 The sensitive nature of the topic and the 
important roles that a number of interview participants occupy, meant that they could not all 
be approached personally. In those instances, snowball sampling was employed. This is a 
strategy ‘in which participants identify others with direct knowledge relevant to the 
investigation being conducted’.373 Initial participants interviewed referred me to others and 
made efforts to find replacement participants when they themselves were unavailable.374 This 
resulted in a sample that was diverse and not as homogenous as critics of snowball sampling 
would suggest.375 
3.2.4.1 Interview Participants 
A total of 43 participants from both Zambia and South Africa were interviewed as depicted 
below. 
 
369 In Zambia, the interview process is private, so journalists were only interviewed in respect of South Africa. 
370 Zucker, p. 177. 
371 Smith and Osborn, p.56. 
372 The former type of sampling selects participants randomly, while the latter takes all cases on hand until a 
desired size is reached. 
373 Ibid. 
374 This also occurred in Zambia where the Chief Justice Irene Mambilima was unavailable for an interview, but 
she instructed her office to assist me in getting interviews with JSC members and judges. 
375 Fossey and others submit that snowball sampling has been criticised for relying on the quality of participant’s 
social networks, which results in a homogenous sample. 
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Table 1. 376 
Country Judges JSC members Members of the 
Legal Pool 
(Advocates, 
Attorneys, 
Magistrates and 
members of 
Academia) 
CSO Members/ 
Journalists 
Zambia 7 W 1 W, 3 M 4 W, 4 M 
 
3 M 
South 
Africa 
6 W 2 W, 4 M 3 W, 2 M 
 
 3 W, 1 M 
 
The initial number of participants was 32, with an equal number in each group. 
However as the interviews proceeded, the lack of saturation led to more interviews which 
resulted in different numbers in each allocated group. Saturation occurs when ‘patterns are 
recurring, or no new information emerges’.377 Only when ‘major trends begin to recur and 
outlying or secondary themes have already emerged’, should researchers stop adding new 
individuals to their sample.378 Using this approach resulted in the breakdown as depicted above. 
Given that 43 interview participants is a relatively small sample, statistical generalization was 
improbable and analytical generalisation was preferred, as this would likely be relevant to other 
 
376 W represents Women and M represents men. 
377 Fossey and others, p.726. 
378 Anne-Marie Ambert and others, ‘Understanding and Evaluating Qualitative Research’, Journal of Marriage 
and Family, 57.4 (1995), 879–93 (p.886) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/353409> [accessed 16 May 2017]. 
 
 
84 
 
jurisdictions in the region. However, the sample size was adequate because it allowed ‘all 
possibilities and aspects of the researched phenomenon to be identified’.379 The inclusion of 
diversity in other aspects apart from gender was another important part of sampling. A wide 
and diverse sample especially in non-homogenous societies, adds credibility to the research — 
an important aspect of assessing the internal validity of a study.380 
From a Zambian perspective it was imperative to interview judges and JSC members 
in particular, who had knowledge of the appointment process both before and after the 
Constitutional amendment of 2016.381 Of the interview participants, two JSC members and four 
women judges were appointed before the Constitutional amendment, while two JSC members 
and three women judges were appointed after the amendment. The judges were drawn from 
the High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Appeal. For South Africa, it was 
necessary to interview diverse racial groups because, some were more privileged than others 
during apartheid.382 This differential life and career experience had to be broadly reflected in 
women judges. Of the judges interviewed two were indigenous African, two were white, one 
was Coloured and one was Indian. The judges were also from three main tiers of the court, the 
High Courts, Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court.  
The legal professionals were drawn from private practice and the magistracy in both 
countries, with the inclusion of academics and state department lawyers for Zambia. All the 
interviews were conducted from November 2016 to July 2017 in Kitwe and Lusaka (Zambia) 
and Johannesburg, Bloemfontein and Cape Town (South Africa).383 With one exception, all 
 
379 Bless, Higson-Smith, and Sithole,p.164. 
380 Heith Copes and Richard Tewksbury, ‘Publishing Qualitative Research in Criminology and Criminal Justice 
Journals’, Journal of Criminal Justice Education, 27.1 (2016), 121–39 (p.128). 
381This amendment and the changes it brought will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent section of this 
chapter. 
382 Best translated as ‘separateness’, it was a deliberate government policy to privilege the minority race over the 
majority. 
383 The South African participants were interviewed in three cities for convenience, though some of them 
operate in Durban and Pretoria. 
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were in-person interviews, at a convenient venue for the participant.384 Some interviews also 
took place at two South African JSC interview sessions in October 2016 and April 2017. The 
average interview time was 50 minutes, with the longest lasting 93 minutes. Of the 43 interview 
participants, 27 opted to be anonymous and only sixteen opted for non-anonymity.  
To protect the majority who chose anonymity, great care has been taken to ensure the 
absence of any affiliation or facts that could possibly lead to participants’ identification. It was 
however interesting to note that of the fifteen who chose to be identified, only five are women 
and all South African based. The majority of the men who chose to be identified are from 
Zambia, where the process is very private. There appeared to be an ease about non-anonymity 
in Zambia which was unexpected, considering the hostile political climate that I refer to later 
under the section on limitations of the study.  
3.2.4.2 The Questionnaire 
In order to conduct interviews, I sought and was granted ethical clearance by the University of 
Cape Town for a period of one year. This allowed me to conduct all interviews during this 
period. As mentioned earlier, semi-structured interviews were preferred for this research. The 
difference between semi-structured interviews and unstructured interviews is that: 
unstructured interviews are usually conducted in an everyday conversational style, in 
which participants take the lead, to a greater extent, in telling their stories, rather than 
the researcher directing the interview. Semi structured interviews are used to facilitate 
more focused exploration of a specific topic, using an interview guide.385 
Although the questionnaire had specific questions, the interviews were guided by the 
questionnaire, rather than dictated by it.386 Bless et al suggest that these type of interviews 
‘presuppose some prior information, an understanding of the problem under investigation and 
 
384 The one exception was a senior woman attorney whom I interviewed telephonically on 11 July 2017. 
385 Fossey and others, p.727. 
386 Smith and Osborn, p.58. 
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a need for more specific information’.387 My previous knowledge of the issue obtained from 
working in this field of study, resulted in the choice of interview format, as I was investigating 
specific identified issues.  
Interesting comments that arose during the interviews were probed and questions were 
continuously added and adapted on the basis of previous interviews. This allowed for a 
sequencing of what I was hearing. As compared to structured interviews, the disadvantage of 
semi-structured interviews, is that they reduce the control the investigator has over the 
situation, taking longer to carry out. 388 In my case, the nature of the research and the 
participants being interviewed required some deference on my part. Acknowledging the 
deferential dynamics in advance, meant that I was not limited by the reduction of control in my 
interviews, but rather aided by it. In some instances, some participants preferred a 
conversational dialogue that was very casual and required more participation from an 
interviewer than normal. 
This was especially the case with judges and legal professionals who are often in a 
position where they are asking the questions and not vice versa. For example when I asked a 
question on whether the current appointment process is suitable for their respective country, a 
number of participants asked me to explain what other processes are used globally. In some 
instances, I was asked to provide details on the composition of the JSC’s or asked details of 
interviews I had observed in South Africa. There was a concern that responses would be tainted 
or at least modified based on my responses to their questions. Nonetheless as I conducted more 
interviews, I realised that this informal style was helpful for two reasons.  
 
387 Bless, Higson-Smith, and Sithole,p.194. 
388 Smith and Osborn,p.56. 
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Firstly, for Zambian judges it appeared to make them feel at ease that I was not only 
there to extract information from them but was willing to share information too. This is pivotal 
because they were wary about speaking to me because of the political climate. Secondly, in 
some instances with both Zambian and South African participants, my knowledge of the field 
and experience in it seemed to be a form of validation. It proved that not only was I qualified 
to interview them but, I was also experienced enough to understand the nuances of the topic. 
These informal interviews were longer than others but proved illuminating as they provided 
more insight into the research and a better understanding of what I was examining. There were 
also formal interviews where participants preferred a more formal and quicker approach to the 
process. 
In respect of data collection, ‘the wealth and quality of the gathered data are strongly 
dependent on the skill of the interviewer and the confidence’389 that the interviewer inspires in 
participants. Good research skills include the creation of accurate questions that elicit relevant 
information from the participants. To receive an optimum outcome, the questions were divided 
into factual and opinion-based questions (otherwise known as empirical and normative 
questions). Factual questions are straightforward and do not influence the respondents; while 
opinion-based questions mean the participant is the only person who knows the true answer.390 
It was important to ask factual questions to establish the current practice in each jurisdiction, 
for example, ‘how does the judicial appointments process in your country work’? I was mindful 
that the veracity of the responses was dependent on what the participants knew of the process 
or how much information they had access to. Therefore, using open-ended questions and 
having a large sample was of benefit in this regard.  
 
389 Bless, Higson-Smith, and Sithole,p.197. 
390 Bless, Higson-Smith, and Sithole, p.208. 
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Opinion-based questions, on the other hand, focused particularly on participants’ 
appraisal of particular issues. Obtaining ‘truthful’ responses was of concern especially from 
judges or JSC members.391 This is because: 
people inheriting socially privileged positions usually are very aware of the necessity 
of political correctness and the danger of saying ‘the wrong things’, in particular when 
the question raises issues that are (potentially) power-sensitive.392 
Yet it was also recognised that if there were questions that were perceived to require 
the ‘right answers’, these questions were themselves useful in understanding the aspects I was 
exploring. Asking some indirect questions was useful, as it made the purpose of the questions 
less obvious and thus more satisfactory for participants.393 For example, a question was phrased 
as ‘do you think the appointment process creates an equal playing field for men and women’? 
This was considered better than asking, ‘in your opinion, is the appointment process 
discriminatory’? Indirect questions were used in conjunction with direct questions, because ‘a 
great number of indirect questions are needed to gauge an opinion or fact, than would be 
necessary if direct questions were used’.394 The use of both types made for richer data in all 
interviews. 
3.2.5 Participant Observation 
Participant observation allows researchers amongst others, to ‘observe events that informants 
may be unable or unwilling to share when doing so would be impolite and observe situations 
informants have described in interviews’.395 The participation ranges from non-participatory 
(watching or reading), moderate (no active interaction just observing the scene) and active 
 
391 These two groups are higher in societal ranks and have the ones with the most to lose if any negative reports 
of their participating in this research came out. 
392 Thomas Diefenbach, ‘Are Case Studies More than Sophisticated Storytelling?: Methodological Problems of 
Qualitative Empirical Research Mainly Based on Semi-Structured Interviews’, Quality & Quantity, 43 (2009), 
875–94 (p.882) <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-008-9164-0>. 
393 Bless, Higson-Smith, and Sithole, p.209. 
394 Ibid. 
395 Kawulich, p.4. 
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participation (where the ethnographer actively engages in the communities’ activities).396 
Moderate participant observation was used in respect of the South African JSC interviews. I 
monitored the JSC process from June 2012 to April 2017. I was physically present at twelve of 
fourteen South African JSC interview sessions in this time period. They were primarily held in 
Cape Town, with three rounds conducted in Johannesburg.397 At these interviews I took notes 
and made observations regarding how the interviews unfolded and how participants were 
treated. 
 Occasionally, I engaged in active participation using three methods. I engaged in casual 
conversations with JSC members in between interview sessions, participated in judiciary 
related workshops where judges were present, and interacted with the legal profession when I 
presented research at their seminars. Moderate and active participation was useful in 
understanding various political, personal and judicial dynamics that are sometimes present in 
interviews.398 These and other intricate issues are not easily observable or understood by 
reading media reports or conducting interviews with different groups. Participant observation 
also helped in developing my questionnaire and in gaining access to members of the JSC for 
one on one interviews. My presence at the interviews and/or my detailed knowledge of the 
process was advantageous when seeking permission to interview the six members in my 
sample. 
3.2.6 Data Analysis 
The database comprised of firstly the interview transcripts. These were transcribed verbatim 
between July 2017 and January 2018. In addition to the transcripts, the data consisted of 
amongst others academic literature, notes from participant observation and data from a 
 
396 DeWalt and DeWalt, pp. 262-263. 
397 These interviews are held at hotel venues and members of the public are allowed to be in attendance. 
398 For example, the presence of opposition and ruling party members of the JSC sometimes meant that political 
differences were brought to the fore during JSC interviews. 
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previous project on judicial appointments.399 It also included notes from relevant seminars I 
had attended, speeches, and field notes that I had compiled during the interview stage. I was 
constantly reflecting on what I was hearing and witnessing prior to, during and after the 
fieldwork interviews. These reflections were recorded in writing and this practice was also 
sustained, during and after my participant observation of the South African interviews. These 
write-up notes are what proponents of grounded theory refer to as memos. Holton describes 
memos as ‘theoretical notes about the data and the conceptual connections between 
categories’.400 Though this research does not fully adopt the grounded theory approach, writing 
memos proved productive because they helped ‘raise the data to a conceptual level’ and guided 
me in regard to further data collection and analysis.401 
 A linear approach to analysis was employed and data was only analysed after all 
interviews had been conducted and most other methods of data collection had been completed. 
The data was processed and analysed using NVivo, a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software (CAQDAS). NVivo was used in the analysis stage to help manage data by 
‘recording, sorting, matching, linking, querying data and visualising it’.402 The primary strategy 
followed in the data analysis stage was a reliance on the theoretical propositions that led to this 
research. Yin refers to this approach as using the original objectives and design of the case 
study which in turn reflect in the research questions, the literature review and hypotheses.403 
The basic proposition underlying this research is that there are aspects of the appointment 
process that have a greater bearing on women judicial aspirants, in comparison to men. This 
 
399 In November 2016, I conducted fieldwork research in Zambia for a project under the Democratic 
Governance and Rights research unit entitled ‘SADC Principles Research’. 
400 Judith.A Holton, ‘The Coding Process and Its Challenges’, The Grounded Theory Review, 9.1 (2010), 21–40 
<http://groundedtheoryreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/GT-Review-vol-9-no-11.pdf#page=34> 
[accessed 13 November 2017]. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Pat Bazeley and Kristi Jackson, Qualitative Data Analysis with Nvivo, 2nd edn (Los Angeles: Sage 
Publications Inc, 2013). 
403 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods, 5th edn (California: Sage Publication Inc, 2014) p. 
316. 
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proposition led to the research question and to the particular identified formal and informal 
aspects of the appointments process.  
These aspects were identified as the major themes prior to the analysis and would in 
turn lead to chapter headings. Thus for the most part, a deductive approach was taken because 
I was looking for particular ‘patterns and elucidating what appeared to be emerging’404 from 
the already identified themes. Despite this, my primary approach did not exclude the possibility 
of discovering new or outlying themes that had not been previously considered. This open 
approach eventually led to the addition of a theme entitled ‘the role of a judge’, which is 
concerned with the notion of what is expected of a judge contextually and how this is 
demonstrated in the appointment process.405  
The analytical process was iterative, moving back and forth between the data and 
relevant literature on the particular topics. All relevant data was coded in initial categories 
called nodes. This resulted in a thematic coding framework. This was constructed using 
identified themes under each jurisdiction. Coding is the transitional process between data 
collection and more extensive data analysis; a code can sometimes summarize, distil or 
condense data.406 In doing this a researcher can see and interpret what has been said, written, 
or done, and can reflect on evolving categories and decide what to follow up.407 The data coded 
included interview transcripts, participant observation notes, reports, media articles, and 
minutes of meetings. Each jurisdiction was coded separately and assigned nodes, based on what 
arose from the data. 
 
404 Hyde, p.84. 
405 This is covered in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
406 Johnny Saldaña, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, 2nd edn (Los Angeles: Sage Publication 
Inc, 2013) pp.4-5. 
407 Bazeley, p.15. 
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For example, for Zambia, initial nodes included amongst others ‘the application 
process’, ‘the JSC’s performance’, ‘the gender composition of the JSC’ and ‘political 
involvement in appointments’. These were related to the aspects of the appointment system 
being examined in this study. However further reflection, exploration, reading and connecting, 
led to the expansion of the nodes into sub-nodes. Each sub-node referred to a constant theme 
that was arising from interview data and was triangulated with reports and literature. Examples 
of these sub-nodes included ‘stereotyping of women’ or ‘perceptions about the bench being 
easier than private practice’. For South Africa, initial codes were amongst others, ‘the interview 
process’, ‘the composition of the JSC’ and the ‘legal profession’. On further analysis and 
reflection, a number of sub-nodes arose such as ‘the race dynamics in the legal profession’, 
‘the Mjali interview’,408 ‘acting appointments’ and ‘presidential power’.  
The creation of sub-nodes helped conceptualise information that was allocated to 
specific sections of the chapters herein. These sub-nodes also provided the necessary material 
to address the sub-questions in this study. These are addressed specifically in Chapters 4 and 5 
of this thesis. To triangulate the material from the coding process, I compared existing literature 
where it was available and consulted other sources such as media reports and policy documents 
where present. This meant that I had to make connections ‘across and through narrative 
accounts and other data’ in my possession.409 The written reflections that I used before, during 
and after the fieldwork interviews and JSC observations, were also relevant during the coding 
process. These initial impressions were useful for reinforcing, extending or challenging other 
sources. They were recorded as memos in the Nvivo system. Having memos, nodes and sub-
nodes in Nvivo resulted in a faster method of retrieving evidence to support what was emerging 
from the study. The memos were also used as a measure to ascertain whether there was a 
 
408 This refers to a memorable interview of High Court Judge Nozuko Mjali which will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
409 Bazeley, p.15. 
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growing understanding of concepts and ideas, because a number of them had been recorded in 
the earlier stages of this research. Referring to them provided a means of auditing any previous 
assumptions that had been present and allowed for a deeper interrogation of said assumptions, 
in order to determine how refined the process had become over the years. Finally, throughout 
the data collection and analysis process, I was mindful about being reflexive. Reflexivity refers 
to how the researcher constantly examines her/his actions and role throughout the research 
process and scrutinizes them in the same way as the rest of the data.410  
I had been working in the area of judicial governance for four years prior to the 
commencement of this study. I had published and accumulated enough knowledge about South 
Africa by the time I commenced this research and hence I had to be mindful of acknowledging 
any preconceptions of what I thought this study would reveal. I had to move away from being 
a subjective actor, to an objective researcher who was open to being surprised by what the data 
provided. I was an active agent in this research and had to constantly interrogate my 
examination of the facts. I also had to acknowledge that as a young, African, legally trained 
woman, the intersectionalities of my gender, age, ethnicity, and social status would have an 
impact on this research. In some respects, it was positive and in others it was a limitation. 
3.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
3.3.1 Literature 
The dearth of literature on gender and judging in Africa resulted in reliance on material mostly 
from the United Kingdom, Canada and the USA. There was also a paucity of academic material 
on the Zambian legal system and the judiciary, with limited material written in the last ten 
years. Nonetheless, the absence of material is an indicator of the novelty and original 
 
410 Jenny K Rodriguez, ‘Intersectionality and Qualitative Research’, in The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Business and Management Research Methods: History and Traditions, ed. by Catherine Cassell, Ann L. 
Cunliffe, and Gina Grandy (London: Sage Publications, 2018), pp. 429–61 
<https://doi.org/10.4135/9781526430212>. 
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contribution to literature that this research makes. The collection of statistics for demographics 
in the judiciary did prove challenging in some instances. For example in Zambia, the delay in 
being granted access to statistics was a disadvantage because I could not refer to the actual 
statistics in the interviews with participants. 
3.3.2 Field Work 
3.3.2.1 Sampling of Interview Participants 
As a researcher, I have no professional network or work experience in Zambia. In addition, I 
was younger than almost all of the people I encountered in this research. Consequently, this 
resulted in a lot of effort and time spent convincing participants to take part in the research. 
This limitation was mitigated however, by the snowball sampling strategy. Once I was referred 
by one participant to another, there was less suspicion in respect of my motives. In South 
Africa, where I have a professional base, this obstacle did not arise. 
3.3.2.2 Zambian Political Dynamics 
A large portion of the Zambian interviews were conducted in Lusaka from 10-21 April 2017. 
April was a very tense time in Zambia as alluded to earlier and the political restlessness was 
palpable. Firstly, the main opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema was arrested and charged 
with treason.411 This had consequences for my research because two prominent State Counsel 
I would have interviewed, were retained as part of Mr Hichilema’s legal team. Therefore, they 
were unavailable for the interviews. Secondly, the Judicial Complaints Authority (JCA) 412 
tribunal was hearing complaints against all five Constitutional Court judges who sat on an 
electoral petition in August 2016.413 The hearings created a climate of fear in the judiciary as 
 
411 Greg Mills, ‘Op-Ed: Now or Never for the International Community in Zambia’, Daily Maverick, 12 April 
2017, <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-04-12-op-ed-now-or-never-for-the-international-
community-in-zambia/#.WVuSCoSGOUk> [accessed 4 July 2017]. 
412 The JCA is a constitutionally mandated body which responsibilities include investigating complaints against 
judges. 
413 Ironically this petition was filed by Mr Hichilema who alleged vote rigging by the ruling party. 
 
 
95 
 
judges were mindful of behaving in a manner that could have them reported to the JCA. The 
assistance of the Office of the Chief Justice was therefore of great assistance in navigating 
interview requests. 
3.3.2.3 Semi-structured and Open-ended Interviews 
The semi-structured and open-ended nature of some of the questions did lead to some 
participants speaking for long periods. This was only a limitation when the comments were not 
pertinent to my research or not directly related to the question. However, I found that the 
information given during those moments, unknowingly fitted into a previously asked question 
or provided an additional angle to follow up. Sometimes, it was an angle that I had not 
identified prior to the interview as being pertinent. There was a notable concern amongst some 
men of sounding sexist or speaking in a manner that they presumed I would find offensive 
because I was a woman. This may have affected the sincerity of some responses but, as 
mentioned earlier these ‘insincere’ responses invoke further areas of interrogation in this 
research. 
3.3.3 Participant Observation 
Due to the nature of the Zambian judicial process, participant observation as a mode of data 
collection was limited to South Africa. I was unable to gather data from observing how the 
Zambian commission operates and occasionally interacting with JSC members where possible. 
However, because there are no public attendees at the Zambian JSC interviews, this is a 
limitation that would face anybody conducting research in this area.414 Hence, it may only be 
considered as a serious limitation if this research was conducting a comparative analysis as 
opposed to a study of two different systems. The two systems are examined in the next section 
in order to provide a contextual framework from which subsequent analysis will emerge. 
 
414 The effects of this private system of interviews is examined further in Chapter 4. 
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3.4 JUDICIARIES  
3.4.1 Historical legacy 
Zambia and South Africa are both former imperial colonies situated in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Zambia gained its independence in 1964 from Britain and had a one-party state of governance 
headed by Dr Kenneth Kaunda until 1991 when multi-party elections were held.415 Its common 
law heritage from England meant that it applied a dual legal and judicial system, using written 
law (common law) in the High Courts and customary law in the lower courts.416 The Customary 
law courts were used to resolve disputes between indigenous Zambians, but lawyers were 
excluded.417 Consequently when Zambia gained independence in 1964, there were no 
indigenous Zambian lawyers who could be appointed to the judiciary as judges.418  
The first trained Zambian lawyer appointed to the High Court was only admitted in 
1970419 and the first indigenous Zambian Chief Justice only appointed in 1975.420 Though a 
post-independence Constitution was enacted in 1973, it was later repealed in 1991 by the 
enactment of the Constitution of Zambia Act 1991. This Constitution was declared the Supreme 
Law of Zambia and any law inconsistent would be void.421 Further amendments to the 
Constitution were made, which will be discussed in the succeeding segment.422  
The South African road to the globally admired Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa is much more complex. South Africa is both a former Dutch and British colony resulting 
 
415 The elections were won by Fredrick Chiluba leader of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD). 
416 Roger Purdy, ‘The Zambian Judicial System:A Review of the Jurisidictional Law’, in Law in Zambia, ed. by 
Muna Ndulo (Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1984), pp. 67–90 (p.79). 
417 Nicholas A Kahn-Fogel, ‘The Troubling Shortage of African Lawyers: Examination Of A Continental Crisis 
Using Zambia As A Case Study’, University of Pennslyvania Journal of International Law, 33.3 (2013), 719–89 
(p. 728). 
418Munyonzwe Hamalengwa, ‘The Politics of Judicial Diversity & Transformation’, p.415. 
419 Ibid. 
420 Former Chief Justice Annel Silungwe served from 1975 to 1992. 
421 Chief Justice Ernest Sakala, ‘Autonomy and Independence of the Judiciary in Zambia: Realities and 
Challenges’ (University of Zambia, 1999) 
<http://dspace.unza.zm:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/929/sakala.e.l0001.PDF?sequence=1> 
[accessed 14 June 2017]. 
422 Adopted on 24 August 1991. 
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in a hybrid system of Roman Dutch Law and Common Law.423 It became an independent state 
within the British Commonwealth in 1931. In 1948, the National Party Government then in 
power introduced its legal policy of apartheid.424 In 1990 at the dawn of political change, the 
judiciary was exclusively white, with only one woman.425 Formal apartheid came to an end in 
1990 after the ban on the African National Congress (ANC) and other black liberation parties 
was lifted.426 Yet on the date of South Africa's first democratic election on 27 April 1994, the 
judiciary remained predominantly white and male, with the exception of three black males and 
one white female.427 As mentioned in Chapter 1, reference to the judiciary in this study is 
limited to Superior Courts and excludes the Subordinate Courts.  
3.4.2 Previous Superior Court Structure and Appointment Model 
The 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Zambia retained the court structure established in the 
post-independence Constitution of 1973.428 This judicial structure comprised of the Supreme 
Court as the final court of appeal with no original jurisdiction. It was led by the Chief Justice. 
High Courts led by a judge in charge, were established as courts of first instance for civil and 
criminal matters and appeals from lower courts. Unlimited jurisdiction over industrial and 
labour matters was given to the Industrial Relations Courts, an appendage of the High Court.429 
Further constitutional amendments were made in 1996 but the court structure remained the 
 
423 John Dugard, Human Rights & The South African Legal Order (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1978) p. 8. 
424 Ibid, p.5. 
425 Murray Wesson and Max Du Plessis, ‘Fifteen Years On: Central Issues Relating To The Transformation Of 
The South African Judiciary’, South African Journal on Human Rights, 24 (2008), 187–213 (p.190). 
426 Dugard, p. 392. 
427 Wesson and Du Plessis, p.190. 
428The 1991 Constitution paved the way for the re-introduction for multi-party democracy and was perceived to 
be transitional in nature in order to allow for multi-party presidential elections. 
429Zambian Ministry of Justice, The Constitution of Zambia, 1991, Part IV 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/zm/zm052en.pdf> [accessed 15 June 2017]. 
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same. In 2005, a Constitutional Review Commission suggested the establishments of other 
courts, amongst them a Constitutional Court but, that was only implemented in 2016.430 
The appointment of judges to fill the above courts was initially a function solely for the 
Executive with limited consultation. A JSC was initially set up in 1963 after Zambia gained 
independence but it was abolished in 1973.431 In the period 1973-1991, former President 
Kenneth Kaunda with the assistance of an advisor, informed chosen candidates by letter that 
they had been appointed.432 It was never known how the candidates were chosen and there was 
no constitutional foundation for the appointment of judges at the time. During the said period, 
Zambia had become a one-party state, so no opposition existed for any objections to judicial 
appointments.433 The secret soundings of judges led to a desire for a more inclusive 
appointment process and the JSC returned after multi-party democracy was reintroduced.434 
South Africa’s courts also had a different arrangement prior to the introduction of 
democracy in South Africa and the Interim Constitution of 1993 (replaced by the Final 
Constitution).435 The highest judicial authority in the land was the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court, headed by the Chief Justice and established in 1910 after the formation of the 
 
430 Recommendations were made by the Mungomba Review Commission, ‘Report of the Constitution Review 
Commission’ (Lusaka: Secretariat Constitution Review Commission, 2005), pp. 1–911 
<http://www.ncczambia.org/media/final_report_of_the_constitution_review_commission.pdf> [accessed 15 
June 2017]. 
431 Winnie Sithole Mwenda, ‘Paradigms of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Justice Delivery in Zambia’ 
(University of South Africa, 2006) <http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/2163/thesis.pdf?sequence..> 
[accessed 15 June 2017]. 
432 Interview with the Deputy Chief Justice of Zambia, Marvin Mwanamwamba for a research conducted for the 
Southern African Chief Justices Forum in his chambers at the Supreme Court of Zambia, 1 December 2016. 
433 Multi-party democracy was banned in 1973 and only introduced in 1991 to make way for Presidential 
elections where President Kaunda was toppled after a 27-year rule. 
434 Sydney Chisenga, ‘The Adverse Effect of Lacuna on the Zambian Judicial System’ (Lusaka: University of 
Zambia,2003), pp.1–57, (p.6), 
<http://dspace.unza.zm:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/2671/CHISENGAS0001.PDF?sequence=1> 
[accessed on 23 Febraury 2017]. 
435 Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 
<http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-act-200-1993> [accessed 17 June 
2017]. 
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Union of South Africa. 436 It had no original jurisdiction and heard appeals from the courts in 
the constituent colonies of the Cape and Natal and the former Boer republics of Orange Free 
State and Transvaal which were formerly referred to as Supreme Courts.437 
Prior to 1994, the President made appointments on the advice of the Minister of Justice, 
though the President’s decision was considered a rubber stamp of the Minister’s choice.438 Du 
Bois notes that the Minister seemed as a rule to have tendered such advice after consultation 
with, or at the initiative of, the head of the relevant court; though this was not always the case.439 
These appointments were from the ranks of Senior Counsel (SC) and were invariably white 
and male.440 The process of identifying candidates and their selection was also shrouded in 
secrecy (known as secret soundings), lending itself to what is often referred to as the ‘tap on 
the shoulder’ appointment system.441 Due to apartheid, this process only sought out white 
practitioners− male in particular, resulting in a judiciary that was unreflective of the society it 
served. 
3.4.3 Appointments in a new Zambian Judicial era 
The Zambian Constitution regulates the appointment of judges but does not create the Judicial 
Service Commission. 442 The JSC is rather a creature of the Service Commissions Act and its 
formation has undergone some changes in the last few years.443 After executive only 
appointments were done away with, the Constitution of Zambia 1996 (herein referred to as the 
1996 Constitution) dictated the appointment of judges. The appointment of judges was 
 
436 Hugh Corder, ‘Judicial Authority in a Changing South Africa’, Legal Studies, 25 (2004), 253–74 
<http://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2007.54.1.23.>. 
437 Corder, ‘Judicial Authority in Changing South Africa’, p.254. 
438 Murray Wesson and Max Du Plessis, ‘Fifteen Years On: Central Issues Relating To The Transformation Of 
The South African Judiciary’, South African Journal on Human Rights, 24 (2008), 187–213 (p. 190). 
439 Francois Du Bois, ‘Judicial Selection In Post-Apartheid South Africa’, in Appointing Judges in an Age of 
Judicial Power:Critical Perspectives from Around the World, ed. by Kate Malleson and P H Russell (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press Incorp, 2006), pp. 280–312 (p.284). 
440 Wesson and Du Plessis, p.190. 
441 Hale, p.5. 
442 Recently amended by the Constitution of Zambia Amendment Act No. 2 of 2016. 
443 Act 19 of 1994, which was later replaced by Act 2 of 2014 and then eventually Act 10 of 2016. 
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governed by sections 93-97 of the 1996 Constitution and a JSC was responsible for selecting 
judges. In 2016 the Zambian Constitution was amended by the Constitutional Amendment Act 
200 of 2016 (herein referred to as the New Constitution). It confirmed the role of the JSC in 
the appointment process and stipulated the minimum requirements that candidates for specific 
judicial positions have to meet.444 
The Judicial Authority and systems of Courts is contained in part VIII of the New 
Constitution. This part established new courts including the Constitutional Court which has 
original and final jurisdiction on constitutional matters and also hears matters relating to the 
election of the President, Vice President and Members of Parliament.445 A Court of Appeal has 
also been established which has jurisdiction over appeals from the High Court, other matters 
that are not constitutional in nature and appeals from quasi-judicial bodies.446 Finally, the High 
Court has now been separated into branches with the creations of Family Courts, Commercial 
Courts and Children’s Court joining the Industrial Courts as parts of the High Court. 
In respect of judges, section 140 of the New Constitution, entitled ‘The Appointment 
of Judges’ reads as follows: 
140. The President shall, on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission 
and subject to ratification by the National Assembly, appoint the— 
(a) Chief Justice;  
(b) Deputy Chief Justice; 
 (c) President of the Constitutional Court;  
(d) Deputy President of the Constitutional Court; and 
(e) other judges. 
 
444 Part VIII of the New Constitution pertains to the Judicial Authority, System of Courts and Independence. 
445 It is ranked equivalent to the Supreme Court and is established in section 121 of the New Constitution. 
446 Sections 131-132. 
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Section 140 differs from the relevant sections on the 1996 Constitution in two important 
aspects. Firstly, the New Constitution in section 140, specifically states that the President shall 
appoint all the judges on the recommendation of the JSC.  
The wording in section 93 (1) and (2) of the 1996 Constitution is different. There, it 
was only stated that the President shall appoint the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice 
subject to ratification by the National Assembly.447 There was no requirement for the JSC to 
provide recommendations in these instances. Secondly, the 1996 Constitution stated that the 
President appointed High Court and Industrial Relations Court judges ‘on the advice’ of the 
JSC.448 This wording was absent in regard to the appointment of Supreme Court judges and the 
leadership of the judiciary. The effect of the amendment in language in regard to the more 
senior judges as per section 140 above, is important to note. Ndulo explains the significance of 
this change by arguing that when the President is required to act ‘on the recommendation of’ 
or ‘on the advice of’ his function becomes purely formal.449 It is only when the President is 
acting in ‘consultation with’ that his role is more substantive; in this instance it is the 
consultation with the JSC that is a mere formality.  
This would mean that prior to the New Constitution, the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief 
Justice and Supreme Court judges could have been appointed solely by the President with no 
input from the JSC. Now the JSC is empowered to play a more substantive role in the 
appointment of these senior judges. The change in language was also to ensure that the 
President did not enjoy exclusive or overriding power over the appointment of judges.450 It 
 
447 The Constitutional Court was only established in 2016; hence its leadership was not included in the 1996 
Constitution. 
448 Section 95 (1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
449Muna Ndulo, ‘Judicial Reform, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law in Zambia: From a Justice System to a 
Just System’, Zambia Social Science Journal, 2.1 (2011), 1–26 (p.9), <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/zssj> 
[accessed on 4 March 2017]. 
450 Mungomba Review Commission, p.443. 
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provides some measure of protecting judicial independence and the autonomy of the courts, by 
reducing the role of the President.  
The Zambian Constitutional framework offers guidance in regard to requirements for 
judicial appointments. Section 141 of the New Constitution states that: 
(1) A person qualifies for appointment as a judge if that person is of proven integrity 
and has been a legal practitioner, in the case of the— 
(a) Supreme Court, for at least fifteen years; 
(b) Constitutional Court, for at least fifteen years and has specialised training or 
experience in human rights or constitutional law; 
(c) Court of Appeal, for at least twelve years; or  
(d) High Court, for at least ten years. 
(2) A person appointed as judge to a specialised court shall have the relevant expertise, 
as prescribed. 
 
 Previously, section 97 (2) of the 1996 Constitution permitted the President or the JSC 
in special circumstances, to dispense of the requirement that a judge should have held 
qualifications for ten or fifteen years as prescribed. Special circumstances would only apply if 
the person was admitted as an advocate as per Legal Practitioners Act [Cap. 48] and was 
considered to be worthy, capable and suitable as a judge.451 The New Constitution contains no 
exceptions where judges can be appointed if they do not meet the prescribed constitutional 
requirements. This means that neither the JSC nor the President have discretionary power to 
appoint persons lacking experience 
 In addition to the constitutional requirements, a candidate is assessed by JSC criteria 
in privately conducted interviews. The guiding philosophy of the JSC is that candidates should 
have extensive experience in legal work acquired from either private practice, on the bench or 
 
451 Section 97 (3) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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from public service. 452 The criteria also state that a record of competence must be established 
through recommendations or references and they must have a lengthy post-call period of legal 
experience before appointment.453 Unquestionable integrity, suitable temperament, patience, 
an impartial disposition, objectivity and courage are also essential.454 The criteria particularly 
mention the desire for candidates without strong business interests. The presence of strong 
business interests is considered as a potential area where conflict could arise if one is on the 
bench.455  
For all positions, there is no public advertisement process and candidates apply after 
receiving information of a vacancy either from within the judiciary, from the Bar, the Ministry 
of Justice or from their peers. All candidates for the High Court are interviewed by the JSC 
but, there are no interviews for positions on the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Court. For these positions, the President seeks recommendations from within 
the judiciary, before forwarding those names to National Assembly for ratification.456 The 
Select Committee of the National Assembly interviews candidates there, before their names 
are sent to the House for ratification.457 The efficacy of this process will be interrogated in the 
analytical chapters that follow. 
3.4.4 The New Era of Judicial Appointments in South Africa 
Corder posits that ‘a number of innovations in the judicial process accompanied liberation in 
1994’.458 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (herein referred to as the 
Constitution) paved way for the Appellate division of the Supreme Court of South Africa to 
 
452 Zambian Judicial Service Commission, ‘JSC Criteria for Appointing Judges’ (Lusaka: Judicial Service 
Commission, 1993). 
453 The call period is the training at the Zambian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies and admission as an 
Advocate. 
454 Page 8 of the criteria. 
455 Interview with Deputy Chief Justice (DCJ) Marvin Mwanamwambwa on 1 December 2016 in Lusaka, Zambia. 
456 This difference in procedure will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
457 The Select Committee is comprised of members of the opposition and the ruling party and a negative 
appraisal from the Committee results in a candidate’s name not being forwarded to the House for votes. 
458 Corder, ‘Judicial Authority in a Changing South Africa’, p.261. 
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become the Supreme Court of Appeal in 1997.459 The previous provincial Supreme Courts 
became single High Courts, which were later reorganised into a single High Court of South 
Africa with a division in each province.460 A Constitutional Court was also created as the 
highest court on constitutional matters and the arbiter of disputes between organs of state 
amongst other functions. 461 
The JSC, the body responsible for the selection of judges was initially enshrined under 
section 105 of the Interim Constitution.462 The current JSC is a creation of section 178 of the 
Constitution and it publicly interviews candidates nominated for positions.463 The JSC is 
guided by the provisions in section 174 of Chapter 8 of the Constitution. Section 174 reads: 
Appointment of judicial officers 
174. (1) Any appropriately qualified woman or man who is a fit and proper person may 
be appointed as a judicial officer. Any person to be appointed to the Constitutional 
Court must also be a South African citizen. 
(2) The need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of 
South Africa must be considered when judicial officers are appointed. 
 
Section 174 (1) is often referred to as the merit clause because, it is considered pertinent 
to one’s competency to hold the position of a judge.464 Section 174(2) is referred to as the 
transformation or affirmative action clause because of its diversity imperative and regard to the 
gender and racial dynamics of South Africa.465 The application of the two clauses has been a 
subject of great debate. Former Supreme Court justice Louis Harms has argued that the 
transformation imperative ‘has led to the unfortunate and often unfair division of judicial 
 
459 Section 166 of the Constitution.  
460 The Superior Courts Act no 10 of 2013. 
461 Section 167 of the Constitution. 
462 Act 200 of 1993. 
463 This process will be examined further in Chapter 5. 
464 Morné Olivier, ‘A Perspective on Gender Transformation in the South African Judiciary’, South African Law 
Journal, 13.3 (2013), 449–64. 
465 Wesson and Du Plessis, p. 194. 
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appointees between ‘transformation’ judges and ‘other’ judges, i.e., those appointed purely on 
merit’.466 A broader discussion on the tension between merit and transformation will be 
explored in a Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
Section 174 (3) of the Constitution prescribes the method for appointment of the Chief 
Justice and Deputy Chief Justice and the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal. Notably, the President appoints the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice after 
consulting both the JSC and heads of parties in the National Assembly. However in regard to 
the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, he needs to consult only 
the JSC. Ordinary Constitutional Court justices are appointed by the President from a shortlist 
sent by the JSC,467 while all other High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) judges 
(excluding the SCA leadership positions) are appointed on the advice of the JSC.468 Irrespective 
of what type of judicial position is in question, the Constitution does not provide any additional 
definition of what it means to be ‘appropriately qualified’ and ‘fit and proper’.  
In 1998, four years after it came into operation, the JSC, chaired by former Chief Justice 
Ismail Mahomed, drafted guidelines as a means of supplementing the Constitutional 
requirements.469 These guidelines, referred to as the Mahomed guidelines, were later reissued 
and published in 2010 under Chief Justice Ngcobo with no changes.470 The JSC explained that 
the decision to publish the criteria was in ‘line with the JSC’s principle that the process of 
judicial appointments should be open and transparent to the public so as to enhance public trust 
 
466 LTC Harms, ‘Transparency and Accountability in the Judicial Appointment Process’, Advocate , 23.2 (2010), 
36–38, (p.38). 
467 The list has to have three names more than the number of appointments to be made. 
468 Section 174 (6) of the Constitution. 
469 Ismail Mahomed, ‘Criteria and Guidelines for Appointment’, Department of Justice Report on Activities of 
the Judicial Service Commission, 1998 <http://www.justice.gov.za/reportfiles/1999reports/1999_judicial service 
comm.htm> [accessed 24 June 2017]. 
470 South African Judicial Service Commission, ‘Summary of the Criteria Used by the Judicial Service 
Commission When Considering Candidates for Judicial Appointments’ (Johannesburg: Judicial Service 
Commission, 2010), pp. 1–2. 
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in the judiciary’.471 The criteria anticipate a two stage enquiry. The first stage is based on three 
fundamental requirements in the Constitution: first is the candidate appropriately qualified; 
second are they fit and proper; and third, would the appointment reflect the racial and gender 
composition of South Africa?  
The second enquiry, also referred to as supplementary criteria, includes questions about 
whether the candidate is technically competent and if they have the capacity to give expression 
to the values of the Constitution? Moerane SC, a former JSC member explained that this 
enquiry requires a consideration of the mind-set of a candidate, irrespective of race. He added 
that candidates have: 
to demonstrate a commitment to the values that underpin the Constitution, such as 
respect for the human dignity of each and every person, the achievement of equality, 
the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racism and non-sexism, the 
supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.472 
In addition a two-tier approach is also utilised in assessing a candidate’s experience for the job. 
Here technical experience is again required, in addition to an assessment of experience in 
regard to the values and needs of the community. 
 This technical experience, Moerane submits, is appraised from amongst other things, 
information provided in the candidate's curriculum vitae, the evaluation of comments received 
from various professional and other bodies, about the candidate and the candidate’s reputation 
in his or her profession.473 Moerane concludes that these criteria allowed the JSC (at the time 
he was a member of it) to recommend ‘the appointment of persons across the social and 
 
471 Ibid. 
472 MTK Moerane SC, ‘The Meaning of Transformation of the Judiciary in the New South African Context’, South 
African Law Journal, 120 (2014), 708–18 (p.714), <http://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2007.54.1.23.>. 
473 Ibid, p.714. 
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political spectrum of South African society, including former members of the Afrikaner 
Broederbond’.474 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The first section of this chapter has outlined the methodological framework for this research. 
Primarily a deductive approach was used, working with identified theoretical propositions in 
examining the two case studies. Qualitative methods which include amongst others, the use of 
semi-structured interviews and participant observation for the South African case study, were 
considered best suited to this research. This is because of the necessity of privileging the voices 
of those involved in or with knowledge of the judicial appointment process. The breakdown of 
interview participants revealed that participants were from varying groups, genders and 
hierarchies (in respect of judges). The desire for anonymity from the majority of participants 
could be considered as a reflection of the sensitivity of the research topic and an indication of 
just how powerful the judicial role is or is perceived to be.  
The second section has provided a contextual background of Zambia and South Africa, 
which are my case studies. It commenced with a brief account of the histories of both systems. 
This revealed a colonial past that had ramifications on society and the legal systems, in both 
countries. An examination of the previous judicial appointment processes unveiled patronage 
and exclusion. This changed for both jurisdictions in the 1990’s and new Constitutions ushered 
in judicial appointment bodies and new court structures. Finally, the chapter concluded with a 
brief description of the criteria for judges in each jurisdiction, emphasising that this study only 
focuses on appointments to Superior Courts. This contextual section provided a sound 
framework from which to proceed to the substantive chapters that follow. 
  
 
474 The Afrikaner Broederbond was a secret, exclusively male and Afrikaner Calvinist organization in South 
Africa dedicated to the advancement of Afrikaner interests. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION IN ZAMBIA: 
GATEKEEPER OR ALLY? 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is devoted to an examination of the Zambian Judicial Service Commission (JSC) 
which was earlier identified as the responsible body for appointing judges in Zambia. In chapter 
2, the theoretical chapter, I introduced the notion of seeing gender diversity as a way of 
strengthening judicial independence and impartiality. The creation of a diverse judiciary is 
partially dependent on the JSC because they recruit, interview and recommend judges. Thus, 
if it is to instil public confidence in the appointment process, the body that selects these judges 
must itself be independent, diverse and impartial. In particular, the importance of the diversity 
of the selection body cannot be overstated. Research in corporate governance has shown that 
the lack of diversity in nominations committees can impact the decision of which candidates 
to interview, and subsequently appoint as board members.475 Research into the absence of 
women in leadership found that predominantly male nomination bodies, may find it hard to 
‘assess the suitability of new board members without bias, whether conscious or 
unconscious’.476 Galbadon and others further add that the presence of women on nomination 
committees, can have direct effects on biases in the selection or treatment of candidates.477 
 Thus, Iyer argues that ‘the extent to which women are - or are not - appointed to the 
courts is a direct reflection of the institutions responsible for making appointments’.478 The 
implication of Iyer’s statement is that the success or failure of any initiatives to increase the 
 
475 Barriers to Progression (London, 2016) <https://30%club.org/assets/uploads/barriers_to_progression.pdf> 
[accessed 6 April 2018]. 
476 Ibid. 
477 Patricia Gabaldon and others, ‘Searching for Women on Boards: An Analysis from the Supply and Demand 
Perspective’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 24.3 (2016), 371–85 
<https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12141>. 
478 Sundeep Iyer, ‘The Fleeting Benefits of Appointments Commissions for Judicial Gender Equity’, 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 51.1 (2013), 97–
121,<https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2013.749673>. 
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number of women judges lies at the feet of the relevant JSCs. Considering that the thesis 
research question asks how aspects of the judicial appointment process inform equal 
representation of women and men on the bench, it is imperative to assess the JSC’s role. In 
order to do this effectively, it is necessary to commence the analysis by referring to 
international principles regarding judicial appointments. These will act as a framework of 
assessment for both JSCs.  
4.1.1 Relevant International Guidelines 
Article 10 of the 1985 UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary states: 
Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with 
appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall 
safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of 
judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, 
sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
status...479 
The UN Principles emphasise three important aspects. First the need for judges with 
appropriate character and qualifications and secondly the desire for an appointment body that 
is free from undue influence. The third aspect is the necessity of a judiciary that is diverse and 
epitomises the value of non-discrimination in its demographic composition.  
The Commonwealth of all Nations in 2003, further elaborated on these three aspects 
when they established what are known as the Commonwealth Latimer House Principles (herein 
referred to as the Latimer Principles). The Latimer Principles on the Three Branches of 
Government were a culmination of years of discussion amongst Commonwealth states.480 Of 
importance to this research, is article IV on the Independence of the judiciary. It commences 
by stating that ‘An independent, impartial, honest and competent judiciary is integral to 
 
479 united Nations Human Rights Office Of The High Commissioner, Basic Prinicples Of Judcial Independence, 
1985 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.aspx>. 
480 Commonwealth, Commonwealth ( Latimer House ) Principles on the Three Branches of Government, 2003, 
pp. 1–52 <http://www.cmja.org/downloads/latimerhouse/commprinthreearms.pdf>. 
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upholding the rule of law, engendering public confidence and dispensing justice’. To achieve 
this purpose, the Latimer Principles require that appointments to judicial office be made on ‘the 
basis of clearly defined criteria and a publicly declared process’.481 Further, they state that the 
process should ensure equal opportunities for eligible persons, as well as appointment on merit. 
Attention should also be given to the need for progressive attainment of gender equality.  
 Thirteen years later, academics from Commonwealth jurisdictions convened to agree 
on what became known as the Cape Town Principles in an effort to formulate norms for judicial 
appointments.482 The Cape Town Principles build on the Latimer Principles and affirm the 
importance of an independent judiciary.483 Principle 1 states that the principal objective of any 
system of judicial appointments must be to identify and secure the appointment of persons who 
are independent, impartial, have integrity and are professionally competent. The Cape Town 
Principles also emphasise the need for a fair process ‘that encourages the best candidates from 
any background to seek a judicial career, and that generally enhances public confidence in the 
judiciary’.484 They affirm the need for transparency in judicial appointments by recommending 
that criteria for appointments should be readily accessible to candidates and the public at large 
in order to inspire public confidence in the selection process. 485  
They go a step further than the Latimer principles, because they state that judicial 
appointing bodies must be suitably composed.486 While they do not explicitly state what 
suitably composed means, it is obvious that an appointing body that is predominantly 
composed of men cannot be suitably composed, if gender equity in the judiciary is a desired 
 
481 Article IV (a) of the Latimer Principles. 
482 These scholars included academics from South Africa, Kenya, Canada, The United Kingdom and India 
amongst others. 
483 Cape Town Principles on the Role of Independent Commissions in the Selection and Appointment of Judges 
(Cape Town, 2016) <https://www.biicl.org/documents/868_cape_town_principles_-
_feb_2016.pdf?showdocument=1> [accessed 3 April 2018]. 
484 Principle 2. 
485 Principle 9. 
486 Principle 9. 
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goal. A worthy reference point is The Model Constitutional Clause on Judicial Appointment 
Commissions (Model Clause). This was formulated in an attempt to deal with practical 
problems which have been experienced in various Commonwealth jurisdictions, in regard to 
constitutional appointment clauses.487 In suggesting a model composition of an appointment 
body, it recommends the appointment of five lay members who would ‘broadly reflect the 
composition of the community in terms of gender, ethnicity, social and religious groups and 
regional balance’. It recognises the presence of women on an appointing body as a critical 
aspect of the appointments process. 
A recent addition to these international norms is to be found in the Lilongwe Principles 
and Guidelines on The Selection and Appointment of Judicial Officers (herein the Lilongwe 
Principles).488 These principles were adopted at the Southern African Chief Justices’ Forum 
(SACJF) Conference and Annual General Meeting in Lilongwe on 30 October 2018. The 
overriding purpose is to safeguard the independence and integrity of the judiciary.489 The 
Lilongwe Principles emphasise most aspects of the Cape Town Principles, though they 
surprisingly do not discuss the composition of appointing bodies. The Lilongwe Principles do 
however accentuate the importance of the bench reflecting the diversity of society. Therefore, 
the Lilongwe Principles state that ‘appointment authorities may actively prioritise the 
recruitment of appointable candidates who enhance the diversity of the bench’. 490 Members of 
the SACJF are also encouraged to prioritise record keeping and transparency, in order to 
develop legislation, policy and practice.491 
 
487 Karen Brewer, James QC Dingemans, and Peter Slinn, Judicial Appointments Commissions: A Model Clause 
for Constitutions (London, 2013) <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Judicial-Appointments-
Commissions-CLA-CLEA-CMJA-Report.pdf> [accessed on 3 April 2018]. 
488 Southern African Chief Justices’ Forum, Lilongwe Principles and Guidelines on The Selection and 
Appointment of Judicial Officers (Lilongwe, 2018) <https://www.unodc.org/ji/> [accessed 3 August 2019]. 
489 Ibid, p.1. 
490 Principle viii.  
491 Southern African Chief Justices’ Forum p.4. 
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 Despite the availability of international principles regarding judicial appointments, it 
is difficult to suggest or agree on one way of operationalising them. This is especially true in 
regards to gender diversity, because of the acknowledgment that ‘targeting the appointment 
process alone will never be an adequate way of promoting judicial diversity’.492 Further, it has 
been suggested that differences in social and professional practices and attitudes relating to 
gender, are also likely to be relevant in addressing the underrepresentation of women but these 
differ between jurisdictions.493 What is certain however in international principles and other 
agreements, is that there are certain standards that must be met in order for judiciaries to 
function optimally.  
The first standard is the primacy of transparency of the process and the need for publicly 
known criteria.494 The transparency referred to here, is not limited to information being 
accessible to the public. The information also needs to be accurate and comprehensible.495 The 
second standard is the independence of the judiciary and the appointing body as a crucial aspect 
of a functional judicial system− this too is widely agreed on. In practice, this means that judges 
must be free to operate as arbiters without fear or favour, while appointing bodies need the 
same freedom to select the correct judges. Wynn and Mazur refer to this as the ability to be 
institutionally immune from inappropriate extra-legal pressures, in the decision-making 
process.496  
 
492 Cape Town Principles on the Role of Independent Commissions in the Selection and Appointment of Judges 
(Cape Town, 2016) <https://www.biicl.org/documents/868_cape_town_principles_-
_feb_2016.pdf?showdocument=1> [accessed 3 April 2018]. 
493 Jan van Zyl Smit, ‘“Opening up” Commonwealth Judicial Appointments to Diversity? The Growing Role of 
Commissions in Judicial Selection’, in Debating Judicial Appointments in an Age of Diversity, ed. by Graham 
Gee and Rackley Erika (Oxford: Routldege, 2017), pp. 60–82. 
494 This was affirmed in what is known as the Nairobi Action plan, a means of promoting and advancing the 
Latimer Principles. The action plan was signed by members of the executive, the judiciary, the legislature, 
Commonwealth partner organizations and representatives of civil society from 18 African countries. See 
Gabaldon and others. 
495 Marieke van den Brink, Behind the Scenes of Science: Gender Practices in the Recruitment and Selection of 
Professors in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2010) (p.65) 
<http://repository.ubn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/2066/82590/82590.pdf?sequence=1> [accessed 6 April 2018]. 
496 Wynn and Mazur, p 775. 
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The third standard that appears indisputable is the importance of a diverse judiciary 
which requires that judges are of different genders and diverse backgrounds. In practice, this 
requires that judicial appointment bodies publicly state their commitment to diversifying the 
judiciary and if necessary, actively recruit rather than merely vet candidates for 
appointments.497 I submit that the commitment to diversity also starts with a commitment to 
have a diverse appointment body. Action needs to be taken to recruit and appoint women to 
selection bodies. It is suggested that this is valuable for the process for three main reasons. 
First, there is symbolism in having a powerful body such as the JSC exhibiting gender equity. 
It is a sign that there are no more areas in the judiciary related sphere that women cannot enter. 
It is also symbolic of a commitment to include women in decision-making processes, as 
mandated by the Latimer Principles and the Cape Town Principles.498  
The second reason is that diversity is important for the JSC as a decision-making body. 
Article 8 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa (better known as the Maputo Protocol), specifically requires state parties to 
ensure that ‘women are represented equally in the judiciary and law enforcement organs’.499 
Article 9 of the Maputo Protocol requires that state parties ensure the increased and effective 
representation of women at all levels of decision making. To further bolster efforts in the 
region, Article 12 of the Southern African Community Development (SADC) Protocol on 
Women, mandated state parties to ‘endeavour that, by 2015, at least fifty percent of decision-
making positions in the public and private sectors are held by women […].’500 The SADC 
Protocol recognises the need to change discriminatory attitudes, norms of decision-making 
 
497 Principle VIII of the Lilongwe Principles. 
498 Principle V (b) of the Latimer Principles requires public office holders to reflect the composition of the 
community in terms of gender and the related Edinburgh Action Plan requires measures to be taken to ensure 
holders of public office are gender diverse. Principle 2 of the Cape Town Principles requires an appropriately 
diverse appointing body. 
499 African Union. 
500 Southern African Development Community, ‘SADC Protocol on Gender and Development’. 
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structures, and procedures and it calls for the enhancement of gender mainstreaming in all 
structures.501  
Members of JSCs are in decision-making positions, as envisaged by these protocols, 
because of their responsibilities and the power they possess to recommend candidates to the 
President. Gender mainstreaming in the JSCs would require more than merely appointing more 
women as members. It also necessitates that the JSC has a clear understanding of the sexism 
and biases that are sometimes present in male dominated decision-making bodies. Doing this 
will strengthen the body’s ability to act independently and impartially and instil public 
confidence in the process.  
Thirdly, diversity on appointing bodies may have the effect of encouraging more 
women to apply for positions in the judiciary, because of a belief that women commissioners 
are more likely to interrogate the challenges that women face in the legal fraternity.502 The 
three standards of transparency, independence and diversity are not applicable to the JSC alone 
but, for the purposes of this chapter, the focus is on the appointing bodies.503  
This chapter is divided into five segments. The first segment introduces the Zambian 
JSC in terms of composition, responsibilities and modalities of operation. It also provides 
statistics of the judges appointed in this research period, which is 2013-2017. The second 
segment looks at the value of transparency, by examining the application process and 
investigating different facets of the process that can affect women’s ascension to the bench. 
The third segment highlights the value of independence by discussing the JSC’s performance, 
from the perspective of the interview participants. The participants’ responses elicited two main 
themes, which will be discussed in this segment. The first is the consideration of the 
 
501 Article 13(c) and (d). 
502 See Masengu, ‘Gender Transformation as a Means of Enhancing Impartiality on the Bench’, p.487. 
503 Further chapters will explore the role of the legal profession and political leaders. 
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Constitutional Court election petition as a turning point and the second is the scepticism 
regarding the feminisation of the judiciary.504 Both these points are underpinned by a view that 
the appointment process is not sufficiently independent. 
The fourth segment highlights what I argue is prejudice against women judges in 
Zambia. I submit that this prejudice arises from illegitimacy perceptions of women’s 
leadership. Since judgeship is a position of leadership, women judges are therefore regarded as 
illegitimate holders of power. The last segment before the conclusion, focuses on the values of 
representativeness. As mentioned earlier, gender diversity on the JSC as a decision-making 
body is valuable for both the body as a structure and for the process outcomes. Nonetheless, in 
the final segment, I examine arguments that more women on the JSC will lead to the 
appointment of more women judges. This is an examination of the process outcomes of a 
gender diverse bench, while acknowledging that equal representativeness on the JSC, should 
not be dependent on outcomes.  
4.2 THE ZAMBIAN JSC IN SUMMARY 
4.2.1 Composition  
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the JSC in Zambia was initially created by Chapter 259 
of the Service Commission Act of 1994 and this act was later replaced by Act 10 of 2016.505 
Section 219 of the New Constitution establishes the JSC but does not contain details of its 
composition. The details are found in section 5(1) of the Service Commission Act (2016), 
which states that the JSC shall consist of eight designated members. The JSC must be chaired 
by someone who is qualified to hold ‘high judicial office’ and this is currently former Chief 
 
504 The term feminisation is used in this research to denote the increased participation of women on the bench 
and not a feminist influence in the practice of law. 
505 ‘Constitution-of-Zambia-Amendment-Act-No-2-of-2016’. 
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Justice Mathew Ngulube.506 This new requirement of ‘high judicial office’ was introduced in 
2016; previously the JSC was chaired by the sitting Chief Justice according to the 1994 Act.  
The removal of the sitting Chief Justice as head of the JSC elicited mixed reviews. 
Several interview participants expressed the view that the absence of the Chief Justice as the 
chair of the JSC, is a disadvantage to the entire process. A former JSC member explained that 
it would be difficult for the Chief Justice to get results from people she did not have a role in 
selecting.507 There were a few participants however, who argued that the deputy represents the 
Chief Justice on the JSC and that her absence allows for an impartial process.508 The rationale 
of excluding the sitting Chief Justice from chairing the commission is unknown. There is 
speculation, that it pertains to the interference in the process from former Acting Chief Justice 
Lombe Chibesa-Kunda who acted in the role from 2012-2015.509 
 This interference was also alluded to by current JSC Chair Justice Ngulube who 
mentioned that under the chair of acting Chief Justice Chibesa-Kunda, there were some unusual 
occurrences. For example, the JSC only has one stage of interviews for candidates, but in one 
selection process, the candidates had to undergo two interview stages.510 He stated that this was 
because the former acting Chief Justice was unsatisfied when some candidates did not score 
highly in the initial interviews, so another round of interviews was added. The inference was 
that there were people whom the former Chief Justice wanted as judges and who did not 
initially make the grade. Justice Ngulube was quick to point out that he thought it was 
unfortunate that the current Chief Justice does not chair the commission. He added that he had 
 
506 Justice Ngulube was the Deputy Chief Justice from 1982 -1992 and Chief Justice from 1992-2002. 
507 Interview with Mr Fraser Chishimba, 12 April 2017. 
508 Interview with a Legal Professional 5, 20 April 2017. 
509 Ibid. 
510 Interview with former Chief Justice Ngulube on 12 April 2017. 
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personally made presentations to the authorities to give the chair of the JSC back to the sitting 
Chief Justice, because she is the head of the judiciary511 
 In addition to the chair of the JSC, other members include the following: a judge 
nominated by the Chief Justice, currently Deputy Chief Justice Marvin Mwanamwamba; the 
Attorney-General (with the Solicitor-General as the alternate);512 the Permanent Secretary 
responsible for public service management; and a magistrate nominated by the Chief Justice. 
As at November 2017, the representative of the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) on the JSC 
was Mr Mwikisa Mukande and the Dean of a Law school was Mr Frederick Mudenda.513 The 
final member of the JSC is appointed by the President, who at present is retired Judge Bobby 
Bwalya. As of November 2017, there were no women on the JSC. The last woman who sat as 
a JSC member was Chief Resident magistrate Aridah Chulu who was the magistrates’ 
representative on the JSC.514 She left the JSC in January 2017. 
4.2.2 Responsibilities 
The JSC’s role is not limited to the appointment of judges but it also includes the appointment, 
confirmation, promotion and discipline of all employees of the judicial service.515 This includes 
but is not limited to all magistrates, registrars, deputy registrars and the Chief Administrator. It 
also performs other functions incidental to the regulation of human resources and determines 
complaints and appeals from the employees of the Judicial Service.516 However, it does not 
deal with any complaints or disciplinary issues relating to judges. The Judicial Complaints 
Commission, an independent quasi-judicial body, handles complaints against judges.517 The 
 
511 Ibid. 
512 Mr Likando Kalaluka and Abram Mwansa respectively. 
513 Currently Dean of Law at the University of Zambia law School. 
514 Mrs Chulu has since been appointed Deputy Registrar at the Lusaka High Court. 
515 Ministry of Legal Affairs, The Service Commission Act (Zambia, 1994), pp. 1–116 
<http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Service Commissions Act.pdf>.  
516 Section 6 (d) and (e). 
517 The body derives its power from the Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act No. 13 of 1999 as amended by the 
Judicial (Code of Conduct) (Amendment) Act No. 13 of 2006 and the New Constitution.  
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members of the JSC are paid an honorarium for their services, as they only operate as and when 
needed.518 
4.2.3 Appointments and Modalities of Operation  
Zambia is a small jurisdiction with only 72 judges as of April 2018.519 In the period 2013-2017, 
57 judges520 were appointed.521 The appointments are divided as follows: 
Table 2 
Court Appointments 
Constitutional Court 4 women, 3 men 
Supreme Court of Appeal 3 women, 8 men 
Court of Appeal  5 women, 4 men 
Specialised High Court Divisions 16 women, 13 men 
Total 50% women, 50% men 
 
The new courts have only been in existence since 2016 and appointments to the courts is an 
ongoing project.522 As of December 2017 there were still several vacancies which included at 
least 28 more High Court positions, twelve Court of Appeal positions and six Constitutional 
Court positions.523 Justice Ngulube stated that one of the challenges preventing the appointment 
 
518 Interview with Chief Justice Ngulube. 
519 Statistics obtained from the website of the Zambian judiciary, http://www.judiciaryzambia.com/. 
520 All judges in the Zambian judiciary regardless of ranking are referred to as justices and will be referred to as 
such, when being referred to individually. 
521 Official statistics sent from the Zambian judiciary in August 2017, with additional amendments made using 
the Zambian judiciary website. 
522 The establishment of new courts was discussed in Chapter 3 under the section ‘Appointments in a New 
Zambian judicial Era’. 
523 Interview with Justice Mathew Ngulube. 
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of more judges is the lack of infrastructure, particularly regarding chambers and 
accommodation for judges.524 
In respect of the appointment of judges, the recruitment process commences with the 
JSC. It operates privately and does not advertise vacancies publicly, but rather relies on two 
methods; internal communication sent to various identified bodies and head hunting. For the 
former method, an internal document is sent to the government institutions that employ 
lawyers, the National Prosecuting Authority, Attorney General’s chambers and to the Law 
Association of Zambia (LAZ) to circulate it to their members.525 Mr Chishimba confirmed that 
during his time on the JSC,526 this method of circulating vacancies resulted in a pool of 
candidates from different backgrounds in terms of careers and experience.527 For the 
headhunting method, senior members of the judiciary identify potential candidates and 
approach them directly encouraging them to apply. Though appointed at different times, the 
seven women judges interviewed for this research, reflected this dual method of recruitment.  
Two of them had been recruited from private practice having been encouraged by the 
LAZ to apply. Another two had been in the government service - one worked for the Ministry 
of Justice, another was previously at Legal Aid - and they received news of the vacancies 
through internal communication. The fifth and sixth judges had been in the judicial service, 
rising from magistrates to registrars and then judges, while the final one went directly to the 
High Court from the magistracy. For these last three judges, their ascension to the bench was 
considered a natural progression, although they were specifically encouraged by senior judges 
to apply. Ordinarily, candidates send in their application using a prescribed application form 
together with relevant documents.  
 
524 Ibid. 
525 Ibid. 
526 His term was from March 2007 to October 2015. 
527 Interview on 12 April 2017. 
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A shortlisting process is conducted by the JSC to narrow down the candidates.528 While 
the short-listing process includes assessing whether they meet the prescribed constitutional 
criteria, there is an extra level of vetting involved. The names of all applicants are sent to 
specific security agencies such as the Zambian Police Service, the Anti-Corruption 
Commission (ACC), the Drug Enforcement Commission, and the Zambia Intelligence 
Service.529 These agencies conduct background checks to verify amongst others, the 
candidate’s citizenship, financial dealings, and any criminal record and whether they have been 
involved in any corrupt activities. One interviewee stated that she knows a number of people 
who had not been shortlisted or in her words ‘stopped from crossing over’ because of the 
background checks.530 Those who are cleared are interviewed on an appointed date, with 
individual interviews lasting up to an hour.531  
The judges whom I interviewed spoke of the rigour of the interview process, with three 
of them commenting on the difficulty of some technical legal questions posed by the 
commissioners. While for interview candidates this was the most memorable aspect, the 
commissioners seemed to emphasise the necessity of going beyond the purely legal questions 
as they assessed candidates. However, it was also necessary to discern whether they were 
‘clean’.532 The commissioner proffered: 
That perhaps is something, which is not so obvious, but which we did look for was 
whether they had any skeletons, like some scandals. Yah we tried to avoid people who 
were scandalous.533 
The notion of desiring candidates without scandals is considered an integral part of the process. 
It helps to ensure that those who are passing judgement on others, are above reproach 
 
528 Interview with Justice Ngulube. 
529 Tabeth Masengu, ‘Research Report on the Zambian Judicial Appointment System’ (Cape Town: Democratic 
Governance and Rights Unit, 2017), pp. 1–20. 
530 Interview with Legal professional 4 on 19th April 2017.  
531 Interview with Justice Ngulube. 
532 Interview with JSC Commissioner 1 on 21 April 2017. 
533 Ibid. 
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themselves. It is worth noting though, that this rigorous process is limited to candidates aspiring 
for High Court positions. 
 For those already on the High Court aspiring for promotion, the process works 
differently. For the Supreme Court and the newly established Court of Appeal, candidates are 
specifically identified and encouraged to apply. One does not solicit appointment but rather, 
the senior judicial officers deem that one is worthy because they see one’s performance and 
decide that one is ready to be promoted.534 The Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice are 
involved in the process of head hunting, with the chair of the JSC also included.535 The 
candidates encouraged to apply have to submit ten of their best judgments for scrutiny and the 
selected candidates’ names are sent to the other JSC members, but they are not interviewed.536 
One senior judge confirmed that when she was in the High Court, she was advised to submit 
her CV for ascension to one of the higher courts. She was of the opinion that this invite was 
based on her performance over the years and the same advice was given to at least twelve of 
her colleagues.537  
 The recruitment process for the Constitutional Court seems to have operated 
differently. Several people are said to have applied both upon solicitation and of their own 
volition. Some were disqualified due to age and adverse information provided from security 
agencies. Only three applicants who were not members of the judiciary at the time they applied 
were interviewed, before the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and the JSC chair selected the 
others.538 For all positions (including High Court), the recommended names are sent to the 
President for appointment, subject to ratification by the National Assembly as per section 140 
 
534 Ibid. 
535 Interview with Deputy Chief Justice Marvin Mwanamwamba for the Research Report on the Zambian 
Judicial Appointment System on 1st December 2016. 
536 Ibid. 
537 Interview with Justice 4, 18 April 2017. 
538 Interview with Deputy Chief Justice Marvin Mwanamwambwa. 
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of the New Constitution. A more detailed examination of the President and National 
Assembly’s role in the process, will follow in Chapter 8.539 
4.3 IS THE JSC PROCESS TRANSPARENT? 
4.3.1 Relevance of transparency in Judicial Appointments 
Handsley and Lynch posit that ‘in public law and political theory, the value of transparency is 
almost axiomatic’.540 Nevertheless, they consider it worthwhile to remind us that if procedures 
are transparent resulting in their workings being readily visible to outsiders, then it is likely for 
them to operate as intended.541 They further add that ‘if there is no general agreement on how 
a procedure should work, keeping it transparent at least leaves room for an effective debate on 
this question, leading ultimately to the establishment of some optimal process”.542 This is 
because a legitimate appointments process is determined by how transparent the selection 
process is.543 Transparency and openness is also considered as an effective mechanism to 
address principles of good governance.544 It is a critical standard found in the UN Principles, 
the Latimer Principles and the Cape Town Principles. The Model Clause also highlights that, 
regardless of the method established to ensure transparency, there must be a public system of 
assessing the qualification of candidates.545 
4.3.2 How transparent is the appointment system in Zambia?  
To analyse the transparency of the Zambian process, one must look at the relevant stages where 
the JSC is involved. Rafael Pardo differentiates between two types of transparency− process 
transparency and candidate transparency. Process transparency is about whether the decision-
 
539 Chapter 8 will be focused on political and other determinant factors. 
540 Elizabeth Handsley and Andrew Lynch, ‘Facing up to Diversity ? Transparency and the Reform of 
Commonwealth Judicial Appointments 2008-13’, Sydney Law Review, 37 (2015), 187–215.  
541 Ibid. 
542 Ibid. 
543 van Zyl Smit, 'The Appointment and Removal of Judges pp 1-2. 
544 Article 2.3.1 of the Nairobi Action Plan of the Latimer Principles. 
545 Pp.12-13 of the Model clause. 
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making process of the selecting body should be visible to the public and judicial candidates.546 
This would include information on how the recruitment is conducted, when the interviews are 
held and how recommended candidates are assessed. This can also include how the interviews 
are conducted, whether it be publicly televised as in the Kenyan appointment system or whether 
the interviews should be open for public attendance as in the South African system. The latter 
system however is not recommended by the Model Clause, because reports have shown that 
although candidates are prepared to put themselves through an open and fair process, they are 
less willing to share their candidature, and any lack of success, with the public at large’.547 
 Candidate transparency refers to the extent to which a candidate's views should be 
made visible and to whom. This also requires that information on the candidates is publicly 
available before the selection process. This information can include a history of their legal 
experience or expertise, any previously held positions that may be in conflict with the office of 
a judge, or any ideological beliefs that could be considered as relevant for the candidate’s 
application.548 Pardo argues that process and candidate transparency do not operate in concert, 
and an appointment process can be transparent, even if it complies with just one of the 
definitions.549  
Using the descriptions provided above, the Zambian scenario has insufficient 
transparency. If one considers process transparency: there are no public advertisements of 
vacancies, there is no publication of interview dates and the names of applicants and short-
listed candidates are never made public. Several participants expressed the view that the 
process is an enigma, with one particularly proffering ‘the whole thing is flawed and a mystery, 
 
546 Rafael I. Pardo, ‘The Utility of Opacity in Judicial Selection’, New York University Annual Survey of 
American Law, 64 (2009), 633–52 <http://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2007.54.1.23.>. 
547 Jan van Zyl Smit, Judicial Independence in Latin America :The Implications of Tenure And Appointment 
Processes (London, 2016), p.22 <www.binghamcentre.biicl.org> [accessed 4 February 2017]. 
548 The latter point is especially relevant in jurisdictions like the United States, where appointments to some 
courts are openly partisan. 
549 Ibid at p.639 
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there is no space for advertising, no one who knows how to apply and how people get 
appointed’. 550 One judge referred to it as being ‘a closed shop and once you’re called in, you 
just hear whispers, and that “there are judges being appointed”’.551 This view was not only 
expressed by judges, legal professionals, and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) but even by 
a current commissioner. This aspect of the appointment process goes against the Lilongwe 
Principles call for a standardised, transparent process.552 
Mr Fredrick Mudenda specifically referred to the Latimer Principles and bemoaned 
how the current process falls short of the principles 553 His complaint centred particularly on 
the recommendation to advertise judicial vacancies for the sake of preserving judicial 
independence. Further, the principles advise that in order to reach gender and diversity targets, 
jurisdictions should ‘through public information programmes, broad advertising of judicial 
vacancies […] encourage women and those from diverse backgrounds to apply for judicial 
appointments’.554 The Cape Town Principles also emphasise that readily accessible 
information on the process, provides a foundation for public confidence in the selection 
process.555 Mr Mudenda stated ‘I have been saying, can we advertise, can we try to make the 
process more transparent. Let us advertise, interview these people, whoever has applied and 
recommend’.556 His recommendations have not been taken up. 
There is an absence of candidate transparency in Zambia because the shortlisting and 
interviews are conducted privately. Nobody knows how many people are being interviewed, 
who they are, and there is no post-interview publication of candidate’s responses. There is also 
no way to ascertain how candidates responded in the interviews, which has led to a questioning 
 
550 Interview with Mr O’Brien Kabaa, 19 April 2017. 
551 Interview with Justice 5, 3 December 2017. 
552 Southern African Chief Justices’ Forum, p.9. 
553 Interview with Dean of University of Zambia Law School, Fredrick Mudenda on 20 April 2017. 
554 Commonwealth Latimer House Principles. 
555 Principle 9. 
556 Interview on 20 April 217. 
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of the rigour of the JSC interviews.557 An interview participant who works within the judiciary 
as a registrar remarked on how quiet the JSC is and how the privacy of the process makes it 
less transparent.  
People do not get to know who is aspiring for that position, their background, their 
credibility, and their competence those factors are not known, and you just get to hear 
that someone has been appointed as a judge. If an interview, an open interview was 
conducted like in South Africa I believe that is the position, whosoever is aspiring for 
that position of High Court judge has to be interviewed publicly, so if we had adopted 
that mode, I think it would be transparent.558 
The view of the appointment process and specifically the JSC’s role as a mystery was a constant 
theme in most of the interviews conducted.  
Lack of information about the process was equated to lack of transparency, which was 
considered a negative aspect of the process. It was particularly interesting that the majority of 
participants did not know the identity of the current JSC commissioners, including former 
commissioners and judges. While the Service Commission Act provides the designations of 
who the members must be, the participants submitted that the identity of the commissioners 
was not publicly available.559  The absence of basic information such as the identity of the 
commissioners, encourages the view that the process is a mystery and only for a selected few 
persons. The necessity for both process and candidate transparency was expressed repeatedly 
in interviews. Interview participants’ responses on what would make the process more 
transparent, ranged from having public advertisements, publishing short-listed names and 
providing reasons why shortlisted candidates qualified. A smaller number of participants were 
of the view that the interview process should be publicly aired on television.560  
 
557 Interview with Mr Lee Habasonda, 20 April 2017. 
558 Interview with Legal Professional 3, 14 August 2017. 
559 The information is not easily accessible, and I was only provided with the information when I interviewed 
the JSC chair. 
560 The participants who were in support of public interviews argued that since the role of a judge is public 
office, the judges should be subject to public scrutiny. 
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Transparency does not necessarily require severe publicity and a process can provide 
sufficient information of its operations, without the need to be publicly televised. Pardo is 
sceptical about public interviews, because he believes that the process is susceptible to 
politicisation.561 This may be the case, as has been experienced in South Africa and Kenya.562 
The perils of public interviews are acknowledged and I have spoken to a number of candidates 
in South Africa, who are not willing to put themselves through a publicly aired process that has 
the potential of harming their reputation.563 Thus, van Zyl Smit submits that ‘the interests of 
individual applicants, may be better served by making provision for targeted and confidential 
scrutiny of commission proceedings’.564  
This thesis agrees with van Zyl Smit and it is submitted that the absence of public 
interviews alone, is not a determinant of the lack of transparency. Other ways to achieve 
process transparency include publicly advertising the vacancies,565 allowing members of the 
public to comment confidentially on candidates and making the JSC members and their 
selection criteria known. This would increase the number of people applying for judicial office 
and ensure a larger pool of applicants, which increases the chances of getting good candidates. 
Further, as Brink opines ‘by providing insight and internal information, the idea is that 
openness will reduce the scope for corruption or unethical practices’.566 This in turn gives the 
impression that people will be appointed on merit, as should be the case.  
 
561 This he argues, can occur when appointing politicians increasingly feel the need to satisfy constituencies who 
either are responsible for or will facilitate their re-election and thus, they become less independent in deciding 
who is an appropriate candidate to be appointed to the bench. 
562 This will be expanded on further in the succeeding chapter on the South African process. 
563 These discussions have been in judicial forums I have attended and in personal conversations with judges. 
564 van Zyl Smit '"Opening Up" Commonwealth judicial appointments to diversity?', p.80. 
565 Ibid. 
566 Brink, p.65. 
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4.3.3 Effect of Lack of Transparency on Women Judges 
One could argue that since Zambia has achieved gender equity on the bench, the lack of 
transparency described above has not been harmful to women. Despite the private system and 
the opaqueness of the process, the number of women judges provides an indication that perhaps 
the lack of transparency, is not a barrier to women ascending to the bench. It is understood that 
transparency in a judicial appointments process is necessary if people are to consider the 
process as legitimate and the recommended candidates as meritorious. However, perhaps it is 
but one relevant factor amongst others. Some interview participants were of the view that the 
lack of transparency, especially process transparency, has facilitated the increase of the number 
of women on the bench. The argument was that if the process was made public by having a 
publicly known shortlist, allowing public comments on candidates and having publicly aired 
interviews, women’s shortcomings, such as their lack of litigation experience, would be 
revealed. This would then make them less appointable.567  
The other view was that women are judged by a different standard and that a more 
public process would be more damaging to them and they would be less likely to apply.568 As 
one legal professional put it ‘if you’re a man and I’m a woman and we’re political appointments 
they’ll attack you on something else, but they’ll attack me on my marriage, they’ll attack me 
on how I look, you know’.569 She further explained that evidence in politics has shown that 
questions of integrity become skewed when women are vying for office, resulting in 
unwarranted personal attacks that discourage other women from seeking office.570Another 
senior advocate offered a similar view on the utility of the public process for women. 
I do not know; it depends on the perception and women are less likely to be prominent 
in the way that men are. You know for example you see in the newspaper very often ‘ 
‘One prominent Lusaka lawyer’, it is almost inevitably a man, you don’t see those 
 
567 Interviews with O’Brien Kabaa and Legal Professional 1, 15 August 2017. 
568 Interviews with Legal Professionals 5 and 6, 20 and 19 April 2017 respectively. 
569 Interview with Legal Professional 6. 
570 Ibid. 
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headlines for women, so they’re less visible as well. So, I am not sure that, it would 
work in women’s favour to be honest.571 
Her argument was premised on a view that the public acts, on what or whom they know, and 
women are less prominent and less likely to be considered as the ‘ideal’ judge. For this reason, 
having a process where members of the public comment on candidates and /or attend public 
interviews of potential judges, would perhaps be a disadvantage for women.  
Jan van Zyl Smit confirms this reasoning by suggesting that there is a concern that 
publicising the identity of individuals or having public interviews, would deter potential 
candidates.572 In particular, he states that ‘in a divided society it is possible that candidates of 
disadvantaged groups may be deterred to a greater extent, if they consider themselves more 
likely to be rejected by the commission’. 573 Nevertheless, there was a suggestion from a senior 
judge that a more public process would be useful to justify to other judicial colleagues why the 
successful candidates have been chosen. This suggestion was particular to appointments to 
courts beyond the High Court, where this particular woman judge presides. Regarding her 
ascension to the higher court, she described the dilemma in the following way:  
You see, those who were not appointed, were aggrieved. [They questioned the criteria 
that were used]. People have a way of measuring their work. In their own eyes, they 
measure themselves and they begin to think, "But how has that one qualified?" So, 
internally, there was a problem because we did not know what was going on, we didn't 
know what was being considered when people were appointed to this position [and] to 
that position.574 
The lack of transparency in her case seemed to create some form of resentment from colleagues 
who had been left behind, particularly male colleagues. 
 Providing reasons for appointments is not only useful for judges, but also for lawyers 
and the public. A former commissioner suggested that if people knew what was involved and 
 
571 Interview with Legal Professional 5. 
572 van Zyl Smit '"Opening up Commonwealth Judicial appointments to Diversity"', p.80. 
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574 Interview with Justice 4. 
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how the interview process really worked, ‘they would not be suspicious of what comes after 
the end’.575 Another judge added that transparency was critical, but it should be encouraged in 
a manner that was suitable for Zambian society. This she argued, meant that one should be 
careful of adopting practices from other jurisdictions, when the Zambian context was 
different.576 A third opined that more transparency would be important for building trust, 
because there were various allegations circulating about how recent appointments had been 
made (the majority of them being women).577 These allegations had resulted in an unflattering 
perception of the JSC. Therefore, the lack of transparency in the process is not only harmful to 
those who have judicial aspirations and to the judiciary, but to those whose responsibility it is 
to recommend judges for appointment. How the JSC operates primarily defines how the entire 
judicial appointment process is viewed. 
4.4 JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JSC 
The independence of a judicial appointment body is a critical aspect of the independence of the 
judiciary. The ‘independence of a commission can arguably be instrumental to promoting both 
judicial independence and judicial diversity by giving a wider range of potential candidates the 
confidence that their application for judicial office will be impartially assessed and 
considered’.578 Challenges to a JSC’s independence can include obvious interference such as 
clear instructions from the executive or other influential powers. However, even when there 
are no obvious challenges to independence, perceptions of interference in the process can be 
damaging. 
 
575 Interview with Commissioner 1. 
576 Interview with Justice 2. 
577 Interview with Judge 6 on 1 December 2016. 
578 van Zyl Smit, '"Opening up Commonwealth Judicial appointments to Diversity"', p.78. 
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4.4.1 The Constitutional Court Ruling on the Election petition 
A pivotal moment for the Zambian judiciary and what a number of interview participants 
consider as an indictment of the JSC and the appointment process arose in September 2016. 
This pivotal moment concerns the dismissal of a presidential election petition by the newly 
established Constitutional Court. This ruling changed the country, both jurisprudentially and 
politically, and to date is still considered a legal anomaly.579 The decision and its effects were 
a prominent theme throughout the field research in Zambia and therefore, it is necessary to 
provide a brief description of the case, before explaining how it impacts on this research.  
On 11 August 2016, Zambia held its tightly contested presidential and general elections. 
These elections were more significant than previous ones because for the first time, a successful 
candidate had to amass more than 50% of the votes to avoid a run-off.580 The gravity of this 
new requirement was visible in a pre-election period that saw an unprecedented level of 
violence, resulting in a decision by the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) to suspend 
campaigning in the capital city Lusaka for ten days.581 The country was deeply divided along 
tribal lines and allegiances when citizens went to the polls on 11 August.582 The incumbent 
President Edgar Lungu who had won the previous election by less than 28 000 votes, was 
declared the winner, by a margin of 100 330 votes.583 He polled 50.35 of the total votes, while 
Hakainde Hichilema had 47.63%. 
The main opposition party United Party for National Development (UPND) alleged that 
there had been election fraud and various election petitions were filed contesting the election 
 
579 It also revealed a lacuna in the Constitutional Court Rules and the election petition articles in the 
Constitution. 
580 The previous system referred to as ‘First past the Post’ required a successful candidate to get the majority 
vote, which could be under 50%. 
581 Aljazeera, ‘Zambia Suspends Election Campaigning over Violence’, Aljazeera Africa, 10 July 2016, 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/zambia-suspends-election-campaigning-violence-
160710141136702.html> [accessed 13 March 2018]. 
582 Ibid. 
583 Official statistics from the Electoral Commission of Zambia. 
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results.584 The presidential election petition was filed in the then newly established 
Constitutional Court, by UPND leader Hichilema and his running mate, Godfrey Bwalya 
Mwamba. They challenged the re-election of Edgar Lungu and Inonge Wina as President and 
Vice President of the Republic of Zambia, respectively.585 The petition was filed on Friday 19 
August 2016 under article 103(1) of the new Constitution, which provides for a nullification of 
the election of a President based on two main grounds.586 Article 103(2) read with article 101(5) 
mandates that the Constitutional Court shall hear an election petition relating to the president-
elect within fourteen days of the filing of the petition.  
The interpretation of this fourteen day clause proved to be the Achilles heel of the entire 
process, as the preliminary process of filing the petition consumed most of the fourteen days.587 
According to Owiso, by the time the preliminary processes were dispensed with, it was 2 
September 2016, the last day of the fourteen days.588 The petitioners’ lawyers frustrated by the 
process, then withdrew their services. The court then adjourned to Monday 5 September to 
allow the petitioners to appoint new counsel and gave each side two days to present their case. 
However on the said morning, the court had a written judgment issued before the matter could 
be heard in full. In Hakainde Hichilema & Others v Edgar Lungu & Others, the majority held 
that the required time limit within which the court could hear an election petition had prescribed 
on 2 September 2016.589 The majority also held that article 105(1) of the Constitution was clear 
and unambiguous and the court had no discretion to enlarge the time for hearing a petition.590 
 
584 These included parliamentary seats around the country. 
585 President Edgar Lungu garnered 1,860,877 votes against Hakainde Hichilema’s 1,760,347 votes. 
586If the person was not validly elected or if a provision of the Constitution or other law, relating to presidential 
elections was not complied with. 
587 The Rules of the Constitutional Court state that the respondent to file an answer to the petition within five 
days of service and the petitioner to reply within five days of being served with the answer. Thereafter, a process 
of discovery is done which is followed by a status conference before the hearing can commence. 
588 Roger Owiso, ‘Zambia : The 2016 Zambia Presidential Election Petition: How Not to Handle Election 
Petitions’, Lusakatimes.Com, 20 Septermber 2016, <https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/09/20/2016-zambia-
presidential-election-petition-not-handle-election-petitions/> [accessed 12 March 2018].  
589 Hakainde Hichilema & Others v Edgar Lungu & Others, 2016, CC/0031, 1–16. 
590 Ibid, p.1208. 
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Accordingly, the court found that the petition failed on a technicality and not because there was 
no substantive case to be heard. 
There were two dissenting judgements written by Justices Hildah Chimbomba and 
Margaret Munalula. Justice Munalula held that the primary purpose of article 101(5) is to hear 
a petition and make one of the pronouncements as in article 101(6). If the process of hearing 
has not been concluded, ‘complying with a deadline without the intended purpose taking place 
is an absurdity’.591 She further added that a purposive interpretation of the Constitution was 
deemed necessary, because the issue of a presidential petition was too heavy for a mechanical 
response from the court.592 She added that such an interpretation would have helped heal the 
nation. Justice Chibomba, the President of the Constitutional Court agreed with Justice 
Munalula’s dissenting judgment and stated that she would have allowed the hearing to 
proceed.593 She further added that, the timeframe given in article 101 (5) was not practical or 
workable and it needed to be revised, in order to ensure that the intention of giving parties a 
fair hearing and adequate time to be heard, which is a fundamental right, could be achieved.594 
 The decision to dismiss the petition without hearing the merits caused shock waves in 
the country and led to two complaints to the Judicial Complaints Authority, demanding the 
removal of the judges.595 The public expectation was that the parties would be given two days 
each to make substantive arguments, because this is what the court had decided on Friday 2 
 
591 Hakainde Hichilema & Others v Edgar Lungu & Others dissenting 1, 2016, CC/0031 
<https://www.zambialii.org/zm/judgment/constitutional-court/2016/4/Election petition dissenting 
Munalula.pdf> [accessed 13 March 2018]. 
592 Ibid. 
593Hakainde Hichilema &Others v Edgar Lungu & Others,dissenting 2, 2016, CC/0031 
<https://www.zambialii.org/zm/judgment/constitutional-court/2016/4/Election petition dissenting 
Chibomba.pdf> [accessed 13 March 2018]. 
594 Ibid, p. J4. 
595 ‘Zambia : Judicial Commission to Table Complaint Demanding Removal of Concort Judges’, LusakaTimes, 
7 September 2016 <https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/09/07/judicial-commission-table-complaint-demanding-
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September. Consequently, the decision to abruptly dismiss the petition was not received well. 
The Carter Centre also issued a statement saying that: 
legal and judicial processes surrounding the presidential petitions failed to meet 
Zambia’s national and international obligations under the Zambian constitution, the 
African Charter for Human and People’s Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights to ensure due process, a fair hearing, and effective legal 
remedy.596 
This decision appeared to have had an impact both domestically and regionally.597 
4.4.2 Controversy surrounding the appointment of the Constitutional Court justices 
It is important to understand that the appointment of the justices who heard the election petition 
was not without some controversy. The Constitutional Court was newly established in 2016 
and its justices were handpicked. When the news of the recommended candidates was made 
known, a prominent State Counsel John Sangwa wrote a public memorandum to the President. 
He declared that the six candidates (four women and two men) appointed by the President 
subject to ratification, were all unqualified for the position.598 In a lengthy and what can be 
described as scathing document, he gave a historical overview of why the Constitutional Court 
was established, before submitting that all six candidates did not have the requisite number of 
years of actively practising law.599 He alleged that they lacked active experience in prosecuting 
constitutional or human rights law related cases.600 This memorandum was also published in 
national newspapers and on online forums. 
 
596 ‘Carter Center Expresses Deep Concern about Zambia’s 2016 Electoral Process and Democratic Institutions’, 
The Carter Center, 2016 <https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/zambia-091516.html> [accessed 13 March 
2018]. 
597 The election petition judgement was brought up by a judge from Botswana and discussed at the SADC 
Judges Forum organised by the Democratic Governance and Rights Unit in Mangochi, Malawi in October 2016. 
598 There were Justices Hildah Chibomba, Mungeni-Mulenga, Anne Sitali, Professor Margaret Munalula, 
Ambassador Palan Musonda, and Mr Enoch Mulembe. 
599SC John Sangwa, ‘Brief to the President of the Republic of Zambia on the Constitutional Court 
Appointments’ (Lusaka: Advocate John Sangwa, 2016), pp. 1–22.  
600 Ibid, p.17. 
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 The National Assembly proceeded to ratify the appointments despite opposition from 
the LAZ and the judges were sworn in on 21 March 2016.601 In an interview with advocate 
John Sangwa SC, he explained that he sent the memorandum to the President prior to the 
appointments, specifically because he knew that they did not qualify for appointments as 
justices of the court.602 He stated that he wrote to the Speaker of the National Assembly 
expressing his concerns and even sought an audience with the Parliamentary Select Committee 
of the National Assembly, but his request was denied.603 The Constitutional Court decision and 
the resultant debacle was considered by many as proof of advocate Sangwa’s allegation, that 
the justices were not ably qualified for the role. 604 One magistrate argued that the best of the 
Supreme Court judges should have been chosen for the Constitutional Court, with nobody from 
the outside being appointed.605 
There was a shared view amongst interview participants that nobody really knew how 
applications for the positions were made and how the JSC selected the justices. It was felt by a 
number of participants that the opaqueness in the process resulted in the highest court in the 
land having some justices with limited litigation experience. As one judge proffered: 
I think they tried to make practice a prerequisite qualification for one to be appointed 
to the Constitutional Court, except when they drafted the clause, it was porous. They 
did not quite achieve what they had set out to do. The intention was that it is a person 
who had appeared before court, argued cases that qualified, but because of the clumsy 
way it was drawn, they still had people who had not practiced being appointed to that 
court and you know the confusion that ensued.606 
In reference to the same, Mr Habasonda opined ‘if you asked me, I will tell you that it is a 
mistake to have a Con-Court. I don’t feel proud that my tax goes to pay people who can’t take 
 
601 Owiso, p.2. 
602 Interview with Advocate John Sangwa SC on 13th April 2017. 
603 The Parliamentary Select Committee discussed in detail in Chapter 8, is the committee that interviews 
prospective candidates and hears reports from various bodies, before it decides to forward names to the house 
for ratification 
604 Advocate Sangwa was initially one of the advocates representing the petitioners in the said case. 
605 Interview with Legal Professional 1. 
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a decision or who change their mind’. 607 Mr Mweenge believed that the whole judiciary had 
been cast in a bad light since the Constitutional Court election petition. He added that while 
there had been previous issues with appointments to other courts, the Constitutional Court 
appointments and the problems that followed, magnified the JSC’s shortcomings.608  
 The Constitutional Court appointments and how they have been used as a yardstick to 
measure the JSC’s performance reveal the challenges of the appointment process. Dodek and 
Devlin submit that 'if impartiality is a state of mind, an orientation, a capability, in other words 
“an end”, then independence is the “means” to that end.’609 In the Zambian instance, lack of 
clarity on how or why the Constitutional Court justices were appointed, appears to have created 
perceptions of the JSC’s lack of independence. This in turn undercut its perceived impartiality. 
This then raised questions about ‘who’ was really recommending candidates for appointment. 
The JSC’s independence or lack thereof was essentially measured by the output, in this case 
the Constitutional Court judgment. They recommended justices who are deemed 
‘unappointable’ by some, and consequently, they too are not seen as fit for their task. Had the 
court decided to hear the petition in full, perhaps the perception of the court and the 
appointments would have been different.610  
 Former JSC Commissioner Mr Chishimba highlighted how perceptions work by 
advancing the argument that people determine what a good judge is based on whether their 
decision is popular or not.611 Thus, these perceptions affect the court’s legitimacy because, as 
Solanke opines, the legitimacy of a court can arise from a single source or from a combination 
 
607 Interview on 20 April 2017. 
608 Interview on 13 April 2017. 
609 Devlin, MacKay, and Kim, p.746.  
610 The Judicial Complaints Authority issued a decision in 2017 that said the court had erred in the interpretation 
of the fourteen day period and that it issued contradictory information regarding whether the petition would be 
heard. 
611 Interview with on 12 April 2017. 
 
 
137 
 
of sources.612 In this instance, for the Constitutional Court, these sources would include 
publicly known information on which candidates applied for the positions, the nature of how 
the judges were selected and appointed and how the JSC arrived at a decision to recommend 
the incumbent judges over and above other applicants.  
The establishment of judicial appointment bodies in African countries was part of the 
design for securing an independent judiciary.613 Therefore if the Constitutional Court 
appointments resulted in a negative perception of the independence of the Zambian JSC, this 
may have damning effects. The first being that perceptions of an institutionally legitimate 
judiciary are tainted because of suspicion of how the judges in that court and others are 
appointed.614 Secondly, it also affects what Gloppen has referred to as social legitimacy in 
Zambia.615 The element of social legitimacy is about whether the courts can draw input and 
support from groups in society. If this is lacking, it may impact on the court’s ability and 
willingness to stand up to other arms of government.616 Thirdly, for judges appointed in the 
future, it can tarnish or detract from the honour of their appointment and create scepticism and 
doubts about whether they are competent and capable. This is particularly a problem for women 
judges. 
4.4.3 Scepticism about the appointment of women judges  
In the interviews I conducted, there was a unanimous opinion that the government is actively 
seeking to appoint more women to the judiciary. Former President Michael Sata appointed a 
 
612 Iyiola Solanke, ‘Diversity and Independence in the European Court Of Justice’, Columbia Journal of 
European Law, 15 (2008), 89–121, <https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?> [accessed 19 July 2016]. 
613 Smit, p.59. 
614 This was confirmed by a number of participants I interviewed. 
615 Siri Gloppen, How to Assess the Political Role of the Zambian Courts? (Bergen, 2004) 
<https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/1927-how-to-assess-the-political-role-of-the-zambian.pdf> [accessed 22 
March 2018].  
616 Ibid at p.113. 
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number of women into various decision-making positions in all sectors.617 This included 
appointment of the first acting woman Chief Justice and a woman deputy at the same time.618 
His successor Edgar Lungu continued this commitment by appointing the first ever, permanent 
Chief Justice in Irene Mambilima and he went on record promising to appoint more women to 
various portfolios.619 Thus, the government’s decision to appoint more women appears to have 
seeped into the JSC process. Dawuni and Kang have highlighted the role of gatekeepers in the 
appointment and promotion of women to judiciaries.620 Gatekeepers include nominating 
commissions and professional organisations involved in appointments.621 In Zambia however, 
women would consider the JSC as an ally rather than a gatekeeper, in their quest for gender 
equity in the judiciary.  
At the time of writing, the Chief Justice Irene Mambilima is one of only three active 
women Chief Justices in Africa.622 Before she took office, another woman, Justice Lombe 
Chibesa-Kunda was acting Chief Justice for just under three years.623 While some women are 
new appointees to the bench, others have risen through the ranks to the Court of Appeal, 
Supreme Court of Appeal, and the Constitutional Court. They have been in the judiciary for a 
long time.624 It is uncommon to find the top three highest courts in a country headed by women, 
even in societies that are considered as champions of gender equity and yet, that is the current 
 
617 ‘Zambia’s Sata Picks Women Judges to Head Judiciary’, Africa Review, 2012 
<http://www.africareview.com/news/Zambias-Sata-picks-women-judges/979180-1427910-format-xhtml-
ggrv2pz/index.html> [accessed 9 April 2018]. 
618 Justices Lombe Chibesa-Kunda and Florence Mumba respectively. 
619 ‘Sata Wins Praise over Women Appointment’, Zambia Daily Mail Ltd, 28 August 2014, <https://www.daily-
mail.co.zm/sata-wins-praise-over-women-appointment/> [accessed 9 April 2018]. 
620 Dawuni and Kang, p.60. 
621 Ibid. 
622 The others are Chief Justice Nemat Abdallah of Sudan and Mathilda Twomey of Seychelles. Justice 
Ntomeng Majara has been suspended since 11 September 2018. 
623 Part of her reign as Chief Justice as after she had reached the legal retirement age which became a 
contentious political issue. 
624 Interview with Commissioner 1. 
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situation in Zambia. In this research period, The Presidents of the Constitutional Court, 
Supreme Court, and Court of Appeal were all women. 
Women are said to perform well in the interview process and according to a former 
commissioner, outperform men in terms of post-graduate qualifications.625 Justice Ngulube 
also added that, after interviewing a large batch of candidates in 2016, ‘the women did 
exceptionally better than the men’.626 One lawyer advanced that this is proof that the JSC 
process has fared well for women and that the process is devoid of any formal discrimination.627 
However, this has not prevented some scepticism around the appointment of more women to 
the bench and the view that the JSC is not acting independently. Rather, it is seen as appointing 
women to pander to the Executive’s desire to have more women judges.628  
The notion of a dependent JSC making recommendations to please the executive has 
resulted in varying views regarding the appointment of women in the last few years. There 
were four views from participants that questioned the competency and capability of the women 
appointed. The first view was that there were many better-qualified men who should have been 
appointed in the same period.629 There is no indication however that the men referred to did 
apply for the positions and were not selected. The second participant submitted that he felt 
there were more women on the bench, because they had failed to succeed in private practice.630 
The third view was that there was a certain threshold one could reach in public service and that, 
because there were more women in public service, judicial appointments were being used to 
‘move officers around and to get desired political appointees in specific public offices’.631 The 
final view was that while women were being appointed to high positions, they really did not 
 
625 Interview with Commissioner 1. 
626 Interview on 12 April 2017. 
627 Interview with Legal Professional 3. 
628 Interview with Legal Professional 1. 
629 Ibid. 
630 Interview with Legal Professional 3. 
631 Interview with Legal Profession 2 on 19th April 2017. 
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have the autonomy to work independently. ‘An invisible hand’ that made them more likely to 
‘play out some favours’ impeded their autonomy.632 Effectively, the judges would not be 
individually independent, because they would owe allegiance to others. 
I was unable to collect sufficient data to test the third view which could be proved or 
disproved by examining the number of women judges who have come from the public service 
in a particular period of time (in comparison to men).633 A perusal of the biographies of the 
justices of the Supreme Court however, showed that there were both men and women justices 
who worked in public service before appointment to the bench.634 In regard to the three other 
views, I submit that they contain hints of sexism. Scepticism around the appointment of women 
to important positions, is not unique to Zambia. Zambia like many other societies is largely 
patriarchal and there is generally still an idea of a ‘woman’s place’. Mr Habasonda captured 
this by explaining that: 
The women participating on the bench [are] also informed in the traditional lenses that 
we find in the society that we are anchored in. The fact that those women are not 
necessarily able to resolve conflict within society. I think that our chiefdoms are in such 
a way that men take the lead, even in situations where the woman is the chief; it is the 
men surrounding her that make the decision.635 
 
Olivier opines that men are probably more likely to be selected as judges because of 
the high value which judicial selectors place on the ability to appear authoritative.636 People’s 
intuitive and preconceived notions of what leaders look like, in addition to reflecting 
personality traits and behaviours, often also reflect social identities associated with traditional 
leaders.637 The judicial robe is traditionally associated with neutrality, assertiveness, 
 
632 Interview with Mr Mweenge. 
633 Despite numerous efforts, the judiciary was unwilling to provide me with further details in this regard, 
because it is considered as personal information. 
634 The website for the Zambian judiciary only contains short biographies of the judges of the Supreme Court 
justices. 
635 Interview on 20 April 2017. 
636 Olivier, 'A Perspective on Gender Transformation', p. 458. 
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confidence, an ability to be objective and stoic. These characteristics are still associated with 
men and therefore, people are still uncomfortable with having women as judges. Margaret 
Thornton argues that prejudice that exists towards women is because the public and work 
sphere has always been delineated as the male sphere.638  
This traditional exclusion has served the myth of intellectual inferiority and given rise 
to the view that the appointment of women is synonymous with a decline in efficiency.639 
Women have also been judged on different standards when it comes to leadership positions640 
and have constantly had to justify their presence on the bench.641 In this Zambian case study, 
the response from some participants was to attribute the increased presence of women on the 
bench to executive interference and invariably, this negates the intellectual capacity and 
experience of the judges. Even when women have succeeded in entering a previously male 
dominated field and theoretically managed to break the glass ceiling, they still encounter other 
obstacles. Andrea Vila et al argue that historical low legitimacy perceptions mean that powerful 
women, relative to powerful men are less likely to be perceived as legitimate authorities.642 
Thus, occupying a high-rank position while simultaneously belonging to a group that occupies 
a subordinate role in society, leads to negative reception.643 
For example, in the Philippines, the appointment of the first ever woman Chief Justice 
was met with complaints about management style which, so the argument goes, would never 
been made about men.644 Further, numerous studies have shown that individuals who are seen 
 
638 Thornton, ‘Affirmative Action, Merit and The Liberal State’, p.29. 
639 Crystal L. Hoyt and Susan E. Murphy, ‘Managing to Clear the Air: Stereotype Threat, Women, and 
Leadership’, The Leadership Quarterly, 27.3 (2016), 387–99. See also ‘Sata Wins Praise over Women 
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641 Rackley, ‘Judicial Diversity,the Woman Judge and Fairy Tale Endings’, p.80. 
642 Vial, Napier, and Brescoll p.400. 
643 Ibid at p.402. 
644 See Emily Sanchez Salcedo, ‘A Five-Year Gender Equality Score Card for the Philippine Supreme Court 
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as atypical in a given context, attract more attention and are more easily singled out for 
criticism.645 In Zambia, it would seem that the higher women have risen in the ranks of the 
judiciary, the more atypical their journey has become and thus, they have attracted more 
attention. The judges and the JSC are thereby singled out or identified as parties succumbing 
to interference and lacking institutional and personal independence. 
 It was interesting to note that the interview participants who were critical of the JSC’s 
performance and of the rise of women, were all quick to affirm the appointment of the Chief 
Justice Irene Mambilima. She was described as a hardworking, fearless, resolute woman of 
integrity who had proved her worth, while presiding at the Electoral Commission of Zambia.646 
Justice Florence Mumba was also mentioned as a woman considered ‘worthy’ of her senior 
status, while others were not.647 Advocate John Sangwa specifically identified High Court 
justice Nicola Sharpe-Phiri and Supreme Court justice Rhoida Kaoma as women worthy of 
their positions, because they were truly focused on being judicial officers, as opposed to being 
interested in the perks of office.648 These women who were singled out for mention, all 
underwent the same process that judges do no − albeit appointed by different JSC compositions.  
There was an absence of clarity regarding what was used as a benchmark, to exclude 
these women from the negative views of women candidates due to the JSC’s lack of 
independence. Advocate Sangwa was one of the few participants who did point out though, 
that the JSC’s performance has largely been poor across the board and according to him, it is 
not only the women appointees who have proved to be incompetent or lacking in practical 
experience.649 Regardless of the mixed views about whether the incompetence is limited to 
 
645 Rackley, ‘Judicial Diversity,the Woman Judge and Fairy Tale Endings’, p.80.  
646 Interviews with Legal Professionals 1 and 3. 
647 Justice Mumba a former justice of the Supreme Court has presided on the International Criminal Tribunal for 
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women judges only, the scepticism of women judges remains and with it, the lingering 
questions about judicial independence. 
4.5 THE PRESENCE OF GENDER PREJUDICE 
4.5.1 Using the Appointment of Women to Assess the JSC 
Before proceeding to the segment on the gender composition of the JSC, it is necessary to 
comment on one striking aspect of the interviews that I conducted. The appointment of more 
women to the bench in Zambia could be a sign that women face no discrimination regarding 
judicial aspirations. Rather, it could even be argued by some that they are the recipients of 
affirmative action initiatives, in the form of the government’s pro-women stance. However, 
there was a subtle bias underlying a number of comments provided in interviews. Take for 
instance the view that the quality of women appointed to the bench has been a sign of the JSC’s 
incompetence. The allegation of this incompetence centred on two main points, the 
Constitutional Court Judgment and the quality of jurisprudence. The Constitutional Court 
election decision was repeatedly mentioned as symbolic of the JSC’s general failure, to appoint 
the ‘correct’ people to the bench. The case was considered by some participants as an exhibition 
of the JSC‘s flawed process, especially regarding the appointment of women. This they argued, 
was because most of the justices on the court at that time were women. 
At the time, the court was comprised of two men and four women, although only five 
members heard the election petition case. I would submit that the argument is flawed for the 
following reason. The majority judgment that was roundly criticised was written by one woman 
justice and two male justices. Both dissenting opinions which held that the petition should have 
been heard, were written by women. Therefore, by apportioning blame to the women justices, 
the critics absolve the men who co-wrote that majority judgment of any responsibility. This 
inconsistent treatment led an interview participant to opine that the Constitutional Court is not 
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respected, simply because it is considered to be a ‘woman’s’ court.650 The second reason given 
for the criticism of the JSC was the quality of decisions being handed down by the courts. At 
least nine of the interview participants (seven of them legal professionals) complained about 
what they perceived as the reduction in standards of jurisprudence. The participants spoke 
generally about falling standards and in two instances, gave examples of bad experiences in 
court.  
There was no specific evidence of this being the result of more women being appointed 
to the bench, despite some of the participants alluding to such a link. In the period of this study, 
there was only one reported investigation probing judicial misconduct, arising from delayed 
judgements. In September 2013, then President Michael Sata suspended High Court judges 
Emelia Sunkutu and Timothy Katanekwa and instituted a tribunal to probe them for 
professional misconduct.651 They were eventually cleared of the charges and the suspension 
was lifted. The tribunal held that they were not at fault, as the delays in judgments were 
occasioned by the fact that they were constantly transferred from one town to another.652 Of 
the judges investigated by the tribunal, one judge was a woman and one was a man. 
Further, there is currently no research available that chronicles the decline in the 
standards of jurisprudence or that directly links unpopular court decisions, to a particular period 
of appointment. Hence it is difficult to appraise the JSC’s performance based on this argument. 
A research project on court efficiency and justice is currently underway by a reputable research 
institution, which seeks to provide policymaking, research capacity, and governance.653 While 
preliminary results indicate that there are some issues with performance and case 
 
650 Interview with Commissioner 1. 
651 Susanne Bruckmüller and others, ‘Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Glass Cliff and Its Lessons for 
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mismanagement, there is no evidence as yet, that this is attributable to the feminisation of the 
judiciary.654 Consequently, I submit that using the appointment of women as a yardstick for 
determining that the JSC is underperforming, is a form of gender prejudice. In the absence of 
credible evidence to support the view that standards have dropped because of women, one can 
not dispute the presence of prejudice in some of the opinions I heard. This prejudice it is argued, 
arises because women are perceived as illegitimate power holders. 
4.5.2 Legitimacy Perceptions and Women Judges  
Andre Vial et al use a model centred on legitimacy to explain the persistence of the gender gap 
in leadership positions.655 In this argument Zambian women judges are positioned as leaders, 
because they are in decision making positions, which are supported by principles of judicial 
independence. In effect, whether sitting as lone judges or on panels, women are pioneers and 
leaders as they perform adjudicative duties, previously reserved for men. Legitimacy is 
described as the sense of obligation or duty to comply freely with the decisions and directions 
of authorities.656 Vial et al posit that the difficulties that female leaders face often stem from 
low legitimacy perceptions—i.e. powerful women relative to powerful men, are less likely to 
be perceived as legitimate authorities. Unlike other models that see women as norm-violators 
which results in bias, Vial et al examine the questions that emerge when bias against female 
leaders is thought of as a special case of bias against an illegitimate leader. This contrasts with 
bias occurring because of women being considered as norm-violators more generally.657 The 
focus is not on the women as ‘disruptors’ and unusual power holders which results in prejudice, 
but rather the perspective that the women are undeserving of the authority that they wield.  
 
654 Interview with Legal Professional 6. 
655 Andre Vial, Jamie Napier and Victoria Brescoll, 'A bed of thorns: Female leaders and the self-reinforcing 
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Power, status, and legitimacy are distinct, but intimately related constructs. Power 
comes attached to the leadership role, but legitimacy is a state in which a leader's power over 
others is seen as deserved and justified.658 The mismatch between traits seen as typical 
behaviours of leaders and those considered to be typical of women, drives expectations that 
women will be less competent than men with identical credentials.659 This mismatch between 
the behaviour of ‘typical’ leaders and ‘(stereo) typical’ women results in bias towards 
women.660 The potential for prejudice against women leaders stems from expectations that 
people typically have about leaders. In particular, people do not associate women with 
leadership positions. Prejudice can therefore arise when perceivers judge women as actual or 
potential occupants of leadership roles. The judgment stems from the inconsistency between 
the predominantly communal qualities that perceivers associate with women and the 
predominantly agentic qualities they believe are required to succeed as a leader661.  
In short, because women are not ordinarily considered as powerful, authoritative, 
independent and assertive actors, any role which affirms these qualities results in prejudice. 
Thus, the idea of a woman taking the lead is historically incompatible to what is expected of 
her.662 Worse yet, the role of a judge. This is because it requires a woman to take charge of a 
court room, adjudicate matters—which can sometimes be matters of life and death, and 
admonish lawyers when necessary. This involves a large amount of power and authority that 
women did not previously experience. If one compares the statistics of women in the three 
arms of government, the judiciary is an outlier on statistical terms alone. At the end of 2018, 
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only 18.8 % of the Members of Parliament were women and only 30% of cabinet ministers 
were women.663 A judiciary with 53% women judges (as of 2018), evokes suspicion as it is 
considered ‘abnormal’ in comparison to other branches of government.  
So we see that historical perceptions of women have not disappeared, as women have 
entered politics, governance and other professions. Rather they have morphed into prejudice 
and illegitimacy perceptions of women in respect of women leaders. Studies suggest that 
traditional sex role stereotypes are imperative for understanding the dynamics and expectations 
for women and men in leadership.664 In the Zambian scenario, some interview participants 
perceive women judges as illegitimate holders of power, because they assume that these 
women are lacking in the required competency and capabilities.665 The low legitimacy 
perceptions of women mean that even though they have the power to preside, it is seen as power 
that is unjustified and undeserved.  
4.6 GENDER DIVERSITY ON THE JSC, AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE GENDER 
EQUITY ON THE BENCH  
4.6.1. Background  
The theoretical chapter in this research explains the importance of diversity to enhance 
impartiality on the bench. The desire for diversity is not only limited to judges, but it is also 
relevant for the bodies that select the judges. In the narrow sense, facial diversity is about seeing 
equal numbers of men and women on a body. However, in the introduction, I highlighted three 
important reasons to have a more diverse JSC. These reasons offer a wider justification for 
gender diversity. The first was the symbolic importance of have more women on the appointing 
body. The second was that the body would be strengthened by diversity, which would enhance 
 
663 Statistics obtained from http://www.parliament.gov.zm/members/gender and 
http://www.parliament.gov.zm/ministers/cabinet. 
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Organizational Behaviour, 25.4 (2004), 515-525. 
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its ability to act independently and impartially, because it would be more likely to identify 
gender biases. The third was that a more diverse JSC would encourage women applicants, 
because of the expectation that other women would understand the challenges they have faced. 
  There is also a theory that a gender diverse JSC leads to more gender diversity among 
judges. Studies have shown that although appointments commissions are considered more 
beneficial for women judicial candidates, because of the lack of patronage, this is contingent 
on the diversity of the appointment commission itself.666 Kenney argues that bodies such as the 
JSC are capable of discriminating against women candidates.667 The antidote to this she 
submits is having more women members on the JSC, providing training to avoid discrimination 
and stereotyping, and ensuring that a gender-diverse bench is a priority.668 Yoon Mi Yung has 
suggested that in order for courts in Tanzania to materialise gender equality, there have to be 
women members of the JSC.669  
The main thrust of this argument is that people in appointing bodies replicate 
themselves and thus are more likely to perceive people who look like them, as being more 
competent. Hamilton describes this as merit lying ‘in the eye of the beholder’ and submits that 
this has not served women well in the past.670 With these studies in mind and the paucity of 
research in this area in the African region, I sought to establish whether the arguments above 
were applicable to the Zambian case study. As this research is not quantitative, the focus was 
on using available information about the JSC and assessing the views of the 22 interviewees. 
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4.6.2 The Gender Composition of the JSC 
As of December 2017, there were no women on the Zambian JSC with the last woman 
commissioner having sat in early 2017. In the period 2016 to early 2017, the two women who 
sat on the JSC represented the Permanent Secretary responsible for public service management 
and the magistracy.671 Upon their departure they were replaced by men. Prior to their 
appointments in 2016, there were not more than three women on the JSC during this period of 
study. This includes, former Acting Chief Justice Chibesa-Kunda and current Chief Justice 
Mambilima, who was previously the Deputy Chief Justice from 2008-2015.672 During the 
period of study, the JSC was initially comprised of ten members, before it was amended to 
eight members.673  
4.6.3 Has the Gender Composition of the JSC made a difference? 
All the interview participants were of the view that the gender composition of the JSC has no 
bearing on women being appointed. Most of the participants pointed to the current statistics as 
proof that the paucity of women on the JSC, was not irreconcilable with achieving gender 
equity on the bench. There were three thematic areas in which their responses fell. The first 
was merit. It was argued that appointments were made on merit; so therefore, the identity of 
the selectors was irrelevant.674 Mr Chishimba stated that because it is a professional screening 
process, people look at the professional principles of the job and not at gender.675 He pointed 
out how more women have been appointed during a time when the JSC remains male 
dominated. Another former commissioner explained that the lack of women on the JSC was 
 
671 These were Dr Velepi Mtonga who retired and Mrs Aridah Chulu who was promoted to Deputy Registrar. 
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irrelevant, because when the JSC recognised the capabilities and qualifications of women 
candidates, there was no other option but to recommend them for appointment.676 
The judges were also of the view that they were appointed because they performed well 
in their interviews and were capable of assuming that office. One senior judge particularly 
emphasised her capabilities by saying ‘you see when you are capable and able; you know it 
matters not who sits on the commission’.677 She further added that while some women might 
be intimidated by the all-male JSC that interviewed her, she was not intimidated at all.678 The 
emphasis on merit for appointments from the judges is understandable. To assign their own 
appointments to the gender or any other status of the commissioners, would be suggesting that 
they did not deserve appointment based on their capabilities alone. In addition, any suggestion 
that women JSC members would assist women potential judges may be considered as partiality, 
which goes against the grain of an appointment system, and a judiciary that strives for 
impartiality. 
The idea that women in authority in one area, did not equate to more women in another, 
was the second thematic area. Mr Mudenda submitted that more women on the JSC would not 
mean more women being appointed because, ‘women are jealous of each other generally’.679 
The idea behind this reasoning is the view that women are reticent to give each other special 
treatment. Instead, so the view posits, women are more inclined to do the opposite; to ensure 
that other women do not ascend the ladder. This is referred to as the ‘queen bee syndrome’, 
where particular women who have been individually successful in male-dominated 
environments, are likely to oppose other women’s movement.680 Ellemers et al explain that 
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678 Ibid. 
679 Interview on 20 April 2017. 
680 Naomi Ellemers and others, ‘The Underrepresentation of Women in Science: Differential Commitment or the 
Queen Bee Syndrome?’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 43 (2004), 315–38 
<http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/16524/Ellemers_British?sequence=2> [accessed 15 March 2018]. 
 
 
151 
 
from a social identity point of view, women in male-dominated environments can been seen as 
pursuing some form of individual mobility.681 Thus the progress of two women is considered 
mutually exclusive.682  
Though one judge did mention that when she was interviewed, the women on the JSC 
asked her the more difficult questions, there is insufficient evidence to merit that it was the 
‘queen bee’ syndrome. Mr Mudenda’s use of the ‘queen bee’ syndrome as a reason why more 
women would not be appointed, is not supported by any evidence. With the prevalence of 
women being appointed to decision making positions even outside the judiciary, it would be 
difficult to believe that women commissioners would become gatekeepers. 683 
The third theme was that the gender composition of the JSC might be a factor but not a 
determinant one. One legal professional stated that while there may be a natural bias towards 
women from women, it is not automatic.684 Another one offered the view that in the Zambian 
context, ‘one could argue that actually a male dominated panel at the moment has actually 
influenced and facilitated for women to sit on the bench’.685 This facilitation infers that male 
commissioners are aware of gender biases and are actively seeking to suppress them. One judge 
referred to it as the JSC needing to have gender inclinations even if it were male dominated.686 
These gender inclinations apply to both men and women and require that they be willing to 
‘work from a gender perspective with a commitment to advance women's rights and equality 
between men and women'.687 This would mean that even when the majority of the JSC is male, 
the fundamental question all members should be asking, is whether their assessment of women 
 
681 Ibid. 
682 This is also colloquially referred to as the PhD − Pull her Down syndrome. 
683 Women are currently occupying high positions even outside the judiciary, such as the police and intelligence 
department and the office of the Public Prosecutor.  
684 Interview with Legal Professional 6. 
685 Interview with Legal Professional 2. 
686 Interview with Justice 3. 
687 Baines, pp.7-8. 
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candidates is advancing the rights of women. This approach would ensure that the 
commissioners are impartial enough to perform their duties competently, but open enough to 
recognise bias where it exists. 
4.6.4 The Value of More Women on the JSC 
The current statistics and the data provided above from Zambia, appear to dispute arguments 
in literature regarding the effect of a more gender diverse appointment body, on the 
appointment of women judges. There is insufficient evidence in this case to suggest that the 
gender composition of the commission does influence the number of women being appointed. 
However, there were three main views about the importance of having more women on the 
JSC, irrespective of whether it affects the appointment of women as judges. Two would fall 
under a wider interpretation of diversity while the third is a narrower view. The first reason is 
that it makes male commissioners more cautious about being sexist. A former commissioner 
argued that her presence on the JSC opened the male commissioners’ minds, because she would 
caution them when they asked inappropriate questions.688 She added further: 
I think that sort of opened people’s minds because you know you can be doing 
something for years and years and this is the normal way of doing it and you see nothing 
wrong with it. Suddenly, the dynamics have changed, and it is in your face really. So 
once that change happens, there is no going back.  
This is similar to the submission made in Chapter 2 of this thesis, where I argued that women 
can help identify prejudice and bring new narratives into a previously male dominated space. 
 The second reason for a desire to have more women on the JSC, is the symbolic value 
of doing so. Mr Mweenge advanced that it was important to have more women on the JSC to 
show that it is not only men making practical decisions about appointments.689 Here Mr 
Mweenge was expressing the importance of having gender equity, not just amongst those who 
 
688 Interview with Commissioner 1. 
689 Interview with 0n 13 April 2017. 
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are chosen as judges, but also amongst those who do the choosing. More diverse appointment 
bodies can help candidates feel more comfortable in interviews and it is argued that a symbolic 
commitment to diversity, may attract a diverse group of applicants.690 The final reason for 
desiring more women on the Zambian JSC was an equality argument advanced by Mr Kabaa. 
He stated that because women are a large part of society, they should be represented in equal 
measure in all areas including the JSC.691 Thus despite the agreement that the composition of 
the JSC had not affected women’s appointment as judges, there were a number of views that 
having more women on the JSC would be beneficial for the process. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter commenced with an overview of the JSC and the appointments that have been 
made in this period of study. Subsequently, it explained the privacy of the Zambian 
appointment process and analysed the negative perceptions regarding transparency, provided 
by several interviewees. A distinction was made between process transparency and candidate 
transparency to highlight the challenges with the current appointment process. Thereafter it 
examined the JSC in respect of independence, by using the Constitutional Court election 
petition and the appointments to that court as a focal point. The chapter interrogated the 
scepticism directed at the increase in women judges and the effect that this has had on how the 
judiciary is perceived.  
Penultimately, an argument was advanced that there is some prejudice against women 
judges. It was argued that this prejudice could be that of women being considered as illegitimate 
power holders. Finally, this chapter concluded with an assessment of the JSC in terms of 
diversity, by examining the argument that more women on the JSC will lead to the appointment 
of more women judges. My findings are that in Zambia, there is currently no evidence to 
 
690 Van zyl Smit, ' "Opening up" Commonwealth judicial appointments to diversity?, p.76 . 
691 Interview on 19 April 2017. 
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suggest that this is the case. The increase in women judges could be a result of the existence of 
more influential factors on the process.692 Similar lines of inquiry in relation to South Africa 
follow in the next chapter. 
  
 
692 A possible influential factor is political influence/willingness, which will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SOUTH AFRICA’S JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION−FRIEND OF FOE? 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter on the Zambian Judicial Service Commission (JSC) was focused on 
analysing the body that appoints judges. This chapter is focused on assessing the South African 
JSC’s role, in informing the equal representation of men and women on the bench. The 
discussion herein is enriched by participant observation data, a source unavailable for the 
previous chapter, due to the private nature of the Zambian interviews. The relevant 
international principles outlined in detail in Chapter 4, are applicable here and shall not be 
duplicated. 693 However, it is necessary to repeat the three standards that I argued, were relevant 
for an examination of the operations of a JSC.  
The first standard is that the process must be transparent and the criteria for judicial 
appointments must be publicly known.694 In order to ensure adequate levels of transparency, 
information about the judicial appointment process must be accurate and comprehensible.695 
The second standard is that the judiciary and the appointing body must be independent. 
Independence is a critical element for the healthy functioning of the judiciary. For judges, 
independence means the ability to adjudicate without fear, favour or any undue influence. For 
appointing bodies like the JSC, independence is connoted by the absence of undue pressure or 
interference in the judicial selection process. Wynn and Mazur refer to this as the ability to be 
institutionally immune, from inappropriate extra-legal pressures in the decision-making 
 
693 The International Principles referred to in the previous chapter, were the UN Basic Principles of 1985, the 
Commonwealth Latimer House Principles of 2003, the Cape Town Principles of 2016 and the Model 
Constitutional Clause for Judicial Appointments of 2018. 
694 This was affirmed in what is known as the Nairobi Action plan, a means of promoting and advancing the 
Latimer Principles. The action plan was signed by members of the executive, the judiciary, the legislature, 
Commonwealth partner organizations and representatives of civil society from 18 African countries. See 
Brewer, Dingemans, and Slinn, p.4. 
695 Brink ‘Behind the Scenes of Science: Gender practices in the recruitment and selection of professors in the 
Netherlands’, p. 65. 
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process.696 The third standard requires that representativeness is emphasised, in the judicial 
appointment process. Representativeness includes the need to diversify judiciaries by gender 
and diverse backgrounds. In practice, this requires that judicial appointment bodies publicly 
state their commitment to diversifying the judiciary and if necessary, ‘actively recruit rather 
than merely vet candidates for appointments’.697 It also means that the JSC has to commit to 
ensuring that the recruitment process is non-discriminatory and free of any barriers that would 
harm the aspirations of women candidates. 
To analyse the JSC considering the three standards mentioned above, this chapter is 
divided into five parts. The first segment provides detail on the operations and composition of 
the JSC. Due to the public nature of the interviews, I am also able to provide statistics of all 
candidates interviewed in this research period, including a breakdown of those who were 
appointed. The second segment centres on transparency and sheds further detail on the specific 
parts of the process and how much information is available to the public. I will use two cases 
to highlight the challenges of transparency in the South African process. Namely, Cape Bar 
Council v The Judicial Service Commission and Others 698 and The Helen Suzman Foundation 
v The Judicial Service Commission & Others.699  
In the third segment, the independence of the JSC will be analysed primarily using two 
major themes that emerged from the interviews. The first is the tension between the merit 
provision and the transformation provision of section 174 of the Constitution. The second 
theme focuses on instances where political dynamics are present in interviews. The fourth 
 
696 Wynn and Mazur, p.775. 
697 Marieke van den Brink and Yvonne Benschop, ‘Gender Practices in the Construction of Academic 
Excellence: Sheep with Five Legs’, Organization, 19.4 (2012), 507–24 
(p.520)<https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508411414293>. 
698Cape Bar Council v The Judicial Service Commission & Others (11897/2011) [2011] ZAWCHC 388; [2012] 
2 All SA 143 (WCC) (30 September 2011) [accessed on 24 November 2019].  
699 The Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission & Others, ZASCA, 2015, CXLV 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2016/161.pdf> [accessed 29 March 2018]. 
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segment will focus on women’s experiences at the JSC interviews and highlight one particular 
interview, which revealed the depth of gender bias present in interviews. In the final section, I 
examine gender diversity on the JSC. I argue that as in the Zambian case, there is no direct 
evidence that an improvement in the gender composition of the JSC will lead to the 
appointment of more women. 
5.2 A PERSPECTIVE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN JUDICIAL SERVICE 
COMMISSION 
5.2.1 The composition of the JSC 
The South African JSC has been described as the most important body for assisting and 
protecting the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the 
courts.700 One of the JSC’s primary responsibilities is the transformation of the judiciary. This 
transformation requires a change in the way judges are appointed, a change in the demographic 
of judges and a change in underlying attitudes of the judiciary, to see them embracing the 
principles of a fundamentally new legal order.701 The JSC is also tasked with sitting as a 
disciplinary committee in regard to judicial misconduct and advising the national government 
on any matter relating to the judiciary or the administration of justice.702 The composition of 
the JSC is outlined in section 178 (1) of the South African Constitution and it consists of 
between 23-25 members. It has been chaired by current Chief Justice Mogoeng since October 
2011 and it comprises of judges, practising lawyers, a law professor and politicians.  
Prior to the formation of the JSC, Hugh Corder predicted that the composition of the 
JSC would probably involve lay members.703 This he argued would be in order to attain popular 
 
700 Koos Malan, ‘Reassessing Judicial Independence and Impartiality against the Backdrop of Judicial 
Appointments in South Africa’, Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad, 17.7 (2014), 1965–2040 
<https://doi.org/10.3366/ajicl.2011.0005>.  
701 Wesson and Du Plessis, p.192. 
702 As per section 178 (5) of the Constitution. 
703 Corder, ‘The Appointment of Judges: Some Comparative Ideas’ p.227. 
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legitimacy and fair representation of regions, gender and class.704 However, when the JSC was 
eventually established, there was no room for lay members. The current JSC is a fairly large 
body, whose members represent competing interests as the politicians and lawyers come from 
different constituencies.705 The political component includes six members of the National 
Assembly, of whom three are from the opposition,706 four permanent delegates of the National 
Council of Provinces (NCOP)707 and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development. 
Further, if the appointment relates to a specific division of the High Court, the Premier of the 
province where that division is located, or an alternate, also sits in.708  
The President also appoints four additional members of the JSC and in the last ten years, 
all the President’s appointees have been lawyers. In 2017, these were Advocates Thandi 
Norman SC, Thabani Masuku SC and Lindiwe Nkosi Thomas SC and Mr Sofiso Msomi.709 If 
added to the political complement described above, there could potentially be sixteen members 
who are politically inclined or appointed on a political mandate. Du Bois has suggested that 
South Africa’s inclusion of a sizable block of politicians in the JSC aims to ensure that 
appointments are the product of collective decision-making, involving all major interested 
parties, as this fosters debate among them.710  
Oxtoby offers another explanation, suggesting that the extensive mandate given to the 
courts to strike down unconstitutional legislation or conduct, may be another reason for the 
 
704 Ibid, p.227. 
705 For example, some lawyers are appointed by the President while others represent professional law bodies and 
organisations. 
706 Julius Malema from the Economic Freedom Front (EFF), Narend Singh from the Inkhata Freedom party 
(IFP) and Hendrik Schmidt of the Democratic Alliance (DA). 
707 The NCOP is akin to an upper House of Parliament and its representatives on the JSC are all from the ruling 
party. 
708 A premier is the political leader of a designated province. 
709 Prior to April 2017, Advocates Ismail Semenya SC and Dumisa Ntsebeza SC and Ms Andiswa Ndoni sat 
with Advocate Lindiwe Nkosi-Thomas SC.  
710 Du Bois, ‘Judicial Selection In Post-Apartheid South Africa’,pp. 280–312. 
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large complement of politicians.711 He opines that ‘age-old concerns about counter-
majoritarianism might be seen to be mitigated by giving the elected branches of government a 
say in the process of appointing the judges vested with that power’.712 On the contrary, Hoexter 
submits that many are convinced that the JSC's woes are because of its unwieldy size, which 
detracts from its effectiveness and efficiency.713 Indeed, the size of the JSC was identified as a 
particular area of reform, by the National Development Plan 2030 (Development Plan).714 The 
Development Plan stated that it could be argued that the JSC is too large to function effectively, 
and is hamstrung by political interests.715 This view was also expressed in 2012, when a private 
member's Bill was introduced in parliament in an attempt to reduce the size of the JSC; it 
eventually ‘fizzled out’.716 
In interviews with different participants, there were very strong and different opinions 
on the composition of the JSC, in particular the utility of having a large number of politicians 
on the JSC. Former Judge President Kgomo was very clear in his views when he said ‘I make 
no bones about it, the JSC is not properly constituted because it is overloaded with 
politicians’.717 Advocate Ngalwana SC also agreed with this view, stating that the JSC was too 
top heavy and even suggested an amendment to section 178 of the Constitution to reduce the 
number of politicians on the body.718 Other participants opined that politicians do not ask the 
right questions, that different interests at play amongst politicians affect the entire process and 
 
711Chris Oxtoby, ‘Managing a Fraught Transition: The Practice of the South African JSC’, in Securing Judicial 
Independence. The Role of Commissions in Selecting Judges in the Commonwealth, ed. by Hugh Corder and Jan 
van Zyl Smit (Cape Town: Siber Ink CC, 2017), pp. 152–75.  
712 Ibid, p.166. 
713 Cora Hoexter, ‘The Judicial Service Commisison: Lessons from South Africa’, in Debating Judicial 
Appointments in an Age of Diversity, ed. by Graham Gee and Erika Rackley (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp. 
83–100. 
714 The Presidency, ‘National Development Plan 2030: Our Future - Make It Work’ (Pretoria: The South 
African Government, 2012), pp. 1–489. This is a plan to eliminate and reduce inequality by 2030. It has a 
section focused on judicial governance and the rule of law.  
715 Ibid. 
716 Hoexter, p.91. 
717 Interview with former Judge President Frans Kgomo, 7 April 2017. 
718 Interview with Advocate Vuyani Ngalwana SC, 7 July 2017. 
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that their mandate, even in a legal process, would always be political, because they were 
incapable of fully shedding their “political hats”.719  
 On the other hand, Thandi Modise MP responded to the view that the JSC is too 
politically heavy, as follows: 
I think there are more people in the country than lawyers. Aren’t there more people who 
are at the mercy of courts than the people who are running the courts? Aren’t they more 
poor people who we represent, than the lawyers? I think that the balance is good, and I 
think that if you look at the number of politicians alone, they would not be able to put 
one person in.720 
Another view in support of the presence of politicians on the JSC was that politicians play a 
vital role by asking non-legal questions and that having them is a way of maintaining checks 
and balances on the judiciary.721 At least three interview participants emphasised that there 
must have been a valid reason for the drafters of the Constitution to include such a large 
complement of politicians.722 One of the three explained that with the benefit of inside 
information of the process, she now realises that during deliberations, the politicians are 
deferential towards the legal camp. This, she mentioned, negates the fear that politicians are 
only pursing political agendas.723 This was confirmed by a politician on the JSC who stated 
that different groups were able to influence each other. He added that it was necessary to have 
politicians on the body because they have their feet and ears on the ground, which is very 
different from jurists.724  
 
719 Views from a JSC member, a sitting Judge, a retired judge and a senior advocate. 
720 Interview with Thandi Modise MP, 15 June 2017. 
721 Interview with Legal Professional V, 12 October 2016. 
722 Views from two senior judges and a legal professional. 
723 A discussion on political agendas will be discussed in the segment on the JSC’s independence. 
724 Interview with Commissioner B, 18 May 2017. 
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5.2.2 How the JSC Operates 
The regulations governing the JSC’s procedure require that the Chief Justice, President of the 
Supreme Court or a responsible Judge inform the JSC when a vacancy arises.725 The JSC then 
publicly announces judicial vacancies and calls for nominations to be made a by a specific 
date.726 The regulations further set out specific requirements for what a nomination must 
contain, including the requirement that there be a letter of nomination specifically identifying 
the nominator, nominee, and for High Court candidates, the division of the court to which a 
candidate is nominated.727 A screening committee (also known as sifting committee) shortlists 
candidates who qualify for appointment and who in the opinion of the screening committee or 
any of its members, have a real prospect of selection for appointment.728 The shortlist is 
released to the public and selected organisations and members of the public are invited to 
comment on candidates by a specified date.729 The JSC publishes the interview schedule with 
the time and venue of all the interviews, so as to allow members of the public to attend. Prior 
to April 2017, the interviews were mostly held in Cape Town, but they have now been moved 
to the Office of the Chief Justice in Midrand, Johannesburg.730 
 At the end of each day after deliberations, the JSC announces which candidates they 
will be recommending for appointment. As per section 174 (6) of the Constitution, the 
President must appoint these candidates on the advice of the JSC.731 For the Constitutional 
Court vacancies, its leaders and the leaders of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), the process 
 
725 Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994, Procedure for Commission GN R 423 in GG 7616 of 27-03-
2003. 
726 Regulation 2(b) deals with Constitutional Court judges and Regulation 3(b) with High Court and Supreme 
Court of Appeal judges. 
727 Regulations 2 and 3. 
728 Regulations 2(e) and 3(e). 
729As per 2(g) and 3(g) of the JSC regulations. 
730 The interviews in Cape Town were often held in expensive hotels hence, the move to Johannesburg was 
justified on budgetary grounds. 
731 This also included candidates for leadership positions on the High Courts, such as the Judges President and 
Deputy Judges President. 
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works differently. For an ordinary Constitutional Court vacancy the nomination process is as 
described above, however the JSC must prepare a list of nominees with three names more than 
the number of appointments to be made.732 The President may make appointments from the list 
or request a supplemented list from which he must make appointments.733 The President 
nominates candidates for the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, President and Deputy 
President of the SCA. After they are interviewed, he appoints them after consultation with the 
JSC and leaders of the parties represented in the National Assembly.734  
What emerges from the above is that the JSC has more control and influence over 
appointments not concerned with the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
The President has to appoint on their advice, as he has no discretion and his appointing role is 
purely formal. Contrast this to the Constitutional Court and the SCA, where the President’s 
substantive role limits the JSCs influence, because all he has to do is consult them. 
Nevertheless, this public process described above is far removed from the apartheid era system, 
where appointments were made secretly, which resulted in a judiciary entirely lacking in 
diversity in terms of demographic representation, social background and professional career 
paths.735 
5.2.3 Candidate Numbers 
Since the Constitutional dispensation in 1994, significant progress has been made by the JSC 
in improving the racial composition of the bench. The proportion of black judges has increased 
from 1.4% in 1994 to 67% as of September 2017.736 However gender transformation has lagged 
behind, with the representation of women on the bench increasing from 1.2% to 37% over the 
 
732 For example, if there is one vacancy, the JSC must send at least four names to the President. 
733 Section 174 (4) (a)-(c). 
734 He acts in his capacity as Head of the National Executive as per section 175(3). 
735 Oxtoby and Masengu, p.540. 
736 The term black refers to African, Coloured and Indians, also known as Previously Disadvantaged 
Individuals. 
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same period.737 The table below depicts the number of candidates interviewed in the period 
2013-2017. [The Constitutional Court is referred to as ConCourt, Supreme Court of Appeal as 
SCA and Highs Courts as HCs.] 
Table 3 – Number of Candidates Interviewed from 2013 to 2017 738 
Year Vacancies 
available  
Total 
candidates 
interviewed 
Gender 
breakdown 
Total 
Candidates 
appointed 
February 
2013 
(ConCourt)  
1 5 M-5 M-1 
April 2013 
(SCA and 
HCs) 
10 23 W-14  
M-9 
W-5 
M-5 
 
October 2013 
(HCs) 
10 22 W-12 
M-10 
W-7 
M-3 
April 2014  
(SCA and 
HCs) 
21 26 W-4 
M-22 
W-2 
M-10 
(9 vacancies 
left open) 
October 2014 
(HCs) 
5  
 
13 W-9  
M-4 
W-4 
M-0 
(one vacancy 
left open) 
April 2015 
(SCA and 
HCs) 
6 
 
20 W-3  
M-17 
W-1 
M-5 
(Land Claims 
Court 
 
737 Statistics provided by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, on file with the author. 
738 M refers to Men and W refers to Women. 
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interview 
cancelled) 
July 2015 
(ConCourt 
and SCA) 
2 5- W-5  W-2 
October 
201(HCs) 
17 40 W-14  
M-26 
W-8 
M=5 
(Six positions 
not filled) 
April 2016 
(SCA and 
HCs) 
13 34 W-14  
 
M-20 
W-4 
 
M-7 
October 2016 
(ConCourt 
and HCs) 
19 40 W-7 
M-33 
 
W-5 
M-12 
 
(ConCourt 
interviews 
cancelled and 
one other 
appointment 
not filled) 
April 2017 
(ConCourt, 
SCA and 
HCs) 
13 29 
 
W-12  
M-17 
 
  
W-5 
M-4 
 
(No 
appointments 
to six 
vacancies and 
one extra 
person 
appointed to 
Labour Court) 
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October 2017 
(HCs) 
18 33 
 
W-13  
M-20 
W-3 
M-15 
 
(Three 
vacancies not 
filled and extra 
person 
appointed to 
HC) 
 
In total the JSC interviewed 290 candidates for 135 vacancies, in the given period of research 
(2013-2017).739 Of the interviewed candidates, 183 have been men (63%) while 107 have been 
women (37%). Of the 113 successful candidates, 67 have been men (59%) and 46 have been 
women (41%).740 When one compares the percentage of women candidates interviewed versus 
the number of women candidates appointed, it is clear that the percentage of women appointed 
is slightly higher than men. Therefore women have not fared badly. However, the total number 
of women being interviewed is still incomparable to the number of men interviewed, which 
then affects the total number of women being appointed. 
5.3 HOW TRANSPARENT IS SOUTH AFRICA’S PUBLIC PROCESS? 
5.3.1 The New Democratic Era 
The current appointment process is a far cry from the previous system pre-1994. In regard to 
the Latimer Principles and UN guidelines, South Africa could be said to be faring well when 
 
739 In some instances, some candidates have interviewed for the same position as many as three times. 
740 Five of the successful women were appointed to leadership positions such as the Judge President of a 
provincial division and the Deputy and then President of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
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one considers what is required for a legitimate appointments process. The public can watch the 
interviews in person or live streamed.741 In terms of candidate transparency, the appointments 
system is faring well and meets requirements of most international guidelines. In the 
interviews, a candidate’s views on various topics are tested and they are also given an 
opportunity to respond to any adverse complaints about them.742 There have however been 
complaints that candidates are not asked enough jurisprudential questions and that the focus is 
rather on ‘political’ questions.743 This aspect will be examined further in the subsequent section 
on the independence of the JSC. In respect of process transparency, the vacancies are 
announced ahead of schedule, the procedure for nomination is publicised and a shortlist is 
released for comments from interested people. Shortcomings in the process have been 
identified in the criteria or rather, how they are used when assessing candidates. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, in respect of judicial appointments, the South African Constitution has two 
specific requirements.  
The first is section 174(1) which requires that the candidate must be a fit and proper 
person. The second requirement is found in section 174(2) which states that the need for the 
judiciary to reflect the racial and gender composition of society must be considered. These 
constitutional criteria have been supplemented over the years. First, by the Mahomed 
guidelines from 1998, which though appearing in an official government document, were never 
officially released.744 These guidelines discussed in detail in a previous chapter, required 
amongst other things that an enquiry be made into whether the candidate is appropriately 
 
741 The streaming service is provided by Judges Matter, a loose coalition of civil society organisations who 
believe in the importance of judges. 
742 Such complaints have been varied in nature, including complaints about professional misconduct, financial 
irregularities and even personal matters such as, a candidate’s failure to pay maintenance for his three children. 
743 For example, see Richard Calland, ‘JSC’s Attitude Opens Door to Conservatism’, Mail & Guardian, 12 
April 2013, <https://mg.co.za/article/2013-04-12-00-jscs-attitude-opens-door-to-conservatism> [accessed 20 
April 2018]. 
744 South African Judicial Service Commission, ‘Mahomed Guidelines’ (Johannesburg: Judicial Service 
Commission, 1999), pp. 1–3 <http://www.justice.gov.za/reportfiles/1999reports/1999_judicial service 
comm.htm>. 
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qualified, fit and proper, and if their appointment would reflect the racial and gender 
composition of South Africa as per the Constitution. Secondly, an enquiry was also made into 
amongst others: whether the candidate possesses technical competence, technical experience 
and an ability to give expression to the values of the Constitution.  
In 2009, in response for a request for access to information, the JSC identified other 
factors to be considered when deliberating on a candidate’s suitability for appointment. These 
included: the recommendation of the relevant head of court; support from professional bodies, 
the judicial needs of the relevant court; a candidate’s age and range of experience; including 
experience as an acting judge and the merits of candidates in relation to each other.745 Albertyn 
critiqued this approach as paying ‘surprisingly little attention to judicial character and the 
content of merit’.746 She has argued that it focused on external factors and seemed to elevate 
these above the actual abilities of a judge.747 The 2010 guidelines referred to as the Ngcobo 
guidelines earlier, were made public after a special sitting of the JSC.748 These guidelines are 
strikingly similar to the Mahomed guidelines and they emphasise both the Constitutional and 
the supplementary requirements.  
The JSC in issuing these criteria stressed that the decision was in line with the JSC’s 
principle that the process of judicial appointments should be open and transparent to the 
public.749 However these criteria have also been criticised as being too open ended and lacking 
in specificity. For example, the criterion of ‘necessary energy and motivation’ is not detailed 
 
745 Judicial Service Commission, Request for Access to Record of Public Body in Terms of Section18(1) of PAIA 
(Johannesburg, 2009). 
746 Catherine Albertyn, ‘Judicial Diversity’, in The Judiciary in South Africa, ed. by Cora Hoexter and Morné 
Olivier (Cape Town: JUTA, 2014), pp. 245–87, (p.281). 
747 Ibid. 
748 South African Judicial Service Commission, ‘Summary of the Criteria Used by the Judicial Service 
Commission When Considering Candidates for Judicial Appointments’. 
749 Ibid. 
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making it difficult to assess.750 The broad nature of the supplementary criteria and the failure 
of the JSC to elaborate on the criteria in the Constitution, has also been observed as a 
shortcoming of the JSC’s efforts to be transparent.751 
There are two parts of the appointment process described above that are not open to the 
public. The first is the screening process of candidates, often referred to as the shortlisting 
process. After the deadline for nominations has passed, the JSC members receive a list of all 
the applicants from the screening committee. The members can make additional nominations 
or inform the screening committee of any candidates they strongly feel should be shortlisted.752 
When the screening sub-committee completes its process, it circulates the list of shortlisted 
candidates to the members of the JSC who have an opportunity to ask that a candidate who was 
not shortlisted, but is deemed worthy, be added to the list.753  
 I was informed that while the JSC screening sub-committee does assess candidates 
based on its publicly available criteria for judicial appointments, it does not apply the same 
stringency as it does in the public interviews.754 The identity of those applicants who were 
nominated (long list), but not shortlisted is never known. Andrews submits that this sub-
committee phase has raised questions ‘about how the choices are made and whether political 
and other inappropriate influences play a part in the decision’.755 These possibly inappropriate 
influences are what I have identified as power and partiality dynamics. They are able to fester 
because of the secrecy around this aspect of the process.756 Former JSC member Advocate 
 
750 Commission for Gender Equality (CGE), ‘CGE Investigation Inquiry into Gender Transformation In the 
Judiciary’, p.20 (Cape Town, 2016). 
751 Oxtoby, p.156. 
752 Regulations 2 (d) (i) (ii) and 3 (d) (i) and (ii). 
753 Regulations 2(f) and 3(f). 
754 Interview with Gauteng Judge President Mlambo, 4 April 2017.  
755 Penelope E Andrews, ‘The South African Judicial Appointments Process’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 44.3 
(2006), 565–72. 
756 For a detailed discussion of this, see Tabeth Masengu, ‘The Judicial Service Commission and the 
Appointment of Women: More to It than Meets the Eye’, International Journal of the Legal Profession, (2019), 
1–14 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09695958.2019.1622547>. 
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Leah Gcabashe SC stated that the purpose of not publicizing the long list is to prevent 
unsuccessful candidates from feeling disgraced.757 She opined that there should be areas in the 
process where the dignity of the candidate is respected, by not publicizing certain information 
and the screening process was one of them. The second part of the appointment process that is 
private is the JSC deliberation, when candidates are being selected. To date, the 
recommendation of successful candidates and the results of the private deliberations process, 
have proven to be the most controversial aspect of the JSC interviews. The two cases that I 
now turn to, shed more light on this. 
5.3.2 The Selection of Candidates and the Cape Bar Litigation 
On 12 April 2011, the JSC interviewed seven candidates for three vacancies on the Western 
Cape High Court (herein referred to as WCHC) bench.758 Of the seven candidates, one was a 
black male, five were white men and only one was a woman. Only one candidate Robert 
Henney, was recommended for appointment, leaving two vacancies unfilled. The Cape Bar, 
the society representing advocates in the Western Cape, took umbrage with the decision and it 
approached the WCHC for an order declaring, amongst other things, that the proceedings were 
inconsistent with the Constitution, unlawful and consequently invalid.759 The basis for the order 
sought by the Cape Bar was that the first respondent (the JSC) was not properly composed on 
the day in question due to the absence of the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal and his 
Deputy. The Cape Bar also stated that the JSC did not say that the three unsuccessful advocates 
namely, Michael Fitzgerald SC, Owen Rogers SC and Sven Oliver SC lacked the required 
criteria. 760 
 
757 Interview with Advocate Leah Gcabashe SC, 2 April 2017. 
758 JSC Interviews held at Cape Town International Convention Centre. 
759Cape Bar Council v The Judicial Service Commission & Others, para 31 . 
760 The Cape Bar as the professional body representing advocates, was not concerned with the other three 
unsuccessful candidates who were not advocates. 
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Thus it was incumbent on the JSC to account for the failure to appoint them. The 
answering affidavit from the JSC acknowledged that all three candidates were excellent in 
terms of competence but that they did not acquire the sufficient number of votes to be 
recommended− which is thirteen.761 The court held that as a public body created to serve the 
public’s interest, the JSC must perform its functions openly and transparently and only reach 
decisions which are not irrational or arbitrary.762 Judge Koen also held that the JSC had not 
been properly constituted when the interviews and deliberations occurred and that the JSC had 
a duty to provide reasons as to why candidates were unsuccessful.763 It was further decided that 
the voting procedure of one vote per vacancy, as advanced by the JSC, was irrational and that 
the failure of the JSC to fill the two vacancies was unconstitutional and unlawful and it fell to 
be set aside.764  
The decision in the High Court was hailed as a reminder that the JSC is bound by the 
principle of legality and that it will not be allowed to exercise its power arbitrarily.765 An appeal 
to the SCA by the JSC was unsuccessful. The SCA confirmed the decision of the lower court.766 
The SCA however, declined to prescribe to the JSC what format their reasons to unsuccessful 
candidates should take, stating that ‘how extensive, who can ask and under what circumstances 
will depend on the facts of each case’.767 The court did express concern that the JSC’s voting 
procedure was shrouded in obscurity, but was unwilling to make ‘a finding of constitutional 
 
761 Ibid, paras 10-11 of the judgment. 
762 Ibid, para 29. 
763 Ms J I Cloete, Mr S J Koen, and advocate Rogers SC were later interviewed in October 2011 and Ms Cloete 
and advocate Rogers were recommended for appointment. 
764 Cape Bar Council v The Judicial Service Commission & Others, paras 122-142. 
765 Pierre Vos de, ‘Another Legal Lesson for the JSC ’, Constitutionally Speaking, 2011 
<https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/another-legal-lesson-for-the-jsc/> [accessed 8 May 2018]. 
766 Judicial Service Commission and Another v Cape Bar Council and Another (818/2011) [2012] ZASCA 115; 
[2013] 1 All SA 40 (SCA) <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2012/115.pdf> [accessed 16 January 2018]. 
767 Para 45. 
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validity which would be both redundant and based on uncertain facts’, 768 and for that reason it 
declined to confirm the finding of the High Court in that regard.  
This case provides useful information in regard to improving process transparency. 
Firstly, requesting the JSC to give reasons when they do not appoint candidates helps with 
process transparency, because those who are unsuccessful, have an opportunity to work on 
their faults (if any) and perhaps try again. Secondly, previously the JSC was only required to 
‘distil and record the Commission’s reasons for recommending the candidates selected’ in 
reference to Constitutional Court interviews.769 Now the JSC has to ensure that it does the same 
for all other interviews, because of the responsibility to provide reasons when requested to do 
so. This will help with improving the legitimacy of the process because the JSC is forced to be 
more accountable, about its recommendations. Thirdly, by interrogating the voting system, the 
courts provided some insight into how the JSC deliberations operate. Yet, even this has not 
been enough, to dissuade further litigation.  
5.3.3 The JSC Deliberation Process and Helen Suzman Foundation Litigation 
On 17 October 2012, the JSC once again interviewed eight candidates to fill five vacancies at 
the WHCH. Amongst the eight, were Mr Stephen Koen, advocate Owen Rogers SC, and Ms 
Cloete who had been unsuccessful in the earlier interviews described above. The latter two 
were recommended for appointment770 and amongst the three unsuccessful candidates was 
advocate Jeremy Gauntlett SC.771 In a letter dated 6 November 2012, former Justice Harms 
who had nominated Gauntlett requested reasons from the JSC as to why Gauntlett was not 
appointed.772 The JSC obliged and noted that while Gauntlett’s technical experience and 
 
768 Para 53. 
769 Regulation 2(l). 
770 As were Ms Babalwa Mantame, Mr Mokgoatji Dolamo, and advocate Ashton Schippers SC. 
771 Ms Nonkosi Saba and Mr Stephen Koen were not recommended. 
772Gregory P Solik, ‘Who Should Judges Be in a Transforming Society? An Analysis of the Constitutional 
Requirements for Judicial Selection in South Africa’ (Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Cape Town, 
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competency was not in doubt, there were concerns about his temperament.773 They added that 
commissioners expressed strong reservations ‘as to whether, as part of his attributes, he has the 
humility and the appropriate temperament that a judicial officer should display’.774 The final 
reason given was that considering the demographics of the court and the large number of white 
males in it (compared to other races), the JSC would not be doing diversity justice, if they 
appointed two white males. 
The Helen Suzman Foundation (HSF) took exception to this response and approached 
the High Court for a declaration that the decision to appoint some candidates over others, or 
the process followed before making the decision, was unlawful and/or irrational and invalid.775 
The HSF also averred that amongst the legal issues to be determined, was the correct 
interpretation of sections 174(1) and (2) and whether the JSC considered irrelevant factors, or 
failed to consider relevant factors when making recommendations to the President.776 Before 
the main matter could be heard, the HSF made an interlocutory application to compel the JSC 
to comply with Rule 53(1) (b) of the Uniform Rules of Court and to deliver the full recording 
of the proceedings (the JSC decision) sought to be reviewed in the main application.777  
The JSC provided HSF with full application packs of all candidates, transcripts and a 
summary of the deliberations− written by the Chief Justice. The HSF argued that access to the 
full deliberations (audio recordings) was indispensable to any proper determination of whether 
there was a rational connection between the deliberations, the decision taken, and any reason 
 
2014) <http://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/9174/thesis_law_2014_solik_gp.pdf?sequence=1> 
[accessed 19 October 2017]. 
773 Sello Chiloane, ‘Why We Didn`t Appoint Jeremy Gauntlett’, Politicsweb, 7 November 2012, 
<http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/why-we-didnt-appoint-jeremy-gauntlett--jsc> [accessed 8 May 
2018]. 
774 Ibid,p.1. 
775 ‘Founding Afidavit of the Helen Suzman Foundation’ (Cape Town: Helen Suzman Foundation, 2013). 
776 Section 14 of the affidavit. 
777 Helen Suzman Foundation v JSC & Others, WHCH,(8647/2013) [2014] ZAWCHC 136 . 
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provided by the JSC.778 Such a decision they argued would enhance the constitutional rights of 
access to information and advance transparency and accountability. The JSC countered that the 
HSF was not entitled to the deliberations, because they do not form part of the proceedings as 
per the Rule, and that non-disclosure was reasoned and justifiable.779 The court agreed and 
emphasised that the JSC followed their procedure in Regulation 3(k), to deliberate in private 
and that the rest of the process until deliberations satisfies transparency and openness 
requirements. 
  HSF appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal 
and agreed with the judgment of the High Court.780 Deputy President Maya (at the time), 
writing for the majority, emphasised the confidentiality of the process as outlined in the JSC 
regulations and found that there was no absolute requirement of disclosure of JSC proceedings. 
The court held that the rules of court must be construed and applied in the manner enjoined by 
s 39(2) of the Constitution and there can be no objection to a limitation of the record if that is 
reasonable and justifiable.781 She added that the relief sought would undermine the JSC's 
constitutional and legislative imperatives. A further appeal was made to the Constitutional 
Court by the HSF and this time they were successful. In a judgment handed on 24 April 2018, 
the Constitutional Court took a different approach from the two lower courts.  
Writing for the majority, Justice Madlanga found that the JSC’s blanket ban on 
disclosure is unjustifiable in an open and democratic society, in which the rule of law and the 
values of accountability, responsiveness and openness are paramount.782 It held that disclosure 
 
778 Ibid, para 8. 
779 Amicus also involved in proceedings included the National Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADEL) 
and the Democratic Governance and Rights Unit (DGRU). 
780 The Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission & Others, ZASCA, (145/2015) [2016] 
ZASCA 161 <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2016/161.pdf> [accessed 29 March 2018]. 
781 Ibid, Paras 27-28. 
782 Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission & Others, 2018, ZACC 08, 1–33 
<https://collections.concourt.org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/3903/Full judgment Official version 24 
April 2018.pdf?sequence=30&isAllowed=y> [accessed 24 April 2018]. 
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would not be a dampener to deliberations as the Supreme Court of Appeal had decided. It added 
that JSC members worth their salt ought not to be deterred from deliberating freely and 
honestly, purely because of the prospect that the content of the deliberations might be 
disclosed.783 The first separate dissenting judgment written by Justice Jafta held that the rules 
of the court would not entitle a party to the deliberations of the JSC, as such deliberations do 
not form part of the record of proceedings as contemplated in the rule.784 The second dissenter, 
Acting Justice Kollapen, found that deliberations should only form part of the record, if they 
satisfy the test for relevance and even if the test for relevance is satisfied, the deliberations 
could still be excluded if there was a justifiable reason for their exclusion.785 
 Central to all three judgments were the values of transparency and accountability. The 
difference between the two lower courts and the Constitutional Court was how they defined 
the need for transparency. In other words they differed on how to approach, the JSC’s insistence 
that a refusal to hand over full deliberations was reasonable and justified. The Constitutional 
Court stated that truly confidential information could adequately be protected by a suitably 
couched confidentiality regime, which limited access to the deliberations.786 While this sounds 
like a reasonable measure, it would not immediately come into operation until the JSC 
determined the regime, which then needs to be gazetted by the Minister of Justice before it 
comes into effect.787 In the meantime, the HSF will have access to the full audio deliberations 
from the 2012 JSC interviews which it is submitted, goes beyond the requirements of 
transparency.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal judgment emphasised both the need for the 
commissioners to deliberate candidly and that adverse remarks made ‘may yet be hurtful to a 
 
783 Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission & Others, (2018, ZACC), Paras 35. 
784 Ibid, paras 84-154. 
785 Ibid, paras 155-214. 
786 Ibid, paras 73-75. 
787 Section 178(6) of the South African Constitution allows the JSC to determine its own procedure. 
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candidate and cause reputational damage harmful to his or her professional career’.788 Having 
attended the interviews over the years, I have witnessed some robust engagement in the actual 
interviews, so it is not hard to imagine that in private deliberations, discussions could possibly 
get quite heated or painfully honest. The commissioners I interviewed emphasised the need to 
have a safe space for open and candid discussion. I suggest that allowing access to the full 
deliberations will diminish this candid engagement, because commissioners will be careful 
about what they say. Some may agree with Justice Madlanga and say that ‘real’ or ‘worthy’ 
commissioners would not baulk at the idea, but the reality is that these commissioners are not 
merely fiduciaries sitting on a public body. They are representatives of the body they belong 
to, be it a political party, the judiciary, academia or a legal professional body. As such, their 
input is informed by their vantage point and it is suggested that their input may also affect the 
body they represent.  
As Acting Justice Kollapen held, commissioners may express views that are damaging 
to a candidate and ultimately the member who expressed it will remain the source of that 
damage, with all the attendant consequences that go with it.789 There are limits to transparency 
and I agree with Justice Kollapen that in this case, ‘preserving the confidentiality of the JSC 
deliberations not only served as a justifiable reason for the exclusion of the deliberations from 
the record, but was also necessary to safeguard multiple constitutional values’.790 These values 
also include the rights of the candidates to human dignity and privacy.   
5.3.4 Perspective from Participants 
One of the participants, advocate Vuyani Ngalwana SC, was counsel for the first Amicus 
Curiae in the HSF Supreme Court of Appeal proceedings.791 He insisted that his argument as 
 
788 Para 28. 
789 He suggested that they could even face delictual liability for defamation. 
790 Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission & Others (2018, ZACC), Para 91. 
791 He acted for the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union. 
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counsel in the Supreme Court of Appeal and his personal belief were one and the same. He 
advanced that providing full deliberations to the public would limit commissioners from freely 
expressing themselves in the private deliberations, which in turn would take away from what 
is meant to be a rigorous and robust process.792 He added further, that this limitation was 
especially restrictive for those commissioners who personally knew candidates vying for 
judicial positions. He argued that the commissioners would be in a difficult position if it was 
later publicised that they genuinely felt that the particular candidates they knew personally, 
were not ready for the judicial role just yet. 
 A member of Civil Society, Alison Tilley appeared to support the view that 
transparency did not mean publicising everything. She stated that: 
Transparency is about giving you the facts that will allow you to put the puzzle together, 
but in any situation where there are facts, there is the interpretation of the facts. 
Therefore, there are people who take those facts and put them together and analyse 
them and create narratives and create explanations of all those parts of the puzzle and 
the more parts to the puzzle they have access to, the more accurate they picture those 
generally. The act of making information available, is only one side of the coin.793 
She submitted that we ‘should not fetishize transparency, beyond its correct and necessary role’ 
and that more transparency was needed around other processes such as acting appointments.794 
 Judge President Frans Kgomo, a previous member of the JSC, expressed the view that 
the private nature of the deliberations allowed people to be brutally frank which was important 
for the process.795 This view seemed to be supported by a majority of participants amongst the 
four groups. Journalist Aarti Narsee stated that she appreciated why the deliberations needed 
to be private, in order to preserve frank conversations, but she suggested that JSC provide 
reasons or at least some details of why they chose particular candidates.796 There was a contrary 
 
792 Interview with Advocate Vuyani Ngalwana SC, 7 July 2017. 
793 Interview with Alison Tilley, 4 October 2016. 
794 This will be discussed further in the section on the JSC interviews. 
795 Interviews with Judge Kgomo, 6 April 2017 
796 Interview 6 August 2017. 
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view from a senior attorney who advanced that since most of the process was public, it was 
important to open up the deliberations too.797 She suggested that it was important because the 
public watched the interviews and thought some candidates were worthy.798 When these 
candidates were not appointed, no explanation was provided, and this led to suspicion about 
how the process worked. She did acknowledge the potential harm that could occur because of 
public deliberations. Nonetheless, when asked about the repercussions of public deliberations 
and the harm they would bring to candidates, she opined that such harm was part of the process 
of becoming a judge in South Africa.  
A senior advocate suggested that if the idea behind the public process of appointment 
is that ‘sunlight is the best disinfectant’, then there would be consequences, which would affect 
people senior in their careers.799 He however cautioned that it was necessary to reflect on 
whether legal professionals who have worked for years to build their careers and reputations, 
should be exposed to a process that could undermine everything they had worked for. The 
necessity of reflecting on this statement cannot be understated. There is no doubt that relevant 
information about the interview process, the deliberation process and the eventual outcome, is 
critical for potential candidates and the public. However, if not handled wisely, public JSC 
deliberations may deter candidates and provide the public with deliberations that are superficial 
in nature. It must be noted that transparency alone is not a sufficient guarantee that the JSC will 
operate optimally. In addition to having a transparent process, the JSC needs to show that it is 
an independent body. 
 
797 Interview with Legal Professional K, 6 July 2017. 
798 For an example of the extent of public interest, in 2017, the highest viewed JSC interview had 330 000 views 
on Youtube. 
799 Interview with Legal Professional S, 18 July 2017. 
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5.4 ANALYSING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JSC 
The JSC’s central role in recommending candidates makes it an important political body. This 
is because it arguably neutralises executive control over judicial appointments. The envisaged 
role of the JSC is essential for the enhancement of the transformation project, in order to 
maintain the credibility of the judiciary as an independent body that reflects South Africa’s 
diversity.800 Undue influences that may undermine the independence of the JSC are not limited 
to the executive and can appear in both blatant and subtle forms. For the purposes of this 
discussion, I will focus on two particular aspects: the JSC’s efforts to transform the judiciary 
as an alleged conduit of interference, and the power dynamics that arise when political 
representatives on the JSC have their own interests. 
5.4.1 Can Efforts to Transform the Judiciary Undermine the Independence of the JSC? 
The Merit v Transformation Debate. 
From inception, the JSC was tasked with changing the appointment process and transforming 
the judiciary. The JSC has been criticised in particular, for its interpretation of what 
transformation in terms of demographics and judicial mind-set looks like. In 2005, renowned 
advocate Geoff Budlender who himself has appeared before the JSC,801 highlighted that there 
was no need to be ‘squeamish’ about the necessity of changing the demographics of the 
bench.802 However, he warned against the appointment of compliant judges ‘who would not 
rock the boat’ and would be deferential to government in cases where policy questions were 
involved.803 He also warned against well qualified persons being unwilling to make themselves 
available for JSC interviews, because of the view that the JSC was insufficiently open- minded. 
The implication of his statement was that JSC commissioners would be insufficiently open-
 
800 Nomthandazo Ntlama, ‘The Transformation of the South African Judiciary: A Measure to Weaken Its 
Capacity?’, New York Law School, (2014). 
801 He was interviewed for a Constitutional Court vacancy in 2009 and mentioned that his applications for a 
position on the Western Cape High Court had been rebuffed three times. 
802Geoff Budlender, ‘Transforming the Judiciary:The Politics of the Judiciary in a Democratic South Africa’, 
South African Journal on Human Rights, ?22.4 (2005), 715–24 <https://doi.org/10.3868/s050-004-015-0003-8>. 
803 Ibid, p.722. 
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minded, if they were perceived to have an ‘agenda’ that was informed by other factors such as 
politics.  
Years later, Budlender may have been proved correct because there has been some 
reluctance from qualified candidates to be nominated for judicial positions.804 The topic of 
transformation of the judiciary has been heated and often polarising, because it has been centred 
on race. This has been most acute in the context of the non-appointment of some white men in 
favour of black candidates.805 In this context, the transformation debates to date have been 
centred on the fear that merit, which is supposedly defined as technical experience and 
competence, has been sacrificed at the altar of transformation.806 Section 174(1) is considered 
by some as the merit provision, because it requires that candidates be appropriately qualified 
and fit and proper. Section 174(2) is seen as the diversity provision and is often regarded as a 
competitor to merit.807  
Ntlama argues that ‘there are commentators in position of authority and influence, who 
are determined to label the whole process of transformation as nothing more than a measure 
designed to weaken the capacity of the judiciary’.808 The weakening of the judiciary referred 
to here, often implies a loss of judicial independence in order to be more deferential to 
government. Retired judge Louis Harms is one of these commentators that Ntlama refers to 
and he has stated that, ‘the requirements for racial and gender composition have led to the 
unfortunate and often unfair division of judicial appointees between 'transformation judges' 
 
804 For example, in 2016, the JSC struggled to have enough nominations to interview for the vacancy left by the 
retirement of Justice Van der Westhuizen. 
805 Bonthuys, p.138. 
806See former Justice Johan Kriegler’s address, available at https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/can-judicial-
independence-survive-transformation-a-public-lecture-delivered-by-judge-johann-kriegler-at-the-wits-school-
of-law/. 
807 Morné Olivier, ‘A Perspective on Gender Transformation in the South African Judiciary’, South African Law 
Journal, 13.3 (2013), 449–64 (p.450). 
808 Ntlama, p.11. 
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and 'others'’.809 In essence, he argues that in order to have more black judges, the JSC has 
forgone the need for experts and highly trained lawyers for incompetent (malleable) or at least 
inexperienced black judges. The implication is that the black judges appointed are not experts 
or highly trained and those passed over (predominantly white males) are.  
The result is the classification of diversity candidates as unmeritorious, a phenomenon 
not unique to South Africa. Malleson, Thornton and others have chronicled how this debate 
often makes unfair insinuations about minority candidates and women.810 Malleson writes that 
‘almost without exception, official expressions of support for proactive measures to encourage 
diversity, have been qualified by a statement of commitment to a strict application of the merit 
principle’.811 This she argues, maintains a strong maximalist approach to merit and ‘a clear 
divide between the idea of positive action to encourage a wider candidate pool and the 
sacrosanctity of the role of merit in selecting between those candidates’.812  
As mentioned earlier, McLoughlin has argued that merit is determined in the context 
of power’.813 Thus we need to ask, how is merit defined? And more importantly, who is 
defining it? The previous South African system was dominated by white men from the 
advocate’s profession and therefore merit is still defined by that standard. We are made to 
believe that the definition of merit is neutral, because merit is the quality of excellence and 
great worth.814 Yet, Davis and Williams submit that: 
 
809 Harms p.38. 
810 See Kate Malleson, ‘Rethinking the Merit Principle in Judicial Selection’, Journal of Law and Society, 33.1 
(2006), 126–40 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2006.00351.x>; Margaret Thornton, ‘Otherness on the 
Bench: How Merit Is Gendered’, Sydney Law Review, 29 (2007), 391-
413,<http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/sydney29&id=391&div=23&collection=journals> 
[accessed 7 September 2016]; Erika Rackley, ‘Representations of the (Woman) Judge: Hercules, the Little 
Mermaid, and the Vain and Naked Emperor’, Legal Studies, 22.4 (2002), 602–24;  
811 Malleson, p.131. 
812 Ibid. 
813 McLoughlin, 'The Politics of Gender Diversity' p. 168. 
814Rachel Davis and George Williams, ‘Reform of the Judicial Appointments Process: Gender and the Bench of 
the High Court of Australia’, Melbourne University Law Review, 27 (2003), 819–63. 
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The “best person” to occupy a position of authority has tended to be unproblematically 
defined in masculinist terms that reflect the values of the “public sphere”, making it 
virtually impossible for women and differentiated others.815 
In South Africa, despite the majority of the population being black, decades of apartheid 
resulted in the best candidates for the job often defined not only in masculinist terms, but in 
racial terms too. Thus white men are more likely to be perceived not only as more technically 
sound or competent, but also as less likely to be influenced by political or other non-judicial 
factors.816  
This thinking is evident when one examines the uproar over candidates, who have not 
been successful in their applications. The most common example is the non-appointment of 
advocate Gauntlet, mentioned in the earlier section.817 Other examples, have been the initial 
non-appointment of well-respected Judge Clive Plasket to the SCA818 and the initial failures of 
advocates Owen Rogers and Willem van der Linde’s applications for vacancies on the Western 
Cape and Gauteng Court respectively.819 There has barely been any outcry when respected 
black senior male advocates such as advocate Gcina Malindi SC and advocate Takalani 
Madima SC, have not been appointed, despite their seniority at the Bar.820  
In respect of women, the lack of attention to those who have fallen through the gaps is 
even worse. This is not surprising considering the intersectionality of race and gender 
discrimination that is common in society.821 Gender often takes the backseat to race. Despite 
her solid reputation and the paucity of women at the court, there were hardly any complaints 
when the current SCA President Mandisa Maya was not appointed to the Constitutional Court 
 
815 Ibid. 
816For an example of this narrative, see the article Malan, pp.1979-1980. 
817He has been unsuccessful at attempts to be appointed to the WHCH and the Constitutional Court.  
818 He was since appointed in 2019 after he failed in 2013. 
819 After a second attempt they were appointed in 2013 and 2015 respectively. 
820 A full discussion on which men are appointed and why, is outside the ambit of this paper. 
821 For a detailed discussion, see in its entirety, Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination ’. 
 
 
182 
 
in 2012. Thereafter, there were also interviews conducted by the JSC for the KwaZulu-Natal 
Deputy Judge President position, and the Free State Judge President position. Despite the 
impressive interviews of judges Fikile Mokgohloa in 2012, Connie Mocumie in April 2014 
and Kate Pillay in 2015, none of these three women were appointed.822 The failure to appoint 
any of them did not evoke any reaction from those who lead the merit versus transformation 
debate.  
All this begs the question, is recognition of merit or the non-appointment of meritorious 
candidates, only limited to unsuccessful white men?823 The JSC’s primary criteria require that 
a candidate be appropriately qualified, be a fit and proper person, and that their appointment 
reflect the racial and gender composition of society. These requirements are to be read in 
tandem. Suitable qualifications and diversity are not mutually exclusive. Albertyn submits that: 
Race and gender are not envisaged as screening or trumping criteria but are relevant to 
a wider set of judicial qualities. There is not a simple equation between a judge’s race 
or gender and his or her ability to adjudicate fairly … The JSC nevertheless allows itself 
space to advance a black or female candidate over a more qualified white or male 
candidate should the former lack experience but display competence and ability in 
relation to the criteria under s 174(1). This reading redefines merit, to include an 
appreciation of South Africa’s different communities and an understanding of the 
values of the Constitution, while s 174(2) enables a flexible approach to appointing 
black and women judges when presented with promising candidates.824 
Albertyn and Bonthuys further submit that a more substantive approach to professional merit 
and demographic representation, views race and gender representativeness as mandatory, but 
they locate this within a wider understanding of multiple axes of difference including class, 
background, ethnicity, culture, sexual orientation and religion.825 
 
822 Judges Mokgohloa and Pillay interviewed for the Kwazulu Natal Court, while Judge Mocumie interviewed 
for the Free State High Court. 
823 For a more detailed discussion on this, see Oxtoby 'Managing a Fraught Transition', p.70. 
824 Albertyn 'Judicial Diversity', p.279. 
825 Cathi Albertyn and Elsje Bonthuys, ‘Gender and the Judiciary in Africa: From Obscurity to Parity?’, in 
Gender and the Judiciary in Africa: From Obscurity to Parity?, ed. by Gretchen Bauer and Josephine Dawuni 
(Routledge, 2015), pp. 49–66 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719603>. 
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 Such an approach they argue balances both merit and transformation, while 
simultaneously interrogating and expanding the traditional concepts of judicial merit.826 I 
submit that in order to answer the question of whether a transformation agenda can be used as 
a means of undermining the JSC’s independence, it is necessary to interrogate what qualities 
are seen as meritorious. Such an approach requires an expansion of the traditional concepts of 
merit, so that one can better evaluate the JSC’s actions. It is suggested that the secondary 
criteria proposed by the JSC are helpful in this regard. Firstly take for example, the distinction 
made between two types of competence: technical competence and the ability to give 
expression to the values of the Constitution.827 This distinction alone reveals that technical 
competence in terms of the ability to write good judgments and analyse cases thoroughly, is 
not enough to be described as competent. This is especially so because in the apartheid era, 
judges used that type of competence, to buttress an abhorrent system. In the new democratic 
era, candidates should be able to demonstrate not only that they understand constitutional 
values, but also that they espouse them in their professional and private life.  
This would include a commitment to transforming the legal profession in ways such as 
mentoring previously disadvantaged persons, being involved in causes that seek to improve 
South African society or even providing pro bono services to those less privileged. De Vos 
submits that those who hold views ‘out of kilter with the values embodied in the 
Constitution do not possess the requisite merit’828 and therefore cannot be appointed, despite 
how technically sound they are. It is also submitted that the definition of competence, should 
include the ability to bring diverse views to a judicial panel that are necessary in order to reach 
 
826 Ibid. 
827 Section 3(b) of the JSC criteria. 
828Pierre Vos de, ‘The JSC Must Redefine Merit to Advance Judicial Transformation » Constitutionally 
Speaking’, Constitutionally Speaking, 11 April 2013 <https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/the-jsc-must-
redefine-merit-to-advance-judicial-transformation/> [accessed 8 May 2018]. 
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a fair outcome in a case. An example of this is a case that was explained by Justice Mocumie 
who sits on the SCA.  
Justice Mocumie remarked on a matter where she sat with four other justices.829 It was 
a contractual dispute concerning household repairs and in the application, there was constant 
reference to the word ‘tarp’. The other justices had no idea what it was. It turned out that tarp, 
was a reference used to describe a particular lamination on the floor that was often found in 
houses in the townships (high density poor areas). Her underprivileged background in that 
moment provided her with information that the other justices did not have and assisted them in 
understanding the case much better, because she was able to explain the importance of this 
material for people in the townships. This knowledge and other information that people from 
different social backgrounds and classes can offer, can also be considered as a form of 
competence. This is because the ability or expertise to grasp elements of the daily social life of 
a large number of South Africans is a form of knowledge and expertise on its own. 
Another helpful definition in the JSC criteria, is the distinction between technical 
experience and experience in regard to the values and needs of communities. This too is crucial, 
because 25 years of experience at the Bar is of no value, if one cannot adjudicate with the 
necessary decorum, patience, objectivity and sensitivity to the socio economic conditions of 
South Africa, and its painful history of apartheid.830 It is submitted that the needs and values 
of South African communities, especially given the historical backdrop, require a judge with 
the ability to recognise the necessity of an approach to litigants that is respectful and recognises 
that those who were previously disadvantaged, often experience a lack of power. The JSC’s 
ability to be independent, must include an ability to make appointments that are based on the 
 
829 Lunchtime Talk on 8 August 2017, hosted by the Centre for Law and Society at University of Cape Town, 
Law faculty. 
830 Constance Baratang Mocumie, ‘Gender Transformation of the Judiciary in South Africa through the Eyes of 
a Woman Judge.’ (Unpublished, 2017), pp. 1–33. 
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needs of the court and the society they serve− even if others will deem them as ‘unmeritorious’. 
These appointments it is argued, could be considered ‘as advancing the JSC’s strategic 
transformation objectives at a particular point in time’.831  
Inspite of the above suggestions, it is clear that the definition of ‘merit needs to be re-
engineered’ and this requires the development of a modern judiciary with a skill set to meet the 
requirements of a wider group of stakeholders.832 A wider interpretation of merit or the re-
engineering of it, will allow for the recognition of ‘other’ attributes that women can bring, that 
had not previously been considered as merit. That being said, Ntlama is correct in stating that 
‘the quest for transformation does not mean that anyone can be appointed to the bench and it 
is not an entitlement or a privilege of the categories of persons that suffered discrimination to 
be appointed to the judiciary’.833 The necessity of legal expertise, judicial craftsmanship, 
relevant experience (which includes that of non-advocates) and an intellectual ability, are non-
negotiable requirements for appointment.  
It is therefore argued that unless commentators stop pitting merit against 
transformation, the definition of merit will remain by and large trapped in its historical roots.834 
Invariably, this will mean that the value and contributions of women candidates before the JSC 
will not be given their due respect or support. The institutional and substantive independence 
of the JSC not only requires that they be free from political influence, but it also necessitates 
that they have the courage to apply their minds fully to transforming the judiciary. Their efforts 
to do so will be appreciated, if there is a broader understanding of the definition of a meritorious 
candidate.  
 
831 Yvonne Mokgoro, ‘Judicial Appointments’, Advocate, 23.3 (2010), 43–48 (p.45). 
832 John Morison, ‘Beyond Merit: The New Challege for Judicial Appointments’, in Debating Judicial 
Appointments in an Age of Diversity, ed. by Graham Gee and Erika Rackley (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp. 
223–39. 
833 Ntlama, p.15. 
834 Solik,p.41. 
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5.4.2 When Politics and Power Collide on the JSC 
The JSC interviews have been an opportunity to see some of the best and brightest of South 
Africa’s legal community. There have been interviews of women in particular, where women 
have impressed the JSC and the audience watching them. Current Gauteng High Court Judge 
Lebogang Modiba, narrated how she grew up in a poverty-stricken home with no mother and 
how she later found solace in the library. Her journey to the bench included a Master’s in public 
administration from Harvard University and setting up her own law firm in Johannesburg.835 
The General Council of the Bar (GCB) who are often highly critical of candidates, were 
glowing in their comments on her candidacy. They stated that she showed that with effort and 
commitment, achievements such as appointments to the bench were now possible for any South 
African, regardless of gender or race.836 
 In her interview for the WCHC bench, now Judge Nolwazi Boqwana at 40, proved that 
age should not be a consideration for appointment; she had JSC members visibly enamoured 
with her poise, confidence, intelligence and impressive legal background.837 There have been 
various other examples where judges seeking elevation to a higher court have been both an 
encouragement to women who aspire to judicial office and a reminder that women are not 
lacking in the skills and competence required for judicial office.838 
 However on occasion, the political composition on the JSC has been a cause for 
concern. Power and privilege dynamics have arisen in the interviews, providing evidence for 
the scepticism that a number of interview participants had about the large political composition 
 
835 JSC Interview, 5 October 2015 at the Radisson Blu Le Vendome Hotel in Sea Point, Cape Town.  
836 Full transcript of the interview available at 
http://www.dgru.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/103/ModibaM.pdf.  
837 JSC Interview, 8 October 2013 at the Cape Town International Convention Centre, Cape Town. 
838 Other examples include Mandisa Maya’s interview for Deputy Judge President of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in 2015, Leona Theron and Dhaya Pillay’s interviews for the Constitutional Court in 2015 and the 
interview of Mahube Molemela for the position of Judge President of the Free State in 2014. 
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on the JSC.839 In the period of this research, the year 2013 particularly stands out, because some 
politicians on the JSC, particularly former ministers Fatima Chohan-Khota, and Ngoako 
Ramathlodi were hostile to those who had issued judgments considered as undermining the 
Executive’s authority.840 These politicians from the ruling party, the African National Congress 
(ANC), were replaced in 2014, but political questions still seep into the process on particular 
occasions. One such occasion arose on 9 July 2015, when four candidates were interviewed for 
a Constitutional Court vacancy.841 They were all women. In addition, Justice Mandisa Maya 
was also interviewed for the position Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal; she 
became the first woman to ever be nominated for the position.842 
 This historical moment was particularly poignant because critics of transformation had 
argued that merit was being sacrificed at the altar of transforming the judiciary.843 Yet before 
them, the JSC had five well respected women judges, with strong jurisprudential records, stellar 
careers and very impressive Curricula Vitae. The moment was however overshadowed by then 
Minister Michael Masutha’s questioning on judicial deference and in particular whether judges 
needed to consider the effects their judgments could have on society at large before they made 
them. These statements were thinly veiled attacks on the judiciary for a Gauteng High Court 
decision that held that government had ignored its constitutional obligations when it allowed 
Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir to leave.844 The South African government did this, 
 
839 Masengu, ‘The Judicial Service Commission and the Appointment of Women: More to It than Meets the 
Eye’, pp.3-6. 
840 For more details, see Malan., p.1978-1979. 
841 Interviews held at the Southern Sun O.R Tambo International, Johannesburg.  
842 For the Constitutional Court the JSC interviewed Justices Leona Theron, Zukisa Tshiqi, Nonkosi Mthlantla, 
and Judge Dhaya Pillay. 
843 Tabeth Masengu, ‘Lady Justice and the Road to Equality’, City Press, 7 July 2015, < https://city-
press.news24.com/Voices/Lady-justice-and-the-road-to-equality-20150707> [accessed on 24 November 2019]. 
844 See Southern African Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Others (27740/2015) [2015] ZAGPPHC 
402; 2016 (1) SACR 161 (GP).  
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despite a previous court order to detain him under a warrant issued by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).  
It was clear that the thinly veiled attacks on the judiciary made some members of the 
commission uncomfortable. As one journalist put it: 
the Minister of Justice kept pushing this thing about consequences and how judges 
should consider the consequences of their judgements on the outside world, kind of 
setting the impression that judges should like in a way be compromised in making their 
decisions. The Minister of Justice has not been, I go as far as saying independent in a 
way, and he has been very biased.845 
The Chief Justice tried to defend the judiciary, which resulted in moments where the interviews 
were more about the tension between the judiciary and the executive, than about the candidate 
being interviewed.846 The political agitation present in the interviews, was essentially about 
power: the power that the executive has; the power that they felt was being exercised 
unjustifiably by the courts; and the power of politics to enter a judicial interview and dominate 
what is meant to be a professional process.  
This was a clear instance where the JSC’s independence as a body, was effectively 
undermined. The presence of politicians on the JSC means that invariably, there will be 
political dynamics at play. However, the undue use of political power indirectly negates the 
JSC’s independence. The focus on the Al-Bashir judgment detracted from the opportunity to 
critically engage with candidates’ judicial philosophies or enquire how they perceived their 
role in a constitutional democracy. This diminished the JSC’s institutional independence. The 
substantive independence of the Minister was also weakened because his objective was to put 
the judiciary in its place. As opposed to utilising his role for the purposes of the actual task at 
 
845 Interview with Aarti Narsee. 
846 Tabeth Masengu, ‘Small Steps in the Journey Towards Gender Equality on the South African 
Bench’,(Oxford Human Rights Hub Blog), 21 July 2015 <http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/small-steps-in-the-journey-
towards-gender-equality-on-the-south-african-bench/> [accessed 22 March 2018]. 
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hand – the administration of objective interviews, to ascertain whether the candidates before 
him, were fit for a Constitutional Court position.  
 In another instance, a decision handed down by a judge in a criminal case, earned her 
the ire of some of the politicians. Judge Violet Phatsoane of the Northern Cape High Court had 
sentenced former Northern Cape ANC provincial chairperson, John Block to 15 years 
imprisonment847 because she found him guilty of corruption and money laundering following 
an arduous four-year trial.848 Members of the ANC took her to task by inferring that she had 
been partial and that Mr Block did not deserve his sentence.849 Former Minister Faith 
Muthambi a staunch member of the ANC, further added that Phatsoane‘s refusal to recuse 
herself from the trial showed bias.850 Mr Nyambi an ANC NCOP member, on more than one 
occasion stated that Judge Phatsoane had been compromised and suggested she had acted in a 
legally reprehensible manner. Judge Phatsoane was visibly upset and her respite came in the 
form of opposition MP Julius Malema. He suggested that because the case had gone on appeal, 
it was still sub judice and therefore should not be discussed any further. 
 Having frequently observed the JSC interviews, it was expected that Judge Phatsoane’s 
interview would not run smoothly because of this particular case. Over the years, I have 
discerned that any politically connected judgments always come to haunt the person who made 
a decision that was not in the favour of the ruling party − the ANC.851 An argument could be 
made that a politician on the JSC represents their constituency and invariably the party that 
they belong to. Therefore, politicians cannot be expected to shy away from interrogating 
candidates when there is a political interest at stake. Rather, as representatives of the people, 
 
847 JSC Interviews, held 3–7 April 2017, Office of the Chief Justice in Noordwyk, Midrand. 
848 See National Director of Public Prosecutions v Scholtz and Others (2027/2012, KS20/2013) [2016] 
ZANCHC 37 at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZANCHC/2016/37.html. 
849 JSC interview round of 3-7 April, Office of the Chief Justice in Noordwyk, Midrand. 
850 There was an allegation that then Judge President Frans Kgomo had influenced her decision. 
851 For instance in October 2013, Judge Clive Plasket was taken to task over decisions he had made against 
government in regards to social security in the Eastern Cape. 
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they should be entitled to openly declare their preference for candidates who make favourable 
decisions. After all, ‘if actual and potential political implications are taken into account, the 
composition of the JSC and its decisions pertaining to recommendations of candidates are of 
political significance’.852 The validity of this argument is noted, because the composition of 
the JSC does seek to balance different interests. 
So perhaps the issue is not that politicians are expected to behave like legal 
professionals and not have partisan interests. Instead it is how politicians balance 
accountability, with their role as members of an independent JSC. A JSC who are a critical part 
of a national transformative project. If the idea is to hold judges accountable for their decisions, 
then there is need for a consistent pattern of questioning on all types of judicial decisions.853 
Accountability should not be selective and all JSC members politicians included, have to try 
and restrain their personal agendas. Failure to do this will result in an approach that is solely 
focused on promoting ‘compliant’ or deferential candidates. It is submitted that such an 
approach is not much different from the previous executive type of appointment model, where 
‘individual merit had not always been the decisive factor’.854 
Dodek and Devlin suggest a possible solution to ensuring institutional independence on 
an appointment body with various stakeholders.  
Processes and procedures must be designed in such a way that participants in the 
selection process do not operate as, or perceive themselves to be, agents/representatives 
of a constituency. Rather, they are fiduciaries whose responsibility is to select judges 
who will generate public confidence in the administration of justice.855 
 
 
852 Malan, p.1968. 
853 For agreement on this aspect see Oxtoby ‘Managing a Fraught Transition’, p.161 and Richard Calland and 
Chris Oxtoby, ‘Rational, Consistent Process for Choosing Judges Needed’, Business Day, 18 April 2013. 
854 Du Bois, p.5. 
855 Devlin and Dodek, pp 45-66. 
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When politicians act as fiduciaries, a candidate’s merit has to be viewed holistically and not 
just in a narrow sense where past judgements in a political case determine whether a candidate 
will get sufficient votes. If the task is to appoint judges who will generate public confidence, 
then it is submitted that the judges who are brave enough to make hard decisions, in the face 
of political pressure are the type of judges that the public needs. Judge Phatsoane was not 
appointed and we are not privy to the reasons why. Nonetheless, it is certain that such a 
politically charged interview can only serve to discourage other judges who have ruled against 
the ANC from applying for promotion. Even worse it would also discourage judges who want 
promotion, from ruling against the ANC. 
5.5 GENDER BIAS IN THE JSC INTERVIEWS 
5.5.1 The Interviews as a Traumatic Experience 
Though issues around the JSC’s independence have arisen in interviews of both men and 
women, issues around gender bias have been focused on women. The women judges I 
interviewed were in agreement about how difficult and nerve-wracking the process can be for 
women. Only one of the six interviewed had appeared before the JSC only once. Four had 
appeared at least twice for the same vacancy after it had been re-advertised in the same or 
subsequent years856 and the sixth had been interviewed more than two times for different 
positions. One judge shared her thoughts on the interviews. 
My sense is, it’s a very traumatic interview, and it’s a very unusual situation. In the 
sense that a lot of my colleagues speak of it, speak of having Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder afterwards but, it can be, even if it goes well. It’s extremely gruelling and it 
takes some time to recover from it. So, I think what surprised me about it was that, I 
wasn’t expecting that. There’s a sense of like if you’ve had a heavy term at work or a 
heavy six months at work. You have that condensed into the space of a day and there 
is a sort of recovery.857 
 
856 This was for the High Court and other higher court vacancies. 
857 Interview with Judge E, 19 June 2017. 
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The description of the interviews as gruelling was also confirmed by another judge who related 
an instance of one of the heads of courts being extremely antagonistic towards her in the 
interviews for his court.858  
It is worth acknowledging that in some respects, the process has moved away from what 
was once a very sexist process. The questioning process under Chief Justice Mogoeng’s 
leadership is much improved. There have been no sexist or homophobic questions posed to the 
candidates, as was the case with Judge Anna-Marie de Vos who interviewed for the position 
of Deputy Judge President of Gauteng in 2005. She was quizzed about the fact that she was a 
lesbian and asked whether her sexual orientation would not make her colleagues 
uncomfortable.859 Judge Kathy Satchwell’s sexual orientation also appeared to be a barrier 
when she interviewed for a vacancy on the Constitutional Court in 2009.860 A complaint from 
the Society for the Protection of the Constitution averred that ‘god fearing people would not 
accept a lesbian judge’.861  
In the 2006 interview round, Penny Andrews who was based in the USA at the time, 
was asked whether getting a boyfriend in South Africa might persuade her to return if she was 
unsuccessful in her bid to join the Constitutional Court.862 These questions and others like them 
reveal a disturbing truth. Despite having a progressive and transformative Constitution, the JSC 
members are part of a society that is ‘steeped deeply in patriarchal and masculinist cultural 
attitudes’.863 This means that gender bias and prejudice is likely to be present in interviews. In 
the period of this research, no interview epitomised this more than that of Judge Nozuko Mjali. 
 
858 Interview with Judge A, 22 October 2016. 
859 Sheena Adams, ‘Lesbian Judge Quizzed about Her Lifestyle ’, IOL News, 19 October 2005 
<https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/lesbian-judge-quizzed-about-her-lifestyle-256414> [accessed 7 May 
2018]. 
860 ‘Judge Defends Her Private Life’, News24, 22 September 2009 
<https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/judge-defends-her-private-life-20090922> [accessed 7 May 2018]. 
861 Ibid. 
862 Andrews, p.571. 
863 Ibid. 
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5.5.2 The Case of Nozuko Mjali 
Judge Nozuko Mjali a sitting judge on the Mthatha High Court (a division of the Eastern Cape 
High Court), was seeking a transfer to the Bisho High Court in the same division where her 
family was based.864 Regulation 4 of the JSC Act requires that a judge seeking a transfer must 
apply for a vacancy and be interviewed by the JSC as per standard procedure.865 Judge Mjali’s 
transfer was requested after her husband who stayed in Bisho with their young children, was 
charged with the rape of their domestic worker. The husband’s case was widely reported in the 
media with reference also being made to an instance where Judge Mjali was presiding over 
another rape trial, while her husband was appearing in the court right next to hers.866 Judge 
Mjali was initially appointed in 2010, and with no negative comments regarding her application 
to the Bisho Court, it was expected that the interview would be a mere formality. Instead, Judge 
Mjali had a devastating interview which left her sobbing before the JSC. 
 It was clear that the Judge President of her division Themba Sangoni, was not in support 
of her transfer request and that he was hostile towards her. He intimated that she knew that her 
family lived in Bisho when she took up the position in Mthatha and that she had managed fine 
by commuting. Mjali described in detail how the arrest of her husband had traumatised her nine 
year old child and how her three year old who was autistic was traumatised by her absence.867 
She further explained to the JSC how she had to stop commuting with one of her children from 
East London (where the child was in a special needs school), after she had received death 
threats due to a criminal case she was hearing and she said she sought the transfer to find a 
balance between work and family life.868 One commissioner asked Judge Mjali how she had 
 
864 JSC interview held on 8 October 2014 at the Twelve Apostles Hotel, Camps Bay, and Cape Town. 
865 Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994, Procedure for Commission . 
866Gugu Phandle, ‘Rape Case Irony for Judge’, Dispatch, 26 June 2014 
<http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2014/06/25/rape-case-irony-for-judge/> [accessed 9 May 2018].. 
867Niren Tolsi, ‘Judge Tells JSC about Husband’s Arrest for Rape ’, News24, 30 April 2014 
<http://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Judge-tells-JSC-about-husbands-arrest-for-rape-20150430> 
[accessed 12 May 2017]. 
868 Ibid. 
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coped since the incident and she explained that she had relied on the generosity of her 
colleagues to exchange caseloads, so she could work in East London closer to Bisho.  
Commissioner Modise enquired as to whether the judiciary provided any support for 
people in her situation because women were often selfless in the face of challenges. Judge Mjali 
informed the JSC, that no assistance was available within or from the judiciary. After such a 
harrowing interview that left many in the audience shaken, the JSC decided not to recommend 
Judge Mjali for the Bisho vacancy and it was left open. They did not provide reasons why, but 
the JSC spokespersons stated that there had been extensive deliberations and that other 
measures could be taken to ensure that Judge Mjali worked closer to her family. This however, 
could only be done by her Judge President.869 
 At least six interview participants mentioned Judge Mjali’s interview as an example of 
the JSC’s failure to be sensitive towards the challenges women candidates face and/or used it 
to illustrate just how terrible the process can be. One senior judge explained that granting Judge 
Mjali the transfer, would have enhanced the gender transformation in the judiciary because 
[I]f she was placed, where she could just have the comfort of having a normal life. She 
would be able to give her all to this demanding job. Stunningly, the JSC just closed its 
eyes to everything she said and each and every one of the reasons in my view that she 
gave was compelling. She should have been given what she was asking for.870 
She also stressed that the interview did little to encourage women in the profession aspiring to 
be judges, that the JSC would acknowledge their concerns, if they joined the bench.871 A 
journalist mentioned that the highly insensitive approach to Majli led one to believe ‘that there 
was clearly something else that was going on that we did not know about’.872 She added that 
 
869 Franny Rabkin, ‘Judge Makes Tearful Appeal for Transfer’, Pressreader, 9 October 2014, pp. 1–2 
<https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/business-day/20141009/281573763935121> [accessed 7 May 
2018]. 
870 Interview with Judge C.  
871 Ibid. 
872 Interview with journalist R, 5 October 2016. 
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the message that was sent to women judges was that the JSC would not ‘cut them any slack’ 
for being mothers.873 
Another judge expressed similar shock at how the interview unfolded and stated: 
That’s the kind of locus classicus on how not to treat women and an appalling lack of 
sympathy, of any kind of empathy or even basic sympathy. And I think, my concern is, 
there seems to be an attitude that they will not consider transfers, so they’re going to 
make a point with Mjali.874 
Journalist Narsee’s deduction from the interview was that women, especially women who are 
married and have children, are at a disadvantage before the JSC. She opined that despite the 
very emotional and honest interview, Mjali’s position was viewed by the JSC as one of 
weakness.875 A senior advocate called the lack of interrogation by the JSC of the challenges 
Mjali faced as ‘deeply problematic’ and he stated that the JSC needed to clarify ‘what their 
policy position is on questions of gender equity’.876 In his opinion, the interview was a 
reflection of the legal profession as a rough place and a reminder that different challenges 
impacted women differently.877 
 I have previously expressed the view that expecting somebody in the position of Judge 
Mjali to serve the public efficiently and continuously, without providing support systems to 
help them cope, was not only frightening, but damaging in the long term for the judiciary as a 
whole.878 In the interview, concern was expressed by Judge President Sangoni and ANC MP 
Mathole Motshekga that candidates often sought to leave Mthatha High Court, because it was 
located in a ‘rural’ town in comparison with the others. Yet it was clear in this case that Judge 
Mjali had a valid reason for wanting to leave, a reason not based on a vain desire to be in a 
 
873 Ibid. 
874 Interview with Judge E. 
875 Interview, 6 August 2017. 
876 Interview with Legal Professional S. 
877 Ibid. 
878 Tabeth Masengu and Katy Hindle, ‘The New JSC in a Man’s World ’, The Con Magazine, 10 November 
2014, <http://www.theconmag.co.za/2014/11/10/the-new-jsc-and-the-patriarchy/> [accessed 10 April 2018]. 
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‘city’. Judge President Kgomo made a subtle plea for Mjali, when he pointed out that Mjali 
had performed judicial duties in different parts of the country and he wanted ‘commissioners 
to understand her passion and sacrifice’, so that all things could be considered during 
deliberations.879 Yet this plea by a fellow commissioner was surprisingly not enough to garner 
the support of at least thirteen JSC members, despite what were undeniably compelling 
circumstances.  
The interview certainly raised questions about whether women can be treated equally 
before the JSC, if there is no recognition of the burden of motherhood and caregiving on women 
judges. This is a point Justice Mocumie considers in her article on the gendered challenges 
faced by women in the judiciary. She submits that: 
The JSC missed the opportunity to be flexible in respect of her dire circumstances. In 
my view, this was further exacerbated by the fact, that in the interview, the 
commissioners did not reflect, nor did they interact with her on the gendered aspects of 
her application. The application should have been dealt with internally on its merits and 
with the assurance that she would receive support on the way forward. Instead, her 
children ended in the same situation they were in before —exposed to all the adverse 
and negative publicity of their parents’ situation and the absence of a mother who could 
not spend enough time with them.880 
Hodgson et al argue that, ‘the JSC failed to acknowledge the double burden women face when 
they are required to take on both primary caregiver roles and full-time work, and to attempt to 
give effect to substantive gender equality to alleviate these challenges’. 881 
 They conclude that instead the JSC members, unsympathetic to Mjali, voted against 
her transfer and perpetuated patriarchal discrimination against women in the workplace.882 
While we may never know why Mjali’s Judge President was not supportive of her transfer, it 
has been suggested that the opinion of the Judges President weigh heavily in some voting 
 
879 JSC Interview for Nozuko Mjali. 
880 Mocumie 'Gender Transformation in the Judiciary ', p.27. 
881 Mateenah Hunter, Fish Tim Hodgson, and Catherine Thorpe, ‘Women Are Not a Proxy Why the Constitution 
Requires Feminist Judges’, South African Journal on Human Rights, 33.3 (2015), 579–606. 
882 Ibid. 
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deliberations.883 In this case since the Judge President was a man, one couldn’t help but wonder 
if the outcome would have been different had the Judge President been a woman. 
5.6 MORE WOMEN ON THE JSC EQUALS MORE WOMEN BEING APPOINTED 
AS JUDGES? 
5.6.1 Gender Composition of the JSC over the years 
In the period of this research, the number of women members on the JSC went from six to 
eight, less than 30% of the entire body. The South African JSC falls short of the SADC 
guidelines for at least 50% women in decision-making positions. In the period 2013-2014, the 
women JSC members were Deputy Minister of Home Affairs Fatima Chohan, Professor Engela 
Schlemmer, Advocate Leah Gcabashe SC, Ms Andiswa Ndoni (a presidential appointee) and 
two members of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP).884 A critical interrogation of the 
issues that women face had been lacking and the only questions that did attempt to dig deeper, 
came from Advocate Gcabashe. Chohan’s focus was mainly on questions of judicial deference, 
while Schlemmer often focused on whether candidates had published academically. Andiswa 
Ndoni’s questioning was directed more at the dynamics in the legal profession. The other two 
hardly spoke which led to comments about whether a lack of gender balance on the JSC fed 
into how female candidates were interviewed and viewed.885  
It was reported that the lack of engagement by some female commissioners was 
considered as embarrassing and potentially robbing ‘the commission of a crucial gender voice’, 
‘additional perspectives’ and, ‘insights’.886 It is important to state here that the responsibility 
to interrogate challenges that women candidates face, does not lie with the women on the JSC 
alone. Women commissioners can bring different perspectives and insight into the process. 
 
883 Interview with Judge C.  
884 ANC Members Mmatlatla Boroto and Peace Mabe. 
885 Niren Tolsi, ‘JSC Is Getting to Grips with Gender’, Mail & Guardian, 11 October 2013 
<https://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-11-00-jsc-is-getting-to-grips-with-gender.> [accessed 9 May 2018]. 
886 Ibid. 
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Nonetheless, all members of the JSC should be actively seeking to try to question or at least 
understand, the difficulties that are faced by the very women they need to be appointing to the 
bench. During the Majli interview, Judge Kgomo provided an example of this, when he made 
his plea to the JSC. It was Julius Malema MP another man, who asked Sangoni during the 
interviews, why he couldn’t allocate Majli to cases only in East London, so she could be nearer 
to her children in Bisho. Another man, Advocate Ishmael Semenya enquired whether Mjali and 
her children had received trauma counselling.  
Therefore, there has been some interrogation into women’s challenges by men, it just 
has not happened consistently. The Chief Justice since 2013, perhaps fuelled by complaints 
about the lack of progress in appointing women,887 has constantly asked women about the 
challenges they face in the legal profession that impede their access to the bench.888 These 
questions have often been repetitive, mostly centred on the paucity of women appearing as 
counsel in litigation matters before the courts. A change in the JSC composition in October 
2014, brought with it a wind of change. Chohan, Schlemmer, Boroto, and Mabe left the JSC. 
Ms Thandi Modise together with Ms Dikeledi Mampuru were appointed as representatives of 
NCOP. Ms Thoko Didiza, and Ms Dikeledi Magadzi arrived as the ANC MP’s, while Lindiwe 
Nkosi-Thomas SC was a presidential appointee and Professor Nomthandazo, a representative 
of academia. Added to Ndoni and Gcabashe, the complement of women grew to eight, the 
highest ever number of women on the JSC since its inception.889  
The opposition members on the JSC also changed with Julius Malema, the controversial 
leader of the Economic Freedom Front (EFF), and Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) MP Narend 
 
887 Democratic Governance and Rights Unit and Sonke Gender Justice, ‘CGE Complaint on Gender 
Transformation in the Judiciary.’ (Cape Town, 2012), pp. 1–19. 
888 In October 2012, the author on behalf of the DGRU filed a joint complaint with Sonke Gender Justice where 
the Chief Justice and the JSC were respondents in the complaint. It was made before the Commission for 
Gender Equality and resulted in an Investigative Report in 2016. 
889 After April 2017, Gcabashe and Ndoni were replaced by Advocates Thandi Norman SC and Jennifer Cane 
SC. 
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Singh also being appointed to the JSC. The effect of the new appointees was felt immediately. 
Thandi Modise impressed from the first interviews, when she asked a woman candidate vying 
for the position of Judge President, how she would cope with men trying to undermine her.890 
It was the first time we had heard a commissioner bluntly pose such a weighted 
question. Modise was also quick to question Judge Mojalefa Rampai a male candidate vying 
for the same position, who advanced that a leadership position needed people who were 
seasoned and ‘chiselled’ and there were not many women like that.891  
Thoko Didiza also asked Judge Rampai whether he would consider making gender 
mainstreaming part of the curriculum if appointed and whether he would support the 
appointment of a Judge President who was his junior on the bench (and a woman). Didiza also 
asked those vying for leadership, what steps they would take in addressing gender imbalances 
and asked all candidates what they had done to mentor other women from their communities. 
These two commissioners in particular, have continued to impress while on the JSC and it 
could be as a result of their history in gender activism.892 While other JSC members do ask 
questions about women’s challenges, these two women and Advocate Gcabashe during her 
term, consistently asked substantive and nuanced questions about gender equality, gender-
based violence and women’s difficulties in the legal profession. Their consistency appears to 
have rubbed off on other members, some commissioners seem to be asking more ‘enlightened’ 
gender related questions. This is an example of the advantage that different perspectives can 
have on a process. 
 
890 JSC Interview of Judge Constance Mocumie, 8 October 2014 at the Twelve Apostles Hotel, Cape Town. 
891 JSC interview 8 October 2014. 
892 Didiza had several roles in women’s rights prior to her political career and Modise was one of the founders of 
the ANC Womens League. 
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5.6.2 Perspectives on the Gender Composition of the JSC 
The responses to the question on whether the gender composition of the JSC does influence or 
have an impact on the number of women getting appointed fell within three separate camps. 
The first camp agreed with the assertion that more women at the JSC would lead to more 
women being appointed as judges. Seven of the participants were of this view and a common 
reason given was that women on the JSC would be able to identify better with women 
candidates. One participant said that more women would be appointed, because they would be 
more empathetic and identify with other women’s struggles, and the obstructions they had 
faced in their careers.893  
Tilley offered another reason, stating that research had shown that people were often 
thought to be competent, if they looked and sounded like the selector determining the 
competence.894 Hence in her opinion, the gender balance on the JSC would be determinative 
in the appointment of women, as women are more likely to think women are competent. A 
third argued that the impact of more women on the JSC could be seen in the increase in women 
getting appointed. Specifically, she proffered that this is because there would be a stronger 
voice on the JSC to speak for the cause of women.895 This was supported by a JSC member 
who stated that women are inclined to support women, because of the perspective that they 
came with from their own backgrounds.896  
The participants in the second camp were adamant that the proportion of women on the 
JSC has no bearing on appointments. At least three of the commissioners mentioned that in 
some instances, women JSC members have not supported women candidates. They stated that 
sometimes it was because the women candidates were not deemed as capable, and that at other 
 
893 Interview with legal professional L, 12 October 2016. 
894 Interview, 4 October 2016. 
895 Interview with Judge D, 12 January 2017. 
896 Interview with Commissioner A, 14 May 2017. 
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times it was hard to discern why they did not support the women.897 The latter argument was 
similar to the one made in Zambia in regard to the ‘queen bee’ syndrome and women’s 
propensity to be jealous of other women. Modise said she only supported women who were 
extremely competent and was even harder on women candidates, because she wanted that 
woman to be ‘a shining example to others who come behind them’.898  
Advocate Ngalwana said that from his experience, having more women on a body did 
not mean an advancement of other women. He added, ‘you put women in certain positions, and 
you hope that they are going to adopt a different approach from men, you find them mimicking 
men’ and not bringing a different perspective.899 Another judge suggested that the number of 
women on the JSC had no bearing, especially for the Constitutional Court vacancies, because 
the President appoints on the advice of his close circle of confidants. These confidants she 
pointed out, weren’t even present at the interviews.900  
The final camp argued that the composition of the JSC would only be determinant if 
certain conditions were present. The first condition is that the women on the JSC would have 
to have a feminist perspective. It was pointed out by one participant, that a feminist perspective 
can also be present in male commissioners.901 This perspective is what I referred to earlier in 
the corresponding Zambian section, as a perspective that is committed to advancing women’s 
rights and equality between men and women.902 Another judge pointed out that even an all 
women commission would serve no purpose, if it didn’t have the correct objectives in mind.903  
 
897 Views from Judge Kgomo, Advocate Leah Gcabashe and Commissioner B. 
898 Ibid. 
899 Interview, 7 July 2017. 
900 Interview with Judge B. 
901 Interview with Judge A. 
902 See Chapter 4, section 4.6.3 on whether the gender composition of the JSC in Zambia has made a difference. 
903 Interview with Judge C. 
 
 
202 
 
One participant cautioned against assuming that women would vote for women, 
because of a natural affiliation. She described this thinking as gender essentialism. She rather 
preferred the inclusion of people from different backgrounds, ages and worldviews. This she 
argued, would have a greater impact on diversity in regard to judicial appointments, than 
gender diversity amongst JSC members would.904 A final more nuanced response came from 
an advocate who stated that there was no direct correlation between power and the extent to 
which there was commitment to questions of gender equality and diversity. Men too could 
understand the plight of women in the profession and vote for them.905 However, he argued 
that women would bring a different perspective to the challenges than men would, and it was 
important for those women to be part of the JSC process too. 
5.6.3 Improving the Composition for other reasons 
The responses from the South African participants offer insight into how difficult it can be to 
deduce the relationship between the number of women on the JSC and the number of women 
getting appointed. There is no evidence that suggests that in the South African case, better 
gender diversity on the JSC would lead to more women being appointed. Yet some conclusions 
can be drawn from the responses. For those who believe that it would make a difference, they 
point to the fact that as more women have been appointed to the JSC, more women have been 
appointed as judges. In 2009, when only three women at most sat on the JSC, only 23% of the 
judges were women.906 In 2017 with the eight women as the highest number ever on the JSC, 
37% of the judges are women.907  
There is no direct evidence of a causal link between the two as other factors have been 
present. For example more women have been nominated for positions in that same time and 
 
904 Interview with journalist R. 
905 Interview with Legal Professional S. 
906 49 out of 216 judges. 
907 89 of 240 judges. 
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there has been more advocacy around the need to transform the judiciary by gender. Yet it is 
perceived that there is a link and these perceptions fuel the desire for more women 
commissioners. Participants also relied on wider interpretations of diversity when they argued 
that women commissioners could bring a different perspective and that their presence on the 
decision-making body, also has symbolic importance. The equity argument was rarely 
mentioned. The view expressed by some participants that perhaps Mjali would have been 
treated better had there been more women on the JSC, points to the belief that it is necessary 
to have more women on such bodies, to negate discriminatory attitudes. They agree with 
Kenney’s view that the presence of more women on the JSC is the antidote to discrimination 
against women coming before the JSC.908 In addition, two participants who argued that gender 
diversity on the JSC did not necessarily mean more women getting appointed, made an 
important point. They said that women were likely to shy away from an interview process that 
may humiliate them and then it would not matter who was sitting on the JSC. 
 This is similar to views expressed in a discussion with three judges in respect of why 
women were unwilling to make themselves available for a Constitutional Court vacancy in 
2015. I was told that women were apprehensive about going before the JSC because of previous 
negative interview experiences of their own and others.909 Hence their fear was not whether 
there would be enough women sitting on the JSC, but rather, what the JSC as whole 
represented. If the JSC represented an extension of a societal patriarchy and the hostility that 
some women experience in the legal profession, then the gender composition would hardly be 
relevant. Here the emphasis is that gender equity should not only be present on the JSC, but 
that gender main-streaming should be infused in the process, so that it is a safe and fair process 
 
908 Sally J Kenney, ‘Which Judicial Selection Systems Generate the Most Women Judges? Lessons from the 
United States’, p 6. 
909 Tabeth Masengu, ‘Gender Transformation as a Means of Enhancing Perceptions of Impartiality on the 
Bench’, The South African Law Journal, 133.1 (2016), 475–90. 
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for women to undertake. Gender mainstreaming could be achieved by institutionalising gender 
concerns about the JSC process and ‘contributing to a long-term transformative process for the 
organisation in terms of attitudes, culture goals, and procedures’, towards and in respect of 
gendered issues. 910 
On a final note, I have previously argued that perceptions of impartiality are extremely 
important for the JSC process.911 If women are represented only by a third of the JSC 
commissioners, how can there be an expectation of a fair, impartial and non-sexist process? 
This question is still relevant especially because I have witnessed on many occasions, how the 
JSC process can easily become an ‘old boys club’. When male commissioners are huddling in 
corners during breaks or even whispering to each other during the interviews, it feels no 
different from other male dominated spaces. A male-dominated JSC suggests partiality, thereby 
creating the impression that much like the legal profession and the current judicial composition, 
the JSC operates in a man’s world. 912 Thus I would add that for the South African process, the 
appearance and enhancement of impartiality could be an added justification for diversity on the 
JSC. The message from all three camps in regard to the diversity issue, all boils down to a 
desire and need for gender conscious JSC members. Or rather, members with a feminist 
perspective that are willing and able to listen, reflect on and interrogate women’s challenges. 
This can and should not be limited to women JSC members only. 
5.7 HAS THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS HELPED 
WOMEN GET APPOINTED? 
One of the other sub-questions explored by this research is whether greater transparency of an 
appointment process, would lead to more women getting appointed. Thomas has highlighted 
 
910 Fenella Porter and Caroline Sweetman, ‘Gender Mainstreaming since Beijing: A Review of Success and 
Limitations in International Institutions’, Gender & Development, 13.2 (2009), 11–
22(p.11).<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03085685>. 
911 Masengu, ‘Gender Transformation as a Means of Enhancing Perceptions’, pp.485-490.  
912 Ibid. 
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that the most widely addressed issue in regard to appointments, ‘is whether the method of 
judicial selection affects the relative success of women attaining a seat on the bench’.913 The 
use of the merit appointment system after apartheid has opened the JSC to scrutiny. As 
elaborated under section 3 of this chapter, for the most part, the South African process allows 
for its ‘workings to be readily visible to outsiders, which then makes it likely for it to operate 
as intended’.914 However I suggest that irrespective of the admirable levels of transparency, the 
South African case study suggests that transparency alone is not enough to ensure an increased 
presence of women on the bench. 
 Firstly, the power and political dynamics that arise from the broad composition of the 
JSC have in some instances been detrimental to women. The examples of the Constitutional 
Court interviews in 2015 or the interview of Judge Violet Phatsoane reveal that JSC interviews 
can become a site to settle scores. As Thomas has argued, nominating commissions do not 
eliminate politics from judicial selection, they merely replace traditional party politics with 
executive branch politics amongst others.915 The presence of these politics does not augur well 
for women who have judicial aspirations and they are rather discouraged from appearing before 
the JSC. This is especially so if they have handed down judgements that went against 
government or might be considered controversial.916 Thus, the transparency of the JSC 
processes is negated if it leads to a public appointment system that potentially harms the people 
taking part in it. The manner in which the JSC members exercise influence and when they do 
it is a pivotal part of the process that can not be resolved by more transparency. 
Secondly, there has been a failure to recognise the implications for women in the 
judiciary who are mothers and the intersections of their roles as judges and caregivers as 
 
913 Thomas, p. 35. 
914 Handsley and Lynch, p 199. 
915 Thomas, p.92. 
916 Masengu, ‘The Judicial Service Commission and the Appointment of Women: More to It than Meets the 
Eye’, p.6. 
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witnessed in the Mjali interview. On the one hand if not for the transparency of the process, we 
would have been unaware of the JSC shortcomings in this respect. On the other hand, the 
transparency of the process meant that Judge Mjali’s personal life was aired publicly, which 
must have not only embarrassed her, but also discouraged other women. In this respect, 
concerted efforts to improve gender diversity from the JSC as power holders, must go beyond 
lip service. If women are discouraged from appearing before the JSC for interviews, then there 
are fewer women to recommend for appointment which invariably means the judiciary will 
continue to have fewer women than desired. The transparency of the process has proved to be 
critical for civil society campaigns as will be addressed in Chapter 8. However while 
transparency, may be a starting point, it is not a panacea for improved gender outcomes. 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have examined the South African JSC process regarding transparency, 
independence and representativeness. Though the process is one of the most public processes 
in the region, it is not devoid of challenges. The Cape Bar and Helen Suzman Foundation cases 
are evidence of the various issues that have arisen in regard to the workings of the JSC. This 
chapter analysed the contentious aspects of the process in regard to publicity and provided 
reasons as to why too much transparency, might have negative consequences for candidates. 
An enquiry was made in respect of the extent to which the JSC’s objectives to transform the 
judiciary could be a foundation for weakening the independence of the JSC. Using the debates 
about merit versus transformation as a lens, I argued that a broader definition of merit would 
prevent accusations that the JSC was trying to weaken the judiciary.  
The second issue that was discussed under the JSC’s independence was the instances 
when the ANC members have used their political positions to impair some interviews. Here, I 
concluded that the value of independence is not only relevant to influence from outside 
interference, but it includes the question of whether commissioners can be independent enough 
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to act according to their constitutional obligations. The next part focused on examining the 
gender bias present in some of the JSC interviews, focusing on the interview of Nozuko Mjali. 
This interview exemplified the consequences of a failure to understand the structural challenges 
that women judges face. The penultimate discussion was on the value of diversity where I 
concluded that there is no evidence of a link between more women on the JSC and the number 
of women appointed as judges. Nonetheless, I provided reasons why having more women on 
the JSC is still important for the JSC as a body and for the courts, and why it is a cause worth 
pursuing. 
The final part of this chapter investigated whether greater transparency in a judicial 
appointment process, would lead to more women being appointed. I concluded that in the South 
African context, greater transparency has not necessarily resulted in more women being 
appointed on the bench. Rather, bias, politics and power dynamics present in women’s 
interviews have overshadowed some of the values of transparency.  
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPECTATIONS OF JUDGES AND HOW THEY CAN AFFECT THE 
APPOINTMENT OF WOMEN 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
We all possess a certain image of a judge. He is old, male and wears pinstriped trousers. 
He decides only what is necessary, says only what is necessary and on no account ever 
talks to the press. He is respected and revered. His word is, literally and figuratively, 
the law, eternal, majestic. Even those of us who do not fit naturally into the traditional 
image tend to grow into it. The truth cannot be avoided. We judges, like the old image. 
We cling to it. And why not? It brings comfort, the comfort of knowing one is right, at 
least pending the verdict of the Court of Appeal, although most of us have learned to 
rationalize that as well. It brings security, the security of knowing what to do and when 
to do it. And it brings gratification, the gratification of knowing we are important and 
appreciated. 917 
The quote from Canada’s first woman Chief Justice Beverly Mclachlin, encapsulates the 
previous (and in some quarters, still common), idea of the judge. This idea is one of a masculine 
description of authority; coupled with a detachment that comes with such a position of 
privilege, and the esteem that comes with wielding such responsibility.918  
At the commencement of this research certain formal and informal aspects of the 
appointments process were identified, which would be examined in order to answer the 
research question. These were the recruitment process (JSC’s role), the legal profession, the 
role of political leadership, transparency and the landscape regarding women’s rights. However 
as I conducted my interviews, a constant theme that arose was the role of judges and the 
qualities and conduct that are expected from these judges. All the participants stated that an 
interrogation of the judicial appointment process alone was not enough. I had to understand 
what is expected of judges. This chapter therefore explores the various dimensions of what is 
expected of judges, from the vantage point of international guidelines, judiciaries, lawyers and 
other relevant stakeholders. 
 
917 Beverley McLachlin, ‘Role of Judges in Modern Commonwealth Society’, The Advocate, 53 (1995), 681–87 
<https://doi.org/10.1097/ANS.0000000000000109>. 
918 Thornton, ‘Affirmative Action, Merit and The Liberal State’,p.30. 
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 In particular, this chapter is interested in how these expectations of judges impact 
participants’ perceptions of women judges and also, how they impact on the process of 
appointing judges. Invariably, expectations about who should be appointed as a judge are tied 
to notions of who a judge should be. If this notion was largely tied to masculine traits or 
gendered notions of authority and experience, then the appointment of women to the bench 
would be affected. Therefore, it was necessary to ask some questions. Are the requirements for 
what is expected of a judge context specific? Do women not possess the qualities of a good 
judge, or do they face different challenges because of their gender? Has the role of the judge 
evolved, resulting in a need to shift away from old conceptions of judges, which would allow 
for the inclusion of more women? 
 McLachlin notes that in modern Commonwealth societies, judges are required to be 
servants of the people, in the ‘highest and most honourable sense of that term’.919 The new 
system for judges involves changes in their tasks and duties, in the way they discharge those 
duties, in the process, the administration of judges and the appointment and removal of 
judges.920 Indeed, the way judges work has changed drastically and the judicialisation of 
politics is a visible example of this change. The judicialisation of politics is the ‘ever-
accelerating reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, 
public policy questions, and political controversies that define the boundaries of the collective 
or cut through the heart of entire nations’.921 Courts in Africa have made a fair contribution to 
the judicialisation of megapolitics particularly in the last two decades.922 This is typified by the 
fact that the electoral processes and outcomes were decided by the courts in Uganda in 2006, 
 
919 McLachlin, p. 862. 
920 Ibid. 
921 Ran Hirschl, ‘The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts’, Annual Review of 
Political Science, 11 (2008), 93–118 <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0008>. 
922 For a definition of mega-politics, see Ibid, p.2. 
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Ghana in 2013, Kenya in 2013, Malawi in 2014, and in Zambia in 2016.923 Courts have also 
had to decide on whether incumbent presidents can run for a third term in office.924 In another 
instance, the Zambian Constitutional Court had to determine whether ministers should repay 
the salaries they received, while parliament was dissolved.925  
While matters of megapolitics are new to the Zambian judiciary, the courts in South 
Africa have been delving into political controversies since 1997. In that year, the Constitutional 
Court had to adjudicate on the universal constitutional right to medical treatment in the context 
of an under-resourced health care system.926 Since then, the courts have decided on several 
policy and political matters. The courts have mandated that government roll out antiretroviral 
drugs to HIV-positive mothers927 and decided that the failure to provide learners at public 
schools with a textbook for each subject prior to the commencement of the 2014 school year, 
was an infringement of their rights to a basic education.928 The courts have also determined 
that former President Jacob Zuma should abide by a decision of the Public Protector, requiring 
him to repay money spent on upgrades at his personal home.929 They have also held that the 
 
923Rachel Ellett, Judicial Independence Under the APRM : From Rhetoric to Reality, Occasional Papers, 2015 
<file:///H:/Conference Attendance 2016/LSA 2016 conference/Articles/Judicial Independence under the 
APRM.pdf>[accessed on 17 November 2018]. 
924 For example, Burundi in 2015 and the Zambian Constitutional Court decision in December 2018. 
925 Constitutional Court of Zambia, Steven Katuka & Others v The Attorney General & Others, 2016, 
2016/CC/0010/ 2016/CC/0011 <https://zambialii.org/zm/judgment/constitutional-court/2016/1/Katuka v 
LAZ.pdf> [accessed 26 June 2018]. 
926 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal), (CCT32/97) ZACC 17; 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1997/17.html> [accessed 26 June 2018]. 
927 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 1) (CCT9/02) [2002] ZACC 
16’, CCT9/02, 2002, 2002 (5) SA 703, <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/16.html> [accessed 28 June 
2018]. 
928 Minister of Basic Education v Basic Education For All, 2015, (20793/2014) [2015] ZASCA 198; [2016] 1 
ALL SA 369 (SCA), <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2015/198media.pdf> [accessed 26 June 2018]. 
929 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly & Others, (CCT 143/15; CCT 171/15) 
[2016] ZACC 11; 2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC), <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2016/11.pdf> [accessed 16 
July 2018]. 
 
 
212 
 
government ignored its constitutional obligations when it allowed Sudanese President Omar 
Al-Bashir to leave, despite the existence of an international arrest warrant in his name.930 
 These and other cases show that judges are now in some sense political actors, 
bolstered by constitutional protections that were absent in the past. They now have the power 
to make pronouncements on the conduct of other branches of government. With the new role 
of judges in perspective, the discussion in this chapter commences with a review of 
international guidelines pertaining to the role of the judge. The second part then explores the 
judicial codes of conduct for the two jurisdictions in this thesis, in order to ascertain what is 
required from them. These codes of conduct have a bearing on this discussion because the 
expectations of a good judge are a combination of conduct and qualities. The subsequent part 
of the chapter locates the discussion in literature, by analysing current perceptions of the role 
of the judge. Here I focus on deducing the most common qualities required for judges, from 
the views of previous and sitting judges. The examination of literature confirms that what is 
expected of judges, is a combination of procedural conduct, substantive qualities and external 
factors central to the role. Therefore, the discussion in this chapter combines these different 
facets under the umbrella of expectations of a judge. 
Section four focuses on the expectations of judges in Zambia and it discusses perceived 
disadvantages for women, using data from interview participants. The fifth section looks at 
expectations of judges in South Africa using participant observation combined with data from 
interview participants. I also examine the obstacles facing women candidates in South Africa. 
The sixth section of this chapter answers three questions. Whether the expectations of judges 
 
930 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development and Others (2015 
(5) SA 1 (GP); [2015] 3 All SA 505 (GP), <http://saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2015/402.html> [accessed 31 
July 2018]. 
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are gendered, whether women are at a disadvantage because of particular obstacles they face 
and whether some expectations of judges are context specific.  
6.2 GUIDELINES ON JUDGING AND JUDICIAL QUALITIES 
6.2.1 International Standards 
There are a number of guidelines outlining what is expected of judges. In 1985, the United 
Nations (UN) adopted the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (UN Basic 
Principles).931 The preamble acknowledges that judges are charged with the ultimate decision-
making over life, freedoms, rights, duties and property of citizens. Consequently the judiciary 
is called to be independent, impartial and to conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve 
the dignity of their office.932 Article 10 states that ‘persons selected for judicial office shall be 
individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law’.933 The 
UN Basic Principles conclude with information on the professional secrecy required of judges 
and the grounds on which a judge can be removed from office. Almost two decades later, the 
Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, which included various Chief Justices and 
international judges, met to provide the judiciary with a framework for regulating judicial 
conduct.934 The result was the Bangalore Principles for Judicial Conduct (herein Bangalore 
Principles), which were intended to establish standards for ethical conduct of judges.935  
 The Bangalore Principles outline six key values relevant for judicial officers, two of 
which are independence and impartiality —already mentioned in the UN Basic Principles. The 
 
931 Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights < 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.aspx> [accessed on 24 November 
2019].  
932 Ibid at 1-8. 
933 Ibid, article 10.  
934 This included amongst others, Chief Justice Latifur Rahman of Bangladesh, Chief Justice Bhaskar Rao of 
Karnataka State in India, South African Deputy Chief Justice Langa, Chief Justice Nyalali of Tanzania, the 
Judge Christopher Weeramantry, Vice-President of the International Court of Justice. 
935 The Bangalore Principles, Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity.United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, < https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf> 
Strengthening Judicial Integrity. 
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other four are propriety, integrity, equality and competence, combined with diligence. Each 
value commences with the principle statement, followed by a description of what is expected 
from judges under that principle. Independence as a value is informed by two principles. There 
is an institutional requirement, where a judge must be free from extraneous influences, because 
she/he is expected to enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.936 
Then there is an individual requirement, which I refer to as an extended definition of 
substantive independence in Chapter 2 of this thesis.937 Here the judge needs to be independent 
from colleagues and any internal influences that may arise.938 In respect of impartiality, judges 
are called to perform their duties without favour, bias, and prejudice and to avoid making 
comments that may affect the fair trial of any person.939 The value of integrity receives the 
shortest attention in the Bangalore Principles and here, a judge’s conduct is required to be 
above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer. Their behaviour and conduct must also 
reaffirm people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary.940  
Closely related to impartiality is the propriety value and here the Bangalore Principles 
provide lengthy guidance for judges. Amongst others, judges are requested to avoid even the 
appearance of impropriety and avoid engaging in personal relationships with members of the 
legal profession ‘that give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favouritism or partiality’.941 
Judges are cautioned in regard to how they exercise their right to freedom of expression, in 
order to preserve the dignity of judicial office and the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary. Judges are also warned about letting family or social contact influence their 
 
936 Ibid at p.3. 
937 See section 4.1 ‘Redefining Substantive Independence’. 
938 See Chapter 2, section 2.4.1 ‘Examining Substantive Independence’, where I posit that judicial diversity 
enhances the independence of judges and the judiciary. 
939 The Bangalore Principles p.3-4. 
940 The Bangalore Principles, p.4. 
941 Ibid. 
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decisions, while being reminded not to accept any gifts, loans, favour or tokens in connection 
to their functions.  
The value of equality requires that judges be: 
aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from various 
sources, including but not limited to race, colour, sex, religion, national origin, caste, 
disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other 
like causes ("irrelevant grounds").942 
In applying the value of equality, judges are implored to amongst others, avoid words 
or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds. This 
requirement is not just personally required of judges, but they are also expected to ensure that 
lawyers appearing before them, refrain from similar conduct. The final value, which is a 
combination of competence and diligence, also lists a number of ways of implementing the 
said values. There is a requirement that judges be devoted to their professional activities and 
judicial duties, which includes tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court's operations.943 
Judges are also expected to keep themselves informed about relevant developments in 
international law, as well as ‘take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance the judge's 
knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial 
duties’.944 Further, it is expected that judges will perform all judicial duties, including the 
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. In doing so, 
she/ he must be dignified, patient and courteous to all litigants, lawyers, witnesses and anybody 
else related to official duties. 
As a follow-up to the Bangalore Principles, an intergovernmental Expert Group on 
Strengthening Basic Principles of Judicial Conduct met in Vienna to prepare a draft 
commentary on the Bangalore Principles.945 This commentary was later adopted by the United 
 
942 The Bangalore Principles, p.6. 
943 The Bangalore Principles, p.7. 
944 Ibid. 
945 This meeting was attended by participants from over 35 countries. 
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Nations Judicial Integrity group in 2007 and is an explanatory memorandum in the form of an 
authoritative guide to the application of the Bangalore Principles.946 The Commentary on the 
Bangalore Principles of Conduct, (herein the Bangalore Commentary) is a lengthy document 
expanding on the six values already mentioned. On a number of occasions the Bangalore 
Commentary emphasises the importance of public perceptions of judges and the judiciary. In 
particular it advises judges to refrain from any conduct that would be perceived as being biased, 
prejudiced, unethical, and unsuitable for judicial office, subservient to another person or 
institution or that would bring the judiciary into disrepute.947 
In the same year, the International Commission of Jurists published a Practitioners 
Guide (herein Practitioners Guide) on International Standards for Independence and 
Accountability of judges.948 It highlights the importance of a judge’s right to freedom of 
association and freedom of expression. It affirms the UN Basic Principles’ view that judges 
should form associations ‘in order to defend their independence and that of the judicial 
profession more effectively’.949 While it still cautions against how judges use their right to 
freedom of expression, the Practitioners Guide states that as guarantors of the rule of law, 
judges must necessarily participate in the debate for reforms and other legal issues. Importantly, 
it reminds judges that they cannot be removed from office or punished for bona fide errors or 
for disagreeing with a particular interpretation of the law.950 
 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights also provides further 
indication of what is expected of a judge. It does so in the form of Principles and Guidelines 
 
946 Commentary on The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct < 
https://www.unodc.org/res/ji/import/international_standards/commentary_on_the_bangalore_principles_of_judi
cial_conduct/bangalore_principles_english.pdf>. 
947 Ibid. 
948 International Commission for Jurists, ‘International Principles on the Independence and Accountability of 
Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors’ (Geneva, 2007), pp. 1–260 <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a7837af2.pdf> 
[accessed 28 June 2018]. 
949 Ibid at p. 37.  
950 Intentional Commission of Jurists,p.55. 
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on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (herein the African Commission 
Guidelines).951 Though they are procedural rules, they are helpful in teasing out qualities 
expected of judges. For example, sections 3(j) and (h) require judges to take steps to protect 
the identity and dignity of victims of sexual violence and to protect the identity of accused 
persons or witnesses, when it is in the best interests of the child. Yet, in order to do so, a judge 
must be knowledgeable, competent and diligent. Therefore section 4(k) stipulates that no 
person shall be appointed as a judge if they lack the appropriate training or knowledge, which 
enables them to adequately fulfil their functions.952 Such knowledge and training feeds into the 
quality of technical expertise that is expected of judges. Thus, the African Commission 
Guidelines are a reminder that a successful and efficient judicial process, largely depends on 
judges being professionally qualified adjudicators, who can be impartial, independent and 
ethical. 
6.2.2 Zambian Judicial Code of Conduct 
The Zambian Judicial Code of Conduct (Judicial Code of Conduct) was enacted in 1999 and it 
is a combination of preferred qualities, procedural rules and prohibitions, indicating that the 
judicial roles embrace different elements.953 The procedural rules and prohibitions are an aspect 
of what is expected of a judge. The Judicial Code of Conduct was enacted after the UN Basic 
Principles and is divided into four sections, relevant for this discussion. The first is part II 
which is entitled ‘Adjudicative Responsibilities’. Here the Judicial Code of Conduct delves 
into values that are present in the international guidelines mentioned above. Independence, 
 
951 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial 
and Legal Assistance in Africa, 2003 <http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/principles-guidelines-right-fair-
trial/achpr33_guide_fair_trial_legal_assistance_2003_eng.pdf> [accessed 28 June 2018]. 
952 Ibid. 
953 Parliament of Zambia, The Judicial (Code Of Conduct) Act13, 1999 
<https://zambialii.org/zm/legislation/act/1999/13/jcoca1999277.pdf> [accessed 26 June 2018]. 
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integrity, impartiality and practical advice, as found in the Commentary on the Bangalore 
Principles. 
 The Judicial Code of Conduct also emulates the African Commission by providing 
procedural requirements. For example, article 5(4) precludes a judge from testifying as a 
character witness before a court. Article 8 (2) requires judges who are appearing as expert or 
technical witness before a court, tribunal or commission, not to give an opinion or express 
information, unless they have: 
 a) adequate knowledge of the facts in issue; 
(b) a background of competence or jurisdiction on the subject matter; or 
(c) an honest conviction of the accuracy and propriety of the testimony. 
Article 8 identifies a judge’s adjudicative responsibilities, as those not limited to their own 
court room proceedings and thus requires them to be effectively good and honest ‘witnesses’. 
In essence, part II focuses on the expected conduct and character traits of judges. 
 Part III on ‘Extra Judicial Activities’ is concerned with how a judge behaves outside of 
the courtroom. Here the Judicial Code of Conduct provides some guarantees of impartiality, 
by detailing when and how a judge may receive compensation for services rendered, what 
activities cannot be conducted outside the office and when a judge can serve as a director, 
trustee or member of a Non-Governmental Organisation.954 The accentuation in part III is that 
a judge’s ill actions outside the courtroom, are likely to bring the judiciary into disrepute, hence 
the need to guard against ill-advised activities. Part IV of the Code of Judicial Conduct is 
dedicated to the significance of financial propriety. Judges are prohibited from soliciting or 
accepting any consideration for services performed and from using commercial information 
received during professional duties for personal profit.955 The latter prohibition requires that 
 
954 Article 11-13. 
955 Article 14 (1) (a) and (b). 
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judges are honest and ethical enough not to capitalise on information that comes their way, 
purely because of their office. In respect of bribes, gifts, favours, loans or bequests, the 
prohibition goes beyond the judge. It also includes a judge’s family members and the Code of 
Conduct provides a detailed list of what would be described as a gift, bequest or favour.956 It 
appears that the drafters of the Code of Judicial Conduct stipulated these prohibitions as a 
means of guaranteeing impartiality in judges.  
 In article 16, judges are also prohibited from serving in any fiduciary capacity, which 
includes amongst others, being a trustee, executor or an administrator. The only exception to 
this prohibition, is if it is in respect of the judge’s family. This article is interesting because 
there is no agreed standard, on when a judge can act in a fiduciary capacity. The Bangalore 
Commentary notes that during discussions, civil law judges did not believe that prohibitions of 
serving in any fiduciary capacity should be generally accepted as international standards.957 
Therefore, the Bangalore Commentary states that ‘depending on the circumstances’, a judge 
can serve in a fiduciary capacity in relation to family or a close friend, but must do so without 
remuneration.958 Consequently judges in Zambia, are also prohibited from engaging in 
permitted fiduciary duties, if it is ‘likely that the officer will engage in proceedings or matters 
that would ordinarily come before the officer’.959 
 The final section in part V, entitled ‘Political and Employment Opportunities’ is 
focused on helping judges navigate any political and professional ambiguities. It is brief and 
states that judges are prohibited from amongst others, endorsing political candidates, standing 
for political office and attending political gatherings.960 The appointment of judges to offices 
outside the judicature is permitted, but the judge must apply for unpaid leave or apply for a 
 
956 Article 15. 
957 Commentary on The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, p.15. 
958 Ibid at p.113. 
959 Ibid. 
960 Article 18. 
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secondment. Article 19(3) permits judicial officers seeking employment to communicate with 
the body designated to consider the application and to request a reference or endorsement from 
any authority or relevant person. The Code of Conduct is not clear on what type of employment 
it refers to, but I submit that it could be in relation to situations where a judge wants to seek an 
opportunity in a different court, such as regional or international courts. In some instances, 
judges can serve in their countries and be on the roster for Special tribunals. Examples of this 
include Justice Florence Mumba who was a Justice of the Supreme Court of Zambia when 
appointed reserve judge of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and High 
Court Justice Prisca Nyambe, who currently serves on the International Residual Mechanism 
for Criminal Tribunals.961 
 When judges are not abiding by the Code of Conduct, a complaint or allegation of 
misconduct against them, can be made to the assigned disciplinary body as per part VI. This 
body previously referred to as the Judicial Complaints Committee, is now the Judicial 
Complaints Authority. The Judicial Code of Conduct Amendment Act 13 of 2006, was enacted 
to amend part VI of the Code of Conduct Act and must be read as one with it.962 The Judicial 
Complaints Committee previously heard allegations of misconduct against High Court Judges 
Emelia Sunkutu and Timothy Katanekwa mentioned in the previous chapter.963 The new 
Judicial Complaints Authority has also heard amongst others, allegations of misconduct against 
the Constitutional Court justices who presided over the presidential election petition in 2016.964 
 
961 See https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/organs/judicial-chambers and http://www.unmict.org/en/about/judges/judge-
prisca-matimba-nyambe.  
962 Parliament of Zambia, The Judicial (Code Of Conduct) (Amendment) Act 13, 2006 
<https://zambialii.org/zm/legislation/act/2006/13/jcoca2006277.pdf> [accessed 26 June 2018]. 
963 They were cleared of the charges of alleged misconduct, caused by their delays in delivering judgments. 
964 For a reminder of this case, see the discussion on Hakainde Hichilema & Others v Edgar Lungu & Others, in 
chapter on the Judicial Appointment Commission in Zambia. 
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6.2.3 The Code of Conduct in South Africa 
The Code of Judicial Conduct (herein Code of Conduct) was adopted in terms of section 12 of 
the Judicial Service Commission Act of 1994.965 Like the Zambian Code of Conduct, it 
identifies expected behaviour with required qualities. The preamble of the Code of Conduct 
states that any negligent or wilful breach of the Code of Conduct, ‘may amount to misconduct 
which will lead to disciplinary action in terms of section 14 of the Act’.966 The Code of Conduct 
is structured in such a way that each article commences with what is required of a judge, before 
providing explanatory notes. For example the first requirement in article 12 is independence. 
Judges are required to uphold the court’s independence and take reasonable steps to ensure that 
‘no person or organ, interferes with the functioning of the courts’.967 There are five attached 
notes to judicial independence and the first one states that ‘a judge acts fearlessly and according 
to his or her conscience because a judge is only accountable to the law’.968 South African judges 
are expected to act honourably, comply with the law and be transparent.969 Article 7 on equality, 
requires judges to at all times, refrain from bias or prejudice and act courteously and with 
respect to others. It goes further and specifically requires that a judge: 
personally, avoid and dissociate him- or herself from comments or conduct by persons 
subject to his or her control that are racist, sexist or otherwise manifest discrimination 
in violation of the equality guaranteed by the Constitution.970 
 
Considering the historical injustices that arose at the hands of the courts during the 
apartheid era, the drafters of the Code must have felt it extremely necessary to remind judges, 
what was required from adjudicators in the democratic dispensation.971 The South African 
 
965South African Government, Code of Judicial Conduct, Government Gazette No.35802, 18 October 2012, 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2012/20121018-gg35802-nor865-judicial-conduct.pdf> [accessed 
26 June 2018]. 
966Ibid at p.19.  
967 Article 4. 
968 Ibid at Note 4 (i). 
969 Articles 5, 6 and 8. 
970 Article 7 (a). 
971 For a detailed information this past, see Dugard pp 10-15. 
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judiciary has unfortunately had to deal with two specific cases where a judge has not abided 
by article 7(a), leading to serious consequences. The first is the case of Gauteng Judge Nkola 
Motata, who crashed through a residential wall on 17 January 2007. Judge Motata was first 
convicted of drunken driving and sentenced to 12 months imprisonment or a fine of R20 000. 
He unsuccessfully appealed the judgment.972 At the time, the JSC had already received 
complaints of gross misconduct made against him on two grounds; namely that he had made 
racist slurs against the owner of the property, Mr Baird, at the scene of the accident, 973and that 
he conducted his defence at the criminal trial in a manner inconsistent with a judicial officer.974 
In this discussion however, the focus is on the first complaint.  
 Judge Motata was placed on special leave after the accident and after the criminal 
proceedings, he appeared before the Judicial Conduct Committee (JCC) in 2011. The JCC (a 
sub-committee of the JSC) decided that a prima facie case of gross misconduct had been 
established and it recommended that the complaint be referred to the Judicial Conduct Tribunal 
(JCT).975 Motata then sought to delay the proceedings, by bringing an application challenging 
the sections of the Judicial Service Commission Act regulating the disciplining of judges.  
The North Gauteng Court heard the matter in 2016 and dismissed it with costs, leaving 
room for the JCT to commence its task.976 The JCT was finally able to hear the matter and it 
submitted its report on 12 April 2018. The tribunal found that Judge Motata had used vulgar 
and racist language unbecoming of a judicial officer. It found that the judge’s defence of 
 
972 South Gauteng High Court, Motata v S (A345/2010) [2010] ZAGPJHC 
134,<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2010/134.html> [accessed 29 June 2018]. 
973 See Judicial Conduct Tribunal of the Judicial service Commission, Report of the Judicial Conduct Tribunal 
Re Judge Motata (Johannesburg, 2018) <http://www.judgesmatter.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Judge-
Motata-Tribunal-Report-April-2018.pdf> [accessed 29 June 2018]. 
974 Ibid. 
975 Established in terms of s 21(1) of the JSC Act, it hears and investigates complaints, in terms of s 16(4) (b) of 
the JSC Act. 
976 Motata v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Another (52010/2016) [2016] ZAGPPHC 1063; 
[2017] 1 All SA 924 (GP), , <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2016/1063.html> [accessed 29 June 
2018]. 
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provocation did not justify his conduct and stated that judges are custodians of citizen’s rights 
to dignity. It concluded that Judge Motata’s conduct impinged on and was prejudicial to the 
impartiality and dignity of the courts.977 The JCT also recommended that the provisions of 
section 177 (1) (a) of the Constitution be invoked. This section states that a judicial officer may 
be removed if ‘the Judicial Service Commission finds that the judge suffers from an incapacity, 
is grossly incompetent or is guilty of gross misconduct’.978 
 The advice to invoke section 177(1) (a) highlights the enormity of Motata’s conduct 
and the consequences of a violation of article 7 of the Code of Conduct. The other relevant case 
is that of former Judge Mabel Jansen, whom I referred to in the Chapter 2 of this thesis.979 
Jansen had been placed on special leave in May 2016, following a trail of racist and disparaging 
remarks that she made on social media, including comments that rape was a part of the culture 
of black men.980 Jansen resisted numerous calls for her to resign and a complaint was made to 
the JSC, by Advocate Vuyani Ngalwana SC in his capacity as the Chairperson of the Advocates 
for Transformation (Johannesburg).981 In April 2017, the JCC found that Jansen’s conduct 
warranted the establishment of the JCT to probe the complaint of gross misconduct.982 To avoid 
the disciplinary process and possible impeachment proceedings, Jansen finally tendered her 
resignation to the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development in May 2017.983  
At this juncture, it is necessary to point out that Jansen’s comments were not only racist, 
but they also raised questions in regard to an accused person’s rights to a fair trial. The 
 
977 Judicial Conduct Tribunal of the Judicial service Commission, p.23. 
978 The removal can only happen if the National Assembly adopts the resolution for removal, by a vote of at 
least two thirds of its members. 
979 See Chapter 4, section 4.1 entitled ‘Impartiality and Bias’. 
980 ‘Judge Mabel Jansen Placed On “Special Leave”’, Mare Claire. 11 May 2016. 
981 SC Vuyani Ngalwana, ‘Formal Complaint to the JSC Re Judge Mabel Jansen’ (Johannesburg: Johannesburg 
Society of Advocates, 2016), pp. 3–15. 
982 Franny Rabkin, ‘Judge Mabel Jansen to Face Impeachment Tribunal over Facebook Comments'’, Mail & 
Guardian, 7 April 2017 <https://mg.co.za/article/2017-04-07-judge-mabel-jansen-to-face-impeachment-
tribunal-over-facebook-comments> [accessed 10 July 2018]. 
983 ‘“Racist” Judge Mabel Jansen Resigns’, Cape Argus, 4 May 2017 <https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/racist-
judge-mabel-jansen-resigns-8957039> [accessed 10 July 2018]. 
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statements made by Jansen generated questions about whether alleged rapists who were black, 
had received a fair trial in her courtroom. The requirement that a judge conduct a fair trial is 
also included in the Code of Conduct. Article 9 of the Code of Conduct states amongst others 
that, a judge must remain ‘manifestly impartial’ and ‘observe the letter and spirit of the audi 
alteram partem rule’. The accompanying notes in article 9 advise that ‘a judge may not, under 
the guise of performing judicial functions, make defamatory or derogatory statements actuated 
by personal spite, ill will, or improper, unlawful or ulterior motive’.984 Jansen had claimed that 
she was making truthful statements about rape, based on the numerous cases she had heard in 
her court.985 Even though Jansen made her comments outside of the court (via Facebook 
communication), the Code of Conduct does include guidelines on behaviour outside of the 
courts.  
Article 12(c) states that a judge must not take part in any activities that practice 
discrimination inconsistent with the Constitution. Therefore regardless of where the activity 
takes place, if it is inconsistent with the Constitution, it is questionable conduct. Judges are also 
advised to immediately sever all professional links upon appointment and recover outstanding 
fees speedily, in order to minimise the potential for conflict of interest.986 Furthermore, judges 
are also warned against social associations which might create the impression of favouritism 
or enable the other party to abuse the relationship.987  
Articles 14 and 15 provide details on conduct expected in regard to extra-judicial 
activities and extra-judicial income. In both instances, a judge cannot be involved in activities 
and extra-judicial appointments, or negotiate or accept remuneration, gifts, advantages or 
privileges that would be incompatible with the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. 
 
984 Note 9 (iv). 
985 ‘Judge Mabel Jansen Placed On “Special Leave”’, Marie Claire, 11 May 2016. 
986 Article 12 (2). 
987 Note 12(i). 
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Included here, are any actions that would provide a risk of conflict with judicial obligations 
and would be reasonably perceived as being intended to influence the judge in the performance 
of his or her judicial duties.988 However, judges are permitted to act in fiduciary position, such 
as in family or public benefit trusts, charitable institutions and university councils or governing 
bodies.989 
6.3 GENERAL EXPECTATIONS OF JUDGES 
It is clear that it is insufficient to examine the conduct and values required of judges, without 
referring to the responsibilities that come with the judicial role because, the judicial role is the 
basis from which one draws out necessary qualities for potential judges. Leslie Green submits 
that the judicial role consists of three main obligations.990 The first is law applying obligations, 
which include correct findings of fact, knowledge of the law and how to apply it. The second 
is law improving obligations to clarify the law where necessary and resolve conflict in law. 
Third, is the law-protecting obligations, which occurs when judges are regulating their own 
process and protecting the rule of law and the integrity of the jurisdiction from attack.991 These 
obligations, he submits are not absolute and depend on a positive environment.992 In order to 
adequately fulfil these obligations, it is relevant to understand what is expected of judges. 
6.3.1 The Requirements of a Good Judge 
Shirley Abrahamson reflects on what she learnt from former American jurist Benjamin 
Cardozo, who was famous for his candour about the realities of the judicial role. First, she 
learnt that in criminal cases, judges not only have to consider principles from prior cases and 
look at the history of defences, but they also have look to social values to be served by an 
 
988 Note 14(i) and article 15(b) respectively. 
989 Article 14(2) (a) and Note 14 (b). 
990 Leslie Green, Law and the Role of a Judge, (13 September 2014) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series No. 47/2014 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495953> [accessed 19 October 
2017]. 
991 Ibid at pp.19-20. 
992 Ibid. 
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outcome.993 Secondly, even though judges may disagree about the process through which 
decisions are reached, they should always strive for self-awareness and disclosure of their 
reasoning process. Abrahamson acknowledges that neither full self-awareness nor full 
disclosure is possible and the ‘judge's mind which reaches the result sometimes works faster 
than the judge's fingers on the word processor's keyboard’.994  
Others, she continues, may not have the ability to articulate a satisfactory account of 
the reasoning, which led them to the judgment. There are some constraints when one is a judge 
however such as the fact that ‘the judges desire to earn the respect of sibling judges, the Bar, 
and the public and the dynamics of the judicial decision-making process’ amongst others.995 
Yet Abrahamson argues that while the presence of constraints may be contested, what is 
important is that ‘the judges perceive themselves as subjects to constraints’.996 Consequently, 
she suggests that perhaps the most important element for a sound judicial process, is the 
selection of the right person to be judge. 
 Who is the right judge and how do we determine this, when different jurisdictions 
operate under different conditions? Cowen in her book on judicial selection in South Africa, 
provides some attributes which should be applicable irrespective of what jurisdiction a judge 
operates in. Though written with South Africa in mind, Cowen provided five categories that 
are helpful when considering, a candidate’s fitness and propriety for office.997 These are 
independence, impartiality and fairness, integrity, judicial temperament and commitment to 
constitutional values. The latter two categories are not overtly present in the international 
guidelines previously described, and hence they require some elucidation. Cowen describes 
 
993 Shirley S Abrahamson, ‘Judging in the Quiet of the Storm’, St. Mary’s Law Journal, 24 (1993), 965–94 
<https://doi.org/10.3366/ajicl.2011.0005>. 
994 Ibid at p.990. 
995 Ibid at p.993. 
996 Ibid. 
997 Cowen, Judicial Selection in South Africa, pp. 34-51. 
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judicial temperament as ‘a somewhat elastic, term that refers to “the manner of thinking, 
behaving or reacting” expected of a judge’.998 In a narrower sense, the term denotes humility, 
open-mindedness, courtesy, patience and decisiveness. The combination of these traits Cowen 
argues, is particularly important because a judge is performing a public function, and even the 
losing litigant in a case, should leave feeling that the case has been fairly tried.999  
In respect of the category ‘commitment to constitutional values’, Cowen distinguishes 
between having a commitment to constitutional values and having the skills and expertise 
relevant to constitutional adjudication. The former is about judges having a personal 
commitment to the values of a transformative Constitution while the latter is about the technical 
expertise involved in judicial reasoning concerning constitutional matters. The relevant 
constitutional values would include amongst others, respect for diversity and pluralism, an 
appreciation of the judicial role and the extent and limits of deference owed by the judiciary 
and the promotion of an active citizenry.1000 For Cowen, valuing active citizenry means that 
judges will uphold active participation by citizens in decisions that affect them.1001 Therefore 
she argues, it is ‘surely legitimate for selectors to consider whether a candidate for judicial 
office is committed to the type of democracy, that active citizenry contemplates’.1002   
Another important requirement is that a judge will be of strong character, able to 
withstand frequent criticism that comes with the role and ‘take it all with good grace and 
smile’.1003 A candidate for judicial office who is easily offended or is overly sensitive would 
not stand up to the rigours of what the role entails. In addition to having a thick skin, good 
 
998 Ibid at p.38. 
999 P.39. 
1000 Pp. 41-46. 
1001 Ibid. 
1002 Ibid. 
1003 Harold R Medina, ‘Some Reflections on the Judicial Function: A Personal Viewpoint’, American Bar 
Association Journal , 38.2 (1952), 107–10 
<http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/stable/pdf/25717921.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A94de3cab52c0d7ef561
854f9eaaea7ae> [accessed 24 October 2017]. 
 
 
228 
 
judges are expected to be decisive, because research has shown that decision-making falls 
along a continuum of difficulty.1004 Decision-making also requires information processing and 
Abrahamson et al submit that as information becomes more plentiful and more complex, 
decision-making becomes more difficult.1005 Unlike when one is a lawyer, primarily focusing 
on their client’s matter in order to win, a judge has to delve through all documents and evidence 
from both sides in order to arrive at a proper conclusion. To do so, judges have to be of a certain 
standard and a good source for an assessment of these standards, is from past and present 
judges. 
6.3.2 Advice from the Bench 
Northern Irish Judge Evan Bell recognised that being a judicial officer is a continuing role. 
Therefore, in a letter to new judges, he offers some important advice. 
The skills needed to be a successful judge are not necessarily synonymous with the 
skills required to be a successful lawyer. Simply put, lawyers are advocates; judges are 
neutral decision-makers. Judges face a difficult transition upon appointment in that they 
must learn to move from advocacy to decision making, from marshalling and presenting 
evidence to fact-finding and synthesising.1006 
The transition from a good lawyer to a good judge, is one that a number of judges have had to 
grapple with. In a historical project on women judges in New Zealand, many of the judges 
noted how judging as a non-partisan referee was very different to that of a partial advocate.1007 
Judge Rushton found that looking at everything very objectively made it much easier, while 
Judge McAloon enjoyed the ability to be non-partisan. She ‘was able to see and understand 
both sides of the story’, which allowed her to resolve litigants’ problems, particularly in the 
 
1004 Shirley S Abrahamson, Susan M Fieber, and Gabrielle Lessard, ‘Judges on Judging: A Bibliography’’, St. 
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1006 Evan Bell, ‘Letter to a New Judge’, Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 40.1 (2014), 95–126 
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1007 Elizabeth Chan, ‘New Zealand Women Judges Oral History Project : Part Two’ Wellington: The Law 
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Family Court. 1008 Seeing and understanding both sides of the story is part of the hard work of 
adjudicating. Hence Bell warned judges that there is no room for ‘judicial passengers’ in 
adjudication and that the work of a judge, is like a ‘treadmill that never stops’.1009  
 A second requirement of a good judge, common amongst the judges in New Zealand, 
was being a listener. Judge Shaw stated: 
[…] Listening is the great skill of judging. Active listening. Listening, and processing 
as you’re listening, is what it’s all about. If you’re a judge who talks too much, then 
you’re not listening and you’re not absorbing, and you’re not hearing and you’re not 
giving the impression that you’re listening. 1010 
Closely related to listening, was the necessity of having an open mind. Judge Shaw underscored 
the need to listen to all sides of a dispute and to maintain rigorous independence. 
The need to be absolutely, rigorously independent, and to work at being independent, 
and to never stop questioning whether you are independent of all forces that are thrown 
at you. Its independence not just from institutional things or from interest groups, it’s 
from your own background, from your own leanings, from your own domestic 
situation.1011  
This open-mindedness she emphasised, was required throughout the entire hearing, coupled 
with a willingness to change one’s mind. 
 It is submitted that the willingness to change one’s mind is only present if one has a 
certain level of humility. Humility is a quality Bell touches on in his letter; he warns against 
the perils of judicial hubris because judges should be servants of the people.1012 He explains 
that pride is an occupational hazard and judges are simply temporary occupants of judicial 
positions, ‘which existed before we arrived and will continue to exist long after we have passed 
 
1008 Ibid at p.25. 
1009 Bell. p.98. 
1010 Chan, p.27. 
1011 Chan. p.28. 
1012 Ibid p.99. 
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on’.1013 Judges are advised to be friendly but firm, personable but not personal, patient and not 
petulant or officious.1014 Bell posits that the most important audience is the litigant and 
therefore, a judge must ‘listen to the arguments, so that when people leave your courtroom, 
whether they won or lost, they will say you were decent, fair and tried to do what was right’.1015 
He further advises that judges must exhibit an understanding of human affairs and daily life, 
and have insight into the values of society. 
In the advice given by the judges above, we can see the values of competence, 
impartiality, diligence and integrity that are present in the international guidelines discussed 
earlier.1016 Notwithstanding, Bell also touches on an aspect that is not present in international 
guidelines and that is the importance of understanding human affairs and having insight into 
society. When judges are deciding ‘what is necessary in a free and democratic society, or what 
is reasonable or fair’, they need to bring to bear their insight into the values of society 1017 This 
requirement recognises that judges are human beings, who need to consider facts, ruminate on 
conflicting views, apply standards and sometimes, even disagree with the legislators. This role 
cannot be performed adequately if a judge is out of touch with the pressing societal issues in 
their jurisdiction.  
Former South African Chief Justice Ismail Mahomed appears to agree with this view in 
his article on the role of the judiciary.1018 He stated that the secret of effective justice through 
a procedurally and substantially effective process, lies in the capacity of judges to strike the 
 
1013 Ibid, p.100. 
1014 Ibid, p.101.  
1015 Ibid, p.103. 
1016 For an Australian study collating judges and magistrates views on necessary judicial skills, see Kathy Mack 
and Sharyn Roach Anleu, ‘Skills for Judicial Work: Comparing Women Judges and Women Magistrates’, in 
Gender and Judging, ed. by Erica Schultz and Gisela Shaw (Portkland: Hart Publishing, 2013), pp. 211–32 
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1018 Ismail Mahomed, ‘The Role of the Judiciary’, South African Law Journal, 115 (1998), 111–15 
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balance between what is ethical, coherent and fair.1019 That capacity for balance he continued, 
required a subtle and creative combination of a number of crucial qualities which need to be 
consciously identified, articulated and nurtured. He identified twenty qualities and these 
include experience, scholarship, dignity, rationality, forensic skill, humility, a capacity for 
articulation and discipline. He also listed diligence, intellectual integrity, and intolerance of 
injustice, emotional maturity, courage, objectivity, energy-both intellectual and physical, 
rigour, wisdom, efficiency and a sense of relevance. The final quality was that judges needed 
the moral ability to ‘distinguish right from wrong and sometimes the more agonizing ability, 
to weigh two rights or two wrongs against each other’.1020 Justice Mahomed’s listed qualities 
are not confined to ‘competent scholarship’ but also include attributes such as intolerance of 
injustice and a moral ability to distinguish between right and wrong. These qualities it is 
submitted, are often understated in discussions on judging. 
 McLachlin also advises that to perform their modern role well, judges must be sensitive 
to a broad range of social concerns. This includes possessing a keen appreciation of the 
importance of individual and group interests and staying in touch with the society in which 
they work— understanding its values and its tensions.1021 She asserts that the ivory tower no 
longer suffices as the residence of choice for judges. Their role in social policy, demands new 
efforts of objectivity.1022 These efforts, as opined by fellow Canadian Justice Rosalie Abella, 
should be made with an understanding that judicial impartiality and neutrality does not mean 
that judges have no pre-conceptions or opinions about society’s values.1023 However she 
recommends that those pre-conceptions ought not to close his or her mind to the evidence and 
arguments presented. She states, ‘all law is about values, all values are about public policy, and 
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public policy and laws are about morality’.1024 Thus Abella states that we cannot pretend that 
judges are prohibited from being influenced by them. 
Former Chief Justice of Kenya Willy Mutunga goes even further than Justice Abella by 
stating that the fundamental pillar for judicial integrity is the ideological and political position 
of a judicial officer.1025 He points out that despite this being so, judicial officers are told to 
distance themselves from their ideological and political positions, as if it were possible. He 
submits that building people’s confidence in the judiciary and judicial officers lies on integrity. 
Judges will have moral authority to speak to societal issues, when ‘whatever the decision she 
or he makes can be critiqued or supported on the basis of real and perceived honesty of the 
judicial officer’.1026 He further adds that judicial officers should constantly and consistently 
ask themselves in whose interests is the independence of judiciary. This is because in the new 
constitutional dispensation, judges ‘make’ law and as such also need to guard against their own 
internal pressures, in order to achieve individual independence.1027 
The views by Justices Mahomed, Mclachlin, Abella and Mutunga reinforce one 
important point: the declaratory theory of judicial decision-making, which encouraged judges 
to hold the view that their personal input into the decision was minimal, is no longer 
applicable.1028 Australian Judge Michael Kirby opines that the demise of the declaratory theory 
of the judicial function, has been accompanied by greater candour about the process in which 
the judge is actually engaged. This has resulted in an acknowledgement that judges must make 
decisions on factual conflicts and that judges are not endowed with a judicial capacity to discern 
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truth from falsehood.1029 Kirby argues that in regard to judicial reasoning, judges can hear a 
case and leave the courtroom with the impression that this side must succeed, but eventually 
decide the opposite. According to Kirby, the unspoken reason for this could be legal realism, 
physiological stress and psychological forces. 1030 Therefore, he concludes by advising that 
judges need to understand decision making as a complex function combining logic and 
emotion, rational application of intelligence, reason and intuitive responses to experiences. 
This he suggests, is the best way to deal with the ever-evolving role of being a judge. 
Consequently, it is necessary to turn our attention to what can be learnt from interview 
participants in each jurisdiction and participant observation in South Africa. 
6.4 WHAT IS EXPECTED OF A GOOD JUDGE IN ZAMBIA? 
6.4.1 A General View of what is required to be a Successful Judge 
The most striking element of my interviews with women judges in Zambia, was their emphasis 
on the nobility of the judicial role and how they see themselves as servants of the people. One 
judge argued that if one wants to be a judge, they must be ready for hard work and practically 
giving up their lives, for the service of the state.1031 A second judge echoed the view that being 
a hard worker was necessary, while also adding the importance of diligence and integrity.1032 
She added that women in particular, needed to be assertive in order to successfully run their 
courts. A third mentioned how now more than ever, there is a specific need to be ‘strong in the 
current dispensation in order to pass through the fire’.1033 This metaphorical reference to fire 
was used in order to emphasise the trying times that judges can find themselves in, especially 
during times of political tension.1034 Hence she stressed that one needed courage and soberness 
 
1029 Ibid at p. 6. 
1030 Pp.13-17. 
1031 Interview with Justice 1. 
1032 Interview with Justice 4. 
1033 Interview with Justice 2. 
1034 This interview was conducted during a politically tense period in Zambia, where the cadres from the ruling 
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of character and behaviour.1035 This courage she pointed out, was not only relevant to dealing 
with external parties, but also when one was sitting in an appeal court and needed to disagree 
with colleagues. 
 The need for a judge who is non-partisan and has integrity was also pointed out as a 
necessary quality, befitting of a good judge.1036 For Justice 2, integrity was directly related to 
her Christian beliefs and fear of God. For advocate John Sangwa SC, a critical quality was 
intellectual superiority. He stressed that having a law degree alone was not enough. 
There is a reason why you need somebody who was excelled academically. One is that 
such a person, is likely to be very intellectually sound. [Secondly], such a candidate is 
likely to be broadminded, which is very important when you are a judicial officer. When 
you have a sound academic background, you would not flinch if you are challenged 
intellectually.1037 
While he admitted that having superior intellectual ability did not always translate into being a 
good judge, he still insisted that judicial confidence and knowledge came with intellectual 
expertise. Mr Chishimba was concerned however, with judges who let their personality 
overshadow their office. He intimated that a judge’s primary focus should be honing the skill 
of authorship, because ‘you are authoring a public document when you write judgments’.1038 
He opined that judges ‘have to be authentic, you have to be exact, you have to be clear’. You 
have to explain why justice has been pronounced in a certain way’.1039  
Interviewees also emphasised the necessity of having a judge who was efficient. One 
advocate stressed that a good judge is one who prepares adequately for trial and does not 
adjourn matters unnecessarily.1040 The soberness of one’s character and the ability to be long 
serving and commit to the role of a judge, was also pointed out as a necessary quality.1041 
 
1035 Interview with Justice 2. 
1036 Ibid. 
1037 Interview on 13 April 2017. 
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1039 Ibid. 
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Interview participants also highlighted how demanding the work of a judge is. Judges were 
expected to be hard workers, meticulous in analysing cases and writing judgments. However it 
seemed that there were misconceptions about this amongst lawyers and people more generally 
who assume that judges have many perks with little work. Hence new judges were often 
surprised when they discovered how difficult the job is.1042 Mr Chishimba explained that some 
judges only realised once they were there, that it was not a regular 8am to 5pm job. ‘It is more 
than that, you have to burn the midnight oil and you have to respond according to the demands 
of a particular case. No two cases are the same. One could be very easy, another more 
complex.’1043  
One judge explained that upon appointment, she found herself with 200 cases because 
the judge responsible for them had been promoted to another position in Lusaka.1044 Therefore, 
she was starting her role as a judge with a disadvantage because she had inherited a backlog. 
This was not the start to a judicial career that she had anticipated. Advocate Sangwa SC 
confirmed the existence of the assumptions about the judicial role. He pointed out that judges 
not only had life tenure, but they got 80 percent of their salary until death and were assigned a 
house and many other perks. Thus in his opinion, some people applied to be judges for the 
benefits, without being committed to the actual job.1045 Another state advocate explained that 
there were those who thought private practice was hard, because of the billing structure. A 
position in government departments was also unattractive after a while, because of a glass 
ceiling.1046 Hence the desire to apply for a judicial position was motivated more by the need to 
have a well-paid, notable secure position, than by the desire to serve the country.1047 These 
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candidates both men and women, were initially said to often struggle when appointed as judges 
because they were overwhelmed by the sheer volume of the cases.  
In response to a question on whether they aspired to join the bench, two women legal 
professionals said they had no such aspirations. Their reluctance though, was not due to the 
hard work that would be required of them, but rather because they argued that being a judge is 
a restrictive role. One senior advocate described it in the following way. 
It’s a bit of a restrictive lifestyle and it’s a lot of work. It’s a lot of work, if you want to 
do it properly and I guess also, I am used to being my own boss. This is something that 
you have to give up definitely and you give up your voice.1048 
 
The restrictive lifestyle was also mentioned by another interviewee as the requirement that a 
judge should conform. She stated that she was not a conformist and that the judiciary, or at 
least the Zambian one, required judges who would conform.1049 The idea of conformity to her 
meant she could not freely express her opinion on matters which she felt were important. Indeed 
articles 8 and 9 of the Code of Conduct restrict the expression of opinions and dictate the type 
of communication that judges can be involved in.1050 In Zambia unlike in South Africa, judges 
do not pen newspaper opinions, give speeches at events not strictly related to the profession or 
lecture in university while serving as a sitting judge. 1051 Therefore for both women, a critical 
aspect of being a judge was the ability to accept that one would have to restrain their activities 
and the expression of their opinions. Something, they were not willing to do. 
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6.4.2 In Which Areas are Women Considered to be at a Disadvantage? 
Some of the questions asked during my fieldwork interviews were aimed at collecting 
perceptions of women as a group. This also included noting gender stereotypes and exploring 
how they feed into a larger narrative of women judges in both jurisdictions. Therefore, I had to 
enquire about whether interviewees believed that women were lacking in particular aspects that 
were necessary for the judicial position. Two issues were pointed out to me as possible areas 
where women may fall short.  
6.4.2.1 ‘Women can be too emotional’ 
Two of the participants I interviewed argued that women got emotionally involved in the cases, 
which meant they lacked the necessary character expected of judges. One advocate provided a 
perspective on this: 
I think women are more emotional when you have got a criminal matter for instance 
rape, defilement, or even murder. If I’m representing somebody and it’s a defilement 
offense, the cause list comes out and we are before a woman I will tell him “my friend, 
your chances [of conviction] just went from 50-90 or 80”. That’s a fact, but it’s not a 
good quality for the job. So, women are more emotional. I have appeared before judges 
who are so sympathetic to the plaintiff. If I’m prepping a witness and we are appearing 
before a female judge, I actually tell them, “be extremely vulnerable my friend, don’t 
even summon your best language don’t look your best, just look humble”.1052 
I asked the advocate whether he believed that being emotional meant that a judge could be 
partial or whether it was just a judge showing a human response to a terrible crime. His response 
was that from a justice perspective, it depended on what you expected of a judge.  
 He added that an emotional reaction from a judge could be an act of injustice for the 
opposing party and he used one of his cases as an illustration.1053 On one occasion, he was 
representing a woman whose daughter had died in suspicious circumstances. While narrating 
the horrific story in the judge’s chambers, the mother of the deceased started to cry, which 
prompted the judge to start crying too. The other side settled the matter, because they were of 
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the view that the judge was already sympathetic to the plaintiff and hence their client’s chances 
of success were minimal. While he stressed that this instance was an exception, he expressed 
concern about ever appearing before the same judge again, because he now knew ‘how 
sentimental’ she could be in cases of that nature. He concluded by adding, ‘she is very good 
actually, for purely commercial matters, very good, but it is in criminal matters, domestic 
[matters], where she becomes emotional’. 1054 
 The former Chief Justice Ngulube also expressed a view that some women appeared to 
eschew the idea of giving harsh sentences to criminal accused. He noted that while women 
gave convicted child defilers harsh sentences, they sometimes tried to avoid imposing the 
mandatory sentence in cases where the girl is almost 16 and the man is 19.1055  
One judge phoned me the other week from Ndola and she asked me “judge what do you 
think, I’m having difficulty with this [defilement] case”. You have no choice at all [he 
responded]. Maybe once you have done that [handed down the mandatory sentence], 
make a recommendation to the President for his clemency. Tell the President to 
commute it to a smaller sentence. He has the power to commute, you have no 
discretion.1056 
He too mentioned, that such instances are exceptions and that from his experience, women 
judges did not cry while presiding over matters in court. Even though the instances mentioned 
by the two participants were noted as exceptions, they are a cause of concern for three reasons.  
Firstly, the behaviour described by both does little to refute old stereotypes about 
women being emotional, hence unfit for the role as a judge.1057 Ifill argues that women judges 
may be vulnerable to narratives about physical strength, emotionalism, vulnerability, 
virtuousness and that this can influence how they evaluate cases involving women litigants.1058 
 
1054 Ibid. 
1055 Under statutory law, sex with a girl under 16 is considered child defilement and mandatory sentence for 
those convicted of child defilement is 20 years. 
1056 Interview with Justice Mathew Ngulube. 
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In the two examples given above, the narratives are of judges who allow their emotions to get 
ahead of their judicial duties. Though they are regarded as exceptions, they do nonetheless 
provide evidence for those who would criticise the feminisation of the judiciary. Secondly, a 
perusal of the aforementioned advice from judges and the views of other interview participants, 
shows that a good judge is one of sober character, courage and emotional maturity. If some 
women judges are deemed to be too emotional or lenient in sentencing, it could be argued that 
these traits are the antithesis of courage, strong character and emotional maturity. Finally, 
describing women judges as more emotional, essentialises all women into emotional beings 
who are incapable of self-control. This negates the character of the women who are handing 
down harsh sentences (including the death penalty) and who do not show outward emotion 
when affected by a case.  
6.4.2.2 Balancing Family Life and Judging 
The second reason why women were said to fall short of expectations, was their perceived 
‘failure’ to balance family obligations and the work of a judge. One senior judge described the 
multiple roles that women judges have to balance as homemakers, parents and cooks.1059 She 
considered it to be a limitation in that, unlike their male colleagues, who could get home to a 
cooked meal from their wives, women judges still had to prepare dinner for their husbands and 
children when they arrived home.1060 This she said meant that they had more roles to fulfil than 
male judges did, yet they were still expected to perform at a high standard. These sentiments 
were also echoed in a Swiss study, that found that women judges ‘feel more obliged to cope 
with multiple tasks and bear the ultimate social responsibility for the family, household and 
child rearing or education’.1061 The result of these obligations Kalem argues, is that ‘the 
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compulsory balance between their work and family life, is the main yardstick against 
which’,1062 a woman’s competence as a judge is measured. 
The primary reliance on women as home makers in Zambia is not surprising, even 
where those women hold a high profile role as judge. Historically, women in Zambia have been 
largely stereotyped as housewives, while men tended to present themselves as masters of their 
households. Public leadership has also been male-dominated: women’s prescribed role has 
been to support men’s endeavours.1063 Thus, even in judicial interviews, women candidates 
were routinely asked what would happen if their husbands got transferred or if they got posted 
to another city, while male candidates were not asked these questions.1064 As Advocate Sangwa 
SC stated, it is difficult for women to find a healthy balance between career and family, when 
they have societal expectations to fulfil. He added that, ‘invariably if they focus on careers, 
then family life suffers’. If they focus on family life, then careers suffer’.1065 
To conclude, it is important to note that there was no indication from any of the participants 
or any literature, that women lack the intellectual capacity or the experience to be good judges. 
Despite the view that some women judges were too emotional, two of the judges I interviewed 
spoke of instances where they stood up to Members of Parliament and withstood pressure from 
political cadres to pass judgment in government’s favour.1066 There was also no view that 
women candidates lacked integrity, humility and diligence in their work.1067 There was some 
disagreement however, on which legal pool better prepared women candidates to be good 
adjudicators and this will be discussed in detail, in the succeeding chapter. In essence, 
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interviewees’ perceptions were that women’s occasional failure to be emotionally detached in 
cases and their difficulty in balancing career and familial expectations, meant that they were at 
a disadvantage in comparison to men. 
6.5 A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON JUDGING 
6.5.1 Expectations of Potential Judges 
6.5.1.1 Views of Interview Participants 
In the South African interviews, it was apparent that just more than two decades after the 
declaration of a democratic country, one could not separate the judicial role from the country’s 
transformative vision. The preamble of the South African Constitution states that the 
Constitution was adopted amongst others, to heal the divisions of the past and establish a 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.1068 Social 
justice and respect for human rights cannot be achieved without judges who are willing and 
able to grapple with hard constitutional questions. Therefore, it was unsurprising that one of 
the most mentioned expectations of judges (regardless of which group I was interviewing) was 
that they understand their role in the new constitutional democracy. One judge described it 
succinctly: 
I think of an understanding of what it is to be a judge in this country [is required]. What 
are the dynamics at play, what are the relevant issues that pertain to many cases? So, 
sort of an understanding of politics, an understanding of our history, an understanding 
of gender, of race, of religion, of our Constitution and an understanding of where we’ve 
come from and where we’re going to. 1069 
 
 
1068 Constitution of the Republic Of South Africa, 1996 
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Another judge spoke of how the Constitutional requirement to have a bench diverse in terms 
of race and gender, also included a conscious understanding of societal, ideological and cultural 
differences.1070  
 Closely related to this was the view that technical experience alone, was not enough to 
be considered as a good judge in South Africa. Technical experience was described as 
knowledge of how to apply the law and in what circumstances a particular law should be 
applied. 1071 However, it was argued that a judge also needed to be ‘human enough to know 
what life was like for people on the ground’.1072 This means that a judge is expected to be in 
tune with the sufferings of those less privileged to properly dispense justice. Thandi Modise 
added that a good judge needed to understand ‘where we come from’, to have an ‘understanding 
of the need for consciousness when you look at diversity’ and an understanding of gender 
issues.1073 Essentially, experience was framed in a broad sense to include an understanding of 
what adjudication in the new South Africa meant. 
The second most noted requirement was judicial temperament, as articulated by 
Cowan’s work above.1074 Judge Kgomo stated that a judge needed to have the requisite 
temperament that helped them ‘treat not only litigants, but also the practitioners, with respect’ 
as this enhanced decorum in the court.1075 Another participant described temperament as a 
softer skill that was difficult to judge until somebody was actually adjudicating in court.1076 
Advocate Leah Gcabashe SC stated that a potential judge needed to come off as even tempered 
and not somebody who would be up to ‘theatrics’ in court.1077 A third expectation was that 
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judges would be women and men of integrity, a value also emphasised by international 
guidelines. For one legal professional, it was not enough to have the requisite experience and 
qualifications− a judge needed to have integrity.1078 The ability to analyse material and write 
succinctly was the fourth expectation of judges.  
One senior judge said that judges especially appellate judges, need to have ‘razor sharp 
intellect’. She stated that the higher cases went in the judicial hierarchy, the more difficult they 
became and hence one needed to have razor sharp intellect to cope.1079 On the contrary, though 
another participant agreed that judges needed to be analytical, he submitted that this did not 
necessarily mean that judges needed to be clever in order to perform their role well. They just 
needed, an analytical mind-set.1080  
6.5.1.2 Lessons learnt from Participant Observation of the Judicial Interviews 
While observing the JSC interviews over the period of this research, several critical 
expectations of judges have emerged. For the purposes of this discussion, three important ones 
are worth mentioning. The first one is the issue of judicial temperament, which was earlier 
referred to by one of the interview participants as a ‘soft skill’. The absence of judicial 
temperament has often come in the form of lack of humility, patience and/or courtesy. One 
such example already mentioned earlier is the candidacy of Jeremy Gauntlett SC.1081 In Chapter 
5, I mentioned that the JSC had expressed reservations about whether he ‘had the humility and 
the appropriate temperament that a Judicial Officer should display’, because he had a ‘short 
thread’.1082 Having observed Gauntlett’s demeanour at his second interview, I agree with the 
 
1078 Interview with Legal Professional V. 
1079 Interview with Justice C. 
1080 Interview with Commissioner A. 
1081 I referred to him under the section on Transparency, in respect of litigation concerning his non-selection for 
appointment to the Western Cape High Court on two occasions. 
1082 Sello Chiloane, ‘Why We Didn`t Appoint Jeremy Gauntlett’, Politicsweb, 7 November 2012. 
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JSC submission that he did not appear to be a candidate who possessed humility and 
patience.1083 On the contrary, he presented himself as officious.  
It could be argued that an acerbic nature may be useful if one is to be a successful 
advocate. However, it is not a desirable trait for a judge who must pass judgments that have 
repercussions for various people. Temperament is not only assessed by how a potential 
candidate conducts themselves in court, but also how they conduct themselves outside the 
courts. A fitting example of this is the interview of Judge Rosheni Allie who was nominated 
for the position of Deputy Judge President of the Western Cape High Court division.1084 The 
JSC had received copies of excerpts of a conversation in 2014, between Judge Allie and a 
Professor Ziyad Motala. In these WhatsApp and email conversations, Judge Allie had made 
disparaging remarks about Chief Justice Mogoeng, Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
Stevan Majiedt, Judge Nathan Erasmus of the Cape Town High Court and others.1085 She 
accused the Chief Justice of ‘fruitless and wasteful expenditure’ as he travelled the world with 
an ‘undemocratically elected’ group of judges researching best practice models to make the 
judiciary more effective.1086 She also referred to the Chief Justice as a sick roadshow with no 
integrity, Majiedt was accused of compromising his morals, and Erasmus was called an 
Apartheid spy.1087 
Judge Allie defended her numerous comments by stating that it had been a conversation 
between two friends, a ‘heated and robust exchange’ in which she made comments in the heat 
of the moment.1088 Though she apologised in the interviews for her comments and repeatedly 
 
1083 Interview on 17 October 2012 at the Grand Westin hotel, Cape Town. 
1084 JSC Interview held on 6 April 2016 at the Radisson Blu Le Vendome Hotel in Sea Point, Cape Town. 
1085 The communication was made available to the JSC by Professor Motala himself. 
1086 Interview of Judge R Allie (Cape Town, 2016) <http://www.judgesmatter.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Western-Cape-Deputy-Judge-President-Allie.pdf> [accessed 26 July 2018]. 
1087 The derogatory phrase she used for apartheid spy is ‘apparatchik’, which was used to describe people of 
colour who were ‘bought’ by the Apartheid government. 
1088Interview of Judge R Allie p.8. 
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stated that they had been made in anger, it was later revealed that she had not personally 
apologised to any of the people she had disparaged in her conversations. One commissioner 
suggested that Allie did not have the maturity and temperament required of a good judge, while 
others suggested that she had behaved dishonourably; they could not excuse her behaviour, by 
stating that she had lost her temper.1089 Rather by using anger to excuse her behaviour, Judge 
Allie only succeeded in showing that she did not have good qualities for leadership. It was also 
felt by some commissioners that Allie lacked integrity. This is because integrity is concerned 
with the need for judges to conduct themselves in an honourable and righteous manner that 
does not bring the judiciary into disrepute.1090 For Allie, it was considered that her insistence 
on proceeding with the interview, despite being given opportunities to withdraw her candidacy 
showed her lack of integrity.1091  
Judge Allie however is not the only woman judge, to be questioned about conduct that 
was considered to be lacking in integrity. The previous year on 9 July 2015, Justice Zukisa 
Tshiqi, then a Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was vying for a position on the 
Constitutional Court.1092 At the time of the interview Justice Tshiqi had been a Supreme Court 
Justice for six years, having been appointed in 2009 and she was considered as a worthy 
candidate for the position.1093 While there were adverse comments about her disinclination to 
write minority judgements, the biggest problem arose when Commissioner Thandi Modise 
pointed out that Tshiqi’s mobile phone contract was still being paid by Tshiqi-Zebediela 
Incorporated, her previous law firm. She responded by stating that she never presided over any 
of their cases and hence did not see the conflict. Another commissioner pointed out that the 
firm still used Tshiqi’s name, and there was no justification of the mobile arrangement, unless 
 
1089 Interview with Commissioner C, 14 May 2017. 
1090 Commentary on The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct p.80. 
1091 Interview of Judge R Allie pp.10-16. 
1092 JSC Interview held on 9 July 2015, Southern Sun O.R Tambo International, Johannesburg. In 2019, she was 
appointed to the Constitutional Court. 
1093 Masengu, ‘Lady Justice and the Road to Equality’, p.1. 
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it had been part of the conditions of the sale of the firm. Justice Tshiqi continued to defend 
herself, stating that she had been honest enough to declare the arrangement in her application. 
The Chief Justice eventually informed her that there was no justification for it and that she 
should terminate all ties with the firm. 
 Tshiqi’s arrangement with her previous firm created doubts to a reasonable observer 
about her integrity. Despite her insistence that she avoided matters that the firm was involved 
in, a reasonable person cannot be certain that she does. Alternatively even if she did avoid those 
specific matters, her connection to the firm might still raise a reasonable suspicion that she 
could be working to assist them ‘behind the scenes’. Secondly, that Justice Tshiqi did not see 
anything wrong with her former firm paying her mobile contract for ten years, also brought 
into question her own wisdom.1094 Judges are often asked to recuse themselves from cases, 
because of alleged bias and the impact this would have on the eventual outcome. Courts have 
held that if a reasonable litigant would have a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer 
was or might be biased, it would affect the judge’s impartiality.1095 With the body of 
jurisprudence on bias and Tshiqi’s considerable experience, it was surprising that she had not 
considered the effect that the mobile phone arrangement would have on the public’s perception 
of her integrity.  
The final expectation worth mentioning, is the expectation that judges will be impartial 
as they adjudicate over matters. Judge Dhaya Pillay who interviewed for the same 
Constitutional Court vacancy as Justice Tshiqi, faced a question about her impartiality in 
matters.1096 The General Council of the Bar (GCB) had commented that while Judge Pillay was 
generally fair and impartial, she often came to the aid of the indigent, to the prejudice of the 
other party. Judge Pillay’s response to those comments was that she rather thought part of her 
 
1094 She had previously been a High Court judge for four years, prior to joining the SCA. 
1095 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC). 
1096 Judge Pillay is a High Court Judge from the KwaZulu-Natal division. 
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mandate as a judge was to assist the poor and vulnerable.1097 She questioned how 
transformation would occur in South Africa if the vulnerable citizens were not given sufficient 
support as many did not have access to courts. This response appeared to find favour with some 
of the commissioners, as it was deemed that such conduct could not be considered as partiality 
that would be detrimental to a case.  
Nonetheless, in the interview of Judge Violet Phatsoane mentioned earlier in chapter 5, 
impartiality was a bigger question than it was for Judge Pillay.1098 Members of the ANC took 
her to task by inferring that she had been partial when she sentenced a former politician John 
Block, to fifteen years for fraud. The JSC commissioners alleged that then Judge President 
Frans Kgomo, had influenced Phatsoane’s decision because he was reportedly heard telling her 
on a telephone call, to convict Block and his co-accused.1099 Despite the fact that the JSC had 
dismissed the complaint of her alleged partiality and bias in the matter, some commissioners 
were not satisfied. Their accusations weighed heavily in her interview and this could have been 
a reason why she did not get a sufficient number of votes to be recommended for appointment. 
The examples given above are merely a reflection of different expectations of judges as 
revealed during the interviews. Interestingly, of the three expectations discussed in this section, 
judicial temperament is not specifically mentioned in the South African Judicial Code of 
Conduct. Attributes that would fall under temperament such as humility and patience are also 
absent; only courtesy is explicitly mentioned. This is because as described earlier, temperament 
can be an elastic term which refers to how one thinks, reacts and behaves.1100 Alternatively, it 
could be that the traits that encompass temperament are not considered as important as others, 
 
1097 Notes taken by the author on 9 July 2015. 
1098 See Chapter 5, section 5.4.2 entitled’ When Politics and Power collide on the JSC’. 
1099 See Interview of Judge M V Phatsoane, 2017 <http://www.judgesmatter.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/April-17-JSC-interview-of-Judge-M-V-Phatshoane-WCHCJudges-Matter.pdf> 
[accessed 26 July 2018]. 
1100 Cowen,p.38. 
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unless and until somebody behaves contrary to these values. Despite the examples given above 
of interviews where women had been questioned about impartiality, temperament and integrity, 
there was no substantial evidence that the expectations of judges in South Africa are 
predominantly met by only male candidates. I have also witnessed interviews of male 
candidates where issues of integrity, honesty, propriety and temperament have dominated the 
interviews. However, there are other areas where women would appear to face obstacles. 
6.5.2 Challenges Faced by Women  
6.5.2.1 Lack of Acting Experience as a Hindrance 
In South Africa, acting judges are appointed to fill temporary vacancies caused by the absence 
or disability of particular judges.1101 There is no written requirement that a judicial candidate 
needs to have acted in the court they are applying for, yet this has become the practice. All the 
Chief Justices as chairpersons of the JSC, have stated that acting appointment is not a pre-
requisite for permanent appointment. Yet, very few candidates have been appointed without 
it.1102 Acting experience in principle is worthwhile for a candidate to have because it exposes 
candidates to the rigours of the court. It also allows one an opportunity to gain some confidence 
and learn how to control the court, while gaining valuable experience in writing judgments.1103 
The importance of acting experience was uncontested amongst interviewees. However, there 
was a unanimous view that the manner in which acting appointments are made is prejudicial, 
especially to women.1104 The statistics of acting appointments speak for themselves. In the 
period of this research (2013-2017), 9 266 acting opportunities were available across the 
country. The availability of acting opportunities refers to various periods when the courts need 
 
1101 Harms,p.37. 
1102 Mocumie,p.16. 
1103 Views from a journalist R, Judge E and Advocate Leah Gcabshe SC. 
1104 For a perspective on how the lack of acting appointments has affected gender transformation at the 
Constitutional Court, see Moses Retselisitsoe Phooko and Sibusiso Blessing Radebe, ‘Twenty-Three Years of 
Gender Transformation in the Constitutional Court of South Africa : Progress or Regression’, Constitutional 
Court Review, 1.2016 (2016), 306–31 (p.319). 
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to fill a vacancy created by either illness, death or an increase in the workload. Hence it is 
possible that one person may temporarily fill several of these vacancies during the year, 
depending on the duration of their acting stint. Of the 9 266 available opportunities, only 3 095 
opportunities were given to women, a mere 30% of the opportunities.1105  
 Women are effectively prejudiced by this situation because acting experience is highly 
prized by the JSC and in this period of research, nobody was appointed to the High Court 
without acting experience.1106 A 2015 report based on five legal sector meetings across the 
country with various stakeholders, noted that: 
Judge Presidents of the various provincial divisions exercise their discretion on who to 
appoint in the absence of a guideline or policy. Selections or acting appointments are 
generally closed processes that lead to acting appointments of candidates who are 
known to the individuals making the decisions about who to appoint. This results in 
many interested or suitable candidates not being appointed on an acting basis. 1107 
 
 In response to the report and other complaints in April 2016, the JSC issued guidelines 
pertaining to the appointment of acting judges. The guidelines require a candidate have been 
in practice for ten years and must be appropriately qualified.1108 They do not expound on what 
‘appropriately qualified’ means. Further, the guidelines also advise courts to have a selection 
committee for the recommendation of candidates and urge the committee to consider the gender 
and racial composition of the country when candidates are being chosen. Despite this guideline, 
there are still discrepancies in how candidates are appointed across the country and this 
continues to prejudice women. 
 
1105 Statistics obtained from the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. 
1106 For a view on acting affects women seeking promotion, see Masengu, ‘A Perspective on Women and 
Leadership in the South African Judiciary’. 
1107 Tabeth Masengu and Cherith Sanger, Legal Sector Meetings on Gender Transformation in the Judicairy 
(Cape Town, 2015) <http://www.dgru.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/103/gender.pdf> [accessed 
26 March 2018]. 
1108 Judicial Service Commission of South Africa, Criteria for Acting Appointments (Johannesburg: Office of 
the Chief Justice Republic of South Africa, 2016). 
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6.5.2.2 Tension between Family Life and Career 
The difficulty of trying to balance raising children and pursuing a judicial career has been a 
constant problem that has been echoed in both JSC interviews and in the fieldwork data. In one 
interview, then Judge Nambitha Dambuza of the Eastern Cape High Court, was interviewing 
for a position on the Supreme Court of Appeal.1109 It was noted by Commissioner Singh, that 
Dambuza was a single mother who had two daughters, aged 14 and 16 years. He enquired 
whether being appointed to the Supreme Court of Appeal would not affect childcare duties, 
since she would be in a different province.1110 This question could be viewed in two ways. One 
is that it was a sexist question, because it has not been asked of men and could insinuate that a 
position on the Supreme Court of Appeal may not be a suitable aspiration for a single mother. 
On the other hand, it could be an acknowledgment of the fact that Commissioner Singh was 
alive to the challenges that single mothers with high profile careers face and thus he wanted to 
know what Dambuza would do to alleviate these challenges.  
Dambuza’s responded that she had anticipated applying for the position and hence had 
placed her daughters in boarding school and would visit them during court recess. When asked 
by another commissioner why it had taken her so long to avail herself for the position, she 
stated that her primary concern had been raising her daughters. She also explained that the 
judiciary did not provide support for single mothers, hence she relied on colleagues to swap 
rotas with her and arrange suitable timetables for her children. Dambuza, who was 
subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court, was neither the first nor last woman candidate 
to explain the difficulty of being a mother and judge at the same time. In the 2015 Constitutional 
Court interviews, Justice Nonkosi Mlanthla and Judge Dhaya Pillay also spoke about the 
challenges of balancing family with career.1111 Judge Mlanthla spoke of how women had to 
 
1109 JSC Interview on 14 April 2015, held at the President Hotel, Bantry Bay, Cape Town. 
1110 Notes taken by the author. 
1111 JSC Interviews on 9 July 2015, held at the Southern Sun O.R. Tambo International Airport. 
 
 
251 
 
work ‘double’ shifts in order to raise a family and achieve any ambitions they had, because 
taking care of a family is often considered a ‘woman’s issue’.1112 
Judge Pillay referred to it as a vicious cycle, because women’s capacity was often 
impaired, due to the lack of support when raising children and managing households.1113 In 
order to have the kind of legal practice focusing on human rights law that would eventually 
lead to a judicial career, Judge Pillay made the choice not to have children. Commissioner 
Modise referred to this choice as one between reproductive rights and career advancement.1114 
She submitted that it was a real problem facing women everywhere and that institutions used 
familial obligations to block women’s progress. She further explained how she and other 
women parliamentarians, had fought to have child facilities provided at parliament and that the 
judiciary needed to do the same. For Modise, real democracy meant that one had to look at 
society through a gender lens and this meant specifically addressing the challenges women face 
regarding career and family goals.1115 To ignore the challenges faced by women who wanted 
both a family and a judicial career, was to ignore the reality of women. 
 One of the judges interviewed for this research also pointed out that the work of a High 
Court judge was not conducive for mothers because it required them to physically be on the 
move.1116 This was also highlighted in the interview of Judge Nozuko Mjali mentioned in 
Chapter 5, who sought a transfer in order to strike the balance between work and family.1117 
She had reported commuting with an autistic child between East London and Mthatha where 
she was hearing a case; she only stopped doing so because of death threats.1118 Allison Tilley 
commented on this dynamic: ‘I think particularly in some of the more recent interviews of the 
 
1112 Ibid. 
1113 Ibid. 
1114 Interview on 15 June 2017. 
1115 Ibid. 
1116 Interview with Judge A. 
1117 See Chapter 5, section 5.5.2 entitled ‘The Case of Nozuko Mjali’. 
1118 JSC Interview held on 8 October 2014 at the Twelve Apostles Hotel, Camps Bay, and Cape Town. 
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senior women, they have been able to explain the problems of being a primary caregiver and 
needing flexibility in their work in order to do that’.1119 The openness of these women 
candidates brought a much ignored matter to the fore, as they stated the real challenges that 
women face.  
Judge President Mlambo also noted that when he encouraged women who had acted in 
his court to avail themselves for permanent appointment, he heard a familiar response. ‘I have 
got young kids. I don’t think I will be able to’. ‘Having acted and seen what it takes, to bring 
up my kids and do this job effectively. Give me four or five years’.1120 He cited this as the 
reason why good women candidates were not available for nomination and effectively not for 
appointment either. 
6.6 WHAT CAN BE LEARNT FROM THE VARIOUS EXPECTATIONS OF 
JUDGES? 
Before the conclusion of this chapter, there are three questions which need to be answered. 
Firstly, are the expectations of judges gendered, thus excluding women candidates? Secondly 
is the role of the judge in modern societies an acknowledgment of the need to do away with 
previous conceptions of judging that were steeped in patriarchal definitions and standards? 
Thirdly, are judicial expectations context specific? To respond to these questions it is helpful 
to categorise the various expectations of judges (a combination of conduct and qualities), that 
have been outlined in this chapter. 
6.6.1 Practical Requirements 
The first category is the practical expectations of judging or judges. These are the attributes 
most concerned with law applying obligations or adjudicative responsibilities. Here, I include 
requirements such as technical experience, competence, forensic skill, intellectual rigour and 
 
1119 Interview on 4 October 2016. 
1120 Interview on 4 April 2017. 
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the ability to analyse cases. Hard work, diligence, the ability to work under pressure, 
knowledge of the law and the capacity for articulation and discipline amongst others, also fall 
in this category. I categorise these as practical elements, because they are the basic elements 
for the functioning of the judicial role. Without the necessary experience or analytical mind, 
one cannot be successful in practice or whichever legal pool they are in, which is the route to 
appointment as a judge. These, I would argue are the minimum expectations for judicial office. 
I would submit that these expectations initially seem non-gendered but upon interrogation, one 
discovers that women bear the brunt of the consequences of these expectations. 
 If we examine women in South Africa, the acquisition of technical experience and 
forensic skills can be very difficult. Both attributes are acquired and honed with exposure and 
practice. The people often perceived as the ‘best advocates’ or the experts in a particular field, 
are all products of years of exposure and practice in that field. Typically for one to be successful 
in their chosen legal career, they must be specialists in a niche area. For example, an advocate 
in South Africa may have a commercial arbitration niche practice. They will be experts in this 
area, to the exclusion of other areas of law such as criminal law or family law. Similarly 
magistrates often do not amass a large wealth of experience in various legal areas because they 
are often assigned to specialist lower courts.1121 However to perform successfully as a judge, 
one has to be able to adjudicate and have a knowledge of a wide range of legal matters.  
This makes acting experience useful because the length and breadth of exposure to 
judicial work while acting, is unmatched by experience in any other professional pool. And yet 
women in South Africa are not given enough acting opportunities as judges. Consequently, 
without acting experience a woman judicial candidate is prejudiced, because that is the most 
effective way of gaining technical experience and forensic skills.1122 Thus technical experience 
 
1121 This will be elaborated on further in the subsequent chapter on the Legal profession. 
1122 See Mocumie 'Gender Transformation of the Judiciary', p.14. 
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which is largely gained by acting experience on the bench, invariably becomes a gendered 
expectation of potential judges. 
 Secondly for women in both Zambia and South Africa, efforts to acquire experience, to 
be diligent, perform their duties competently and even the ability to work under pressure, can 
be affected by family obligations. As mentioned in the previous sections interview participants 
across the board pointed to the tension between motherhood and family obligations versus 
career. To rise to the level of expertise and competence to be considered for judicial 
appointment, one must spend countless hours dealing with legal matters and working overtime. 
This is difficult to do when a woman must balance family obligations, especially when one has 
small children. Even when a woman does gain the skills, experience and competence required 
for appointment, the challenges do not stop there. As heard from the judges interviewed or 
observed during interviews (in South Africa), there is insufficient support for single mothers 
in the judiciary. Therefore, ‘while women continue to bear children, there is a biological 
necessity for reconciling the complicated relationship between personal lives and professional 
work’.1123  
The reconciliation of personal and professional work is not only necessary for those 
who would be joining the bench, but for existing judges too. Failing to recognise the importance 
of this particular issue on women judges, means turning a blind eye to the gendered 
implications of the expectations of judges. This leaves women in a difficult position, one that 
male judges are rarely in. If they neglect their job because they are focusing on their family, it 
affects litigants and the functioning of the judicial system. If they give everything to their job 
at the expense of their family, it leads to personal problems too. Thus women who are mothers 
 
1123 Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers :The “feminization” of the Legal 
Profession’, p.916 . 
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will continue to work double shifts in a dual role that requires them to ‘feel like these are 
necessary sacrifices if they want to be a judge’.1124 
6.6.2 Essential Character Traits 
This category, I suggest, contains attributes that are very much concerned with law improving 
obligations. These are the expectations of judges that come after the minimum requirements 
mentioned above and I suggest that these are the ones that determine whether a good lawyer, 
becomes a good judge. As a judge, one moves from advocacy to decision making, ‘from 
marshalling and presenting evidence, to fact-finding and synthesising’.1125 This transition is 
not easy. It is in a candidate’s demeanour and in how they interact with people that you can 
observe whether they have the specific traits of impartiality, honesty, independence, integrity, 
and judicial temperament (which includes humility and patience, good listening skills and 
emotional maturity). It is in this category, that I would place Justice Mohamed’s requirements 
that a judge needs a moral ability to ‘distinguish right from wrong and sometimes the more 
agonizing ability to weigh two rights or two wrongs against each other’1126 and that she/ he 
also needs to have an intolerance for injustice.  
I submit that understanding the daily lives of most of a country’s citizens, understanding 
societal values and the competing interests between group and individual rights, is also a 
necessary attribute for having an intolerance for injustice. Integrity, in the form of moral 
authority as expressed by Justice Mutunga, can also not be understated. The list is not 
exhaustive however and has room for aspects that would be unique for the jurisdiction in 
question. Therefore, there may be instances where some expectations can be specific to a 
jurisdiction. For example, in South Africa, it is paramount for judges to be non-discriminatory 
and to steer away from any actions or words that would be interpreted as racist. This is peculiar 
 
1124 Kalem,p.9. 
1125 Bell,p.96. 
1126 Mahomed,p.115. 
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to the historical nature of the country and thus, a similar emphasis on conduct that can even 
infer racial discrimination, is absent in Zambia. 
 Article 13(3) of the Zambian Judicial Code of Conduct prohibits a judicial officer from 
belonging to any organisation that practices discrimination, contrary to the Constitution.1127 
Nonetheless, the Code of Conduct does not make any specific reference to racial 
discrimination, unlike the South African Code of Judicial Conduct.1128 Another example of a 
context specific expectation, may be religion. In Zambia, although the Constitution upholds a 
person’s right to freedom of religion, the Constitution declares in its preamble that Zambia is 
a Christian nation.1129 Hence, it was unsurprising when judges I interviewed placed emphasis 
on the expectation for a judge to be God fearing or at least Christian. This expectation was 
absent in South Africa. It should be noted that being a Christian is not a requirement to become 
a judge in Zambia however, there appeared to be an expectation that judges should be of a 
religious belief. 
From the perspective of two interviewees in Zambia, some women judges are 
considered as too emotional, when dealing with criminally related cases. This allegation 
impinges on their emotional maturity and effectively, judicial temperament. In the absence of 
empirical research to support these perceptions, it would be inaccurate to state that this is a 
factual obstacle facing women judges. However, even though this perception of women being 
too emotional, is currently not harming women’s aspirations in Zambia, it could have a 
negative impact on litigants who may, as a result, view women as non-impartial adjudicators. 
These perceptions of women were limited to Zambia and were absent in the South Africa part 
of this research. 
 
1127 Parliament of Zambia, The Judicial (Code Of Conduct) Act. 
1128 Article 7 focuses on equality and non-discrimination. 
1129 Government of Zambia, Constitution-of-Zambia-Amendment-Act-No-2-of-2016, 2016. 
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 Finally, I suggest that essential character traits help us answer the question of whether 
the role of the judge has developed from its patriarchal roots, to acknowledge women’s 
competence. An examination of the traits listed in this category provides a testament to this 
change in thinking. In the past, judges were expected to be aloof, devoid of personal feelings 
and out of touch with the common population. As McLachlin stated, judges clung to the old 
image of the judge, because it brought security and gratification.1130 As the role of judges has 
broadened to include matters of mega politics, the expectations of judges have also broadened 
to include previously unemphasised traits such as good listening skills, honesty, compassion, 
humility and patience.  
These were previously considered to be the domain of women, while men mastered 
authority, assertiveness, objectivity, power and articulation.1131 The idea that men had the 
monopoly on the latter traits helped support the private versus public divide, where women 
were consigned to home duties while men served their countries in public capacities.1132 Now, 
there appears to be agreement that the traits previously alleged to be proof that women were 
unfit for judging are the very traits that are relevant in today’s societies. More so because social, 
economic, political and cultural rights, are now at the very heart of a large part of judicial 
adjudication.1133 
6.6.3 Societal Interactions − Conduct 
This final category is more concerned with law protecting obligations in the sense that a judge 
needs to be concerned with not only honouring the law but protecting the judiciary’s image.1134 
It does not necessarily have gendered implications. The protection of the law and the judiciary’s 
 
1130 McLachlin, p.681. 
1131 Sherrilyn Ifill, ‘Racial Diversity on the Bench Beyond Role Models And Public Confidence’, Washington & 
Law Review, 57 (2000), 405–95. 
1132 Thornton, p.31. 
1133 This is evident in the cases being in heard in a number of African courts regarding presidential and 
parliamentary elections, the provision of social rights, contestation about the expropriation of land and the 
presence and work of multinational companies in mineral rich states. 
1134 Green, p.19-20. 
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image is premised on the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and thus unlike the 
first two categories, this one relates more to the external interactions of judges or rather, their 
conduct. For example, this category covers matters of financial propriety, interactions with 
lawyers and the expectation that they would refrain from any social interactions that would 
create a reasonable apprehension of bias. This category also encompasses the expectation that 
judges will be non-partisan, will act with caution in regard to the receipt of gifts or favours and 
that judges would refrain from commenting on political matters. The limitations of fiduciary 
duties as in Zambia or the exercise of same as in South Africa, are all relevant for this category. 
As such, there is no expectation where women could be prejudiced by these expectations in 
any way. 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the expectations of judges in both countries. The chapter commenced 
with the premise that an understanding of the role of a judge, would provide some insight into 
whether, if at all, women were at a disadvantage in comparison to male candidates. I have 
highlighted the international guidelines on judging and judicial qualities before discussing the 
judicial codes of conducts in both jurisdictions. While the codes of conduct also included a 
number of procedural rules, I submit that the examination of these rules was relevant in order 
to illicit a holistic picture of what is expected of judges. The advice from current and past judges 
revealed some general practical qualities necessary for the performance of judicial work. The 
ability to be a neutral adjudicator, a good listener, a hard worker and a person of integrity and 
impartiality, were some of the commonly listed traits. 
Empirical research in the form of interviews and participant observation, where 
possible, was of assistance in outlining specific expectations in each jurisdiction and the areas 
where women may face obstacles. In both jurisdictions, balancing family life and a judicial 
career was identified as a major obstacle. Women have either had to avoid appointment until 
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their children are older or accept appointment and try to balance the two competing demands. 
Despite numerous advances that have been made in recognising women’s rights, the judiciary 
appears to be lagging in terms of providing a conducive and supportive environment for 
women. Further, societal expectations weigh heavily on women judges despite their privileged 
societal position. The tension between family life and work is an obstacle to advancing to the 
bench or being promoted to higher positions after appointment. In Zambia, there were two 
views that women judges get too emotionally involved in cases. This perception if proven true 
would be problematic, because judges are expected to be of emotional maturity and judgment.  
In South Africa, the lack of acting experience presents a very real problem, because 
acting experience is the ticket to get permanent High Court appointment and in a large measure 
appointment to higher courts. Then there is the challenge of balancing career and family in 
both jurisdictions. If there is inadequate attention to the structural and institutional dynamics 
that inform these issues, women will continue to be disadvantaged. Not because they are 
incompetent, unfit or incapable of meeting judicial expectations, but because they are receiving 
inadequate support to do so. Support for women in regard to institutional and structural 
challenges is not only necessary for those in the judiciary, but for women in the pool from 
which judges are drawn. It is relevant therefore to scrutinise the legal profession, in order to 
assess what type of challenges are faced by prospective judicial candidates. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 
WHERE POTENTIAL JUDGES ARE RECRUITED 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
A study on gender and judicial appointments in the selected jurisdictions would be incomplete 
without a discussion on the pool from which judges are drawn. Cheryl Thomas submits that 
there is a combination of background factors that affect judicial diversity.1135 One such relevant 
factor is the legal pool from which judges are drawn. If judges are drawn from a single pool of 
lawyers with similar backgrounds, training and work experience, their gender alone will not 
guarantee a rich diversity of backgrounds. Essentially, the composition of judges on the bench 
is affected by the composition of the legal pool and legal system that those very judges are 
selected from.1136 Rackley has argued that judicial diversity is not just about having more 
women on the bench, but also about ensuring that a wide diversity of backgrounds and 
experiences ‘are actually tapped into’ so that they can lead to diversity in judging.1137 This 
diversity will depend on the legal pool from which judges emerge. 
This chapter moves away from the selectors and the role of the judge, to the people who 
are most likely to be future judges. In order to understand the pool from which judges are 
drawn, one must interrogate the legal professions in each jurisdiction. It is acknowledged that 
an examination of the legal profession alone requires an in-depth and detailed study, due to the 
various factors that create, inform and sustain the legal profession in different jurisdictions. 
This chapter does not intend to address all these facets of the legal profession in both countries. 
 
1135 Cheryl Thomas, Commission for Judicial Appointments Judicial Diversity in the United Kingdom and Other 
Jurisdictions (London, 2005) <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-
institute/files/Judicial_Diversity_in_the_UK_and_other_jurisdictions.pdf>[accessed on 5 February 2019]. 
1136 For instance, see Vadim Volkov and Aryna Dzmitryieva, ‘Recruitment Patterns, Gender and Professional 
Subculture in Russian Judciary’, International Journal of the Legal Profession, 22.2 (2015), 166–92. 
1137 Erika Rackley, Submission to the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity (Durham, 2009) 
<http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/eji/docs/51452.pdf> [accessed on 5 February 2019]. 
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Instead what is provided here is a succinct exposition of the legal profession, limited to an 
overview of the environment in which women lawyers operate. The chapter commences with 
a general summary of the legal profession, drawing from international guidelines and literature. 
Subsequently, the chapter is divided into two distinct parts. 
  Part 1 is a discussion of the Zambian legal profession. Here the reader is introduced to 
the career trajectory for a potential lawyer and the different available pools from which judges 
can be drawn. Obtaining statistics from Zambia proved challenging so it is impossible to 
provide a complete picture of all the legal pools. The statistics discussed will therefore be 
limited. Nonetheless, using interview data, I identify certain aspects of the legal pools that are 
worth drawing attention to; one of which is the perceived tension between people in private 
practice and those in government branches or those working in the judiciary. This tension is 
the result of contesting perspectives about which legal trajectory better prepares one to be a 
judge. I conclude part 1 by submitting that the current system of judicial appointments, favours 
those from within the judiciary and Ministry of Justice who are mainly women. 
The South African legal profession is discussed in part 2, where I examine the trajectory 
for a legal professional in South Africa. Consequently, the availability of more statistics in this 
jurisdiction allows for a more detailed interrogation of the three pools from which judges are 
drawn. These are the advocates’ profession, attorneys’ profession and the magistracy (those 
with a pure academic background are no longer a pool for judicial appointment). The 
interrogation of these pools of professionals will also include a summary of the challenges 
women face in these pools, which includes the lack of quality work, stereotypical perceptions 
of women, gender discrimination, lack of mentorship and training opportunities and the lack 
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of acting experience.1138 This chapter concludes with an examination of different perspectives 
regarding which legal professionals actually make the best judges. 
7.2 LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
7.2.1 Operationalising the Legal Profession 
In 1990, the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (UN Basic Principles) were formulated 
by the United Nations to assist Member States in their task of promoting and ensuring the 
proper role of lawyers.1139 Articles 9-11 focus on the lawyers’ qualifications and training, with 
emphasis being placed on the need for lawyers to be adequately educated and trained. The UN 
Basic Principles also prohibit any form of discrimination in respect of entry to or practising in 
the legal profession. The UN Basic Principles further provide guidelines for lawyer’s duties 
and responsibilities, lawyers’ rights to freedom of association and expression, the importance 
of professional associations and how disciplinary proceedings should be conducted.1140 The 
African Union (AU) Guidelines on the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial 
mentioned in the chapter on the expectations of judges, further provides direction on what is 
expected of lawyers. In addition to the guidelines provided in the UN Basic Principles, the AU 
Guidelines specifically draw attention to the role of prosecutors.1141  
Prosecutors are expected to perform their duties without fear, harassment and 
intimidation and are, amongst other things, entitled to adequate remuneration and services.1142 
The AU Guidelines provide detailed requirements for states to ensure that lawyers in general 
can practise in conducive environments for themselves and their clients. This includes 
recognising and respecting that all communications and consultations between lawyers and 
 
1138 The lack of acting experience as an obstacle to judicial appointment was introduced in the preceding chapter 
on the Expectations of Judges. 
1139 Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (Cuba, 1990) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/roleoflawyers.aspx> [accessed 11 September 2018]. 
1140 Ibid, Articles 12-29. 
1141 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
1142 Articles F (a)-(o). 
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their clients within their professional relationship are confidential.1143 Finally, the International 
Commission of Jurists Practioners Guide of 2007, buttresses the above principles with a section 
specifically dedicated to the role of lawyers.1144 It also highlights the need for lawyers to behave 
in an ethical manner and prohibits any form of discrimination.1145 
7.2.2 General Experiences of Women in the Legal Profession 
Despite the existence of international guidelines that prohibit discrimination in the legal 
profession, globally women’s experiences in the legal profession have not been without 
challenges. Previously there was a paucity of women among law graduates, legal professionals, 
or for that matter in any occupation involving legal work, however loosely defined.1146 Menkel-
Meadow explains that while opportunities were created by the inclusion of women into 
universities in the 1970’s, this did not bring a flood of women to the profession. Rather, 
women’s entry to law has been a gradual process through much of the first half of the twentieth 
century.1147 Eventually when women could practise law, social barriers to entry and 
participation in the profession, seemed more powerful than legally prescribed limits.1148 
 These barriers were and still are the absence of cultural and social capital which is 
necessary to excel in private practice,1149 stereotypes about the type of work women can do,1150 
 
1143 Article I (c). 
1144 Practitioners Guide No. 1 International Principles on the Independence and Accountability of Judges, 
Lawyers and Prosecutors (Geneva, 2007) <www.icj.org> [accessed 21 August 2018]. 
1145 The International Bar Association also provides extensive guidelines for practioners on various aspects of 
practice. See 
https://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#Practice%20Rules%20
and%20Guidelines.  
1146Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers',p.897. 
1147 Fiona Kay and Elizabeth Gorman, ‘Women in the Legal Profession’, Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science, 4.1 (2008), 299–332 <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.4.110707.172309>. 
1148 Menkel-Meadow 'The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers' p.897. 
1149 Kay and Gorman, p.10. 
1150 Justin D Levinson and Danielle Young, ‘Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study’, 
Duke Journal of Gender & Policy, 18.1 (2010), 1-41, <http://www.aals.org/statistics/2009dlt/titles.html> 
[accessed 30 August 2018]. 
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racial and gender discrimination present in the profession,1151 relegation to feminised 
specialisms which are less remunerative and offer fewer opportunities for progression in 
firms,1152 and bias in promotion criteria.1153 In Schultz and Shaw’s seminal book on women in 
the legal profession, some authors highlight the double discrimination faced by women of 
colour in the legal profession.1154 This discrimination can take various forms such as slower 
progression in the careers of women of colour or difficulties in being hired and/or being 
retained in legal positions. The intersections of race and gender and the implications of such, 
are relevant for recognising patterns that may impede women’s progress in the profession and 
the judiciary. 
 Barmes and Malleson argue that in the legal profession, notably but not exclusively, 
women and members of ethnic minorities are disadvantaged because of the segmented and 
stratified nature of the profession.1155 The stratified nature of the profession starts at the very 
beginning when a jurisdiction chooses to have a split or fused bar. Dawuni and Kang posit that 
in African civil law jurisdictions, where one trains to be a judge after taking an examination, 
women are more likely to ascend to the bench.1156 Further, in common law jurisdictions with a 
fused legal profession, where there is no distinction between barristers and solicitors (advocates 
and attorneys), there is a higher chance for women to be appointed as judges, than if they were 
 
1151 Jennifer Tomlinson and others, ‘Structure, Agency and Career Strategies of White Women and Black and 
Minority Ethnic Individuals in the Legal Profession’, Human Relations, 66.2 (2013), 245–69 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726712460556>. 
1152 Sharon Bolton and Daniel Muzio, ‘The Paradoxical Processes of Feminization in the Professions: The Case 
of Established, Aspiring and Semi-Professions’, Work, Employment & Society, 22.2 (2008), 281–99 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0950017008089105>. 
1153 Ibid, p.8. 
1154 Women in the World’s Legal Professions, ed. by Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw (Oxford: Hart, 2003). 
1155 Lizzie Barmes and Kate Malleson, ‘The Legal Profession as Gatekeeper to the Judiciary: Design Faults in 
Measures to Enhance Diversity’, Modern Law Review, 74.2 (2011 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
2230.2011.00845.x>. 
1156 Dawuni and Kang. 
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in a split legal profession.1157 Consequently, the senior judiciary is often a reflection of the 
systematic marginalisation present in the legal profession.1158  
 In some jurisdictions, women have managed to negotiate their way and survive in 
private practice, which is structured in a masculinist nature. Sweetha Ballakrishnen’s research 
on women in global transactional law firms in India, provides an interesting case study.1159 Her 
findings were that women in these firms reported strong organizational and interactional 
advantages within the firm, especially in contrast with women in other legal workspaces.1160 
Ballakrishnen noted that some part of the advantage was negotiated because their social and 
cultural standing (class), mediated their gender. She also theorised that women’s deference in 
these firms, led to greater rewards because they had been typecast as being more careful, more 
dedicated and polite.1161 In the United Kingdom, a study by Tomlinson et al showed that 
women and minorities engage with organisational structures and ways by developing different 
agentic strategies to deal with discrimination.1162 As new lawyers, women and minorities used 
assimilation techniques and ‘played the game’ (found ways to progress and perform) to be 
retained.1163  
Once they had been at the firms for long, the tactics changed. If they reached partnership 
level, they were then likely to compromise, in order to reconcile professional and personal lives 
and challenge and reform existing structures and practices. How women negotiate their 
careers in the legal profession, is not only relevant for building on existing theoretical 
approaches to women’s experiences in law. If judicial appointers and other stakeholders are 
 
1157 Ibid at p.57. 
1158 Barmes and Malleson,p.246. 
1159 Swethaa Ballakrishnen, ‘“Why Is Gender a Form of Diversity?”: Rising Advantages for Women in Global 
Indian Law Firms’, J. Global Legal Stud, 20.2 (2013), 1261-89. 
1160 Ibid at p.1268. 
1161 Ballakrishnen, p.1281. 
1162 Tomlinson and others, p.247. 
1163 Ibid at p.259. 
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committed to diversity in the judiciary, they too must first recognise the barriers that exist in 
the legal profession and the negotiation that women do, to navigate through these barriers. 
There are various contributing factors that compound to sometimes produce legal environments 
that perpetuate the barriers that women are seeking to overcome. The examination of the two 
jurisdictions provided below, reveals the complexity of varying issues and outcomes faced by 
women.  
7.3 PART 1 - THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ZAMBIA 
7.3.1 How do you Qualify to be a Lawyer? 
Until 1967, Zambian lawyers were trained in Britain and thus the resulting legal education 
pattern, largely reflected the English system of law.1164 The urgent need to train lawyers locally 
to run the courts and various government departments, resulted in a pattern of education 
reflecting this urgency. Ndulo submits that more scholarly and reflective subjects were 
excluded from the curriculum, and the English system of law as an undergraduate course was 
adopted.1165 Currently, potential lawyers need to obtain a Bachelor of Laws degree (LLB) from 
a recognised Zambian university or an internationally recognised university.1166 Previously, the 
University of Zambia (UNZA) was one of only two universities in the country and the only 
one that offered a law degree. The recent establishment of five private universities in the last 
few years, has provided more avenues for those seeking to obtain a law degree.1167 
After graduation, prospective lawyers must complete post-graduate training at the 
Zambia Institute of Advanced Legal Education (ZIALE), while undertaking clinical pupillage 
 
1164 Muna Ndulo, ‘Legal Education in Africa in the Era of Globalization and Structural Adjustment’, International 
Law Review, 20. (2002), 487–503.  
1165 Ibid at p.488. 
1166 Mwizukanji Namwawa, ‘The Legal Profession: Perceptions and Misconceptions’ (Unpublished Thesis, 
University of Zambia, 2005) 
<http://dspace.unza.zm:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/2747/NAMWAWAM1.PDF?sequence=1&isA
llowed=y> [accessed 29 August 2018]. 
1167 A number of interview participants in this research expressed the view that the proliferation of universities 
offering the law degree, have led to a ‘drop in standards’. 
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at local firms or government departments.1168 They then have to pass the Bar examinations set 
by the Council of Legal Education.1169 As Zambia has a fused legal system, success at the 
examinations will enable one to be called to the Bar and be admitted as an advocate of the 
Supreme Court of Zambia. The ZIALE has faced criticism in recent years, due to its poor 
student pass rate (normally 3-9% at the first attempt).1170 In the period 2013-2017, only 118 
candidates in total passed the Bar examinations.1171 This includes candidates who were re-
taking the exams after previous failed attempts. The lowest number was in 2013, where only 
12 of 200 candidates passed while, the highest success rate was in 2017, where 40 of 300 
candidates passed the exams.1172  
Gender disaggregated information from ZIALE was unavailable, therefore it is difficult 
to establish how well women are faring at the Bar exams. Though the law school of the UNZA 
does not maintain gender disaggregated data of law students, the Dean and another interview 
participant stated that most of their law graduates are women.1173 The chairperson of the JSC 
also stated that there are more women taking the exams at ZIALE and being called to the 
Bar.1174 However, the lack of accurate data makes a thorough analysis impossible. The pass 
rate at ZIALE is particularly worrying because Zambia is a small jurisdiction with a shortage 
of lawyers. In 2013, there were only 800 lawyers in the country, which if applied to the general 
population meant one lawyer for every 20 000 people. 
 
1168 Ministry of Legal Affairs, The Zambia Institute of Advanced Legal Education Act, 1996 
<http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Zambia Institute Of Advanced Legal 
Education Act.pdf> [accessed 17 September 2018]. 
1169 The Council of Legal Education was also established by the same Act that created the ZIALE. 
1170 Elias Munshya, ‘On ZIALE: Questions, Concerns and the Way Forward’, Elias Munshya, 26 November 2015 
<https://eliasmunshya.org/2015/11/26/on-ziale-questions-concerns-and-the-way-forward/> [accessed 12 
September 2018]. 
1171 Statistics obtained from the ZIALE in November 2017. 
1172 These statistics include those who were re-writing the Bar exams after previous failures. 
1173 Interviews with Dean Mudenda and Legal Professional 6. 
1174 Interview with Chief Justice Ngulube. 
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 Kahn-Fogel has argued that the shortage of lawyers in Zambia is partly due to the 
failure rate at ZIALE which is informed by various factors such as the cost of tuition, the unfair 
examination system,1175 insufficient practical experience and a faculty that has private practice 
or judicial experience, but no academic teaching or training experience.1176 However, he argues 
that the lawyers who administer the programme at ZIALE have an incentive to keep the 
profession small, because of how lucrative legal work is due to the small number of practising 
lawyers in Zambia.1177 In order to understand Fogel’s argument better, it is necessary to 
examine the structure of the legal profession.  
7.3.2 Structure of the Profession 
The legal profession is considered attractive owing to the popular view that lawyers earn a high 
income and appear to have easy access to seats of social and political power.1178 The profession 
is regulated by the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) established by the Law Association of 
Zambia Act,1179 read with Legal Practioners Act of 19731180 and the Legal Practioners 
Amendment Act of 2006.1181 Amongst other objectives the LAZ furthers the development of 
law as an instrument of social order, considers the qualifications of lawyers and issues licensing 
certificates.1182 Only advocates who are admitted to the practising roll in Zambia can be 
members of the LAZ that is, if they can afford to pay the membership fees. 
 
1175 Candidates write ten subjects and if they fail more than four, they have to retake all ten exams in the next 
round. In addition, if one fails to succeed after three attempts, they are banned from writing the exams for five 
years. 
1176 Kahn-Fogel,p.765. 
1177 Ibid at 767. 
1178 Namwawa, p.11. 
1179 Ministry of Legal Affairs, The Law Association of Zambia Act, Cap 31,1973 
<http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Law Association of Zambia Act.pdf> 
[accessed 13 September 2018]. 
1180 Ministry of Legal Affairs, The Legal Practioners Act, Cap 30, 1973. 
1181 Ministry of Legal Affairs, Legal Practioners Amendment Act, 14 of 2006 
<https://zambialii.org/system/files/legislation/act/2006/14/lpa2006287.pdf> [accessed 13 September 2018]. 
1182 Section 4 of the Act. 
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 The LAZ is an influential actor in Zambia, contributing to law reform and political 
debate.1183 It has also been involved in the numerous constitutional processes that Zambia has 
undergone since 1996 and has defended the judiciary when the Executive has sought to 
intimidate them.1184 That being said, Pamela Sambo argues that there are multi-faceted 
challenges faced by the legal profession in Zambia. These include high poverty and illiteracy 
rates in the Zambian population and gender imbalances.1185 The high rates of poverty and 
illiteracy amongst the population are relevant if one considers just how elite legal practice in 
Zambia is. In this research period, the following licences to practise law were issued: 
Table 4 - Number of Practising Certificates.1186 
Year Practising Certificates issued 
2013  
 
920 
2014 901 
2015 868 
2016 1026 
2017 1112 
 
In 2017, Zambia had a population of 17,237,931 people.1187 With only 1112 practising 
lawyers, there was one lawyer to every 15,501 people. Of the 1112, most legal practitioners 
 
1183 Jeremy Gould, ‘Strong Bar, Weak State? Lawyers, Liberalism and State Formation in Zambia’, Development 
and Change, 37.4 (2006), 921–41 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2006.00507.x>. 
1184 Joyce Shezongo-Macmillan, Zambia Justice Sector and the Rule of Law (Johannesburg, 2013) 
<http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/afrimap_zambia_justice_main_report_web_5july.pdf> [accessed 1 May 
2017]. 
1185 Sambo, 'The Legal Profession and Judicial Appointments in Zambia’. 
1186 Statistics obtained from LAZ in December 2017. 
1187 Statistics obtained from https://www.populationpyramid.net/zambia/2017/. 
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prefer employment in private legal practice or in the corporate sector, while very few join the 
public service, either in the government ministries, National Prosecution Authority or the 
Judiciary.1188 The cost of studying law at university, funding the post-graduate training at the 
ZIALE and paying membership fees to the LAZ in order to join the legal practice, are serious 
barriers to people entering the profession.1189 Secondly, a large number of the population 
cannot afford private legal services and the Legal Aid department under the Ministry of Justice, 
is overworked and understaffed.1190 Advocates who work for Legal Aid often leave due to 
insufficient income.1191 This has led to the provision of some legal services by non-state actors 
such as the National Legal Aid Clinic for Women, Caritas Zambia, Paralegal Alliance Network, 
Young Christian Women Association and Plan International.1192 
 In respect of the gender imbalance in the legal profession, like the ZIALE, the LAZ 
does not keep disaggregated statistics of its members. It is therefore difficult to ascertain how 
many practising women lawyers they are in Zambia. The difficulties in obtaining data in the 
Zambian part of this study, can perhaps be attributed to what Nabombe et al argue is a culture 
of sharing information minimally.1193 They argue that in government institutions, government 
policies do not generally promote a culture of sharing of information, making it difficult for 
those who want to undertake research.1194 However, while this may be applicable to the 
 
1188 Sambo,p.4. 
1189 Marc Masson and Ovais Tahir, The Legal Information Needs of Civil Society in Zambia, Occasional Papers 
Series, 2015 <http://saipar.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2015_3_Masson-and-Tahir_The-Legal-Information-
Needs-of-Civil-Society-in-Zambia.pdf> [accessed 31 August 2018]. 
1190 Kahn-Fogel, pp.722-23. 
1191 Ibid. 
1192 Masson and Tahir, p. 11. 
1193 Pumulo Nabombe and Christine W~munyima Kanyengo, ‘Knowledge Sharing among Lawyers in Zambia: 
Drawing from the Experience of the Ministry of Justice’, Zambia Library Association Journal, 24.1 & 2 (2009), 
29–36<http://journals.co.za/docserver/fulltext/zambia/24/1-
2/409.pdf?expires=1535724656&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=1F93F06CC8E262DFA0505267C6155E2
5> [accessed 31 August 2018]. 
1194 Ibid. 
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judiciary as an arm of government, it does not apply to entities such as ZIALE and the LAZ. 
They are established as body corporates and have no attachment to the government. 
 It is submitted that the failure to disaggregate data by gender, by both ZIALE and the 
LAZ could be indicative of two issues. Firstly, that the system does not see the need to collate 
gender disaggregated statistics because they are of the view that ‘it does not matter’. This could 
be due to a lack of understanding of just how important reliable gender statistics are in 
providing a quantitative picture of women’s access to the legal profession. The first Zambian 
woman to be admitted as an advocate was the former acting Chief Justice Lombe Chibesa-
Kunda. She was only admitted in 1973.1195 Hence, reliable gender statistics would be useful in 
determining the rate of women’s access to the legal profession and comparing the increase in 
women judges to the number of women in the profession, since CJ Chibesa Kunda’ ascension. 
Have more judges been appointed because of an increase in qualified women lawyers or is the 
proportion of women judges extraordinarily higher than women advocates? 
Secondly, the lack of disaggregated data could be indicative of the belief that the 
Zambian legal profession is non-discriminatory because legal acumen and expertise, not 
gender, make one a successful advocate. This view, coupled with the idea that lawyers are 
deemed to be an isolated breed ‘adorned in gowns of superiority’,1196 often lends itself to the 
perception that the legal profession is ‘above’ practising discriminatory behaviour. Some of the 
interview participants emphasised that the profession is concerned with technical skills and not 
gender. The presence of formal equality in regard to studying law and joining the legal 
profession, may contribute to this theory. However, there are signs that in regard to substantive 
equality, all is not well. The first woman President of the LAZ, Ms Linda Kasonde was only 
 
1195 Florence Ndepele Mwachende Mumba, ‘The Quest for Equal Opportunities’, in International Courts and the 
African Woman Judge: Unveiled Narratives, ed. by Josephine Dawuni and Akua Kuenheyia (New York: 
Routledge, 2018), pp. 27–35. 
1196 Namwawa, p.3. 
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elected in 2016 and she served a two year term.1197 She has openly spoken about the personal 
attacks, criticism and sexual objectification she faced based on her gender.1198  
In addition, one woman legal professional stated that ‘women don’t survive in private 
practice’, as evidenced by the paucity of female partners and very few women holding senior 
legal positions.1199 She reiterated that women advocates in Zambia are not excluded from 
global challenges that women face such as sexism, the stress of billing hours for new mothers 
and expectations to bring in new clients.1200 It was further argued that many women would 
prefer to go into government departments, because they receive full employment benefits when 
on maternity leave. This is better than private practice, which thrives on uninterrupted periods 
of labour and billing hours − something that mostly only men can accomplish.1201 Another 
woman advocate explained that the commission earnings structure common in a majority of 
law firms, impeded women’s progress higher up the ranks.1202 From her experience as a junior 
associate, senior associates were unlikely to work on complex matters with juniors, because 
they did not want to share the commission that was attached to each file.1203  
Consequently, women were less likely to gain the requisite experience if they didn’t 
stay at the firm for more than five years and were also less likely to be in the running for partner. 
This also had consequences for any bids to apply for the status of State Counsel (SC). This 
status is a recognition of one’s skill and experience and is akin to Queen’s Counsel in the UK 
and Senior Counsel (SC) status in South Africa and is sometimes called silk. Being an SC is a 
prestigious position entitling one to charge high fees and retainers, take on complex and 
 
1197 Ms Kasonde was also the first woman to become a named partner in an established law firm in 2009. 
1198 Linda Kasonde, ‘Why We Need More Women in Leadership’, News Diggers, 7 March 2018 
<https://diggers.news/guest-diggers/2018/03/07/why-we-need-more-women-in-leadership/> [accessed 28 May 
2018]. 
1199 Interview with Legal Professional 6. 
1200 Ibid. 
1201 Interview with Mr O’Brian Kaaba. 
1202 Interview with Legal Professional 4. 
1203 This commission is in addition to the monthly salaries senior associates receive. 
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important political matters and generally be held in high esteem by the legal fraternity.1204 
Advocates in Zambia must make an application for SC to the Attorney General on the 
recommendation of two other SCs.1205 This application then must be recommended by the 
Attorney General in consultation with the Chief Justice, before the names are sent to the 
president, who has the final say.1206 
 In 2018, the official number of registered SCs affiliated with the LAZ was 31.1207 At 
the time only two women were listed as SCs. Advocate Abha Nayeer Patel who was later 
appointed as a High Court judge in May 20191208 and Lillian Fulata Shawa -Siyuni, the current 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). High Court judge Prisca Nyambe also attained silk 
status before she was appointed to the bench, but as a judge she cannot participate in any of the 
LAZ activities. At the time of conducting fieldwork in 2017, I was informed that two women’s 
names had been submitted to the President for approval as SCs, but they are yet to be appointed. 
The delay could partially be caused by regulations that state that only three SCs may be 
appointed yearly and it can only be increased by the number in which the numbers of the 
preceding year/years falls short.1209 
The LAZ Executive Council (herein LAZ Council) is predominantly comprised of SCs. 
The LAZ Council recommends advocates and is consulted in regard to appointments for 
judicial office and other senior government appointments.1210 The DPP can not participate on 
the LAZ Council, which effectively means that currently, all of the SCs on the LAZ Council 
are men. It is acknowledged that the impact of the low gender composition of the LAZ Council, 
 
1204 Interview with Legal Professional 2. 
1205Ministry of Legal Affairs, The Legal Practioners Act Cap 30. 
1206 Article 17 (2) of the Act. 
1207 Statistics obtained from the Law Association of Zambia website at http://www.laz.org.zm/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/2018-List-of-Paid-Up-Members.pdf 
1208 Benedict Tembo, ‘Abha Patel Raising Zambian Bar’, Zambia Daily Mail, 17 May 2019. 
1209 According to Article 18(2) , Ministry of Legal Affairs, The Legal Practioners Act Cap 30. 
1210 Appointees to the positions of Attorney General and Solicitor General automatically attain the title of SC. 
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does not appear to have negated women’s appointment to the bench at the moment. However 
it is submitted that an equal gender representation of the LAZ Council, is critical for equal 
gender representation in the profession.  
As argued in previous chapters, the presence of more women, in this case on the LAZ 
Council, would be important for a variety of reasons. Equal gender representation on the LAZ 
Council would not only have symbolic value, but it would also bring different perspectives that 
could change perceptions of what is required of a successful SC candidate. This is because all 
advocates applying for SC status have to be approved by the LAZ Council. If ones’ expertise 
and esteem as an advocate is mostly determined by a male LAZ Council, it could perpetuate 
gendered ideas of the attributes that are required by an SC, mirroring the experience of a male 
advocate. An increased representation of women on the LAZ Council could have the potential 
of reducing gender bias often prevalent in male dominated bodies.1211 A detailed look at the 
dynamics of the legal profession would be useful in understanding the tension that is present 
amongst lawyers in Zambia. 
7.3.3 Dynamics in the Legal Profession 
It was clear from the interviews that tension exists between the advocates in private practice 
and those who work in the judiciary, state departments and other government related entities. 
This tension arises from differences about which legal pool best prepares one to be a judge. 
There are those who argued that the best judges come from private practice because advocates 
appear in court regularly. A competing view is that private practice does not have a monopoly 
on judicial craftsmanship, meaning those within the judiciary and other government 
departments, do also make good judges. These opposing views have resulted in accusations 
that the JSC favours one pool of lawyers, at the expense of the other.1212 The previous JSC 
 
1211 See the sections on the gender compositions of the JSC in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
1212 The term Legal Professional refers to all advocates generally, operating in academia, the judiciary, government 
departments and private practice. 
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practice was to appoint people mostly from magistrates and government departments such as 
Legal Aid and the Attorney General’s chambers.1213 After formal submissions from the LAZ 
for changes to this system, the JSC started to consider advocates in private practice and 
gradually more advocates from private practice were appointed to the bench.1214 However, it 
would appear that this decision has not received universal approval. 
7.3.3.1 Lawyers in the Judiciary and Government Ministries  
Registrars who are within the judiciary believe that becoming a judge is a natural progression 
for them. This progression sees one starting off as a Resident Magistrate, then being appointed 
to Senior or Chief Resident Magistrate, before moving on to become a Deputy Registrar, then 
Chief Registrar.1215 The position of Resident Magistrate is the only one for which a candidate 
can proactively apply. The rest of the positions require one to be head hunted by senior staff.1216 
In the period 2013-2017, 38 new magistrates were appointed across the country and 21 (55%) 
were women.1217 As of 2017, the Zambian magistracy had a total of 207 magistrates, of whom 
only 73 (35%) were women.1218 A specific breakdown of how many women occupy leadership 
positions in the magistracy was unavailable. However, the statistics for registrars are relevant 
because that is the final steppingstone before appointment as a judge. As of 2017, there were 
seventeen registrars in the judiciary with eight (47%) of them being women. This is an 
improvement from 2014, when only 3 of the 12 (25%) registrars at the time were women.1219 
 Registrars in Zambia are important quasi-judicial officers and not just administrative 
officials, as they are in other countries like South Africa. In Zambia, registrars handle chamber 
matters or assessment of damages after a judge has found liability for general damages e.g. 
 
1213 Interview with Mr Chishimba. 
1214 Ibid. 
1215 Masengu, ‘Research Report on the Zambian Judicial Appointment System’. 
1216 Interview with Legal Professional 1. 
1217 Statistics obtained from the judiciary in November 2019. 
1218 Statistics obtained from the website of the Zambian judiciary in Septembers 2018. Available at 
http://www.judiciaryzambia.com/women-in-the-judiciary-2014-2018/.  
1219 Ibid. 
 
 
277 
 
personal injuries.1220 If a judge is busy and cannot determine the quantum of damages, it is 
passed on to the deputy registrar to look at the evidence, evaluate and find damages. Of the 
seven judges interviewed in this research, three of them had started off as magistrates before 
becoming registrars and eventually judges.1221 They all submitted that if you performed well 
as a registrar, it was only a matter of time before you would be encouraged by the Chief Justice 
or senior judges to apply to the bench. Consequently, if there is transparency in respect of a 
preference for those from within the judiciary, this could result in more women taking the route 
of registrar, in order to eventually become judges. 
 On more than one occasion, interview participants referred to the attainment of judicial 
office as a reward for one’s long service in the judiciary after working as a magistrate or 
registrar. The Deputy Chief Justice Marvin Mwanamwamba has also previously stated that 
when one reaches the level of Registrar, they have ample experience which allows for a smooth 
transition to judgeship.1222 While this is a great incentive theoretically, it may however result 
in a sense of entitlement from those working within the judiciary. One magistrate I interviewed 
expressed the view that magistrates or people from ‘within the system’ were now being ignored 
as the JSC sought judges from private practice.1223 
Previously we had an advantage, but of late they are picking more from private than 
from the judiciary itself. Which shouldn’t be the case. First look at the people who are 
in a system, the people on the bench. That’s when now you go and fish from outside.1224 
 
According to him, people who had been in private practice for years with commercial law 
specialities, would struggle when dealing with criminal cases on the bench. Magistrates he 
argued, had the value of hearing both sides argue, before weighing up competing evidence. 
 
1220 Masengu, 'Research Report on the Zambian Judicial Appointment System', p.15. 
1221 Justices 1, 3 and 6, with Justice 1 occupying a position on one of the top courts. 
1222 Ibid, p.15. 
1223 Interview with Legal Professional 1. 
1224 Ibid. 
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Therefore if people were to be appointed from private practice, he insisted that it must be only 
those who regularly appear in court and argue matters of all types.1225  
A woman legal professional argued that favouring those from private practice would 
give magistrates no incentive to work hard and churn out judgments, if they would be ‘bypassed 
by somebody coming out of private practice’.1226 The feeling that magistrates should be the 
prime candidates for judgeship was also informed by the view that magistrates considered 
themselves more patriotic than those in private practice. Ironically, advocates in private 
practice argue that the patriotism that magistrates boast of, is proof that they lack the requisite 
independence to be judges.1227 It was explained that there is a fear that career judicial officers 
have ‘baggage’, making them more likely to defer to government.1228 One woman judge also 
added that there was a deliberate attempt from advocates in practice, to look down on judges 
who had been appointed from within the judiciary. She stated, ‘they still look down upon you 
like “no you are not good enough”’.1229 This negative perception was partially informed by the 
view that those who elected to be in private practice sought a challenging environment, while 
those in the judiciary and Ministry of Justice sought security.  
When questions about this view were raised, the Chair of the JSC Justice Ngulube stated 
that ‘those who stay, who stick around in the government circles, cannot be overlooked in 
favour of people who had run away for greener pastures’.1230 Justice Ngulube acknowledged 
that even though preference is given to those from within the judiciary, former magistrates 
sometimes struggle with civil cases. This is because the majority of the work in the magistracy 
is criminal work.1231 Hence the importance of experience as a registrar, where one would be 
 
1225 Ibid. 
1226 Interview with Legal Professional 2. 
1227 Tabeth Masengu 'Research on the Zambian Judicial Appointment System',p.15. 
1228 Interview with Advocate John Sangwa SC. 
1229 Interview with Justice 3. 
1230 Interview with former Chief Justice Ngulube. 
1231 Ibid. 
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exposed to civil law, matters. He also emphasised that with the new Constitutional obligation 
to establish specialised courts, this problem may eventually fade. 
 It is worth mentioning that there were mixed views on judges who had been appointed 
from government departments. Those who had worked in the Ministry of Justice in the civil 
department and the Attorney Generals Chambers, appeared to be more accepted than those who 
worked in conveyancing or company registration.1232 One of the senior women judges I 
interviewed, was previously in the Attorney General’s chambers where her usual workload was 
at least 100 files.1233 Therefore when she transitioned to the bench, a workload of 50-200 files 
did not intimidate her, while her colleagues from private practice appeared to be overwhelmed. 
An assistant Senior Advocate in the Attorney General’s chambers also echoed this, explaining 
that the workload was not only varied in quality of matters, but also very voluminous.1234 She 
added that with only ten advocates representing the Attorney General nationally, advocates 
were often thrown into the deep end and two years there, was the equivalent of ten years work 
in a law firm.1235 
7.3.3.2 Advocates in Private Practice 
The interview participants from private practice considered themselves as the best candidates 
for judicial appointment for the following reasons. Firstly, it was argued that advocates in 
private practice generally had to constantly research further to know more about cases and this 
meant that they were alive to the latest legal developments.1236 A second reason was that private 
practice gave one commercial acumen which translated into efficiency and an understanding 
of a client’s perspective.1237 The third reason was that advocates from private practice were 
 
1232 Two interview participants specifically mentioned a woman judge who had previously been a registrar at the 
Patents and Companies Registration Agency, as an example of a bad appointee. According to them, she lacked 
the requisite experience. 
1233 Interview with Justice 7. 
1234 Interview with Legal Professional 4. 
1235 Ibid. 
1236 Interview with Mr Gideon Kalandanya. 
1237 Interview with Legal Professional 5. 
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less likely to be inclined to side with government and quasi-government institutions.1238 A 
senior woman judge who was appointed from private practice also argued that those from 
private practice could navigate their way around a courtroom better than those who had not 
regularly appeared in court.1239 A JSC commissioner appeared to agree with the importance of 
court appearances as a way of buttressing one’s experience as a lawyer. He stated that a number 
of women had been unsuccessful in their attempts to become judges because they were weighed 
down by the lack of courtroom experience.1240 
 A fourth reason proffered by Advocate Sangwa SC was that judges who came from 
private practice, were doing the job for the ‘correct reasons’.1241 In mentioning three sitting 
judges who came from private practice, he described them as respectable judges because they 
left successful firms to go to the bench.1242 Therefore these judges he argued, were able to 
perform optimally on the bench because they were not seeking security, but rather took the 
position out of conviction to serve the judiciary. The underlying theme in all four arguments 
seemed to be that advocates from private practice are more versatile, commercially savvy and 
independent, than career judicial officers and those in the Ministry of Justice. Yet Advocate 
Sangwa did admit that his experience as a law lecturer also gave him valuable research and 
other experience, which placed him at a further advantage. A judge who had come from private 
practice was quick to point out that it was possible to have people who rarely appear in court 
become excellent judges. She gave the example of former Supreme Court Justice Gardener, 
who had previously been a legislative drafter in the Ministry of Justice and emphasised that 
there was no perfect judge.1243  
 
1238 Ibid. 
1239 Interview with Justice 4. 
1240 Interview with Mr Fredrick Mudenda. 
1241 Interview with Advocate John Sangwa SC. 
1242 One of the three is a woman and one of the men, is now a Supreme Court justice. 
1243 Interview with Justice 4. 
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7.3.3.3 Who will make the best Judges? 
Admittedly there are contesting views about who makes the best judges. Despite the difference 
in views, all the interview participants conceded that there have been good and bad judges from 
all legal pools. There was also agreement that anybody appointed from a conveyancing 
department or any other area of law that is mainly drafting and filing of registration papers, 
would grapple with the quantity and quality of work on the bench. Essentially, these issues all 
relate to the questions covered in Chapter 6 of this thesis: What are the expectations of judges 
and what does the role of the judge entail? Magistrates and registrars have an advantage in 
judgment writing skills, knowledge of court procedure and experience as impartial 
adjudicators. Advocates from private practice or even those working at the Attorney General’s 
chambers could claim an advantage in regard to a wide knowledge of law, the ability to think 
quickly and the propensity to work under pressure. However, neither of these groups would 
have the monopoly on qualities such as independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, being 
a good listener or the moral ability to distinguish between right and wrong.1244 
 These and other qualities have more to do with character and personality traits which 
are not established in a particular legal pool. Perhaps they can be improved on depending on 
what type of work one deals with, but essentially anybody can be found wanting. Once this is 
recognised, the question becomes less about who makes the best judge and more about how 
the JSC can create the best pool of judges. Two suggestions were offered by the interview 
participants. The first was that the JSC needs to ensure that judicial appointees are a mix of 
people from the judiciary, Ministry of Justice and private practice. The LAZ has previously 
made a submission to parliament stating the importance of having a mix of people with 
different legal backgrounds, because this would bring different perspectives and exposure to 
 
1244 These and other expectation of judges were explained in Chapter 6 entitled ‘Expectations of Judges and 
How They Can Affect the Appointment of Women’. 
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the bench.1245 In this scenario, the judiciary would be able to get the best of both worlds, which 
would even be more beneficial, once the specialised High Courts are fully functional.1246 
 The second suggestion was that judges should be trained after leaving university, as is 
done in civil law countries. Advocate Sangwa admitted that his suggestion was a radical way 
of changing the current system, but he argued that this system was less open to manipulation 
as prospective judges would be trained straight out of law school.1247 He added that making the 
appointment of judges contingent on having the necessary academic qualifications would be 
less open to corruption and would be dictated by the needs of the country. Another lawyer 
agreed with this perspective but stated that there was no need to re-invent the wheel, as there 
was already a training pool for judges, the magistracy. 1248 She argued that people who aspired 
to become judges should all go via the magistracy, so that they could be trained and rise up 
through the system. This she opined, was the best way to build the system and counter 
arguments about who makes the best judges. 
 The current system of preferring those in the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice over 
those in private practice does seem to be working well for women. Despite the view by some 
interview participants that magistrates are being neglected in favour of those from private 
practice, there appears to be no evidence of this in the last few years. At least, not in regard to 
women. One senior judge explained that of the fourteen women judges working in the Lusaka 
courts, only three had come from private practice.1249 The absence of detailed background 
information on all judges, means that I cannot provide an accurate picture of where judges are 
being drawn from. 1250 However, if the system were amended to reflect an equal combination 
 
1245 Interview with Legal Professional 5. 
1246 These include a Commercial Court, Family Court and Children’s Court. 
1247 Interview with Advocate John Sangwa SC. 
1248 Interview with Legal Professional 2. 
1249 Interview with Justice 4. 
1250 The judiciary would not furnish me with such details as they were concerned about the judges’ privacy. 
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of those from private practice and those from within government, perhaps there would be a 
drop in the number of eligible women, because of how difficult it is for women to succeed in 
private practice. Ultimately it would seem that in this period of study, using the judiciary and 
Ministry of Justice as the preferred pools of appointment for women has contributed to the 
increased number of women judges on the bench. 
7.4 CONCLUSION OF PART 1 
The purpose of this entire chapter is the examination of the legal profession, in order to provide 
context to questions regarding judicial diversity. To provide a foundation for the examination 
of the Zambian legal profession, this chapter commenced with an introduction to the legal 
profession generally. Thereafter, I summarised current literature on the challenges that women 
face globally in the legal profession. Some of these challenges mirrored those that were 
expressed by women judges in Chapter 6 of this thesis, such as discrimination on the basis of 
gender, and stereotypes about women’s competence. Other challenges were peculiar to the 
profession, such as the lack of social and cultural capital, fewer opportunities for progression 
and bias in promotion criteria. I then examined the legal profession regarding the necessary 
qualifications to qualify as an advocate in Zambia, and explained the criticism surrounding the 
institute that trains would be advocates.  
The next section of part 1 examined the structure of the legal profession, noting the 
absence of gender disaggregated data from both the ZIALE and the LAZ. I argued that the 
absence of this data could be due to perceptions that gender disaggregated data is not relevant 
or that it is unnecessary, because it is perceived that there is no discrimination in the legal 
profession. The final section of part 1, focused on the dynamics in the legal profession 
generally. There was also a specific focus on the contestation between those in private practice 
and those in the judiciary and Ministry of Justice. Those in private practice suggested that they 
are better placed to be judges because of their vast litigation experience. I concluded part 1 by 
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suggesting that the current system of judicial appointments favours those from within the 
judiciary and Ministry of Justice who are mainly women. I now move on to part 2 on South 
Africa, where there are similarities and differences with the Zambian Legal Profession. 
7.5 PART 2 - THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
7.5.1 Trajectory of Legal Professionals 
There have been changes to both legal education and the governance of the legal profession 
since the end of apartheid in South Africa. In this section, I shall focus on the career paths of 
magistrates, attorneys and advocates because that is where judges have been drawn from since 
1994.1251 Prior to 1997, universities offered a B.Proc (Baccalaureus Procurationis) or B Iuris 
degree as an undergraduate qualification in law which was the minimum educational 
requirement for becoming an attorney.1252 Some, mostly previously white universities also 
offered the graduate LLB (Baccalaureus Legum) degree which was a necessary requirement if 
one wanted to qualify as an advocate. After 1997, universities have offered a four year LLB or 
a five year LLB which enabled one to also graduate with a Bachelor of Arts (BA) or Bachelor 
of Commerce (BCom) undergraduate degree.1253 Thereafter one could pursue one of the 
following routes. 
7.5.1.1 The Magistracy Route 
The Magistrates Courts, also known as the lower courts of the judiciary hear less serious civil 
and criminal cases and are regulated by the Magistrates Act of 1993.1254 Previously, magistrates 
were only appointed from the ranks of State Prosecutors who form part of the public service.1255 
 
1251 Other possible career paths in law include working in the Masters Office and the Office of the Family 
Advocate. 
1252 Lisa R Pruitt, ‘No Black Names on the Letterhead? Efficient Discrimination and the South African Legal 
Profession’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 23 (2002), 545–671. 
1253 These are offered at approximately seventeen law faculties in the country. 
1254 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Magistrates Act, 1993 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/regulations/r2006/MAGISTRATES.pdf> [accessed 19 September 2018]. 
1255 Morne Olivier, ‘Is the South African Magistracy Legitimate’, South African Law Journal, 118. (2001), 166–
176. 
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One could become a prosecutor after completing an LLB degree and completing an exam to be 
part of the Aspirant Prosecutor training. If successful, the candidate trained for twelve months 
as an intern with the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa.1256 On completion of the 
programme, one was appointed as a District prosecutor and could rise up the ranks to eventually 
move to the magistracy. Today, the magistracy is not only limited to prosecutors; there has 
been an influx of mostly attorneys and a few advocates applying to become magistrates. In 
order to be eligible for appointment as a magistrate one must have, amongst other things, seven 
years of post-university applicable experience.1257  
The District Court is the lowest level of all magistrates courts and can hear civil and 
criminal matters of up to R200 000.1258 District Court magistrates can progress to being a 
Senior Magistrate and then Chief Magistrate, or they can be appointed as a Regional Court 
Magistrate. The Regional Courts hear more serious criminal cases such as murder and Regional 
Magistrates now also preside over civil matters such as divorce, transfer of property and actions 
arising from credit agreements that do not exceed the amounts determined by the Minister.1259 
Magistrates are appointed by the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services (herein Minister 
of Justice)1260 after they are interviewed by the Magistrates Commission.1261 Subsequent to a 
successful interview, they must complete a six months course at the Justice College before 
beginning to preside in court.1262 
 
1256 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa, Post: Aspirant Prosecutor Training, 2015 
<https://www.npa.gov.za/sites/default/files/careers/NPA Adverts 03 July 2015.pdf> [accessed 19 September 
2018]. 
1257 The Magistrates Commission Republic of South Africa, The Magistrates Commission Invites Applications to 
Fill the Judicial Vacancies on the Following Levels, 2016 <http://www.justice.gov.za/vacancies/201605-
MagistratePosts.pdf> [accessed 19 September 2018]. 
1258 Western Cape Government, ‘The Courts of South Africa’, Western Cape Government, 2017 
<https://www.westerncape.gov.za/general-publication/courts-south-africa#11> [accessed 19 September 2018]. 
1259 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Amendment Act, 
2008 <http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/bills/081105a31-08.pdf> [accessed 19 
September 2018]. 
1260 The Minister was previously called the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development. 
1261 Part 1 of the Magistrates Court Act. 
1262 Since 2012, the Justice College is part of the South African Legal Education Institute. 
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7.5.1.2 The Attorneys’ Profession 
The admission requirements to become an attorney as of August 2018 are now prescribed by 
the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014.1263 Prior to August 2018, the attorneys’ profession was 
overseen by the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA). It has since been replaced by the South 
Africa Legal Practice Council which will exercise jurisdiction over all legal practioners.1264 In 
this period of study (prior to the new changes), one qualified as an attorney by obtaining an 
LLB and undergoing practical training, through one of two routes. The first route was the 
completion of a two year period of articles of clerkship with either a private law firm, or the 
State Attorney’s office, or a recognised community service organisation or legal aid 
institution.1265 This would be combined with a practical legal training course for five 
continuous weeks. The second route was to serve one year of articles of clerkship followed (or 
preceded) by six months of full time study at the School of Legal Practice. 1266 
  The current guidelines in the new Act add an extra requirement, which is the 
completion of community service in designated areas of practice.1267 One must also 
successfully pass the attorney’s admission exam which is practice oriented, before applying to 
be admitted as an Attorney of the High Court of South Africa.1268 Newly admitted attorneys 
can either practise in commercial firms and community service institutions which include 
organisations like university law clinics and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). 
Alternatively, they can join the State Attorney’s office, which is the equivalent of Attorney 
 
1263 Previously prescribed by the Department of Justice, Attorneys Act (Pretoria, 1979) 
<https://www.lawsoc.co.za/upload/files/ATTORNEYS_ACT_53_OF_1979.pdf> [accessed 19 Sptember 2018]. 
1264Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, The Legal Pratice Act, Government Gazette, 2014 
<http://www.lssa.org.za/upload/documents/Legal Practice Act GG 38022 of 22 September 2014.pdf> [accessed 
4 October 2018]. 
1265 Article 2 of the Attorneys Act of 1979. 
1266 The training was organised by the Law Society’s School of Legal Practice. 
1267 See section 26(c)(i) and section 29 of the Legal Practice Act. 
1268 The exams are held twice yearly, so a candidate has more than one opportunity to write the exams. 
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Generals chambers and is tasked with providing legal services to national and provincial 
departments.1269  
7.5.1.3 How does one become an Advocate? 
Similar to the attorneys’ profession, one needs additional training in order to qualify as an 
advocate. Once a prospective candidate is in possession of an LLB, they can apply for pupillage 
with a constituent Bar. There are ten Bars affiliated to the General Council of the Bar (GCB) 
of South Africa and each Bar is an independent association.1270 Each applicant for pupillage is 
evaluated using a standardised scoring system which assesses academic results, relevant 
previous experience, aptitude and motivation to be an advocate, and an entrance 
examination.1271 The pupillage period runs for one year and each pupil is assigned to a pupil 
mentor to guide them through the process. Unlike the articles of clerkship period for attorneys, 
where clerks are remunerated, pupils are not paid a salary during their one year period. Limited 
financial assistance is offered by the GCB, the Cape, Johannesburg and Pretoria Bars.1272 
 The pupillage period consists of practical courtcraft, legal document drafting skills and 
procedural law.1273 Previously, if one completed their pupillage period, passed their exams and 
was declared a fit and proper person, they would be admitted as an advocate of the High Court 
of South Africa. Now, the Legal Practice Act also requires prospective advocates to undertake 
community service as contemplated by section 26 (c) (i) of the Act. Once they have completed 
their community service, they can practise as an independent advocate affiliated to a constituent 
Bar or apply to the National Prosecuting Authority to be a State Advocate (prosecutors in the 
 
1269 Well known NGOs include the Legal Resources Centre, the Women’s Legal Clinic, Probono.org and 
Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre. 
1270 General Council of the Bar, ‘A Career at the Bar in South Africa:The General Council of the Bar (GCB)’, 
General Council of the Bar South Africa <https://www.sabar.co.za/legal-career.html> [accessed 19 September 
2018]. 
1271 Cape Bar Society of Advocates, Pupillage Selection Policy (Cape Town, 2017) <https://capebar.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/Cape-Bar-pupillage-selection-policy-2017-05-25.pdf> [accessed 19 September 2018]. 
1272 General Council of the Bar. 
1273 Ibid. 
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High Courts). With this description of the three different pools from which judges are drawn, 
I now turn to the challenges faced by women in each pool. 
7.5.2 Dynamics in the Legal Profession 
7.5.2.1 Magistrates, the coalface of the Judicial System 
The Magistrate courts as the lowest tier of the judicial system, are ‘the primary gateway of 
access to justice for the majority of members of the public’ because very few members of the 
public can afford access to the High Courts.1274 The magistracy was previously beset by 
illegitimacy concerns because it was formerly dominated by white magistrates only (the 
demographic minority) and appointments were strongly influenced by the executive.1275 
Magistrates have now become public office-bearers, instead of civil servants and the previous 
administrative tasks handled by senior magistrates are now the responsibility of court 
managers.1276 In the democratic era, the Magistrates Commission has made great strides to 
improve the racial and gender demographics of the magistracy. The table below illustrates the 
statistics of the magistracy in the period 2013-2017. 
Table 5 - Magistrates1277 
Year African 
Male 
African 
Female 
Indian 
Male 
Indian 
Female 
Coloured 
Male 
Coloured 
Female 
White 
Male 
White 
Female 
Total 
2013 424 268 60 86 78 57 461 235 1659 
2014 416 285 50 65 65 48 304 177 1225 
2015 392 272 60 84 84 61 387 228 1568 
2016 259 233 66 93 85 68 346 244 1570 
2017 537 408 80 114 110 90 400 279 2018 
 
1274 Pritzman Busani Mabunda, BLA Welcomes Appointments of District Magistrates (Johannesburg, 2015). 
1275 Olivier 'Is the South African Magistracy Legitimate',p.168. 
1276 The Presidency, Twenty Year Review South Africa (1-43, 1994) <https://www.dpme.gov.za/publications/20 
Years Review/20 Year Review Documents/20YR Judiciary.pdf> [accessed 3 October 2018]. 
1277 Statistics provide by the Magistrates Commission from 2016-2018. 
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  In 1998, only 284(18%) of the total number of magistrates were women. By 2013, the 
numbers had increased to 39% and by 2017 this had risen to 44%. In 1998, of 1515 magistrates, 
only 567 (37%) were black and by 2017, it had risen to 66%. Senior positions such as the 
Regional Court Presidents and Regional Court Magistrates were previously dominated by 
white men.1278 As of May 2017, four out of nine Regional Court Presidents are women, with 
155 of 359 (43%) women Regional Magistrates. Despite the impressive transformation, the 
magistracy has been plagued by various problems. Firstly, the magistracy still suffers from the 
stigma brought on by its skewed composition during apartheid and its reputation as a hub for 
‘government’ appointees who lack independence.1279  
The independence of the magistracy was called into question in the case of Van Rooyen 
and Others v The State and Others.1280 In this case, the High Court held that the Magistrates 
Commission was an executive structure that lacked independence. Consequently, because the 
Commission lacked independence, the magistracy was bereft of institutional protection that it 
required to function independently and impartially.1281 Further, the High Court held that a 
number of provisions pertaining to the magistracy were inconsistent with the Constitution. 
However the Constitutional Court later overturned this ruling and decided that the mere fact 
that the executive and the legislature participate in the appointment process is not inconsistent 
with judicial independence. Therefore, the magistracy was sufficiently independent as required 
by the Constitution.1282 
 
1278 In 1998, five of seven Regional Court Presidents were white men and so were 144 of 173 Regional Court 
Magistrates. 
1279 Olivier 'Is the South African Magistracy Legitimate', p.166. 
1280 Van Rooyen and Others v The State and Others 2001 (4) SA 396 (T); 2001 (9) BCLR 915 (T). 
1281 Ibid at para 26. 
1282 S and Others v Van Rooyen and Others (CCT21/01) [2002] ZACC 8; 2002 (5) SA 246; 2002 (8) BCLR 810 
(11 June 2002). 
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Despite this decision, critics have argued that the Magistrates Commission still lacks 
the power and authority to make independent decisions and that the Minister of Justice has too 
many discretionary powers.1283 In addition, a number of allegations of corruption over the years 
has not improved the perception of the magistracy as one that lacks institutional 
independence.1284 These allegations have included allegations of fraud1285 and corruption 
arising from accepting a bribe to influencing a case.1286 The second issue plaguing the 
magistracy is its structural organisation. There has been a desire to restructure the judiciary to 
have a single (unified) judiciary instead of the Magistracy and the Superior Courts.1287 The 
unified judiciary is not meant to abolish the lower and higher courts, in order to create one type 
of court. Rather, it is a call ‘for unity in name, administration and control’ and a replacement 
of the Magistrates Commission, with the Judicial Service Commission, undertaking its 
tasks.1288  
Steps to unify the judiciary were affected by the Constitution 17th Amendment Bill,1289 
which allowed for the enacting of the Superior Court Act.1290 The Act replaces the term 
‘Magistrates Courts’ with ‘Lower courts’ and also enables the Chief Justice to establish norms 
and standards for the whole country, including for magistrates. The Judge President in each 
 
1283 Vanja Karth, ‘Transforming the South African Magistracy: How Far Have We Come?’ (University of Cape 
Town, 2007) <https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/3788/thesis_hsf_2007_karth_v.pdf?sequence=1>. 
1284See Open Society Foundation, South Africa Justice Sector and the Rule of Law A Review by AfriMAP and 
Open Society Foundation for South Africa Open Society Foundation (Cape Town, 2005) 
<www.afrimap.orgwww.osf.org.za> [accessed 3 October 2018], p.66. 
1285 Editor, ‘Former Magistrate in Court for Fraud and Corruption’, Mpumalanga News, 7 June 2018 
<https://mpumalanganews.co.za/338559/former-magistrate-court-fraud-corruption/> [accessed 3 October 2018]. 
1286 Katherine Child, ‘Corrupt Magistrate Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison’, Times Live, 20 April 2018 
<https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-04-20-corrupt-magistrate-sentenced-to-15-years-in-
prison/> [accessed 3 October 2018]. 
1287 This was first tabled by the Policy Unit of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development in The 
Vision 2000 document. 
1288 Kees van Dijkhorst, ‘The Future of the Magistracy’, Advocate, 13.1 (2000), 39–42 
<https://www.sabar.co.za/law-journals/2000/firstterm/2000-firstterm-vol013-no1-pp39-42.pdf> [accessed 3 
October 2018]. 
1289 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill 6 (Cape 
Town: National Assembly, 2011) <http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/docs/110628seventeenth_0.pdf> [accessed 3 October 2018]. 
1290 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Superior Courts Act, Government Gazette, 2013 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2013-010.pdf> [accessed 3 October 2018]. 
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province also now has responsibility to coordinate judicial functions of all Magistrates Courts 
falling under their jurisdiction. Critics of the proposal for a unified judiciary have argued that 
these changes are an effort to try and establish a career path from the lowest court to the two 
highest courts− the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court.1291 Former Judge 
President Bernard Ngoepe argued this was unnecessary because a career path for judicial 
officers would deter experienced practioners from accepting appointments. In his opinion, the 
best source of appointments was from the advocates profession and thus, magistrates would be 
ill equipped as judges.1292  
How do the two issues plaguing the magistracy relate to women and their aspirations 
for appointment on the Superior Courts bench? Over the years I have gained useful insight into 
the challenges women face, from my interactions with magistrates on various projects.1293 
Firstly, I have heard from both magistrates and judges that there is a perception that a unified 
judiciary is not feasible, because it would be robbing judges of their much-earned status. 
Essentially, the stigma against magistrates goes beyond their being considered as ‘public 
servants’ and corruptible. They are perceived as not being good enough to be considered akin 
to judges of the Superior Courts. This notion has extended into the JSC interviews and on a 
number of occasions magistrates have been interrogated about whether they believe that their 
work is equivalent to the work of judges of the High Court.  
In one interview, Regional Magistrate Sardia Jacobs explained to the JSC that since the 
Regional Court now handled civil matters in addition to serious criminal trials, her experience 
 
1291 Bernad M Ngoepe, ‘White Paper on the Judicial System Memorandum by Pretoria Judges BM Ngoepe’, 
Advocate, 13.1 (2000), 27–32 <https://www.sabar.co.za/law-journals/2000/firstterm/2000-firstterm-vol013-no1-
pp27-28-and-30-32.pdf> [accessed 21 August 2018]. 
1292 Ibid at p.1. 
1293 These projects include the countrywide Legal Sector meetings conducted from 2013-2015 and the Womens 
Pioneer Programme which sees magistrates mentor women LLB students from the University of Cape Town 
(2015-2017). 
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as a Regional Court Magistrate was no different to a High Court judge.1294 This earned her the 
ire of some commissioners and in a subsequent interview in 2014 for the same position, she 
was asked to revisit her opinion on the matter.1295 The women magistrates I have interacted 
with have stated that despite guidelines calling for a career path from the lower courts to the 
higher courts, they would never be considered as ‘good enough’ as evidenced by Sardia Jacobs’ 
interview and others. The perception that magistrates are not good enough also refers to their 
experience or lack of it. Justice Mocumie, previously a magistrate herself, acknowledges that 
in the past district magistrates were not rotated and as such they were stuck in either civil or 
criminal sections only.1296 The Regional Magistrate courts lacked civil jurisdiction prior to 
2014, so despite trying criminal trials akin to those in the High Court, Regional Magistrates 
had insufficient adjudication experience. 
Women magistrates have stated that they are often lumped into the family courts and 
criminal courts, which makes them less equipped for High Court positions.1297 However, 
Mocumie argues that even though Regional Magistrates now hear civil law matters, this is still 
not considered as good enough by the JSC.1298 Mocumie opines that in the district courts, there 
have been some changes and now magistrates are rotated into different sections to garner varied 
experience.1299 This she writes, coupled with an effective mentoring system by High Court 
judges, should give magistrates more exposure and experience that will silence their critics. 
Critics of the magistracy often overlook the fact that the magistracy is composed of 44% 
women magistrates and is more reflective of both gender and race, than the other two legal 
 
1294 JSC Interview held on 18 October 2012 at the Grand Westin Hotel, Cape Town. 
1295 JSC Interview held on 8 October 2014 at the Twelve Apostles Hotel , Cape Town. 
1296 Mocumie, 'Gender Transformation in the Judiciary', p.8. 
1297 View from participants at the DGRU and Sonke Gender Justice legal sector meetings in Johannesburg and 
Port Elizabeth, on 9 November 2013 and 29 March 2014 respectively. 
1298 Ibid. 
1299 Ibid. 
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pools that will be discussed below. If the magistracy is side-lined as an untapped pool that 
could be drawn on for different expertise, it would defeat efforts to diversify the judiciary.  
One of the research interview participants opined that the problem with the magistracy 
is that they ‘don’t promote themselves like the Law Society and the Bar promote their 
people’.1300 The promotion she referred to relates to the need to ‘advertise’ one’s profession as 
competent, skilled, capable and efficient. This advertisement is especially imperative in light 
of the importance of visibility, if one wants to be offered an opportunity to act as a High Court 
Judge. Which as mentioned in Chapter 6, is now a de facto requirement for permanent 
appointment as a judge.1301 Women magistrates have complained that they are often not privy 
to information about how to apply for acting appointment or even how the selection process 
works.1302 Unlike advocates and attorneys who are noticed by judges when they appear before 
them to argue a matter, magistrates are confined to their own courts and will not come to the 
High Court’s attention, unless a case they preside over is taken on review. Thus, magistrates 
must hope that they fall under a Judge President who is pro-active enough to seek 
recommendations of magistrates who can act as judges.1303 
7.5.2.2 Attorneys 
In 2004, Thulu Mhlugu argued that preliminary findings of an investigation into the supply and 
demand for attorneys indicated that there was an oversupply of attorneys, against what the 
public and the state were prepared to pay.1304 This is unsurprising because the attorneys’ 
profession is a more attractive option for many law school graduates. There are fewer financial 
risks, especially for black practitioners who have financial obligations due to family 
 
1300 Interview with Legal Professional L. 
1301 See Chapter 6 on ‘The Expectations of Judges’ and particularly the section on challenges facing judicial 
aspirants in South Africa. 
1302 Masengu and Sanger. 
1303 Former Judge President of the Northern Cape Frans Kgomo and current Gauteng Judge President Dunstan 
Mlambo have been applauded by women magistrates for proactively seeking them out. 
1304 Thuli Mhlungu, ‘Educating and Licensing Attorneys in South Africa’ (Georgia, 2004), pp. 1–15 
<http://clarkcunningham.org/Professionalism/GSULRev-MhlunguDraft2.pdf> [accessed 29 August 2018]. 
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circumstances and university loans.1305 The table below provides statistics of practising 
attorneys in this research period (2013-2017).1306 It should be noted that they were some 
inaccuracies in the race statistics provided by the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) and 
thus when summed up, the numbers will not reflect the accurate total number of attorneys.1307 
 
Table 6 - Attorneys.1308 
Year Women Men Total 
practising 
attorneys 
Non-White 
Women 
and 
Men1309 
White 
Women 
and Men 
Race 
Unspecified 
2013 8102 14385 22487 8024 14189 272 
2014 8708 15004 23712 8659 14694 368 
2015 9356 15344 24700 9790 14696 273 
2016 9818 15465 25283 10025 14765 500 
2017 10309 15808 26117 10712 14890 547 
  
The statistics above show that in 2013 the profession was composed of 36% women 
and as of 2017, this had gone up to 39%. On the face of it, this appears to be an improvement. 
Yet in all the five years of research, more women graduated from law school than men and 
 
1305 Masengu, ‘It’s a Man’s World: Barriers to Gender Transformation in the South African Judiciary', p.311. 
1306 Statistics obtained from the Law Society of South Africa website, see http://www.lssa.org.za/about-
us/about-the-attorneys-profession/lssa-lead-annual-statistics. 
1307 The LSSA does place a disclaimer on its website, saying that the data is received and published as is from 
the relevant Law Society divisions and they assume no responsibility for any errors or omissions. 
1308 The statistics are from April of each year to March of the following year e.g. April 2013-March 2014 is 
counted as the year 2013. 
1309 This refers to Africans, Coloureds, Indians and those who identified as others. 
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more women undertook articles.1310 Of the 11,340 attorneys who were admitted to practise law 
in this research period, 6648 were women, a total of 59%.1311 Therefore the skewed 
composition amongst practising attorneys in favour of men, prompts the question what happens 
to all the women? In regard to race, the contrast in progress is similar. The overwhelming 
number of people graduating with law degrees, undertaking articles and getting admitted as 
attorneys are black (Africans, Coloureds and Indians), yet the majority of practising attorneys 
as displayed above are white. In 2017 alone just 41% of practising attorneys were black, up 
from 36% in 2013 yet in the five years of study, the majority of LLB graduates and admitted 
attorneys were black.1312  
Research has shown that experiences of practising law are highly gendered, and this 
affects women’s ability to stay and thrive in law firms.1313 Added to this is the intersectionalities 
of race, gender and even class, which have devastating effects, especially for black women. In 
2013 a demographic survey of 55% of the corporate law attorneys in South Africa found that 
31% of the equity partners were women, with only 5% of them being black women.1314 The 
study also revealed that 53% of all equity partners were white and male.1315 There were more 
white lawyers in senior positions than any other race group: 89% of managing partners and 
80% of the chief executives. At the level of equity partners, 79% were white women or men 
and nearly half of the African women professionally employed in large corporate law firms 
 
1310 Information obtained from the Law Society of South Africa Annual statistics, found at 
http://www.lssa.org.za/about-us/about-the-attorneys-profession/lssa-lead-annual-statistics. 
1311 Ibid. 
1312 For a detailed discussion on law graduates, articles and admissions, see Jonathan Klaaren, ‘South Africa: A 
Legal Profession in Transformation’, 2018 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3375928>. 
1313 Kay and Gorman and also see Judith K. Pringle and others, ‘Women’s Career Progression in Law Firms: 
Views from the Top, Views From Below’, Gender, Work and Organization, 24.4 (2017), 435–49 
<https://doi.org/10.1111/gwao.12180>.. 
1314 Plus 94, Project Law: Demographic Survey of Large Corporate Law Firms, South Africa (Johannesburg, 
2013) <https://www.vancecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/stories/vancecenter/demographic survey 
report_final.pdf> [accessed 5 October 2018]. 
1315 Jonathan Klaaren, ‘Current Demographics in Large Corporate Law Firms in South Africa’, African Journal 
of Legal Studies, 7 (2014), 587–94 <https://wiser.wits.ac.za/sites/default/files/AJLS_007_04_06_2059-
Klaaren%5B5%5D_0.pdf> [accessed 17 May 2018]. 
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(48.1%) were candidate attorneys.1316 In the 12 participating law firms in a survey done by 
Jonathan Klaaren, only 13.8% of the African women were employed at equity partner or 
director level, with no black women lawyers at managing partner or chief executive level. 1317 
 A 2016 survey conducted by the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) does not show 
much change in law firm demographics of the 12,373 law firms countrywide.1318 There were 
20% less fully white-owned firms and 14% more mixed-ownership firms, than in 2008. Fully 
black-owned firms grew by 3%, but the majority of the firms had an all-male ownership 
structure (53%) with 27% mixed gender and only 20% women owned firms.1319 Even in the 
mixed ownership firms, women were the minority even though there has been an increase in 
mixed ownership firms (8% to 27%).1320 What is clear is that much like in Canada, the 
profession is encountering difficulties in its efforts to absorb and provide opportunities for 
upward mobility to an increasing and more diverse number of entrants to law.1321 In a 2016 
article, I argued that the uneven law setting described above is what Bolton and Muzio have 
characterised as a pattern of vertical stratification.1322 This occurs when a growing cohort of 
predominantly female subordinates are confined to ‘a frequently transient proletarian role’ and 
deployed to support the earnings and privileges of a relatively prosperous and autonomous elite 
of predominately male partners.1323 
 
1316 Klaaren, ‘Current Demographics in Large Corporate Law Firms in South Africa’p.591. 
1317 Ibid at p.592. 
1318Law Society of South Africa and LexisNexis, Attorneys’ Profession in South Africa (Pretoria, 2016) 
<http://www.lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA-LexisNexis---Infographic-Report-2016-Survey-of-the-Attorneys-
Profession.pdf> [accessed 5 October 2018]. 
1319 Ibid at p. 20. 
1320 P.21. 
1321 Fiona M. Kay and Joan Brockman, ‘Barriers to Gender Equality in the Canadian Legal Establishment’, 
Feminist Legal Studies, 8.2 (2000), 169–98 <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009205626028>. 
1322 Masengu, ‘It’s a Man’s World: Barriers to Gender Transformation in the South African Judiciary. 
Perspectives from Women Advocates and Attorneys’. 
1323 Bolton and Muzio, p.6. 
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The past 30 years have seen the emergence of a large corporate law firm sector.1324 In 
these firms, the ‘track to partnership in South Africa is more of an endurance contest, a period 
of paying one's dues’.1325 To eventually become a salaried, then equity partner, one must 
persevere for at least five years once admitted as an attorney.1326 This is why Seuffert et al 
argue that the stratification of partnership was specifically designed to keep women out of 
equity partnership.1327 A 2017 study by Meyer on women in law firms in South Africa, found 
that not only are women outnumbered, they are significantly under-represented.1328 This is 
because only half of the female population is represented at the partnership level and men are 
over-represented.1329 Partnership is not just about having a stake in management decisions or 
equity, it also means greater financial security, power and flexibility. Yet the road to become a 
partner or even advance in law firms, is beset by various complex factors. The first factor is 
human capital development, which often encompasses education, acquired skills and 
experience earned.1330 The legacy of apartheid has meant that those who attained their 
education at formerly non-white (Bantu) institutions, cannot compete for articles of clerkship, 
with white counterparts who went to elite institutions.1331 Only a small number of politically 
connected black people or those who trained outside of the country are considered as 
marketable candidates.1332 The more prestigious university one goes to, the higher the chances 
of being hired as a candidate attorney, which is the entry point into the firms. 
 
1324 Klaaren, South Africa: A Profession in Transformation,p.5. 
1325 Pruitt,p.603. 
1326 Ibid. 
1327 Nan Seuffert, Trish Mundy, and Susan Price, ‘Diversity Policies Meet the Competency Movement: Towards 
Reshaping Law Firm Partnership Models for the Future’, International Journal of the Legal Profession, 25.1 
(2018), 31–65 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09695958.2017.1359613>. 
1328 Tamlynne, Meyer, ‘Female Attorneys in South Africa: A Quantitative Analysis’, African Journal of 
Employee Relations,42 (2018),1-21. 
1329 Ibid, pp.13-14. 
1330 Fiona M Kay and John Hagan, ‘Raising the Bar: The Gender Stratification of Law-Firm Capital’, American 
Sociological Review, 63.5 (1998), 728–43. 
1331 Pruitt, p.567. 
1332 Ibid. 
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 Closely related to human capital development is cultural capital, which encompasses 
‘general dispositions’ and a ‘cultural awareness’ that can facilitate and nurture social 
connections and provide information about opportunity systems.1333 During my period of 
articles of clerkship in a medium sized firm, I realised that the cultural awareness that is prized 
at most law firms is an awareness most familiar and particular to white male activities and 
privileges. These include but are not limited to playing golf, membership of the local country 
club and access to various holiday homes.1334 Displaying particular tastes, styles or 
understandings can often serve as a cultural resource, because one can manage impressions and 
construct social networks through that.1335 Black lawyers to a large extent and women lawyers 
(especially black women) are less likely to possess the general dispositions of the white male 
due to different historical backgrounds, financial capital and educational access resulting from 
apartheid.1336  
In research conducted by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), black 
participants expressed feelings of difference and alienation in law firms due to lack of cultural 
capital.1337 One choice available to them was to try and assimilate into the dominant culture 
through language, behaviour and other social conduct. The option of assimilating is borne from 
the recognition that cultural capital, paves the way into the inner circle from where important 
networks are made that are critical to one’s legal ascension.1338 A lack of the cultural capital 
would lead to career stagnation in a firm. This is not unique to South Africa and research 
 
1333 Kay and Hagan, p.730. 
1334 For a discussion on how merit is also illuminated through traditional practices such as homosocial bonding, 
see Hilary Sommerland ‘The “Social Magic” of Merit: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in the English and 
Welsh Legal Profession’, Fordham L. Rev., 83 (2015), 2325–48. 
1335 Kay and Hagan, p.731. 
1336 Masengu 'It’s a Man's World: Barriers to Gender Transformation in the South African Judiciary ', p.312. 
1337 Centre for Applied Legal Studies, Transformation of the Legal Profession (Johannesburg, 2013) 
<https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/faculties-and-schools/commerce-law-and-management/research-
entities/cals/documents/programmes/gender/Transformation of the Legal Profession.pdf> [accessed 16 May 
2018]. 
1338 Masengu 'It’s a Man's World: Barriers to Gender Transformation in the South African Judiciary ', p.312. 
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conducted in England and Wales also provided similar observations. Promotion in firms was 
tied to bringing in new clients through strategic activities located in gendered, cultural and 
ethnic specific spaces, such as the side-lines of sporting events, the confines of exclusive clubs 
and camaraderie of drinking engagements.1339 This left Black Minority and Ethnic (BME) 
people and white women excluded. Some chose to assimilate which meant adopting traits 
which conform to the dominant white male, dressing in a particular manner and minimizing 
visibility or impact of family life.1340 
 On account of South Africa’s racial history, the majority of corporate clients are white 
and buoyed by the currency of cultural capital in law firms, prefer giving work to other white 
males.1341 Solanke argues that studies have also shown that gender and race create a qualitative 
difference due to negative myths and stereotypes which can covertly influence decision-
making.1342 The decision-making on who the preferred attorneys are, means that women are 
less likely to be retained and to be promoted, because they are not receiving briefs. Kay and 
Brockman have argued that regardless of experience, field of law, billable hours, clientele 
responsibilities, and size of firm, men have consistently higher likelihoods of attaining 
partnership status than women.1343 The situation in South Africa is also informed by what 
Pearce et al refer to as the myth of the meritocratic journey of the atomistic individual.1344 This 
approach rests on an assumption that once at the firm, partners and associates behave as 
atomistic actors, such that their achievement is a function of individual merit and that 
discrimination only occurs when individuals in power intentionally engage in it. 1345  
 
1339 Tomlinson and others,p.251. 
1340 Ibid, p.258.  
1341 See Plus 94 report in totality. 
1342 Iyiola Solanke, ‘Putting Race and Gender Together: A New Approach To Intersectionality’, Modern Law 
Review, 72.5 (2009), 723–49 (p.732) <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2009.00765.x>. 
1343 Kay and Brockman,p.182. 
1344 Russell G Pearce, Eli Wald, and Swethaa S Ballakrishnen, ‘Difference Blindness Vs. Bias Awareness: Why 
Law Firms With The Best Of Intentions Have Failed To Create Diverse Partnerships’, Fordham Law. Review., 
83 (2015), 2407–54. 
1345 Ibid. 
 
 
300 
 
This false approach buttresses the continued privilege of white males and sometimes 
black males, resulting in women leaving the profession due to frustration, lack of promotion or 
simply ill treatment.1346 In addition, discrimination can appear in subtle forms. One interview 
participant stated that he knows firms who will not hire young women attorneys, because they 
want to avoid having to find a replacement when they go on maternity leave.1347 Essentially, 
the situation described above leaves women in a precarious position.1348 The absence of quality 
work and career progression, makes them less experienced and competent to be eligible for 
judicial appointment. If they stay in law firms that don’t recognise their technical expertise but 
rather focus on their cultural capital, they will never make partner. If they leave and start their 
own law firms, they still lack the cultural capital to draw in new clients, hence the small number 
of women owned law firms.  
Accordingly, the CALS report calls for an acknowledgement that the lack of 
transformation in the judiciary is linked to a lack of transformation in the legal profession.1349 
The more women and black women exit the profession, the smaller the pool of black female 
candidates for the judiciary in comparison to their white male colleagues. This is especially 
relevant because in the past few years, there appears to be a recognition of attorneys as a 
valuable pool for judicial appointments. In the period 2013-2017, 77 people were appointed to 
ordinary High Court positions. Of the 77 people, 35 of them were attorneys and of these 35 
attorneys, 16 (45%) were women.1350 This is an indication that attorneys are a competent pool 
 
1346 Centre for Applied Legal Studies, Transformation of the Legal Profession,p.37. 
1347 Interview with JSC Commissioner A. 
1348 For an exposition on why women will never be able to meet the masculine standards of law firms, see Hilary 
Sommerlad, ‘The Myth of Feminism: Women and Cultural Change in the Legal Profession’, Interntaional 
Journal of the Legal Profession, 1.1 (1994), 31–51 <https://doi.org/10.3868/s050-004-015-0003-8>. 
1349 Centre for Applied Legal Studies, p.62. 
1350 Statistics on file with the author, tabulated by information provided by the Department of Justice and 
Correctional Services. 
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to draw from and a more enabling environment in law firms, would further increase the number 
of women eligible for appointment. 
7.5.2.3 The Advocates Profession 
Advocates have long been the preferred pool for judicial appointment. Former Judge President 
Bernard Ngoepe openly stated that ‘the best source of appointments is the advocates profession 
because magistrates, academics and attorneys have limited experience and competence’.1351 In 
the judicial appointment period of October 2010 – April 2015, a total of 265 candidates were 
interviewed for 136 vacancies and 95 of these (35% of the total) were advocates. Of the 
successful candidates appointed to the bench however, 43% of the 101 candidates were 
advocates.1352 In the period 2013-2017, 41% of the successful candidates had been advocates 
before their initial appointment to the High Court. From my observation of the JSC interviews, 
advocates, especially those who have attained silk (Senior Counsel), are highly prized for 
appointment. Yet in terms of diversity, the demographics at the Bar are even worse than in the 
attorneys’ profession. The first table depicts statistics for all advocates and the second table 
focuses on Senior Counsel (SC). 
Table 7 - Advocates.1353 
Year White 
Male 
White 
Female 
African 
Male 
African 
Female 
Coloured 
Male 
Coloured 
Female  
Indian 
Male 
Indian 
Female 
Total 
2013 1378 390 320 102 50 41 120 70 2471 
2014 1387 414 366 115 57 44 116 71 2571 
2015 1374 428 405 132 63 46 117 76 2641 
 
1351 Ngoepe, p.30. 
1352 This is an improvement from the pre-democratic era, when 100% of the judicial candidates were from the 
advocates profession. 
1353 Statistics obtained from General Council of the Bar. 
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2016 1404 442 490 162 70 49 114 95 2826 
2017 1392 458 526 196 75 48 126 94 2915 
 
Table 8 - Senior Counsel 
Year White Male White Female Black Males 1354 Black Females 
2013 371 20 61 9 
2014 367 19 57 7 
2015 383 21 67 11 
2016 414          
 
27 63 23 
2017 410        
 
27 77 17 
  
As of late 2017, 47% of the advocates nationally were white males, while only 27 % 
(796) of the entire advocates’ profession were women. The status of Senior Counsel (SC) is 
dominated (80%) by white men.1355 The advocates’ profession, even more than the attorneys’ 
profession is built on and thrives on a white male masculinist culture that is the antithesis of 
non-white males. Much like Hunter describes the profession in Australia, the South African 
profession is ‘an imagined community sustained by acculturation processes, a hierarchical 
power structure and invented traditions of behaviour that reproduce and reinforce hegemonic 
masculinity’.1356  
 
1354 The term black here, includes Africans, Indians and Coloureds. 
1355 The previous Minister of Justice, Michael Masutha had on two occasions stated that he has returned lists 
from constituents Bars for recommendations of SC, because the lists had no black people or women. 
1356 Rosemary Hunter, ‘Women Barristers and Gender Difference in Australia’, in Women in World’s Legal 
Profession, ed. by Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 103–22. 
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Prior to the introduction of the Legal Practice Act in August 2018, advocates work was 
based purely on referrals from attorneys. In terms of receiving briefs once again, the importance 
of both human development and cultural capital is clear. Who you know, which networks you 
are affiliated to, which university you went to and other factors determine whether one receives 
work or not. Personal preferences of attorneys mean that they are likely to trust, support and 
promote people with profiles similar to their own.1357 Therefore looking at the composition of 
the attorneys’ profession, it is unsurprising that the LSSA survey found that only 24% of the 
expenditure on advocate’s briefs was spent on black advocates, with women advocates only 
receiving 22% of the briefs.1358  
The State has also been accused of playing a role in supporting the unequal field, 
because of allegations that it mostly briefs white SCs. Dissatisfaction with the lack of briefs 
from the State Attorneys office (the institution in charge of government’s legal work) led to a 
public protest by black advocates in 2017.1359 An LLSA draft report found that Government 
departments and State Owned Enterprises briefed the same few advocates from time to time, 
with women significantly receiving fewer briefs than men.1360 Interestingly, the report also 
stated that a handful of both black and white male advocates are the recipients of most of the 
work and specific white advocates are the most paid. 1361 Even though the Minister of Justice 
has previously claimed that government departments are briefing more black advocates and 
women,1362 the issue is whether the briefs are significant enough to earn them big fees.  
 
1357 Tomlinson and others,p.250. 
1358 Law Society of South Africa and LexisNexis,p. 35. 
1359 Alex Mitchley, ‘Stop Feeding Us Crumbs, Black Lawyers Association Tells Govt’, News24, 14 June 2017 
<https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/stop-feeding-us-crumbs-black-lawyers-association-tells-govt-
20170714> [accessed 7 October 2018]. 
1360 Moses Retselisitsoe Phooko, Draft Report on Research Findings on the Distribution of Legal Work in the 
Legal Profession in South Africa (Pretoria, 2016) <http://www.lssa.org.za/upload/Draft Briefing Patterns 
Report.pdf> [accessed 7 October 2018]. 
1361 Ibid. 
1362 Statement by former Minister of Justice and Correctional Services Michael Masutha, at the JSC Interviews 
held on 9 July 2015 at the OR Tambo Southern Sun Hotel. 
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 The larger fees are earned in commercial matters and cases that are heard in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court. As an illustration, consider the fact that in 
2013, 72% of advocates appearing before the Constitutional Court were white and 77% of 
appearances were made by males.1363 Between the periods of 1995 and 2013, 63.3% of the 
appearances as lead counsel in the court have been made by white males and 18.2% by black 
males. Women in total accounted for 19% of the appearances with 9.7% of them being black. 
Consequently, women cannot easily acquire the experience and exposure that would make 
them prime candidates for judicial appointment. 
Another challenge for women is the individualised nature of the Bar. To stay financially 
afloat, one has to consistently make fees to cover their own finance, administrative bills and 
costs of chambers. Yet there are various impediments to this. For example, the GCB rule 7.6.1 
requires junior advocates to wait 60 or 97 days (depending on jurisdiction) before claiming 
fees for work done. Yet every 30 days rental dues must be paid.1364 For junior advocates, the 
financial struggles are mostly experienced by women and black advocates, though some white 
advocates have also struggled. 1365 ‘Many junior advocates have left the Bar because of cash-
flow problems caused by inordinately late or non-payment of their fees by instructing 
attorneys’.1366 It has been argued that women find themselves accumulating debts, being in 
overdraft or falling victim to attorneys who are bad payers.1367 
 Alternatively, there are instances where women are considered as ‘objects of desire’, 
while men are the desiring objects in what Hunter argues is an element of hegemonic 
 
1363 Michael O Donovan, Aspects of South Africa’s Constitutional Court (Cape Town, 2014). 
1364 Vuyani SC Ngalwana, ‘Legitimacy, Transformation and the Need for Change at the Bar’, Advocate, 30.1 
(2017) <https://www.sabar.co.za/law-journals/2017/april/2017-april-vol030-no1-pp03-08.pdf> [accessed 22 
August 2018]. 
1365 Ibid, p.6. 
1366 SC Ngalwana ‘Legitimacy, Transformation and the Need for Change at the Bar ', p.6. 
1367 Thandi Norman, ‘Why Do Women Leave the Bar?’, Advocate, 2 (2004), 24–26 
<http://journals.co.za/docserver/fulltext/advocate/17/2/394.pdf?expires=1526571376&id=id&accname=guest&c
hecksum=E1EB900601D4F4C1D4D24CF2E880E93C> [accessed 17 May 2018]. 
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masculinity.1368 Women are sometimes faced with situations where senior advocates taking 
them on as junior advocates in cases, expect to be paid in kind with sexual favours.1369 It has 
also been reported that some advocates are harassed by attorneys in return for briefs, yet many 
advocates are not willing to report the harassment.1370 This sexual harassment is a form of 
sexual bias.1371 A different form of bias is also present in socially constructed gender biases 
and stereotypes about women being naturally suited to family law work, to the exclusion of 
commercial law and other types of law.1372 Research conducted on women at the Johannesburg 
and Cape Bars found that some women feel pigeon-holed, in family law practice or other non-
dominant practice spheres.1373 There is a perceived disjuncture between the qualities 
stereotypically associated with women and the demands of an advocate’s practice or the 
demands of litigating commercial cases.1374 Therefore, stereotypes about women's work styles, 
character traits and job competencies have hindered women's abilities to land and advance to 
high level litigation in complex commercial matters.1375  
Advocate Norton SC has also posited that the conventional brand of success at the Bar 
calls for single-minded application over a sustained period, which requires ‘the ability to work 
 
1368 Hunter 'Women Barristers and Gender Difference',p.110. For an additional perspective of a profession 
segmented by gender, see Hilary Sommerland, ‘“A Pit to Put Women in”: Professionalism, Work 
Intensification, Sexualisation and Work–Life Balance in the Legal Profession in England and Wales’, 
International Journal of the Legal Profession, 23.1 (2016), 61–82 
<http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=e79b10aa-c57a-4ab7-
9c97-511fa70f70af%40sessionmgr4007> [accessed 25 September 2017]. 
1369 Feedback provided by advocates as the Legal Sector Meeting organised by Democratic Governance and 
Rights Unit and Sonke Gender Justice, held on 9 November 2013 at the Protea Hotel Wanderers, Johannesburg. 
1370 SC Ngalwana‘Legitimacy, Transformation and the Need for Change at the Bar ',p.7. 
1371 Rudo Runako Chitapi, ‘Women in the Legal Profession in South Africa: Traversing the Tensions from the 
Bar to the Bench’ (University of Cape Town, 2015) 
<https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/item/16273/thesis_law_2015_chitapi_rudo_runako.pdf?sequence=1> [accessed 
25 July 2017]. 
1372 Rudo Chitapi, ‘Women in Law: Navigating the Tensions of Gender Bias and Intersectionality at the Cape 
and Johannesburg Societies of Advocates (the Bar)’, Agenda, 115.32 (2018), 43–52 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10130950.2018.1460134>. 
1373 Ibid. 
1374 Michelle SC Norton, ‘The Other Transformation Issue: Where Are the Women?’, Advocate, 30.1 (2017), 
27–34 <www.lexisnexis.co.za/store> [accessed 22 August 2018]. 
1375 Ibid at p.46. 
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long (and often unpredictable) hours on a sustained basis’.1376 Herein lies the fourth challenge 
for women who want to straddle career and motherhood. Women unlike men, are more likely 
to take months out of practice to give birth and parent growing children. Women who assume 
meaningful parenting responsibilities or those who take leave of absence after childbirth suffer, 
because the interruption of practice flies in the face of the sustained momentum required to 
develop a practice.1377 The weight of parenthood disproportionately impacts women and those 
who take maternity leave face a negative impact on their practice, because overhead costs still 
have to be paid.1378 The Cape Bar has tried to alleviate this problem by giving women six 
months maternity leave which addresses the financial burden of keeping chambers, but this is 
not the case in other constituent bars across the country. Having explained the challenges facing 
women in the three legal pools, it is worthwhile to interrogate where the best judges come from. 
7.5.3 Do Advocates Really Make the Best Judges? 
Akin to the discussion in Zambia, there were suggestions that the best judges come from those 
who are constantly litigating and appearing in court. These are predominantly advocates, even 
though attorneys can apply for a practising certificate to appear in the High Court.1379 Advocate 
Ngalwana SC stated it in the following manner: 
by and large, the training that an advocate goes through and the preparation by nature 
of the advocates’ profession, prepares him and equips him or her, for the bench but, 
attorneys are not trained to do that. When attorneys draft contracts by and large, even 
the litigation departments, they don’t litigate themselves, they’ve got too many files 
and cases to deal with and they brief counsel.1380 
He did however admit that there are some attorneys and magistrates who are exceptions and 
can cope with High Court work. An advocate who was formerly an attorney agreed in part with 
Ngalwana SC’s statement. He offered the view the being a judge is a public function and that 
 
1376 SC Norton, p.28. 
1377 Ibid. 
1378 Rudo Chitapi 'Women in Law: Navigating the Tension', p.49. 
1379 The Legal Practice Bill also now allows attorneys the right of appearance in the High Court, Supreme Court 
of Appeal or Constitutional Court, as long as they comply with certain requirements. 
1380 Interview with Advocate Vuyani Nlangwana SC. 
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function requires certain skills. One of them, is the skill to adjudicate disputes and the 
adjudication of disputes is primarily done in the High Court.1381 Therefore in his opinion, it 
was difficult to see how this could be done effectively, if a practitioner didn’t have experience 
in the High Court or some experience in litigation. 
 On the other hand, he argued that judging required other skills such as making findings 
of facts and law, evaluating the admissibility of evidence and managing caseloads. Attorneys 
with a busy practice he opined, were likely to have these skills because they have to research, 
draft and manage their practices (if the practice was small or solely owned). It is obvious in the 
JSC interviews that candidates who litigate often, are considered as more promising judicial 
candidates. Advocates are top of the equation, followed by attorneys. Magistrates who 
adjudicate, albeit in lower courts daily, have often been perceived as inadequate for 
appointment.1382 Justice Mocumie finds this view troubling. 
The magistracy is the coalface of the South African judiciary. Surely if an advocate or 
attorney gained experience, he must have cut his or her teeth in the magistracy. If that 
counts as experience or competence, should it not be that the magistrate he appeared 
before repeatedly to gain that experience and competence gained the same if not more 
because of the diverse practitioners and matters that come before him or her?1383 
 
Essentially, Mocumie argues that if magistrates are adjudicating civil and criminal trials daily, 
they are acquiring the same skills that advocates and attorneys acquire when they argue in the 
High Court.  
Former Judge President Kgomo appears to agree with this view and he has been very 
influential in training and mentoring women magistrates who have subsequently become 
 
1381 Interview with Legal Professional S. 
1382 Interview with Advocate Nlangwana SC. 
1383 Justice Constance Mocumie, ‘Challenges Women Face in Their Quest for a Representative Judiciary’ 
(Bloemfontein, 2013). 
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judges.1384 According to Judge Kgomo, the magistrates he mentored approached their work 
with dedication, honesty and integrity, making them suitable candidates to be mentored in order 
to eventually be eligible for High Court appointment.1385 Regardless of the differentiation in 
work experience, there are three important issues that are relevant for a discussion on diversity 
in the superior courts. First, the emergence of acting appointment as a prerequisite for 
permanent appointment, indicates that there is a prevailing view that one needs to be exposed 
to the quality and quantity of work on the bench. This in a sense helps level any perceived 
shortfalls that magistrates or even attorneys may have. In the periods of acting as a High Court 
judge, one learns skills, adapts to the court environment and essentially tests their ability to 
adjudicate. This period I suggest, should be the determining factor for appointment and not 
whether one has been an advocate.  
Secondly, the recent trend to appoint judges from the magistracy and attorneys’ 
profession, partially stems from the problems that are being experienced in the advocates’ 
profession. If the JSC wanted to only appoint senior advocates as judges, it would be hard 
pressed to find a big enough pool of women from the Bar from which to appoint. I submit that 
the diversification of legal professionals for judicial appointment is not a case of picking 
‘second best’. Rather it’s a proactive and sensible effort to recognise that different legal 
professionals will have different skills and attributes and that can only be of benefit to the 
judicial system.  
Finally, across the magistracy, attorneys’ profession and advocates’ profession, a 
common refrain in the interviews was the need for mentoring. Interview participants 
emphasised the need for male SCs who have been at the Bar for years to mentor women and 
 
1384 He has mentored at least seven women who went on to become High Court Judges by 2017 and one who is 
currently a Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
1385 Interview with former Judge President Kgomo. 
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give them requisite skills.1386 Magistrates spoke of the need to have judges mentor them and 
invite them to shadow them in courts.1387 Even judges, emphasised the importance of mentoring 
and how it had assisted them on their trajectories to the bench.1388 The question should not be 
which legal professionals make the best judges but rather, what can be done to ensure that all 
women legal professionals have equal opportunities to be considered for judicial appointment. 
7.6 CONCLUSION OF PART 2 
In the second part of this chapter, I have provided an exposition of the legal fraternity in South 
Africa. I have discussed the possible routes for LLB graduates before examining three areas of 
the legal profession where judges are drawn from. The magistracy, the attorneys’ profession 
and the advocates’ profession. I did not discuss legal academia because candidates with 
predominantly academic experience are no longer a pool where judges are often drawn from. 
Key to this part of the chapter, was an analysis of the challenges that women face in each pool 
and how that affects their judicial aspirations. It was suggested that a failure to interrogate the 
complexities of women’s challenges will harm any efforts to diversify the judiciary. I also 
highlighted the intersections of race and gender and how they collide, to the detriment of black 
women in the attorneys’ profession and at the Bar. Part 2 concluded by discussing the issue of 
which legal pool provides the best judges and surmised that each legal pool does and can offer 
different skills that would be useful to the judiciary. The crux however, lies in implementing 
solutions that will alleviate the challenges women face, while providing them with useful 
mentorship opportunities. 
  
 
1386 Interview with Justice D. 
1387 Interview with Legal Professional V. 
1388 Interviews with Justice D and Judge E. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ADDITIONAL FACTORS THAT MAY HAVE A BEARING ON THE 
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT OF WOMEN 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
The preceding chapters distinguished factors that are pertinent to the appointment of women 
judges. These factors and the ones discussed in this chapter were either identified at the 
commencement of this research from the literature review or during the field work interviews. 
The factors examined herein are secondary, but not insignificant to discussions on increasing 
judicial diversity in the two jurisdictions. The first factor is the role of political actors in 
appointments. In respect of Zambia, this chapter examines the responsibilities of the President 
and National Assembly. While for South Africa, only the President’s role is analysed here 
because a discussion on other political actors such as members of the JSC, was included in 
Chapter 5.1389 The second factor is the legislative landscape for the advancement of women’s 
rights in each jurisdiction. The third is the role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and legal 
professional bodies in the appointment process and the extent to which they make contributions 
to the process. The objective of this chapter is not to provide an extensive examination of each 
of these factors. Rather, what is provided herein is a summary of notable aspects that are worth 
considering. 
 I begin each part with a discussion on the President’s role in each jurisdiction and for 
the Zambian section, this includes a discussion on the role of the National Assembly in the 
appointment of judges. The next section in each part interrogates the legislative landscape for 
women’s rights in each jurisdiction. What are the constitutional and/or legislative provisions 
regarding gender equality? Do they have any bearing on the appointment of women to the 
bench or are they insignificant due to the complex determinants involved in the appointment 
 
1389 See chapter 5, section 5 2.1 entitled ‘The Composition of the JSC’ and section 5.4.2 ‘When Politics and 
Power Collide on the JSC’. 
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process? The final parts of each section analyse the involvement of CSOs and legal professional 
bodies in the appointment process. Are they valuable stakeholders in the bid for a more gender 
equitable judiciary? Or is their involvement insufficient to influence goals to increase the 
number of women on the bench? 
8.2 OTHER RELEVANT COMPONENTS IN THE ZAMBIAN APPOINTMENT 
PROCESS 
8.2.1 The Zambian Political Actors in Judicial Appointments 
8.2.1.1 The President  
An ongoing theme in interviews with the Zambian participants was the excessive use of 
presidential power. Many of the interview participants stated that a discussion on the 
appointment of judges, was incomplete without considering the removal of judges. One 
concerning incident that was referred to several times, is worth mentioning here. It began on 
30 May 2012 when Judges Nigel Mutuna and Charles Kajimanga of the High Court, and Judge 
Phillip Musonda of the Supreme Court, received a written letter of suspension from then 
President Michael Sata. The President held a press conference on the same day stating that by 
the powers vested in him under articles 98(2),(3) and (5) of the Zambian Constitution,1390 he 
would appoint a tribunal to investigate allegations of incompetence and misbehaviour of the 
said judges.1391 The judges applied for an ex parte order for leave to apply for judicial review 
and a stay of the president’s decision, arguing that this action was contrary to removal 
procedures laid out in section 98 of the 1996 Constitution.  
The Attorney General appealed the granting of the order and the Supreme Court in 
Attorney General v Mutuna & Others,1392 held that there was no condition precedent to the 
President exercising his powers to remove judges from office. These powers were granted to 
 
1390 Constitution of Zambia, 1996 
1391 The judges had not known of the allegations before and neither had they been reported to the Judicial 
Complaints Authority, as prescribed under the Judicial Code of Conduct Act No. 13 of 1999 
1392 (Appeal No. 088/2012) [2013] ZMSC 38 (9 May 2013). 
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him as per article 98(2)(3) and (5) of the 1996 Constitution and thus the suspension was 
lawful.1393 This decision was widely criticized with renowned academic Professor Ndulo 
stating that article 98 had not been drafted to become the conduit of executive influence over 
the judiciary.1394 He cautioned that removing judges from the bench on spurious grounds was 
the greatest threat to judicial independence.1395 Notably the majority judgment was written by 
then acting Chief Justice Lombe Chibesa-Kunda, who courted controversy when Sata 
attempted to appoint her as the permanent Chief Justice. This was problematic because she was 
past the constitutionally permissible age for appointment.1396 The proposal to appoint her as 
Chief Justice was rejected twice by the National Assembly’s Select Committee, which is 
responsible for ratifying all judicial candidates.1397  
The arbitrary removal of the three judges and the illegal attempts to appoint a Chief 
Justice past the constitutionally permissible age, were considered as just some of the problems 
with the President’s power in Zambia. This view appears to be supported by an independent 
report that found that the President’s ability to control judicial personnel, makes the judiciary 
subject to significant pressure from the ruling party.1398 In the New Constitution, the President 
still appoints judges subject to ratification from the National Assembly.1399 The ratification 
process, further explained in the subsequent section, is meant to provide an additional layer of 
scrutiny. The President also has the power to remove judges, upon recommendation of the 
 
1393 Constitution of Zambia, 1996. 
1394 Elias Munshya, ‘With Forked Tongues: Why Chibesakunda’s Majority Ruling in Attorney General v. 
Mutuna & Others Is Flawed.’, Law, Theology, Politics & Culture, 2013 
<https://eliasmunshya.org/2013/07/01/with-forked-tongues-why-chibesakundas-majority-ruling-in-attorney-
general-v-mutuna-others-is-flawed/> [accessed 12 February 2019]. 
1395 Muna Ndulo, ‘Professor Muna Ndulo on Judicial Independence and Supreme Court’s Decision in Matter of 
Three Judge’, Zambian Watchdog, 2016 <http://www.zambiawatchdog.com/professor-muna-ndulo-on-judicial-
independence-and-supreme-courts-decision-in-matter-of-three-judges/> [accessed 20 April 2016]. 
1396 The retirement age for the Chief Justice is 65yrs and Chibesa-Kunda was 70 at the time. 
1397 Elias Munshya, ‘Kuya Bebele: Why Lombe Chibesakunda Should Vacate the Office of Chief Justice ’, Law, 
Theology, Politics and Culture, 2013 <https://eliasmunshya.org/2013/09/11/kuya-bebele-why-lombe-
chibesakunda-should-vacate-the-office-of-chief-justice/> [accessed 5 February 2019]. 
1398 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report- Zambia (Gütersloh, 2018) <http://www.bti-project.org.> 
[accessed 12 February 2019]. 
1399 Constitutional Amendment Act of 2016, Section 140. 
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Judicial Complaints Commission as per section 144 of the Constitution.1400 However, it was 
argued that Constitutional provisions alone are insufficient to prevent political manoeuvring 
present in judicial appointments. 
 In one interview participant’s opinion, ‘he [the President] can ask for a particular 
person to be appointed, he can ask for a particular person to be removed from the list. So, the 
President is too powerful’.1401 Another was more specific when stating, 
I just think it’s the President who appoints, if the President is happy with you, you go 
through because we know that there are people whom the Law Association of Zambia 
have objected to and they have done it [appointed them despite objection].1402 
The belief amongst many participants was that the President decided whose names would go 
to the National Assembly and that he didn’t really comply with all the JSC recommendations. 
The implication was that the de jure method of appointing judges to avoid interference, was 
defeated by the de facto manner in which the President acted. There were concerns that the 
President had previously removed good candidates from the list in favour of ‘not so competent’ 
but deferential candidates.1403 Justice Ngulube the chairperson of the JSC did agree that on 
occasion, the President has rejected some of the names on the list. Yet he stated that the reasons 
given for rejecting some names was the presence of additional intelligence that had not been 
made available to the JSC.  
 If the President’s role is so influential, it begs one question. Has the appointment of 
more women to the Zambian bench been the President’s aspirational goal or is it merely an 
unintended outcome? Kamatali has argued that in Rwanda, ‘the increase in women with a law 
degree opened the door for women to enter the legal professions, including that of a judge; but 
 
1400 Previously the President appointed a tribunal to investigate and advise him in relation to the removal of 
judges. The JSC was not involved. 
1401 Interview with Legal Professional 3. 
1402 Interview with Legal Professional 7. 
1403 Interview with Advocate John Sangwa SC. 
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it took enabling government policies and institutions to push women through the door’.1404 The 
appointment of more women to the Zambian bench started during the time when Sata was 
President from late September 2011 till October 2014. He was reportedly committed to 
appointing more women to key positions, because he believed they were capable and less 
corrupt than men.1405 According to Justice Ngulube, President Lungu has continued this pattern 
and there is a deliberate move from government to appoint more women.1406 The President’s 
role, however must be examined alongside that of the National Assembly. 
8.2.1.2 The Role of National Assembly 
Zambia is one of ten countries in the Commonwealth that has legislative involvement in the 
appointment of judges to ordinary courts.1407 On the one hand, the involvement of the 
legislature in judicial appointments can provide an additional procedural safeguard. This is 
because the presence of opposition party members in the process may allay fears of executive 
interference. However, van Zyl Smit suggests that ‘because legislatures are very often the main 
theatre in which party politics are played out, their involvement in individual judicial 
appointments raises many of the same difficulties as that of the executive’.1408 The legislature, 
in the form of National Assembly enters the judicial appointments process once the President 
submits nominee names and Curricula Vitae to the Speaker of the National Assembly.1409 The 
Speaker then constitutes a Select Committee (herein referred to as the Committee) comprised 
 
1404Jean-Marie Kamatali, ‘Rwanda: Balancing Gender Quotas and an Independent Judiciary’, in Gender and the 
Judiciary in Africa: From Obscurity to Parity, ed. by Gretchen Bauer and Josephine Dawuni (New York: 
Routledge, 2015), pp. 153–69 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719603-17>. 
1405 ‘Sata Wins Praise over Women Appointment’, Zambia Daily Mail Ltd, 24 August 2014 <https://www.daily-
mail.co.zm/sata-wins-praise-over-women-appointment/> [accessed 9 April 2018]. 
1406 Interview with former Chief Justice Mathew Ngulube. 
1407 Other countries include Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Maldives, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and 
Uganda. 
1408 van Zyl Smit, ‘The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Judges under Commonwealth Principles’, p.25. 
1409 National Assembly of Zambia. Response of the National Assembly of Zambia to the SADCJF Research 
Questions on Guidelines for Best Practices on Judicial Appointments in the SADC Region (Lusaka: National 
Assembly of Zambia, 2017), pp. 1–6. 
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of at least ten members, with equitable representation of political parties as per section 80 (3) 
of the New Constitution.1410  
All candidates who have been recommended by the President are interviewed by the 
Committee, where they have an opportunity to respond to any adverse reports about them and 
also convince the Committee about their suitability to be a judge.1411 Under section 10 of the 
National Assembly Powers and Privileges Act,1412 the Committee has the additional power to 
order any person to appear before it and give evidence regarding judicial candidates.1413 This 
includes relevant Civil Society Organisations in addition to the Law Association of Zambia 
(the LAZ), security agents and the Judicial Complaints Commission amongst others.1414 The 
Committee then deliberates on the candidates to decide who it will ratify. A report is presented 
to the House with only the names of those candidates who have the unanimous support of the 
Select Committee.1415 The report is presented to the full House for adoption by way of a motion 
and if the report is adopted, the appointment is ratified.1416  
Interview participants had varying views about the process before the Committee. The 
judges who had appeared before the Committee spoke of how the experience was like a second 
interview. One judge stated that when she first appeared before the Committee for appointment 
as a High Court judge, the process felt intimidating because there were so many Members of 
Parliament (MPs).1417 Further, she was asked whether she would be able to give ‘balanced 
 
1410 Constitution of Zambia, 1996. 
1411 National Assembly of Zambia. Response of the National Assembly of Zambia to the SADCJF Research 
Questions.  
1412 The National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act 1965 (c. 12) (Zambia:Parliament of Zambia,) pp. insert 
page <http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/National Assembly %28Powers and 
Privileges%29 Act.pdf> [accessed 18 February 2019]. 
1413 This act is to be read in tandem with the National Assembly Powers and Privileges Amendment Act 13 of 
2016. 
1414 National Assembly of Zambia. Response of the National Assembly of Zambia to the SADCJF Research 
Questions'. 
1415 Proceedings of the Select Committee are strictly confidential and are therefore not open to the public. 
Members of the Committee and witnesses are also precluded from divulging proceedings. 
1416 Ibid. 
1417 Interview with Justice 2. 
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judgments or whether she would be more favourable to women’.1418 She opined that this 
question was biased and not asked of men who were being interviewed for the same position. 
A High Court judge appointed in 2014 stated that she found the process fair and balanced, and 
that the Committee was comprised of more women than men. Though she noted that it was the 
men who ‘gravitated’ towards appointing more women.1419  
For a third judge, her High Court interview before the Committee in 2008, was more 
rigorous than her JSC interview. In her second interview for a higher court in 2016, she noted 
that not only were there more women on the Committee, but they asked good questions which 
made her feel supported.1420 A fourth judge particularly remembers that in her interview, the 
emphasis was on how young she was and whether she could handle being in a leadership 
position.1421 Ironically in her opinion, the issue was more about her gender and less about her 
age, because questions were asked amongst the Committee, about whether ‘another woman’ 
was needed in leadership. This is because at the time, there were already two women heading 
senior courts.1422 Further, she noted that the comment regarding another woman being 
appointed to a leadership position was voiced by a woman opposition MP and not a man. 
 This last comment from the judge was reminiscent of other comments made regarding 
whether more women on the JSC, would mean more women judges getting appointed.1423 
Reference to the number of women in the Committee and how they supported or opposed 
women candidates in interviews, was indicative of an expectation; that since only 16% of the 
MPs in 2017 were women, they should show solidarity with women who sought judicial 
 
1418 Ibid. 
1419 Interview with Justice 5. 
1420 Interview with Justice 8. 
1421 Interview with Justice 4. 
1422 Constitutional Court President Justice Hildah Chibomba and head of the Supreme Court Chief Justice Irene 
Mambilima. 
1423 In Chapter 4, under section 4.6.3, I discussed different views regarding whether women would support each 
other or whether they would rather concern themselves with their own social mobility. 
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appointments. The presence or absence of a critical mass of women in the Committee appeared 
to be more important (to the women judges interviewed), than the presence of women on the 
JSC. This could be because the process in the National Assembly is public in the sense that 
there is a larger audience and the proceedings are available to follow on radio frequencies. 
Therefore unlike in the private JSC process, the candidates were more vulnerable, hence the 
emphasis on needing support. 
In respect of other interview participants, the emphasis was less on the composition of 
the Committee and more on its efficacy. Despite the acknowledgment that the Committee is 
comprised of a few opposition members, it was felt that its effectiveness is still undermined by 
Presidential power. At least half of the interview participants described the process at the 
National Assembly as a ‘rubber stamping’ process.1424 It was argued that ‘politics are involved; 
if the President appoints you, and the President belongs to a party that has the majority, chances 
are the majority will support the President's appointment’.1425 The ratification of at least three 
judges over the years who had adverse intelligence reports presented against them, was cited 
as evidence of the power of the majority. 1426 The Patriotic Front, which is the ruling party, had 
a 42% majority in the National Assembly after the 2016 elections. After numerous by-elections, 
this number increased to 53.9% by 2018.1427 For Mr Chishimba, the issue was not about who 
had majority, but rather about MPs concerns in respect of whether a candidate was politically 
inclined or not. 1428 The judicial track record of a judge seeking promotion, could determine 
whether they were viewed as an asset or a liability. 
 
1424 This view was expressed across all the four sections of interview participants. 
1425 Interview with Judge 4. 
1426 These included one allegation of social impropriety and another of lack of relevant experience for the court 
the person was being recommended to. 
1427 Statistics obtained from the National Assembly. 
1428 Interview 12 April 2017. 
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 The other half of the interview participants asserted that the ratification process was 
legitimate and not merely a rubber stamp. One example given as proof of this was the rejection 
of President Sata’s bid to appoint Chibesa-Kunda as the permanent Chief Justice.1429 A second 
example was given of a lawyer whose name was not ratified despite being known as a pro-
government supporter. It was stated that intelligence reports connected him to criminal 
activity.1430 It was also asserted that the diversity of the Committee ensured that only the right 
people’s names were put forward to the main house. Thus, even though government did have 
the majority in the National Assembly, the presence of opposition members on the Committee 
safeguarded against nepotism. Hence the list that went to the main floor of the House of the 
National Assembly, was likely to be balanced. 
 With the different views provided about the ratification process, it is difficult to arrive 
at a conclusion about whether the National Assembly is indeed just a rubber-stamping body. It 
has been argued that good practice requires that the dangers of politicisation and deadlock be 
managed.1431 This is done through a combination of carefully designed legislative procedures 
and a respectful and constructive attitude on the part of politicians to the constitutional role of 
the judiciary.1432 In the Zambian scenario, a deadlock appears unlikely because the National 
Assembly is controlled by the ruling party. A respectful and constructive attitude to the role of 
the judiciary would determine how members of the Committee conduct themselves. If the view 
is that an independent and capable judiciary is of paramount importance, then presidential 
influence would play a minor part in decisions to ratify a suitable candidate. This would also 
mean that considerations about what type of judgments a potential judge could make, become 
less important in the context of the greater goal of an independent judiciary.  
 
1429 Though the counter-argument to this was the illegality of the action was the cause of the non-appointment 
and not the independence of the ratification process. 
1430 Interview with Mr Mweenge. 
1431 van Zyl Smit, ' The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Judges under Commonwealth Principles, p.20. 
1432 Ibid. 
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It has been suggested that there is a tendency for legislatures to act strategically as part 
of a larger political contest or bargaining.1433 The National Assembly is comprised of 
politicians and while their involvement in the appointment process is not without its negatives, 
it is important for two main reasons. First, it legitimises the process by including an extra 
branch of government. Secondly, even if uncommon, the instances where certain names have 
not been ratified are encouraging because it indicates that at least there is some agreement 
across parties, about what attributes they will not condone in a judge. The example of justice 
Chibesa-Kunda also shows that the National Assembly will not condone illegal appointments, 
irrespective of whether the ruling party has the majority or not. The efficacy of the ratification 
process can only truly be measured if one has sight of the list that goes from the JSC to the 
President and compares that to the list given to the National Assembly. Since this information 
is not publicly available, it is difficult to know how influential the process in the National 
Assembly is. 
8.2.2 Legislative Landscape for Women’s Rights 
Historically women in Zambia have been largely stereotyped as housewives, while men tended 
to present themselves as masters of their households.1434 Public leadership has also been a 
‘historically male-dominated, socially valued political domain’.1435 Prior to 2016, the Zambian 
Constitution had minimum direct reference to gender equality. Section 23 (3) of the 1996 
Constitution stated that ‘no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself 
or in its effect’.1436 Section 23(3) included grounds for discrimination which included ‘sex’.1437 
 
1433 Ibid at p.25 
1434 Alice Evans, ‘“For the Elections, We Want Women!”: Closing the Gender Gap in Zambian Politics’, 
Development and Change, 47.2 (2016), 388–411 (p.388) <https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12224>. 
1435 Ibid. 
1436 Zambia, Constitution of Zambia 1996. 
1437 The Gender Equity and Equality Bill which has numerous measures to ensure and promote’ gender equality 
and equity in cross cutting spheres of life’ still has not been passed in National Assembly since 2015. For more 
details see Zambia. The Gender Equity And Equality Bill 2015 (Lusaka: National Assembly of Zambia) 
<http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/bills/gender equity and equality bill 
2015.pdf>[accessed on 4 January 2020]. 
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A new Bill of Rights was drafted to be included in the New Constitution and it held promising 
novel provisions respect to women. Amongst others, there was an equality provision that stated 
equality of both genders, which included equal treatment and opportunities.1438 However, the 
referendum on the adoption of the Bill of Rights failed to garner over 50% votes from eligible 
voters taking part in the presidential elections.1439 Therefore, it was not included in the final 
Constitution. 
Notwithstanding the absence of a more progressive Bill of Rights, section 8(d) of the 
New Constitution enshrines equality as a national value and principle.1440 There are also 
provisions for gender equity in the National Assembly, in a requirement that the two Deputy 
Speakers should be of different genders.1441 The New Constitution also established a Gender 
Equity and Equality Commission, the first in Zambian history.1442 Further, pertinent for this 
discussion is section 259 which states: 
(1)Where a person is empowered to make a nomination or an appointment to a public 
office, that person shall ensure—  
(b) that fifty percent of each gender is nominated or appointed from the total available 
positions, unless it is not practicable to do so.1443  
 
This effectively requires that both the JSC and the President intentionally consider women for 
judicial vacancies. The effect of these new aspects of the gender machinery are yet to be seen. 
None of the interview participants referred to these constitutional provisions as a catalyst for 
the increase of women in the judiciary. Perhaps this is because these constitutional changes 
only happened in the latter part of the studied period (2013-2017). Therefore I would surmise 
 
1438 Section 51(1) National Assembly of Zambia, Bill of Rights (National Assembly of Zambia, 2015), pp. 1–27. 
1439 Cephas Lumina, ‘Zambia ’ s Failed Constitutional Referendum : What Next ?’, ConstitutionNet, 2016, pp. 
1–7 <http://constitutionnet.org/news/zambias-failed-constitutional-referendum-what-next> [accessed 19 August 
2019]. 
1440 Constitution-of-Zambia-Amendment-Act-No-2-of-2016 (Lusaka: National Assembly of Zambia) 2016. 
1441 Sections 45 (1) and 82 (3) respectively. 
1442 Section 231. 
1443 Constitution of Zambia Amendment Act No 2. 
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that in the Zambian study, women’s rights legislation appears to have had minimum effect on 
the feminisation of the judiciary. 
8.2.3 The Involvement of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the Law Association 
of Zambia 
CSO’s are only involved in the judicial appointment process, when they make submissions to 
the National Assembly during the ratification stage. However, as per section 10 of the Powers 
and Privileges Act, only selected organisations can appear before the Committee.1444 Over the 
years, Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) has consistently appeared before the 
Committee. The Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) is also an identified CSO that 
appears before the National Assembly and previously, as did the Southern African Centre for 
the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD).1445 The role of TIZ in the process is to 
verify candidates’ legal and academic qualifications and their professional track record.1446 In 
an interview with the former President of the TIZ, he stated that they were highly regarded by 
the Committee and some names had been dropped from the list because TIZ said they had not 
met the minimum years required as practitioners.1447 
 The representative from FODEP argued that while their input was useful to the 
Committee, the added value of CSOs was irrelevant if a decision has already been made about 
an appointment even before the ratification process.1448 In his opinion, this was the case on 
some occasions when he had appeared before the Committee, because he was asked to 
comment on particular names on the President’s list. Both representatives of the organisations 
admitted that there were an insufficient number of CSOs involved in the process to make a 
substantial impact. Mr Habasonda argued that it was especially important to have more CSOs 
 
1444 National Assembly of Zambia, Chapter 12 The National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act. 
1445 Tabeth Masengu 'Research Report on the Zambian Judicial Appointment System', p.16. 
1446 Ironically, the verification of professional and legal qualifications is not done by the Intelligence Agency. 
1447 Tabeth Masengu 'Research Report on the Zambian Judicial Appointment System', p.16. 
1448 Interview with Mr Mweenge. 
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who worked directly with communities and governance matters, appearing before the 
Committee, as this would produce better results.1449 Indeed, there was a consensus amongst 
interview participants that in the Zambian appointment process, CSOs were not or could not 
be an influential factor. Yet, there were mixed responses regarding whether there should me 
more engagement from CSOs, especially in the early stages of the process.  
One group believed that there would be no extra benefit of having CSOs involved from 
the start of the judicial appointment process, as most CSOs were not concerned with judicial 
governance work. One participant alluded to them as people who would create ‘extra noise’.1450 
Another added that apart from FODEP and TIZ, other CSOs were not objective and would 
have nothing relevant to say.1451 A third stated that: 
 [I]think the starting point for me is for civil society to redeem its name, in the past four 
or five years I think they have not been as vibrant as they were in the past. There are 
several reasons, I think one of them is funding. I think civil society has been heavily 
run on donor-funding but, then it has reduced. So, from the perspective civil society is 
viewed with suspicion that also weakens their mobilization of popular support because 
everyone would be asking which side you fall.1452 
Conversely, even though he admitted that Civil Society has been weakened, Advocate Sangwa 
SC insisted that CSOs were another potential check of the process. Their utility he added, was 
dependent on whether they made well informed submissions.1453 A senior judge suggested that 
the involvement of more CSOs would mean public involvement in the vetting of appointments 
and positive criticism was always welcomed.1454 Another surmised that if judges were applying 
for promotion, then CSOs who had appeared in their courts would be useful in assessing a 
candidates’ human rights record.1455 
 
1449 Interview on 19 April 2019. 
1450 Interview with Legal Professional 3. 
1451 Interview with Mr Kalandanya. 
1452 Interview with Advocate John Sangwa SC. 
1453 Interview on 13 April 2017. 
1454 Interview with Justice 1. 
1455 Interview with Justice 4. 
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 Finally, in addition to having a member on the JSC, the Law Association Zambia (LAZ) 
also appears before the National Assembly to give comments on candidates. All interview 
participants conceded that the input from the LAZ was relevant, informed and necessary. Some 
judges spoke of how negative comments from the LAZ had resulted in candidates being 
rejected, but representatives from the LAZ stated that a minimal number of candidates had been 
rejected based on their reports in this study period.1456 It was argued that insufficient weight 
was given to submission from the LAZ, which defeated the point of inviting them as interested 
parties.1457 Further, negative comments on a list of appointments made by the President was 
considered by some as challenging the president’s decisions.1458 Hence it was suggested that 
the role of the LAZ would be more meaningful, if they commented on the JSC shortlist before 
it went to the president.1459 In the absence of this change, the LAZ insisted that their input 
would continue to be used sparingly by the Committee. 
8.2.4 Conclusion  
The first part of this chapter has provided a summary of four factors that could be influential 
in the judicial appointment process in Zambia. The President’s powers can and arguably do 
play an important role in appointments. Though there is no empirical evidence of the exact 
influence, anecdotal evidence and the structure of the appointment system does make this a 
reasonable conclusion. The National Assembly in theory is an effective mechanism to ensure 
that the presidential powers are not abused. Legislative involvement provides the appointment 
process with an extra layer of public legitimacy, because the third branch of government is also 
involved. However, the proportion of the National Assembly in favour of the ruling party 
means that the names coming from the Presidency, will often be ratified. On women’s rights, 
 
1456 Tabeth Masengu 'Research Report on the Zambian Judicial Appointment System',16. 
1457 Interview with Advocate John Sangwa SC. 
1458 Interview with Legal Professional 5. 
1459 Tabeth Masengu 'Research Report on the Zambian Judicial Appointment System', p.5. 
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constitutional amendments that promote gender equality have not been a catalyst for change. 
While they are useful for having a framework for equality goals, they have not yet been an 
important factor in the feminisation of the bench.  
Finally, CSOs appear to play a miniscule role in the process, an increase in the number 
of CSOs making submissions to the National Assembly will not change any patterns of 
appointments. This is because their submissions are limited to the ratification process and in 
the absence of seriously adverse evidence, candidates’ names are likely to be sent to the House 
for ratification. The influence of the LAZ is stronger, as their presence on the JSC does mean 
that they are involved from the beginning of the process. However, because the LAZ only has 
one member on the JSC in comparison to political and other members, their presence on the 
JSC appears to be insufficient, to make a mark. The measure of the LAZ’s gravitas would lay 
in the National Assembly, when they present reports to the Committee. The evidence in this 
research shows that submissions from the LAZ are a deciding factor, only in some instances. 
8.3 OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPOINTMENT 
PROCESS 
8.3.1 The President’s Role 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the President has distinct powers in regard to judicial 
appointments.1460 If the vacant position is for appointment to any High Court and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (excluding the President and Deputy), the President must appoint the 
candidates recommended by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC).1461 In respect of 
Constitutional Court vacancies, the JSC must prepare a list of nominees with three names more 
than the number of appointments to be made.1462 The President may make appointments from 
the list or request a supplemented list from which he must make appointments.1463 The 
 
1460 Chapter 5 entitled ‘South Africa’s Judicial Service Commission−Friend or Foe?’. 
1461 As per section 174 (6) of the South African Constitution. 
1462 For example, if there is one vacancy, the JSC must send at least four names to the President. 
1463 Section 174 (4) (a)-(c). 
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President nominates candidates for the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, President and 
Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). After they are interviewed, he 
appoints them after consultation with the JSC and leaders of the parties represented in National 
Assembly.1464  
 Little is known about how the President decides which candidates to select from the list 
of Constitutional Court appointees sent by the JSC. Even less is known about how he decides 
who to nominate for the leadership positions in South Africa’s two top courts. What is clear 
however is that he has the power to influence gender representativity on the bench for these 
positions. There have been instances where the President has not done so, despite the paucity 
of women in the judiciary. For example, in 2012 only two of the eleven justices on the 
Constitutional Court were women. Four names were sent to the President for a vacancy on the 
Constitutional Court and the only woman on the list was current SCA President Mandisa Maya. 
The President selected now Deputy Chief Justice Ray Zondo.1465 In the studied period, there 
were four Constitutional Court appointments interviews held in 2013, 2015 and 2017.1466 The 
interview in 2013 had five male candidates and of these, Justice Mbuyiseli Madlanga was 
appointed.1467  
At the time, there were still only two women on the Constitutional Court and critics 
believed that the JSC should have re-advertised the position, to allow for women to be 
nominated.1468 In 2015 only women were nominated, guaranteeing that the eventual appointee 
 
1464 He acts in his capacity as Head of the National Executive as per section 175(3). 
1465 Interviews held on 9 June 2012 at the Southern Sun OR Tambo hotel in Johannesburg. 
1466 The October 2016 JSC interviews were cancelled after Justice Ronnie Bosielo withdrew, leaving an 
insufficient number of candidates. 
1467 The other candidates were Judge Selby Baqwa, Justice Ronnie Bosielo, Judge Brian Spilg and advocate 
Jeremy Gauntlett SC. 
1468 Serjent at the Bar, ‘Female Talent Does Not Get a Foot in Highest Court ’ s Door’, Mail & Guardian, 7 
December 2012, pp. 1–6 <https://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-07-female-talent-does-not-get-a-foot-in-highest-
courts-door> [accessed 5 August 2018]. 
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would be the third woman on the court.1469 This was the first time there had been three women 
on the court since 2008.1470 In 2017, Justice Leona Theron was the only woman interviewed 
on a five person interview list.1471 She was subsequently appointed. It is worth noting that the 
Presidency provides no reasons as to why particular candidates are selected. It has been said 
that in 2015 and 2017, the President felt compelled to appoint women to the Constitutional 
Court because of numerous debates and campaigns during the studied period.1472 In respect of 
the SCA, prior to the 2015 nomination of Justice Mandisa Maya as Deputy President, there had 
never been a woman nominated for any of the SCA leadership positions. The Constitutional 
Court has also never had a woman Chief Justice or Deputy Chief Justice. 1473 
It is acknowledged that the appointments of women mentioned above constitute 
progress, because previously male candidates were nominated and appointed to most senior 
positions. Yet one must consider the context, in order to understand how much influence the 
President has over the feminisation of the Constitutional Court, its leadership and the leadership 
of the SCA. As per the Constitution, the President consults the JSC and leaders of National 
Assembly before he appoints the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice. However, this is not 
necessary for the President and Deputy President of the SCA positions.1474 He only needs to 
consult the JSC, which means there is less accountability for the heads of the SCA, than there 
is for the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, over the years the President has merely informed 
the leaders of National Assembly parties about his choices, with no real consultation.1475  
 
1469 Justice Nonkosi Mhlanthla formerly of the Supreme Court of Appeal was appointed after interviews on 9 
July 2015. 
1470 The women justices at that time were Justices Yvonne Mokgoro, Kate O’Regan and Bess Nkabinde. 
1471 Judge Jody Kollapen, Justice Steven Madjiedt, Justice Malcom Wallis and Justice Bossie Mbha. 
1472 Information obtained from discussions with judges at various meetings. 
1473 Justice Ray Zondo was nominated and appointed as Deputy Chief Justice in 2017. 
1474 Section 174(3) of the South Africa Constitution. 
1475 Interview with JSC Commissioner B who is also a member of the opposition. 
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This means that the President’s nomination, even if it appears unwise or unexplainable 
to others, is final.1476 When asked to reflect on the presidential powers regarding these 
important appointments, two interview participants stated that the leadership positions should 
be treated like all other judicial positions. Candidates should apply, be shortlisted and then be 
recommended for appointment, because senior judicial positions should be competitive.1477 
Another argued that while the President’s powers were constitutionally granted, the safeguards 
weren’t enough to ensure that he did not appoint people who would be loyal to him.1478 It was 
suggested that the President should merely have a ceremonial role. This is because of concerns 
that these presidential powers could be used to ‘retreat into populism, rather than advance the 
constitutional project.’1479  
Contrary views were that as head of the ruling party, the President had won the right to 
make these important decisions.1480 Furthermore, it was argued that considering the sum of 
judicial appointments, the President’s role was minimal. What was more important was greater 
accountability and openness, because ‘at the end of the day, a decision still has to be made’.1481 
A senior advocate stated the presidential powers were a reflection ‘of the balance of executive 
powers and separation of powers in a democracy’ and that this was what the Constitution had 
in mind.1482 He argued that a particular process should not depend on the identity of the 
individual holding the power. Therefore, changes should not be made because of concerns 
about who is in power. Advocate Ngalwana SC stressed that there was nothing wrong with the 
presidential powers to appoint.1483 Rather, the problem arose when they were used erroneously 
 
1476 For example, controversy arose in 2011 when the President nominated Justice Mogoeng as Chief Justice. 
There was widespread criticism about this nomination, because the President had ignored then Deputy Chief 
Justice Dikgang Moseneke and several other senior Constitutional Court justices.  
1477 Interview with Judge President Kgomo and JSC Commissioner 3 . 
1478 Interview with Aarti Naarsee. 
1479 Interview with Alison Tilley. 
1480 Interview with Justice B. 
1481 Interviews with Judge President Mlambo and Judge E respectively. 
1482 Interview with Legal Professional S. 
1483 Interview on 7 July 2017. 
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to make questionable appointments. He further advanced that the only reason people were 
worried about presidential powers was because President Jacob Zuma had abused his.1484 In 
essence, concerns about presidential powers and their ability to stifle goals for gender diversity 
were related to trust. 
8.3.2 What about Legislative Protection of Women’s Rights? 
The South African Constitution has been an inspiration for a few other Constitutions in the 
region because of its expansive Bill of Rights.1485 During constitutional negotiations, women’s 
groups mobilised to ensure that they had a presence at the negotiation table.1486 Justice 
Mokgoro states that women ‘were there in their consciousness and they were there in 
recognising the need to strengthen the position of women in South Africa’.1487 Hence, what 
emerged in the Bill of Rights is a result of women’s efforts to ensure that their concerns were 
included. For instance, the Equality clause in section 9 of the Constitution prohibits both direct 
and indirect forms of discrimination on amongst other grounds − gender.1488 Additionally in 
order to promote equality, section 9(2) allows for the establishment of legislative and other 
measures, ‘designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination’.1489  
Included in the equality clause is the requirement that National Legislation should be 
enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.1490 The Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act is one such form of legislation.1491  
 
1484 During his tenure President Zuma was involved in numerous scandals which included allegations of fraud, 
abuse of power and public funds amongst others. 
1485 The Kenyan Constitution, Zimbabwean Constitution and Malawian Constitution all drew heavily from the 
South African Constitution. 
1486 Rutherfurd Living History Program, ‘Yvonne Mokgoro’ (North Carolina: Duke University, 2009), pp. 1–
48(p.12-13) <http://livinghistory.sanford.duke.edu/interviews/yvonne-mokgoro/>. 
1487 Ibid, p.13. 
1488 Section 9(3) of the South African Constitution.  
1489 Section 9(2) of the South African Constitution. 
1490 Section 9(4). 
1491 South African Government, Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination, 2000 
<https://www.gov.za/documents/promotion-equality-and-prevention-unfair-discrimination-act>. 
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Section 8 of the Act states that: 
Subject to section 6, no person may unfairly discriminate against any person on the 
ground of gender, including-  
(h) the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual 
opportunities for rendering services for consideration, or failing to take steps to 
reasonably accommodate the needs of such persons; 
(i)systemic inequality of access to opportunities by women as a result of the sexual 
division of labour. 
This legislation is added protection against discrimination and could be invoked in instances 
where a woman alleges that she has not been appointed to a judicial position because of her 
gender. Such an instance has not yet occurred. 
Additionally, the Constitution contains section 174(2) also known as the transformation 
clause, which was discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 5 of this thesis. It explicitly requires 
that the JSC consider the gender composition of the bench when appointments are being made. 
This obligates those who appoint judges to ensure that they are consciously mindful of the need 
to diversify the judiciary. This section of the Constitution is constantly referred to in JSC 
interviews and in statements from the Presidency, when appointments are announced. Thus, it 
would appear to have aided in creating impetus for gender diversity. The constitutional clause 
and other legislation have also emboldened advocacy efforts from CSOs. 
8.3.3 Civil Society, Legal Professionals Organisations and Judicial Appointments 
A key rationale for the creation of the JSC was to establish a system of judicial appointments 
that was more open and independent.1492 One of the ways in which this is achieved is through 
the JSC’s procedures specifically requiring input from the organised legal profession. The 
Judicial Service Commission Act defines ‘institutions’ in its schedule as amongst others the 
Black Lawyers Association (BLA),the National Association of Democratic Lawyers(NADEL), 
 
1492 Wesson and Du Plessis, p.193. 
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the General Council of the Bar (GCB) and other organisations.1493 These three mentioned 
bodies have representatives on the JSC. They are also involved in other aspects of the process 
together with other identified institutions with an interest in the work of Commission. There 
are two avenues of involvement. The first, is by nominating candidates for judicial vacancies 
when they arise.1494 To understand the importance of the process and how the identified 
institutions can be decisive, consider results from a study undertaken by Oxtoby and Masengu 
on the nomination process in the period October 2010- October 2016.  
A total of 379 candidates were nominated for 174 judicial vacancies in this period, with 
238 nominations made by 51 different types of organisation.1495 In analysing the success of 
nominations, none of the organisations listed had a success rate of more than 45%. The most 
frequent nominators were the BLA and the NADEL with 27% and 20% of the nominations 
respectively. They were followed by the South African Chapter of the International Association 
of Women Judges (SAC-IAWJ) with 11% of the nominations and the South African Women 
Lawyers’ Association (SAWLA) with 4.6%.1496 What is notable is that only 23% of the BLA 
nominees were women (15 out of 65), and only 29% of NADEL’s nominees were women (14 
out of 49).1497 These organisations are the most successful in regard to nominations and – from 
observations of JSC interviews − they are also the most respected. One response to the paucity 
of women nominees, has been that women are not represented enough in the BLA and the 
NADEL membership. Thus the organisations can only nominate the candidates who are 
 
1493 South Africa, Judicial Service Commission Act 2003 (Pretoria: Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development) <http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/regulations/r2003/2003_r423_gg24596-jsc.pdf> [accessed 
8 May 2017]. 
1494 Section 3(b) of the Act. 
1495 See Oxtoby and Masengu. 
1496 Ibid at p.551. 
1497 Oxtoby and Masengu, .p.559. 
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available.1498 In the absence of gender disaggregated membership data from these organisations 
however, it would be difficult to assess whether this is true. 
  The second way organisations provide input to the JSC, is by making comments on 
shortlisted candidates. The input of the organised legal profession and related organisations 
plays a significant role when candidates are interviewed by the JSC. Ordinarily, comments 
from these organisations tend to focus on their members alone, unless they have a negative 
encounter with a non-member. Both positive and adverse comments are regularly put to 
candidates during the interviews.1499 However, the effect of these comments is often 
unpredictable. While adverse comments from professional bodies can naturally be harmful to 
a candidate, there are instances of candidates being appointed despite serious criticism of their 
judicial attributes.1500 Nonetheless as mentioned earlier, support from organisations such as the 
BLA and the NADEL is widely favoured. This is in part because they were both conceived 
during apartheid when there was a need to counter discrimination against black lawyers and 
human rights abuses.1501 In addition, both organisations are concerned with transforming the 
legal profession and developing a legal and judicial system that makes access to justice a reality 
for disadvantaged people.1502 From observations, women endorsed by these organisations have 
a higher chance of appointment than those without their endorsement. 
 The legal profession is not the only sector of society that provides comments to the JSC. 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and individuals are also encouraged to do so and have done 
so in the past. The study by Oxtoby and Masengu found that there were 222 individual 
 
1498 It has been said in JSC interviews, that women are not always willing to be nominated and shy away from 
the process. 
1499 Oxtoby and Masengu at p.550. 
1500 Ibid. 
1501 BLA was founded in 1977 with the NADEL forming a decade later in 1987. 
1502 For BLA, see <https://www.blaonline.org.za/about.html> [accessed on 20 November 2016] and KwaZulu-
Natal Law Society “National Association of Democratic Lawyers Overview” KZNLS (undated) 
<https://www.lawsoc.co.za/default.asp?sl=&id=1972> (accessed 20-11-2016). 
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nominators, with five of them having made more than five nominations over the years.1503 
CSOs had made eleven nominations over the same period. CSOs in this context does not 
include legal bodies such as Legal Aid South Africa or the Commission for Gender Equality 
(CGE) who made five and four nomination respectively.1504 CSOs appear to have had a greater 
impact outside of the JSC process, than within it. In October 2012, the Democratic Rights and 
Governance Unit (DGRU)1505 and Sonke Gender Justice1506 filed a complaint with the CGE 
alleging gender discrimination in the judiciary and specifically in judicial appointments.1507 
The complaint made to the CGE specifically asked for the following relief amongst 
others:  
1) That the CGE constitute an appropriate investigation into what appears to be gender 
discrimination in the appointment of judicial officers. 
2) That the CGE investigate why there are significantly more male judicial officers 
currently in office than female officers and why this disparity continues to exist 
despite the contents on section 174(2) [of the Constitution]. 
3) That the CGE establishes a monitoring capability in respect of appointments to the 
judiciary to ensure there is no gender discrimination and this monitoring should 
encompass both acting and permanent appointments.1508 
This complaint was ground-breaking, and it received wide media coverage.1509 The CGE 
investigation lasted four years and the final report is discussed later in this section. However 
during the four years, CSOs continued to use other avenues to advance their cause. In 2013, 
members of Civil Society wrote to President Jacob Zuma and four leaders of the opposition, in 
 
1503 Oxtoby and Masengu, p.550. 
1504 The study was unable to collate the number of comments that CSOs made on candidates once they had been 
shortlisted. 
1505 An applied research unit situated in the Public Law Department at the University of Cape Town, that 
advances social justice and constitutional democracy in Africa. 
1506 A non-governmental organisation that strives to strengthen government, civil society and citizen capacity to 
act to promote gender equality amongst others. 
1507 The President, Chief Justice, the JSC and the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs were all 
respondents. 
1508 Democratic Governance and Rights Unit and Sonke Gender Justice. CGE Complaint on Gender 
Transformation in the Judiciary. (Cape Town: DGRU, 2012), pp. 1–19. 
1509 See for example ‘Time to Break the Judiciary’s Glass Ceiling for Women - UCT and Sonke Gender Justice 
Network Instigate Complaint with the Commission for Gender Equality’, 2012 pp. 1-2 
<http://www.makeeverywomancount.org/index.php/community/announcements/4427-press-release-time-to-
break-the-judiciarys-glass-ceiling-for-women-uct-and-sonke-gender-justice-network-instigate-complaint-with-
the-commission-for-gender-equality> [accessed on 21 August 2019] 
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respect of the Constitutional Court shortlist which had four men.1510 The signatories to the letter 
were mainly from the women’s rights movement but also included organisations in judicial 
governance, media, human rights litigation and faith institutes. 1511 
The correspondence expressed concern that only men had been interviewed for the 
vacancy, especially in light of the gender obligation in section 174(2) of the Constitution. The 
letter asked the President to invoke his powers under sections 174(b) and (c) of the 
Constitution, which allowed the President to request the JSC to provide him with a 
supplemented list of candidates. This was permitted if the first list he received was 
unacceptable. In this instance, the CSOs asked the President to request the addition of women 
candidates to be considered. The President did not respond. A letter was also sent to the larger 
opposition parties, requesting them to reject the President’s selection from the all-male list, 
forcing him to request the JSC to re-advertise. Only one response was received, and it was from 
the Democratic Alliance (the main opposition). They stated that while they recognised the 
paucity of women on the bench, they respected the prerogative of the JSC to recommend whom 
it saw fit and the President’s prerogative to appoint from the recommended list.1512 
Despite the failure of efforts regarding that Constitutional Court vacancy, that marked 
the beginning of a galvanised effort to strive for gender equity on the bench. There was an 
increase in public discussions about gender transformation and the CGE started to attend and 
monitor the interviews. There was also a recognisable shift in focus regarding the discussion 
on transformation.1513 In 2014 a coalition of CSOs created Judges Matter, an organisation 
which tracks and illustrates the JSC process by amongst other things, providing transcripts of 
 
1510 The letter dated 1 March 2013 is on file with the author. It had a total of 46 organisation and individual 
signatures. 
1511 Ibid. 
1512 Letter dated 8 March 2013, also on file with the author. 
1513 In a survey conducted by the author, media reporting on the topic increased over time, as did meetings 
amongst gender concerned CSOs. 
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the JSC interviews and information about candidates.1514 The creation of Judges Matter 
provided a platform for detailed information on the JSC processes and in 2014, it started to live 
stream the JSC interviews. This has resulted in immense public engagement with the streaming 
website and other social media channels.1515  
The publicity of the JSC interviews also resulted in a better understanding of 
stereotypical attitudes about women, both in the profession and from the commissioners too.1516 
In JSC interviews, the commission has also been mindful of the effect of live streaming on 
public attitudes about how the JSC operates. On one occasion, an interview of a woman 
candidate for a leadership position became quite heated. Mid-way through the interview, one 
of the commissioners alerted the Chief Justice to the fact that the public was watching them 
and following the process via social media.1517 The Chief Justice thereafter ensured that the 
interview took a more moderate approach. Having more people watching the process has in 
some way also forced the JSC commission to confront the challenges that women face in the 
profession and judiciary.  
These challenges were laid bare in the eventual release of the CGE’s Investigative 
Report in 2016. Amongst others, it recommended that the JSC should actively engage in 
practical solutions to improve gender diversity on the bench and that they should consult with 
other relevant stakeholders when doing so.1518 One of the JSC responses to the CGE 
Investigative report was the creation of a committee specifically tasked with tackling the gender 
 
1514 See <https://www.judgesmatter.co.za/.> [accessed on 27 November 2019]. 
1515 Judges Matter have active Twitter and Facebook accounts where members of the public regularly comment. 
1516 For instance, when Judge Nare F Kgomo was interviewed for a leadership position, he made sexist remarks 
that female lawyers were attracted to private practice and expensive cars which obviated their availability for the 
Bench. To date his interview has been viewed 395 515 times. See 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q5wJuhi4Tuo.> [accessed on 27 November 2019] 
1517 The JSC Interview of Judge Shane Kgoele held on 19 April 2017 at the Office of the Chief Justice, Midrand, 
South Africa. 
1518 Commission for Gender Equality (CGE). CGE Investigation Inquiry into Gender Transformation In the 
Judiciary. (Cape Town: CGE, 2016). 
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discrimination present in the appointment of acting judges.1519 This committee would not have 
been established had the initial complaint to the CGE not been made in 2012. Several of the 
interview participants recognised the effects that CSOs have had on the process, especially in 
respect of gender transformation. Judge President Dunstan Mlambo advanced that comments 
from CSOs who litigate were especially required, because they could provide information 
about a potential candidate’s legal acumen in court.1520  
One commissioner said CSOs commented on candidates’ character which is necessary 
because legal professional organisations can be biased.1521 Another judge welcomed CSOs 
participation in the process but cautioned against the use of live streaming of interviews, 
because those records could be harmful for candidates in future.1522 There were also some 
critical views about the involvement of CSOs. A senior judge stated that there was a danger 
that comments from CSOs could sometimes be ill informed or were a case of ‘sour grapes’, 
because of grudge against the candidate.1523 A journalist who has been following the 
appointment process for four years, believed that CSOs needed to be relevant all throughout 
the year and not just when the JSC interviews happened.1524 She emphasised that constant 
engagement in matters of judicial governance and gender transformation would be beneficial 
in the long term. 
In conclusion, input from the legal professional bodies is critical for the process, 
especially since some of them are expressly mentioned in the JSC Act. However in respect of 
women, the number of women nominated by the main organisations remains quite low.1525 This 
 
1519 This committee was established in 2017 and is led by SCA President Mandisa Maya. 
1520 Interview on 17 April2017. 
1521 Interview with Commissioner B. 
1522 Interview with Judge 13. 
1523 Interview with Justice 10. 
1524 Interview with Aarti Naarsee. 
1525 Women candidates are more likely to be nominated by women’s organisations than by legal professional 
bodies, even though the legal bodies have large number of women in their membership. 
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is said to be a possible reflection of the sexism and patriarchy that is present in the legal 
profession.1526 The absence of gender disaggregated statistics of members in reports from the 
main legal professional organisations and the lack of responses to the CGE queries for input 
on its report, seems to support this view.1527 In respect of CSOs, it is difficult to empirically 
quantify their impact on the process. What is certain is that their involvement has resulted in 
the CGE Investigative report and the establishment of the Committee on acting appointments. 
The presence of CSOs in the interview room, coupled with their comments and media articles 
about the process, would appear to have assisted the goals for gender transformation. It is 
however difficult to empirically quantify just how much, because as analysed in earlier 
chapters, there are various other factors that affect the process. 
8.3.4 Conclusion of the South African factors 
The second part of this chapter has focused on other influential factors that may affect the 
appointment of women to the South African courts. The President’s discretion in nominating 
the heads of the Constitutional Court and the SCA is a critical factor in appointments. This is 
also true in regard to his discretion when he selects from the list of ordinary Constitutional 
Court candidates. Several interview participants argued that presidential discretion could be 
abused, especially if he didn’t consult widely.1528 Despite these views, it was also clear that 
what is problematic is the exercise of these constitutional powers and not the said constitutional 
powers themselves. It is obvious though, that in respect of gender diversity, the president will 
determine when South Africa gets its first woman Chief Justice or Deputy Chief Justice and 
whether the complement of women on the Constitutional Court will ever reach 50%.  
 
1526 Interview with Justice 10. 
1527 Commission for Gender Equality. CGE Investigation Inquiry into Gender Transformation In the Judiciary. 
(CGE), pp. 29-33. 
1528 Interviews with Thandi Modise, Legal Professional S, Advocate Vuyani Nlangwana SC, Justice 11 and 
Journalist R. 
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Unlike in Zambia, in South Africa, constitutional and legislative imperatives have been 
pivotal to the appointment of more women to the bench. They have been used to urge the CGE 
to investigate appointments and to remind the JSC of their obligation to consider gender when 
making recommendations. They have also been used to galvanise CSOs when there was little 
progress in the appointment of women. In respect of legal professional organisations, they can 
be influential because they nominate, make comments on candidates and have members sitting 
on the commission. While the legal professional organisations are influential in the process, 
civil society involvement outside of it, appears to have been more overtly beneficial.  
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUDING THE TALE OF TWO JURISDICTIONS 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has explored a number of closely related aspects in respect of women and judicial 
appointments in South Africa and Zambia. Focusing on the two jurisdictions as separate 
entities, it has provided an in-depth study of how and whether various aspects of the judicial 
appointment process lead to equal representation of women and men on the bench. This final 
chapter commences with a comment on the contribution that this research has made to 
scholarship. This is then followed by a summary of some of the main findings and some 
reflections on the results in each jurisdiction. Though this research is not a comparative study, 
the succeeding section reflects on some of the common elements present in the two case studies, 
while noting where they differ. The penultimate section notes the difficulties underlying 
research on the judicial appointment process and concludes with general recommendations for 
the acquisition and retention of gender equitable courts. 
9.2 CONTRIBUTION TO EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP FROM A SUB-SAHARAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
 The gap in scholarship from an African perspective on gender and judging was highlighted in 
the introduction of this thesis. Although there have been a few additions to scholarship since 
2013, this thesis is written in a context in which the majority of the scholarship is from the 
global North. While the body of scholarship from the global North was important in framing 
questions and providing theories, it was imperative to recognise that context shapes research 
results. Thus a key element of this research was to uncover any patterns or theories that either 
dispute existing literature, or confirm it, but with different results. It was also vital to establish 
new theoretical and substantive theories that consider the importance of the context that is 
being studied. In essence where possible, it was necessary for this study to be ‘Africanised’ in 
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the geographic location of the case studies and in the building of theory. The methodology 
though not unique, was selected because of the paucity of a focus on women and judicial 
appointments in African countries. Much like the African Feminist Judgment Project,1529 the 
bid to Africanise this study was centred on establishing a possible alternative African approach, 
to gender and judging. I recognise that there are various possible African approaches to gender 
and judging in Africa. However, the approach adopted herein focused on privileging the voices 
of all actors concerned with the judicial appointment process, as opposed to selecting only 
specific groups of actors. It also highlighted the necessity of considering the judicial 
appointment process against the backdrop of other political and legal challenges in the 
respective countries. This approach provides new evidence in respect of the problems faced in 
achieving gender diversity and the possible applicable solutions. 
Given this approach, it was important to establish additional original justifications for 
the importance of gender diversity in courts. Outlined in Chapter 2, the argument that gender 
diversity enhances an extended definition of independence and supports judicial impartiality, 
is a distinctive one. While it is not distinctively African because it applies to other judiciaries, 
the argument does reflect the need to look beyond established theories in order to contribute to 
global scholarship. If gender diversity is considered as a means to an end and not an end in 
itself, then it is pertinent that the means (gender diversity) should be informed by recognised 
judicial ends. Impartiality and independence are recognised judicial ends because they are 
consistently listed in international guidelines or frameworks regulating judicial conduct.1530 
Creating a link between the justifications for gender diversity and established judicial outcomes 
is arguably a strong motivation for a concerted effort for judicial diversity. 
 
1529 For a reminder of the project, see Chapter 2, under the section 2.3.2 ‘Whose Voice is Being heard’. 
1530 As discussed in Chapter 6, these include the UN Basic Principles, The Bangalore Principles and the 
Practioners Guide on the International Standards for Independence and Accountability. 
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In addition, this thesis makes a valuable addition to scholarship because it critically 
engages with the notions of impartiality and independence, in respect of the JSCs and not just 
in respect of judges. By assessing the detailed workings of two JSCs in the region, it approaches 
judicial independence and accountability from a different vantage point. Unlike most 
discussions that focus on independence and accountability in respect to judges alone, this thesis 
also examined these values in respect of JSCs too. It considered the importance of context in 
judicial appointments and provided novel arguments based on the peculiar needs of the 
societies studied.1531 Accordingly, it is submitted that this thesis is an attempt at finding African 
solutions to African problems. 
 Methodologically, this is the first known study in the gender and judging field to include 
perspectives from these four groups of relevant stakeholders in the judicial appointment 
process.1532 These different units of study provided rich reflections from different perspectives, 
that other studies have lacked. A few studies have focused on interviews with women judges1533 
and others with women lawyers.1534 A recent International Development Law Organization 
(IDLO) report also interviewed women judges, lawyers, bailiffs and law students in Tunisia.1535 
A previous study in England and Wales on judicial independence interviewed judges, 
 
1531 For instance, the argument that the independence of the South African JSC must include the ability to 
transform the judiciary in the face of opposition from those who would not want a change in the status quo. 
1532 In addition to an extensive literature review, the author consulted with five international experts in the field 
in order to ascertain whether similar studies existed. 
1533 For examples see Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu, ‘Skills for Judicial Work: Comparing Women 
Judges and Women Magistrates’, in Gender and Judging, ed. by Erica Schultz and Gisela Shaw (Portkland: Hart 
Publishing, 2013), pp. 211–32 <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781474200127.ch-009>; Josephine Dawuni, ‘To 
“Mother” or Not to “Mother”: The Representative Roles of Women Judges in Ghana’, Journal of African Law, 
60.3 (2016), 419–40;Elaine Botelho Junqueira, ‘Women in the Judiciary: A Perspective from Brazil’, in Women 
in the World’S Legal Professions, ed. by Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw (Portkland: Hart Publishing, 2003), 
pp. 437–50 <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472559395.ch-024>. 
1534 The Law Society of England and Wales, Advocating for Change: Transforming the Future of the Legal 
Profession Through Greater Gender Equality International Women in Law Report, 2019; Rosemary Hunter, 
Discrimination Against Women Barristers: Evidence from a Study of Court Appearances and Briefing 
Practices, International Journal of the Legal Profession, 2005, XII; Rudo Runako Chitapi, 'Women in Law: 
Navigative the Tension'.. 
1535 International Development Law Organization, Women’s Professional Participation in Tunisia’s Justice 
Sector: Pathways and Opportunities (Rome, 2019) <https://www.idlo.int/publications/womens-professional-
participation-tunisias-justice-sector-pathways-and-opportunities> [accessed 26 November 2019]. 
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politicians, civil servants and practitioners, but gender and judging was only a part of the entire 
study.1536 The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History has done a number of interview 
with judges, lawyers and those in the justice system in Ontario. However, the interview archive 
reveals that the interviews were not focused on gender and judging.1537  
No known study in common law jurisdictions has combined judges and lawyers with JSC 
members and journalists and/or CSO’s. In doing so, this study has probed the subject from 
previously unresearched empirical angles, while providing rich and holistic data of 
perspectives from those in or around the judicial appointment process. This study has also 
contributed to existing scholarship by choosing to privilege the voices of women judges − in 
particular, Zambian and South African women judges. This research sought to understand the 
humans behind the judicial robe and to gain insight into the impact of choosing a judicial career. 
This study expanded on existing literature by highlighting the importance of considering 
women’s intersectional identities, even when they are in privileged judicial positions. Various 
aspects of women’s lives inform their role as judges and their performance. Consequently, this 
study emphasised the need to intentionally consider the intersectionalities of women’s multiple 
identities in specific societies and how they affect different facets of their lives.  
It is reiterated, that the broader context of the jurisdictions of where women operate should 
not be underestimated and that is why the second part of Chapter 3 was dedicated to context. 
The historical and judicial backdrops of each country have to be considered against the broader 
contextual landscape that the two judiciaries and societies operate in. Therefore, the two studies 
are discussed separately below, in order to stress some of the main findings. The first is the 
Zambian case study which provided interesting lessons. 
 
1536 See Chapters 7 and 9 in Graham Gee and others, The Politics of Judicial Independence in the UK’s 
Changing Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
1537 See their Oral History Collection at https://www.osgoodesociety.ca/oral-
history/?s=2009&sort=&sort_order=&post_type=oral-history. 
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9.3 THE ENIGMA THAT IS THE ZAMBIAN JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS 
The Zambian judiciary has surpassed the 50% threshold for women in decision making 
positions, previously mandated by the SADC Gender protocol. The progress is even more 
outstanding when one recognises that the Chief Justice and the Presidents of the Supreme Court 
and Court of Appeal, are all women. A new constitutional amendment in 2016 brought with it 
the establishment of new courts and amendments to the constitutional article regarding judicial 
appointments. Yet it cannot be considered as the cause of the progress in gender diversity. In 
respect of concluding the Zambian part of this study, this section discusses the process of 
appointment, the legal profession from where candidates are drawn, and the political dynamics 
present in the appointment process.  
9.3.1 Are Numbers Important? The JSC, the Legal Profession and Statistics 
The first part of this sub-section is dedicated to a review of some of the main findings in regard 
to three aspects: the JSC’s function as an appointment body, the determinant aspects of the 
legal profession and the absence of disaggregated statistics in various important institutions. 
9.3.1.1 The JSC 
The recruitment process administered by the JSC and the composition of the JSC were two of 
the formal aspects analysed in Chapter 4. The JSC headed by a retired Chief Justice had eight 
members at the end of 2017. It has been argued that the gender composition of the appointing 
body can affect gender diversity on the bench.1538 However in the Zambian case study, it was 
determined that this was not the case. The JSC had appointed a number of women in the five 
year study period and yet there were no more than two women sitting on the JSC in the first 
four years (2013-2016). By the end of 2017, all of the commissioners were men. Interview 
participants explained the Zambian situation by advancing arguments that women had been 
 
1538 For a reminder, see Sally J Kenney, ‘Which Judicial Selection Systems Generate the Most Women Judges? 
Lessons from the United States’; Yung Yoon 'Democratization and Women’s Legislative Representation' . 
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appointed on merit, that the queen bee syndrome prevented women from ‘looking out for each 
other’, and that women were not naturally biased in favour of women.  
However, despite these arguments, there was still an agreement that the presence of 
women on the JSC is important for making male commissioners aware of any sexist tendencies, 
for symbolic reasons, and for the sake of societal equality. Despite being a jurisdiction that has 
already reached judicial parity, these arguments are still used. It is suggested that the continued 
use of these arguments is evidence that the justifications for gender diversity on the JSC take 
us beyond the remit of the appointment of judges. They resonate with broader concepts of 
gender mainstreaming, public policy goals of equal representation, and societal concerns about 
inclusion. 
9.3.1.2 The Legal Pool 
Chapter 7 discussed important determinants for the attainment of judicial office such as 
experience, the requisite qualifications acquired in university and work experience in the 
respective legal pool. As an aspiring lawyer, one’s success is dependent on the ability to enter 
a limited number of law schools and then successfully complete the ZIALE process− a process 
that has been heavily criticised.1539 The small number of practising certificates issued in 
Zambia over the period of study, points to a serious problem in the legal profession.1540 The 
practice of law is elite in many jurisdictions but in Zambia, this is even more profoundly the 
case, because of the small number of practitioners in comparison to the population. Of all five 
years, 2017 had the highest number of practising certificates issued (1112) for the entire 
population. Therefore, it is fair to suggest that not everybody who could be an advocate is 
getting an opportunity to be one. The elitism of the practice of law lends itself to a population 
 
1539 A detailed discussion on ZIALE is available in Chapter 7, under 7.3.2 ‘The Structure of the Profession’. As 
of writing, only 5 out of 342 candidates passed the October 2019 bar exams. 
1540 See section Chapter 7, section 7.3.2 for further details 
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of people who have endured a gruelling and long process of qualification and who are 
financially able to support themselves during this time. This can have an effect on the general 
diversity of judicial candidates. To reiterate, gender diversity in the judiciary is more than just 
having more faces of women. Striving for gender diversity can and should include a desire for 
women with diverse socio-economic backgrounds, professional experiences, ethnic groups, 
religions and other societal identities and more.  
On a positive note however, the presence of constitutionally enshrined detailed 
qualifications for those with judicial aspirations has been beneficial to women. They know 
what they need to acquire in order to be considered for appointment. This means that despite 
the small size of the legal pool, women have navigated the complexities of what is considered 
as relevant experience. This is in part because the JSC has taken a position to ensure that the 
judicial candidates are selected from various backgrounds. Candidates have been registrars 
from within the judiciary, magistrates, advocates in the Ministry of Justice and advocates in 
private practice. Thus, Zambia has managed to avoid the pitfall of relying mostly on private 
practitioners – the professional group where women face the most obstacles. The JSC sees legal 
experience as holistic, encompassing various aspects of legal practice that each provide a 
unique contribution to the bench. The establishment of specialised High Courts means that 
those who have mostly been engaged in criminal work, can operate in criminal courts without 
concerns of whether they are competent in civil matters. Yet there are so many aspects of the 
professional pipeline that one is unable to assess because of the lack of statistics.  
9.3.1.3 The Numbers 
Disaggregated data from the main university the UNZA, the ZIALE, the Ministry of Justice 
and the LAZ could have added an even richer element to the discussion of results in Chapter 
4. The absence of this data made it difficult to establish whether the presence of more women 
on the bench is commensurate with the number of women obtaining LLB degrees and working 
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in the legal sector. Levin and Alkoby experienced similar problems with their research on the 
Canadian judicial bench. This led them to advocate for government policies regarding the 
collection of data, in order to establish benchmarks.1541 The use of data for benchmarks in 
Zambia would assist in establishing why the judiciary is the only arm of government that is 
doing well in terms of goals for gender diversity. With relevant data, one could possibly 
compare two different career paths for women in different arms of government. For instance, 
a comparison of the career trajectories of women in law versus women in politics could be 
enlightening. One could explore whether women are doing well in the judiciary, because they 
are shielded from the popularity process that is present in running for legislative positions. 
However, one cannot effectively probe these issues in the absence of detailed disaggregated 
data from relevant sectors. 
 Secondly, accurate data would also be useful to prove or disprove the notion amongst 
some interview participants, that there is no gender discrimination present in the practice of 
law or in the acquisition of legal skills and experience. The denials of the existence of gender 
discrimination could be what Cohen refers to as the deployment of ‘linguistic and conceptual 
strategies to downplay the issues’.1542 The patriarchal nature of Zambian society makes it 
improbable that gender discrimination would be absent, yet that was the view of half of the 
participants (albeit all men). Data would be useful too in order to ascertain if the number of 
women graduating with LLB degrees, could be compared to men and then cross referenced 
with who is obtaining the majority of traineeships in private practice. One could also use the 
statistics of trainee advocates in law firms and compare them to associate positions and the 
figures for who makes partner. 
 
1541 See Avner Levin and Asher Alkoby, ‘Shouldn’t the Bench Be a Mirror? The Diversity of the Canadian 
Judiciary’, International Journal of the Legal Profession, 26.1 (2019), 69–88 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09695958.2018.1489818>. 
1542 Mathilde Cohen, ‘“Judicial Diversity in France: The Unspoken and the Unspeakable”’, Law & Social 
Inquiry, 2018, 1–33 (p.2). 
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 Finally, I posit that accurate, disaggregated data would also be useful in dispelling 
myths that persist in various parts of the legal pools about who is being favoured by the JSC. 
Interview participants from private practice argued that they were being side-lined for those 
from within the judiciary, while those from the judiciary, that is registrars and magistrates 
argued that they were being ignored in favour of advocates from private practice. This resulted 
in an erroneous belief that the judiciary would perform better if these problems were alleviated. 
Future exploration of the legal pools in Zambia could provide evidence that confirms or 
disputes this belief. 
9.3.2 Visibility, Knowledge and Confidence in the Appointment Process 
9.3.2.1 The Importance of Visibility and Knowledge in aiding Transparency 
The most contentious element in the Zambian study was the privacy of the appointment 
process. However upon examination the issue was not so much that the JSC interviews were 
held behind closed doors, but rather how the entire recruitment process leading up to closed 
door interviews, lacked transparency. The JSC was meant to alleviate concerns that the judicial 
appointment process would be tainted with nepotism and patronage. It was a move from the 
executive style of appointment that plagued the judiciary between 1973 and 1994. 
Notwithstanding, the opaque method of appointing judges has made the JSC more vulnerable 
to scepticism, even when events occur that cannot be directly attributed to them. The furore 
that arose after the Hakainde Hichilema & Others v Edgar Lungu & Others Constitutional 
Court matter is the best example.1543 The lack of visibility and knowledge about how people 
are appointed or even who appoints them, appears to have affected the legitimacy of the JSC. 
 Hence the overwhelming view from interview participants was that vacancies should 
be publicly announced, interview dates should be publicised, and the names of shortlisted 
 
1543 See Chapter 4, under 4.4.1 ‘The Constitutional Court Ruling on the Election petition’. 
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candidates should be published. This is not only necessary for the process in respect of new 
candidates, but for sitting judges seeking appointment to higher courts. They too deserve to 
have a promotion process that is devoid of suspicion, in order to avoid adverse perceptions 
about their new appointments. A second element lacking in the JSC process is a diversity of 
stakeholders. Escobar-Lemmon et al submit that the inclusion of civil society in the selection 
process may be particularly important for new ideas and norms to penetrate traditional 
processes.1544 Only two CSOs are involved in the ratification process and there are no members 
from Civil Society on the JSC. It would be worthwhile to include more members from CSOs 
in the parliamentary process and at least two members on the JSC. The JSC is quite small and 
these additions could be made with minimum logistical or financial strain. The addition of these 
members would also make the appointment of judges less of an elite process suited for those 
with power.  
9.3.2.2 Confidence in the process and the legitimacy of women appointees 
The distrust in the appointment process from a number of interview participants was more 
pronounced when interview participants reflected on the appointment of women judges. This 
study found that the high number of women judges in Zambia does not equate to a lack of 
sexism or prejudice in society. The sexism was apparent in views about the Hichilema 
judgment and in the four views that questioned the capability and competence of women.1545 
A more transparent process would assist with these negative views because people would know 
who is being considered, what their background is and why they are worthy of appointment. 
However, there is still the problem of perceptions of illegitimacy raised in Chapter 4. These 
arise from the perceived incompatibility between the authoritative role of a judge and the 
 
1544 Maria C Escobar-Lemmon and others, ‘Appointing Women to High Courts’, in Research Handbook on Law 
and Courts, ed. by Susan Sterett and Lee.D Walker (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp. 200–
212 (p.206). 
1545 These were that better qualified men were passed over, that they had failed to succeed in private practice, 
that they were political appointees being moved around and that those in high positions were beholden to the 
authorities. 
 
 
349 
 
archaic view of women’s standing in society A more transparent process would alleviate this 
by engendering confidence in the JSC. Consequently, transparency also has the potential of 
invalidating illegitimacy perceptions of women−at least in the short term. 
9.3.3 Can the Process ever be Depoliticised? 
The role of political actors and their ability to influence the appointment process was examined 
in Chapter 4. The necessity of presidential and legislative involvement in the process was not 
in dispute. What was disputed was how much involvement the President should have in the 
process and how many presidential appointees the JSC should have on it. The belief that there 
is no room for politicking in the appointment of judges is understandable. The appointment 
process should be devoid of undue political interference and hidden agendas. The independence 
of the judiciary starts with the independence of the appointment process and interference in the 
latter affects the former. Nonetheless, the judiciary is an arm of government and to reduce the 
President’s role to a mere ceremonial one, may be viewed as a prohibition on his ability to 
govern. The lack of transparency is also a contributor here, as the names sent by the JSC to the 
President are not published, for reasons related to security intelligence.  
While the level of background checks by the intelligence services is commendable and 
necessary to safeguard the integrity of the judiciary, it appears that this comes at a cost. If there 
was a bid to either have the President publish the names he receives from the JSC or to change 
his powers of appointment, it would require a constitutional amendment. The goal would then 
be to have a more decentralised appointment process. This could conceivably be one that either 
requires the President to appoint all candidates the JSC recommends or one that leaves the 
power to appoint (not just to ratify appointments) to the National Assembly. These possible 
models do not guarantee that the process will be devoid of political dynamics. If the members 
of the JSC are predominantly presidential appointees, the President can still have an influence 
by ensuring his appointees vote for candidates of his choice. If the final decision is left to the 
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National Assembly, MPs could be involved in political horse-trading that sees one party 
support the other, if the latter party offers some benefits.  
Eventually one realises that it is not possible to entirely remove political actors from the 
process, because judicial governance is an extension of politics in itself. In truth, as Gee et al 
argue, ‘decisions about whom to select as judges, and how to select them, inevitably have 
political dimensions, whether in terms of ideological politics, party politics, identity politics, 
regional politics or institutional politics’.1546 The current and past Presidents used their power 
to ensure that more women were being appointed as judges. Hence the current gender equity 
on the Zambian bench did benefit from political policy/intervention. This is an indication that 
political involvement does not necessarily equate to negative results for women. The key 
challenge is that of finding ways in which political actors can be accountable for how they 
operate in the appointment process. The first step in doing this, is greater transparency. 
9.4 TAKING STOCK OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPOINTMENT PROCESS 
The subsequent section is a discussion on some of the main findings in the South African case 
study. These findings are in respect of the JSC process, the tension between judicial 
appointments and political agendas, the legal profession and other influential stakeholders. 
9.4.1 Publicity v Transparency: Finding a Reasonable Balance 
This sub-section discusses the workings of the JSC by highlighting the values, and sometimes 
pitfalls, of the South African appointment process. It does this by summarising findings 
regarding some visible and non-visible aspects of the JSC. 
9.4.1.1 What is Visible from the Outside 
This study was greatly aided by the public nature of the South African judicial appointment 
process. The results discussed in Chapter 5 were obtained from participant observation, 
 
1546 Gee and others, The Politics of Judicial Independence in the UK’s Changing Constitution, p.159 . 
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watching interviews online and access to interview transcripts over the years. There is no 
denying that the JSC’s efforts to have a transparent process have been pivotal in achieving 
transformation objectives. Public knowledge of the process has been important for judicial 
transparency and for symbolic reminders that the judiciary is operating in a new, free South 
Africa. However, this publicity is contentious. The disadvantages of public scrutiny examined 
in Chapter 5 are worth reflecting on. Candidates’ personal details are publicly aired. If they 
have a terrible interview as Judge Nozuko Mjali had, this has ripple effects and potential 
candidates may ask themselves if the process is worth it, especially since there is no guarantee 
that they will be appointed.  
Commissioners need to be sensitive to the effects that a particular type of questioning 
may have on a candidate and if need be, it is suggested that they could ask the audience to leave 
and the cameras to be turned off, for periods of sensitive questioning. Such safeguards could 
be helpful because despite the negative aspects of public interviews, there is currently no 
suitable alternative. To hold all judicial interviews in private after sixteen years of public 
interviews, would cause great consternation, suspicion and even anger. It would also 
undoubtedly result in litigation from various stakeholders, because the bar has already been set 
for what is defined as a transparent process in a constitutional democracy.  
The gender composition of the JSC also requires some mention. At the end of 2017, 
there were more women JSC members than in previous years (eight women) and over the 
period of study, there has also been an improvement in how issues concerning women are dealt 
with in interviews. This cannot wholly be attributed to the presence of more women on the 
JSC; because while some women have had more feminist perspectives than others, so have 
some men. Once again, the number of women on the JSC appeared to have no clear bearing on 
the actual number of women getting appointed, despite some interview participants thinking it 
did. However, it was agreed that the presence of more women on the JSC would have symbolic 
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benefits and that more women could provide a possible antidote to discrimination. An increased 
presence of women could also enhance perceptions of the JSC’s impartiality, and it could 
encourage the use of gender-mainstreaming concepts in the JSC’s operations. 
9.4.1.2 What Happens Behind Closed Doors 
Notwithstanding the discussion above in regard to the publicity of the interviews, important 
decisions are still made behind closed doors. These are the most important interactions, because 
that is where actors exercise influence and freely air their discontent about a candidate. It is 
behind closed doors that most Judges President make the case for why a candidate should or 
should not join their court. The importance of these private interactions was not lost on the 
Cape Bar Council and the Helen Suzman Foundation, whose litigation focused on issues of 
constitutional inconsistency, illegality and transparency.1547  
Rightly or wrongly in respect of some appointments, explanations are sought as to why 
the JSC’s selection excluded a preferred candidate. It will be interesting to observe what the 
effects of the Constitutional Court decision in Helen Suzman Foundation v JSC & Others will 
be. The JSC has to determine standards for the manner in which deliberations can be released 
and what can be released will determine how far the concept of transparency will go. The JSC 
could limit access to the audio recordings, only to the directly affected parties and the court 
concerned. Alternatively, audio recordings could be replaced with transcripts that could redact 
the names of which JSC members are making which statements, so as to encourage frank 
debates.  
Whatever decision is made, it is necessary to maintain some manner of privacy not just 
for JSC members, but also for future candidates who want to protect their own privacy and 
reputations. This especially applies to positions where the contestation results from the 
 
1547 For a reminder see Chapter 5, under 5.3.2 ‘The Selection of Candidates and the Cape Bar Litigation’ and 
5.3.3 ‘The JSC Deliberation Process and Helen Suzman Foundation Litigation’. 
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misunderstood notion of ‘transformation’ candidates versus ‘meritorious’ candidates. Having 
a bench that has racial and gender diversity is not the antithesis to merit. As proposed in Chapter 
5, the definition of merit should not be limited to technical experience, but should include one’s 
life experience, commitment to constitutional values, community engagements and much 
more. The JSC’s ability to conduct itself independently cannot be limited to the absence of 
political influence or political considerations. It has to include the JSCs ability to make hard 
decisions, even if unpopular so as to advance the important transformation project. This was 
one of the most valuable aspects that the interviewed JSC members emphasised. They do not 
always get things right but in a process such as this, the definition of who is a right or wrong 
appointee, is sometimes in the eyes of the beholder. 
9.4.2 The Antagonists in the Legal Profession 
It is critical that interventions to improve gender diversity extend beyond the confines of the 
JSC. In spite of over two decades of democracy in South Africa, the results in Chapter 7 
revealed that racism and sexism are still dominant features in the legal pools. The greatly 
skewed gender and race patterns in the attorneys’ and advocates’ profession are a cause for 
concern, because they symbolise one common view: that excellence, expertise and invariably 
power, are still the privy of predominantly white males. This is not uncommon in jurisdictions 
with diverse societies and one has to consider the long lasting effects of apartheid policies. 
However in a country that is predominantly black, the disaggregated data is a reminder that 
while the judiciary has made great strides to transform racially, the legal profession still 
struggles to do so. The free market nature of the provision of legal services means that attorneys 
and advocates depend on clients for professional success. Unlike the magistracy, who are 
employed by the Department of Justice, attorneys and advocates are susceptible to contexts 
where their gender and/or race determines what type of work they will receive− if any.  
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This determines whether attorneys will hold any sort of meaningful power in law firms 
such as a directorship or even better, equity partner. In respect of advocates, the acquisition of 
silk status continues to be a mark of one’s esteem amongst peers and a license to charge very 
high fees. In efforts to highlight the enormity of skewed briefing patterns, the Gauteng High 
Court has initiated a project that records the race and gender details of advocates who appear 
in the Gauteng Motion Court.1548 Motion Court is where unopposed applications are heard, 
mostly from the private sector. The aim is to collate data that disproves arguments that private 
sector companies are making efforts to diversify who they brief. Yet even in the presence of 
this evidence, in the absence of legislation, companies in the private sector cannot be forced to 
brief more black attorneys and advocates and/or more women. The highly gendered nature of 
both the professions and the stratification of the partnership route for attorneys will remain as 
it is, and women will continue to leave if the private sector does not do more to aid 
transformation goals. 
On a positive note, there has been an increase in the appointment of judges from the 
magistracy. It is the most racially and gender-transformed legal pool in South Africa but is still 
plagued by negative perceptions about independence, corruption and lack of relevant 
experience. In respect of gaining relevant experience, it is submitted that women would benefit 
from a constant rotation system in the courts that sees them move between civil court and 
criminal court. This would assist in allaying perceptions in regard to whether magistrates have 
enough civil law experience to be considered for judgeship. There is also limited research on 
the magistracy, with a stark paucity of literature and research studies. This is not specific to 
South Africa and it is a common problem in the region, even though the magistracy is the 
coalface of the judiciary. Future research could interrogate the structural, operational and 
 
1548 See https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2016-11-18-exclusive-advocates-races-and-genders-to-be-
recorded-at-pretoria-court/. 
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governance aspects of the magistracy. This could include aspects such as the appointments and 
retention of magistrates, the possible gendered nature of magisterial work and the weight and 
volume of magistrates’ decisions. 
Finally, the lack of acting appointment opportunities was identified as an impediment 
for women with judicial ambitions. A transparent and generally uniform acting appointment 
process across the country would allow more women to become familiar with the quality and 
quantity of High Court work. A starting point for change would be an amendment to the 
guidelines on acting appointments issued by the JSC in 2016. This amendment could contain 
a clause that states that every High Court should have a quota system for acting appointments. 
There could be a requirement that at least 50% of the acting appointment nominees sent to the 
Minister of Justice for approval, should be women. In addition, each committee could strive to 
find a balance in its nominees, to ensure that a fair number are coming from the magistracy and 
not just the attorneys and the advocates’ profession. In the absence of these more stringent 
requirements, acting appointments or the lack of them, will continue to be a hindrance for 
women.  
9.4.3 Political Power and Political Will 
Chapters 5 and 8 discussed the extent to which political actors in the South African process can 
and do influence the appointment process. Even though the majority of interview participants 
felt strongly that the political component of the JSC is too big, the drafters of the Constitution 
must have had a good reason for their inclusion. The MPs and members of the NCOP represent 
their constituencies and people’s interests and the variation in parties speaks to this. The 
Minister of Justice is a critical actor and the attitudes of the two different ministers during 
interviews, was often indicative of whether a candidate had any chance of being recommended. 
Other political members’ motives are often also easy to interpret because of party ideologies 
and statements made in the interviews. The same does not apply to the four presidential 
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appointees. This is because as lawyers they often ask questions that test a candidate’s legal 
aptitude or that enquire about why a candidate decided a case in a certain way. However, their 
internal motives are unknown because they are appointed by the President and there is no 
information regarding how or why particular appointees are selected.  
Thus the role of the four appointees warrants further investigation because they are not 
clear political actors, yet by virtue of how they were appointed, they must share some common 
ideologies or perspectives with the President. In respect of the President himself, absent a 
Constitutional amendment he will continue to be the determinant of who leads the South 
African Judiciary, the SCA and who sits on the Constitutional Court. It has been argued that 
‘weak political commitment is located in the presidency and the executive holds tremendous 
actual and symbolic power in the appointment of judges’.1549 Therefore, the President should 
be identified as a critical site of intervention and such interventions need to extend beyond 
written letters, as in 2013. It is accepted that the President has the power to use his discretion 
when appointing, but it would be useful if stakeholders engaged with him on how this 
discretion is used. This is especially relevant because the Constitution encourages positive 
action in regard to under-represented groups. 
9.4.4 Allies in the Quest for Gender Diversity on the Bench 
In Chapter 8, it was determined that CSOs and legal professional organisations can be and are 
influential in the process. Whether it is by using sustained advocacy campaigns, providing JSC 
interviews online, nominating candidates and endorsing or rejecting others, the avenues for 
intervention in the process are available. The number of women nominated by big organisations 
like the BLA and the NADEL is still low considering that their membership has a large number 
 
1549 Gretchen Bauer and Rachel Ellet, ‘Delayed Indigenization and Feminization of the Judiciary’, in Gender 
and the Judiciary from Obscurity to Parity , ed. by Josephine Dawuni and Bauer, Gretchen, 1st edn (New York: 
Routledge, 2015), pp. 33–48 (p.42). 
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of women. Both organisations have taken steps to equip their members outside of the interview 
process. The BLA holds an annual Trial and Advocacy Training event, aimed at giving lawyers 
the skills to become good and effective litigators.1550 Since 2017, the NADEL in conjunction 
with the LSSA have hosted Judicial Skills workshops that seek to empower attorneys by 
exposing them to the skills required of judicial officers.1551  
These initiatives are generic and not primarily for women. It appears that the necessity 
of providing women with more opportunities and skills training because of previous 
disadvantage, is still underestimated. The influence of the NADEL and the BLA can and should 
extend beyond current practices to specific interventions that recognise the structural problems 
in the profession. These organisations should also partner with Judges Matter and other CSOs 
working on governance issues. Doing so would create a stronger ally for women and it would 
also maximise the different skills and opportunities that each sector has. The results of the CGE 
Investigative Report on the lack of gender transformation can be a springboard to delve into 
deeper structural problems and bring all relevant stakeholders together. This will however 
require that the NADEL, the BLA, the GCB and others be willing to cooperate with a request 
for information. It would also require a willingness from the organisations to undergo an 
organisational introspection, into whether their women members are adequately supported. 
9.5 THE VALUE OF USING TWO CASE STUDIES 
The introduction of this thesis stated that this study would not be comparative study because 
of the disparate nature of the two jurisdictions. Instead, I sought to explore them as separate 
sites of research that could reveal valuable evidence. However, at this juncture it is useful to 
reflect on some important themes that extend across both jurisdictions. 
 
1550 See http://www.blalec.co.za/training/trial-advocacy-training/. 
1551 See Nomfundo Manyathi-jele, ‘What It Means to Be a Judge Tackled at Judicial Skills Training Course’, 
2017. 
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9.5.1 The Importance of Feminist Perspectives on the JSC. 
This study argued that women judges and JSC members in both jurisdictions are in decision-
making positions as per the Maputo Protocol and SADC Protocol. In both jurisdictions, the 
gender composition of the JSC was not directly related to a greater gender diversity on the 
bench. However in both studies, participants relied on wider interpretations of diversity 
amongst others, to argue that more women on the JSCs could be a catalyst to infuse gender-
mainstreaming processes in the JSC. Participants in both countries also highlighted the 
indispensability of a feminist perspective amongst all JSC members, not just women. They 
argued that this feminist perspective is one that is committed to advancing women’s rights and 
equality between men and women. Furthermore, this commitment, should be displayed in how 
JSC members interact with women judicial aspirants. 
9.5.2 High Expectations of Judicial Appointment Bodies  
The two JSCs had a number of dissimilarities. One is composed of up to 26 members while the 
other only has eight. The South African JSC is publicly known and seen, while the Zambian 
JSC is a largely unknown body with members who are not publicly seen or heard from. In the 
former, apart from a few positions, the decisions of the JSC lead to guaranteed appointments, 
while in the latter, it appears that this is not the case. However the two JSCs are similar in two 
manners. First, they are both the product of a desire to have a more merit based type of 
appointment system, where judicial appointments are not the sole domain of the executive. The 
existence of both JSCs is supported by the Constitutions and hence the JSCs can not easily be 
disbanded. The JSCs have great power; this has ramifications for judicial independence, 
judicial governance and even political change. This power should not be taken lightly as it 
comes with expectations that the JSC will be an independent, accountable, trustworthy and 
consistent body in the important task of appointing judges. 
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Secondly, in respect of both jurisdictions, the old adage seems to apply: ‘To whom 
much is given, much is required’. The expectations of both JSCs are very high and the 
appointment bodies do not have much room for error. One ‘wrong appointment’ could and did 
lead to bigger concerns about judicial governance, thereby affecting both of the JSCs’ 
legitimacy. In Zambia, the negative Constitutional Court decision in the Hichilema case led to 
much debate and acrimony in respect of general judicial appointments and the operations of 
the JSC. In South Africa, the Cape and Helen Suzman matters, which were initiated because 
of the non-appointment of particular people, resulted in questions about the workings of the 
JSC and whether it conducted itself as it should. It would seem that irrespective of whether a 
JSC holds public interviews or not, the public is monitoring the process and drawing 
conclusions that extend beyond just one round of appointments.  
9.5.3 Societies Need a New Type of Judge 
Women were previously excluded from law and judicial decision-making processes because it 
was believed that only men mastered the traits of authority, assertiveness, objectivity, power 
and articulation.1552 In both jurisdictions, there was an overwhelming belief that judging in 
contemporary societies requires so much more than these five values. Rather, there is now some 
appreciation of values that were previously dismissed as undesirable in judges. Judicial traits 
such as good listening skills, honesty, compassion, humility and patience are now not only 
largely accepted, but even highly desired by both JSC members and citizens. In constitutional 
democracies and the era of megapolitics, it would seem that a new type of judge is required; a 
judge that requires the judicial traits mentioned above and more. This study concluded that 
women are not lacking in respect of these essential character traits. Further, in both jurisdictions 
there was also consensus that women are not devoid of the practical requirements of judges, 
such as technical experience, competence, forensic skill and intellectual rigour. Instead the lack 
 
1552 Ifill, ‘Racial Diversity on the Bench’, p.442. 
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of acting appointments in South Africa in particular, and the dynamics in private practice in 
both countries, some of which are discussed below, may make the acquisition of these skills 
difficult. 
9.5.4 The Glass Ceiling exists in Different Forms 
In Chapter 7, this thesis referred to Dawuni and Kang’s suggestion that the nature of a country’s 
legal profession may have an influence on whether women rise to the top of the judiciary. They 
argue that in countries with fused legal professions, women are more likely to rise in their 
judicial careers as opposed to countries with split legal profession.1553 On the face of it, this 
appears to be the case in this research as Zambia, with a fused legal profession, is faring well 
with women judges. By contrast, in South Africa which has a split legal profession, women 
have struggled to gain relevant experience needed for judicial appointment. However, it is 
submitted that just because Zambian women have fared well in the judiciary, does not mean 
that the fused legal profession is without its challenges. Women in private practice are still 
faced with similar challenges as those in South Africa, particularly in respect of obtaining 
weighty legal matters, and making partner or director in law firms. In other words, the glass 
ceiling in corporate firms exists in both jurisdictions, just in different forms. 
 There is another glass ceiling that presents itself in the form of acquiring silk status. In 
Zambia, only 6% of the SCs are women while in South Africa, women make up only 20% of 
those that have acquired silk status. The prestige and privilege that comes with silk status is 
undeniable and yet silk status is elusive to women across the study, regardless of whether a 
legal profession is fused or not. Silk status is and will remain the domain of men for a long 
time, unless and until there is a re-engineering of the qualifications to become a State Counsel 
or Senior Counsel. In the absence of this, the glass ceiling will continue to exist. Finally, on a 
 
1553 Dawuni and Kang, p.56. 
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related note, the South African JSC’s current reliance on attorneys and advocates in the 
stratified and gendered context described in Chapter 7, may be unwise. It is suggested that in 
the short term, the South African JSC take a deliberate approach to appoint more magistrates. 
They could be appointed in somewhat of a ‘tenure track’ manner much like registrars in Zambia 
are appointed. In the short term, this could improve gender transformation statistics. 
9.5.5 The Need to Consider the Judicial Working Environment 
Earlier in this thesis it was stated that the use of the term ‘feminisation of the judiciary’ in this 
context, was a specific reference to the increase of women judges. I suggest that another 
definition of the feminisation of the judiciary could be a change in the institutional culture and 
practices of judiciaries. In both jurisdictions across different courts, it was undeniable that 
women are constantly faced with the challenge of combining their judicial career and family 
commitments. There was a unanimous view that judicial work is not conducive for young 
mothers, single mothers and even some married women, because they still carry the majority 
of responsibility in respect of children.  
Despite the presence of more women on the Zambian bench, the expectations for late 
shifts and extra hours still persist. The Mjali and other interviews in South Africa revealed that 
one has to either work double shifts in order to maintain a family life and judicial career or opt 
not to have a family life at all. It is clear that the judicial role is both mentally and physically 
strenuous for women who want to perform optimally in the judiciary, while still being available 
to meet their personal commitments. Hence, there is need for a ‘better understanding of societal 
and professional expectations in relation to gender in the judiciary’.1554 A deeper analysis of 
how judiciaries support or don’t support women’s lived experiences which includes 
motherhood and family obligations in both jurisdictions, is also necessary. 
 
1554 Livia Holden, ‘Women Judges in Pakistan’, International Journal of the Legal Profession, 26.1 (2019), 89–
104 (p.94)<https://doi.org/10.1080/09695958.2018.1490296>. 
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9.6 FINAL REFLECTIONS 
One cannot fully comprehend the nature of various aspects of the appointment process by 
relying on research reports and limited published material. This is because there is much more 
to a judicial appointment process than meets the eye. Graham Gee in his research on the Judicial 
Appointments Commission (JAC) for England and Wales, came to a similar conclusion. He 
stated that ‘it is tricky for outsiders such as academics to capture accurately and then to make 
sense of all of the various institutional dynamics at play in the long and formal processes of the 
JAC’.1555 He acknowledged ‘the real risk that academic critiques of judicial influence might be 
outdated, overstated or simply wrong, whether in whole or in part’.1556  
 Armed with Gee’s reflections, the act of accurately capturing all the institutional 
dynamics involved in the two jurisdictions in this research involved a fine balance. This study 
was not only a consideration of the Zambian and South African JSCs, but it specifically 
examined their record and conduct in respect of women. Still, other aspects of the processes 
were explored that also required a recognition of the changing nature of environments. The 
dynamics in the legal pools continue to evolve. The concept of what is expected of a worthy 
judge and their main characteristics, may also have been affected as political events unfolded 
during this study. For instance, important political actors such as the Zambian President, JSC 
members in both jurisdictions and the Zambian Chief Justice all changed during the five year 
focus period. Consequently, measuring their influence and impact on the process required an 
awareness of the fluid nature of politics. These elements and more are evidence of how complex 
the judicial appointment process can be, and the recommendations provided below take this 
into consideration. 
 
1555 Graham Gee, ‘Judging the JAC :How Much Judicial Infleunce over Judicial Appoitments Is Too Much?’, in 
Debating Judicial Appointments in an Age of Diversity, ed. by Graham Gee and Erika Rackley (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2018), pp. 152–82 (155). 
1556 Ibid, p.156. 
 
 
363 
 
9.7 FUTURE AREAS FOR POLICY ENGAGEMENT AND RESEARCH 
Before proceeding to specific recommendations, it is worthwhile to mention two general 
reflections that would be useful to academics and practioners globally. The first is the 
significance of fieldwork interviews that capture all relevant stakeholders where possible. This 
would include uncommon interview participants in the gender and judging field, such as 
journalists and CSO members depending on the particular jurisdiction. Focusing attention on 
judicial appointers, lawyers and judges primarily might suggest an exclusivity about whose 
opinions are important, and thus deprive researchers from hearing other uncommon but rich 
perspectives. 
 Second, it is acknowledged that varying methods of judicial appointments worldwide 
mean that participant observation as a form of data collection, is not always possible. This is 
especially so because the judicial appointment systems in common law and civil law 
jurisdictions vary greatly. Having said that, in jurisdictions where it is possible, researchers 
would benefit from either non-participatory, moderate or active forms of participant 
observation. In jurisdictions where judicial interviews involve parliamentary ratification or 
senate confirmations as in the USA, the presence of researchers in the room would be 
invaluable. Non-participatory observation could take the form of listening to radio/podcasts 
that transmit audio input from interview proceedings or watching interviews online. Active 
forms of participant observation could take the form of informal discussions with appointers 
and judges and presenting research at legal workshops where one has an opportunity to engage 
with relevant actors. Further, participating in events organised by women judges’ associations 
could provide information that judges and lawyers are not ordinarily willing or able to share. 
In essence, though this thesis has emphasised the importance of context in gender and judging, 
the methodological framework adopted for this study can prove useful to other researchers in 
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other parts of the world. Relevant alterations to the methodology could be made in order to suit 
the particular circumstance of a jurisdiction. 
 Inspired by the two case studies, the rest of this concluding chapter suggests more specific 
interventions that can be adapted to other sub-Saharan jurisdictions. The interventions herein 
are regarded as ‘soft’ measures for increasing gender diversity. They do not include ‘hard’ 
measures such as the proposal of quotas because recent constitutions in a number of countries 
now explicitly call for positive actions in regard to the appointment of women.1557 Hence it is 
necessary to rather focus on other non-established interventions. 
The first intervention is a deliberate re-imagining of the importance of gender diversity 
and a re-orientation of efforts to increase the number of women on the bench in countries that 
are performing poorly. One way to do so is to encourage what Malleson refers to as a ‘shift in 
the conceptualisation of the problem away from the under-representation of marginalised 
identity groups to the over-representation of dominant identity groups’.1558 Reframing the 
problem has the potential to affect the framing of potential solutions. In addition, these 
dominant identity groups are not limited to men, but can extend to ethnic groups, religious 
groups and other societal identities.  
A second proposal is that policy makers and those tasked with overseeing the goals of the 
SADC Gender Protocol need to look at substantive changes in the judiciary, beyond increasing 
women’s participation. The importance of such an approach has already been recognised by 
the ICJ Kenya office, in partnership with the East Africa Magistrates and Judges Association 
 
1557 For instance section 174 (2) of the South African Constitution and section 259 of the Zambian Constitution 
enshrine positive action. Other examples include the Kenyan Constitution says that no more than 2/3 of 
appointments should be one gender and the Zimbabwean Constitution that requires that all genders are equally 
represented in all institutions and agencies of government. 
1558 Kate Malleson, ‘The Disruptive Potential of Ceiling Quotas in Addressing Over-Representation in the 
Judiciary’, in Debating Judicial Appointments in an Age of Diversity, ed. by Graham Gee and Erika Rackley 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), pp. 259–82. 
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(EAMJA). At the time of writing, the two organisations had issued a call for the creation of a 
regional gender policy.1559 The research for the gender policy would include an examination of 
‘judiciary internal procedures, policies, practices and ways of engendering the same in order to 
create an enabling environment for all judicial officers’.1560 Taking a lead from this, future 
policies in respect of women in decision- making positions in the SADC region, could include 
guidelines for creating women-friendly environments for judges. This could include policies 
regarding the provision of childcare for judges at the courts or improved maternity policies in 
the judiciary. It would also be beneficial for women to have flexible work schedules that would 
enable optimal performance of judicial duties, while ensuring overall well-being of judges. 
 Some feminists could argue that such measures would only seek to reinforce women’s 
roles as mothers and home keepers, while discouraging men from taking more familial 
responsibilities. These sentiments are recognised and if there are male judges who bear a large 
share of familial responsibility, these measures should be extended to them too. However based 
on this research and interactions with various judges in the region over the years, the reality is 
that there are a number of women judges who are single mothers or who bear most of the 
familial responsibilities. In light of this, it is relevant to suggest measures that can alleviate 
their particular situations, while recognising that these measures may not be applicable in other 
societal contexts. In the SADC region, these measures have the potential to not only expand 
labour participation by ensuring that women can be appointed to the bench and retained, but 
they also operationalise gender main-streaming.  
Third, future research should also focus on identifying various changes and shifts on micro 
and qualitative levels in the judiciary and in the legal profession. These could include changes 
 
1559 International Commission of Jurists Kenya Section, ‘A Regional Gender Policy for Judiciaries in East Africa 
A Call for Expression of Interest Introduction’ (Kenya: International Commission of Jurists, 2019), pp. 1–2 
<https://icj-kenya.org/jdownloads/Opportunities/Call For Expression of Interest- Regional Gender Policy For 
Judiciaries.pdf> [accessed 28 November 2019]. 
1560 Number 6 on the Terms of Reference. 
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in regulatory practices that govern how legal professionals function. In addition, changes in 
membership of the judicial appointment bodies or shifts in the data of who gets appointed to 
courts, especially Constitutional Courts and Courts of Appeal, could also be noted. Any 
fluctuations regarding the legal pools from which judges are drawn over a given period of time, 
could also prove telling in regard to changing political environments. Identifying changes and 
shifts is ‘not only for prediction about future macro changes, but for the richer explanations 
that are possible and for the observations of variations and deviance from norms that may 
provide the clues to social innovation’.1561  
Fourth, regional stakeholders need to go beyond providing guidelines for appointment 
such as the Lilongwe Principles. The diversity challenges faced in judiciaries start in the legal 
professions. Thus, in cooperation with the Southern African Development Cooperation 
Lawyers Association (SADCLA), the Southern African Chief Justices’ Forum (SACJF) should 
establish and encourage regular annual gender audits in the legal professions and judiciaries. 
Reporting should be encouraged as a means of placing pressure on decision-makers and 
ensuring that there are continuous efforts to diversify judiciaries and the legal profession. 
Highlighting the importance of collating disaggregated data would be critical for such an 
initiative. Additionally, regional stakeholders should spearhead efforts to create a network of 
African scholars who can draw on each other’s insights, while providing current research data 
that can enhance regional judicial governance efforts. Regional multidisciplinary workshops 
and collaborative initiatives amongst academics should be encouraged and funded, in order to 
build a body of scholarship that is lacking in the region.  
Fifth, the impact of professional mentoring and solidarity for and amongst women can not 
be understated. The IDLO recommended that national, regional and international organisations 
 
1561 Menkel-Meadow ' The Comparative Sociology' , p.899. 
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should be supported, to ‘ensure women have a network of supporters and mentors as well as 
access to equal education opportunities’.1562 Mentoring opportunities should be main-streamed 
into universities, by partnering legal professionals with women law students to expose the 
students to real life legal practice. Mentoring could also include exposing students to skills 
equipping workshops, in order to capacitate them for the practice of law.1563 Women who are 
qualified lawyers and are in different pools of the profession would also benefit from skills 
transfer workshops and pairing with more experienced legal professionals to expose them to 
more weighty legal matters and quality work. A mentorship relationship with a judge would 
also grant the legal professional insight into the workings of the judiciary.  
Lastly, women judges could also benefit from mentoring programmes amongst 
themselves. A shared exchange between men and women judges would ensure adequate skills 
transfer, in areas of strength. Ultimately, all the suggested recommendations require political 
will and support. A favourable legal and social context for gender equity in the justice sector 
will be a culmination of various factors that are encouraged and supported by those with the 
power to make decisions. This includes Heads of State, Ministers of Justice, Chief Justices and 
even members of legislative bodies. The quest for gender diverse judiciaries is a governance 
issue and it requires a multi-sector governance response. 
  
 
1562 International Development Law Organization, Women Delivering Justice: Contributions, Barriers, 
Pathways (Rome, 2018) <https://www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/IDLO - Women Delivering 
Justice - 2018.pdf> [accessed 26 November 2019]. 
1563 For example, the author previously led a Norwegian funded partnership with DGRU at the University of 
Cape Town and the South African Chapter of the International Association of Women Judges (SAC-IAWJ). It 
mentored almost 150 women law students in the period 2015-2018. See http://www.dgru.uct.ac.za/news/launch-
2019-womens-pioneer-programme 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix A 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
RESEARCH ON GENDER AND JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
QUESTIONS FOR JUDGES 
 
A. Introduction 
1. What is your designation and which court are you based in? 
 
B. Relevant Factors in the Judicial Appointment Process 
1. Looking at the appointment process, in your opinion, what important factors are 
considered when a candidate is being assessed for judicial appointment? 
 
Probes; Describe what you have experienced as being important requirements for appointments. 
Is it only about what a candidate can bring to the bench jurisprudentially or are there other 
influential factors? 
 
2. Do the factors you have identified have a greater bearing on women candidates as 
opposed to men? 
 
Probes: Describe any aspects that you believe are easier or harder for women to meet. Are they 
given ample experience in private practice or in government departments? 
 
3. When were you interviewed and have you been through the process more than once? 
4. Reflecting on your own judicial interview/s, what would you say struck you the most 
about the process? 
Probes: Describe the context of your interview: who was there, how long was it, were some 
questions unfair/invasive? Was there any part where you felt that some questions asked of you 
would not be asked of a man? 
5. Do you think the appointment process creates an equal playing field for men and 
women? 
Probes: Are the requirements for judicial appointment neutral; are there other relevant factors 
that are taken into consideration that women may be lacking in? 
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6. For South African judges only: What do you think of the practice of appointing only 
people who have acted in the court in question for which they are being interviewed for? 
Probes: Describe what you making of the acting appointment system. Is it necessary and do you 
believe acting experience is the only way the JSC can know if one is ready to be a judge? 
7. How does the acting appointment process work in your court? 
 
8. Would you suggest any changes? 
 
C. The Appointment Body 
1. What are your thoughts on the composition of the JSC in your jurisdiction? 
 
Probes: Describe the number of commissioners, role they play, is it too big, small or just the right 
size? 
 
2. Are there any members of the JSC that you believe are more influential than others and if 
so why? 
 
3. During your interview/s, can you remember how many commissioners were female? 
 
4. What kind of gender dynamics did you observe in your interview and in other interviews 
(where applicable)?  
 
5. Do you think the number of women on the JSC had any bearing on whether you got 
appointed? 
 
6. Do you believe that the gender composition of the JSC has any effect on the number of 
women getting appointed? 
 
Probes: Describe your thoughts on this issue. If there were more women on the JSC, do you think 
more women would get appointed or is it irrelevant? 
 
7. For Zambian Judges: Does parliamentary ratification have any bearing on women getting 
appointed? 
 
Probes: Does having parliament ratify recommendations ensure that there are more supporters 
(advocates) for women candidates or is parliamentary ratification more of a formality? 
  
D. Publicity and Transparency of the Process 
1. Describe how much of your judicial appointment process is public and how much of it is 
a private process? 
 
Probes: Who is involved at which stage, is there any part of it that the public can participate in? 
 
2. Do you believe the process you have described is the best suited for your jurisdiction? 
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3. Would there be need for any improvements in the process and if so, why? 
 
4. If improvements are suggested, would they increase the chances of more women getting 
appointed? 
 
5. What is the role of the legal profession during this process in your jurisdiction- if any? 
 
6. Is it necessary for the legal profession and/or Civil society to be involved and if your 
answer is yes, how can they do so? If the answer is no, please explain. 
 
7. What is the role of political leadership in the appointment process if any? 
 
Probes for South African judges: What do you think of the role of the opposition members on the 
JSC and the members of the ruling party? What about the president’s role in the process re 
nominating heads of the SCA and CC and deciding who is appointed to the CC? 
 
Probes for Zambian judges: What do you think of the role of MP’s in the appointments, both 
ruling party and opposition members and of the President too. 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix B 
RESEARCH ON GENDER AND JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
QUESTIONS FOR JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISIONERS 
 
A. Introduction 
1. What is your designation and what is your role on the JSC? 
 
B. Relevant Factors in the Judicial Appointment Process 
1. Looking at the appointment process, in your opinion, what important factors are 
considered when a candidate is being assessed for judicial appointment? 
Probes; Describe what you have experienced as being important requirements for 
appointments. Is it only about what a candidate can bring to the bench 
jurisprudentially or are there other influential factors? 
2. Do the factors you have identified have a greater bearing on women candidates as 
opposed to men? 
Probes: Describe any aspects that you believe are easier or harder for women to meet. Is the 
structure of the legal profession conducive for women? Are they given ample experience in 
private practice or in government departments? 
3. Reflecting on your own role as a Commissioner, what aspects of candidates’ interviews 
have struck you the most? 
Probes: Describe any incident that surprised/shocked you. Were/are there particular issues 
such as integrity, honesty or experience that stand out as areas of concern or applause? 
4. Do you think the appointment process creates an equal playing field for men and 
women? 
Probes: Are the requirements for judicial appointment neutral; are there other relevant 
factors that are taken into consideration that women may be lacking in? 
5. For South African commissioners only: What do you think of the practice of 
appointing only people who have acted in the court in question for which they are 
being interviewed for? 
Probes: Describe what you making of the acting appointment system. Is it necessary and do 
you believe acting experience is the only way the JSC can know if one is ready to be a judge? 
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6. There have been concerns about the opaqueness of the acting appointment system and 
how this negates womens’ chances for permanent appointment because most acting 
positions go to men. Do you have any comments on this? 
 
C. The Appointment Body 
1. What do you think about the composition of the JSC that you are on? 
Probes: Describe the number of commissioners, role they play, is it too big, small or just the 
right size? 
2. How do you describe your role/responsibilities on the JSC?  
Probes: Are you acting for a constituency or in your personal capacity as a specific leader? 
3. How do you think the JSC has performed in the last five years generally? 
 
4. How many commissioners on your JSC are female? 
5. Do you believe that the gender composition of the JSC has any effect on the number of 
women getting appointed? 
Probes: Describe your thoughts on this issue. If there were more women on the JSC, do you 
think more women would get appointed or is it irrelevant? 
 
D. Publicity and Transparency of the Process 
1. Describe how your JSC functions or operates once a position becomes vacant? 
2. Do you believe the process you have described is the best suited for your jurisdiction? 
3. Would there be need for any improvements in the process and if so, why? 
4. If improvements are suggested, would they increase the chances of more women getting 
appointed? 
5. What is the role of the legal profession during this process in your jurisdiction- if any? 
6. Is it necessary to have engagement from the legal profession and/or Civil society and if 
your answer is yes, how can they be involved? If the answer is no, please explain. 
7. What is the role of political leadership in the appointment process if any? 
Probes for South African JSC members: What do you think of the role of the opposition members 
on the JSC and the members of the ruling party? What about the president’s role in the process 
re nominating heads of the SCA and CC and deciding who is appointed to the CC? 
 
Probes for Zambian JSC member: What do you think of the role of MP’s in the appointments, 
both ruling party and opposition members and of the President too. 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix C 
RESEARCH ON GENDER AND JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
QUESTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
 
A. Introduction 
1. What is your designation and which section of the legal profession do you fall under? 
 
B. Relevant Factors in the Judicial Appointment Process 
1. Looking at the appointment process, in your opinion, what important factors are 
considered when a candidate is being assessed for judicial appointment? 
Probes; Describe what you have experienced as being important requirements for appointments. 
Is it only about what a candidate can bring to the bench jurisprudentially or are there other 
influential factors? 
2. Do the factors you have identified have a greater bearing on women candidates as 
opposed to men? 
Probes: Describe any aspects that you believe are easier or harder for women to meet. Is the 
structure of the legal profession conducive for women? Are they given ample experience in 
private practice or in government departments? 
3. Do you have any aspirations for judicial office and if so what are the areas that you 
believe you would need to excel in? 
Probes: Do you need to get more experience in particular areas of law, have acted on the court 
(if in South Africa), and be a more active member of certain organizations? 
4. Do you think the appointment process creates an equal playing field for men and 
women? 
Probes: Are the requirements for judicial appointment neutral; are there other relevant factors 
that are taken into consideration that women may be lacking in? 
5. For South African members of the profession only: What do you think of the practice of 
appointing only people who have acted in the court in question for which they are being 
interviewed for? 
Probes: Describe what you making of the acting appointment system. Is it necessary and do you 
believe acting experience is the only way the JSC can know if one is ready to be a judge? 
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6. For South African members of the profession only: 
 There have been concerns about the opaqueness of the acting appointment system and 
how this negates womens’ chances for permanent appointment because most acting 
positions go to men. Do you have any comments on this? 
7. For Zambian members of the profession only: Do you believe your legal 
experience/background gives you an advantage over other would be judicial aspirants 
with a different legal background? 
Probes: If you are from private practice, do you think that makes you better qualified than 
those from public service and vice versa? 
 
C. The Appointment Body 
1. What do you think about the composition of the JSC? 
Probes: Describe the number of commissioners, role they play, is it too big, small or just the 
right size? 
2. What do you think about the JSC’s performance in general in regards to appointments in 
the last five years? 
Probes: Have they been good appointments? Any surprising ones or people who should have 
been appointed but weren’t? 
3. How has it performed in regards to women? 
4. Do you believe that the gender composition of the JSC has any effect on the number of 
women getting appointed? If so, why? 
Probes: Describe your thoughts on this issue. If there were more women on the JSC, do you 
think more women would get appointed or is it irrelevant? 
5. Are there any members of the JSC that you believe are more influential than others and 
if so why? 
 
D. Publicity and Transparency of the Process 
1. What are your thoughts on the current appointment process for judges? 
Probes: Is it transparent enough? Are there any problematic areas in your view? 
2. Do you believe the process in your jurisdiction is the best suited for the country? 
Probes: Is the system private/public depending on your jurisdiction a good one? 
3. Would there be need for any improvements in the process and if so, what would they 
be? 
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4. If improvements are suggested, would they increase the chances of more women getting 
appointed? 
5. What is the role of the legal sector group that you belong to, in this process if any? 
 
Probes: if you are a member of the law society or magistrate’s association or the Bar, what is 
the role of your body? Does it nominate people or provide comments? 
6. Is it necessary to have engagement from the legal profession and/or Civil society and if 
your answer is yes, how can they do so? If the answer is no, please explain. 
7. Is there a role for political leadership and/ involvement in the appointment process and if 
so, is it helpful? 
Probes: For South Africans, comment on roles of opposition members, ANC in the process and 
the president as the nominator of the heads of SCA and CC and final decision maker for CC 
appointments. 
Probes: For Zambians, comment on the role of MP’s both opposition and ruling party and the 
president. 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix D 
RESEARCH ON GENDER AND JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
QUESTIONS FOR JOURNALISTS OR CSO MEMBERS OR OTHER CONCERNED 
BODIES 
 
A. Introduction 
1. What is your designation and which media house, Institution or CSO do you represent? 
 
B. Relevant Factors in the Judicial Appointment Process 
1. Looking at the appointment process, in your opinion, what important factors are 
considered when a candidate is being assessed for judicial appointment? 
Probes; Describe what you have experienced as being important requirements for 
appointments. Is it only about what a candidate can bring to the bench jurisprudentially 
or are there other influential factors? 
2. Do the factors you have identified have a greater bearing on women candidates as 
opposed to men? 
Probes: Describe any aspects that you believe are easier or harder for women to meet. Is the 
structure of the legal profession conducive for women? Are they given ample experience in 
private practice or in government departments? 
3. During the time you have been following/been engaged with the process, what elements 
have struck you the most? 
Probes: Describe any incident that surprised/shocked you. Were/are there particular issues such 
as integrity, honesty or experience that stand out as areas of concern or applause? 
4. Do you think the appointment process creates an equal playing field for men and 
women? 
Probes: Are the requirements for judicial appointment neutral; are there other relevant factors 
that are taken into consideration that women may be lacking in? 
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5. For Zambian participants only: What do you think about parliament’s role in the 
appointment process? 
Probes: Is it necessary to ensure a wide consensus or does it just prolong the process? 
6. For South African participants only : What do you think of the practice of appointing 
only people who have acted in the court in question for which they are being interviewed 
for? 
Probes: Describe what you making of the acting appointment system. Is it necessary and do you 
believe acting experience is the only way the JSC can know if one is ready to be a judge? 
7. There have been concerns about the opaqueness of the acting appointment system and 
how this negates womens’ chances for permanent appointment because most acting 
positions go to men. Do you have any comments on this? 
 
C. The Appointment Body 
1. What do you think about the composition of the JSC? 
Probes: Describe the number of commissioners, role they play, is it too big, small or just the 
right size? 
2. What do you think about the JSC’s performance in regards to appointments generally in 
the last five years? 
Probes: Any surprising appointments, people who should have been appointed etc? 
3. How has it performed in regards to women? 
4. Do you believe that the gender composition of the JSC has any effect on the number of 
women getting appointed? 
Probes: Describe your thoughts on this issue. If there were more women on the JSC, do you 
think more women would get appointed or is it irrelevant? 
  
 
D. Publicity and Transparency of the Process 
1. What are your thoughts on the current appointment process for judges? 
2. Do you believe the process in your jurisdiction is the best suited for the country? 
3. Would there be need for any improvements in the process and if so, why? 
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4. If improvements are suggested, would they increase the chances of more women getting 
appointed? 
5. Is it necessary to have involvement from journalists and/or Civil society and if your 
answer is yes, how can they do so? If the answer is no, please explain. 
6. What is the role of political leadership in the appointment process if any? 
Probes: For South Africans, comment on roles of opposition members, ANC in the process and 
the president as the nominator of the heads of SCA and CC and final decision maker for CC 
appointments. 
Probes: For Zambians, comment on the role of MP’s both opposition and ruling party and the 
president. 
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